R E D I S C OV E R I NG E M PAT H Y AGENCY, FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES KARSTEN R. STUEBER Rediscovering Empathy Rediscovering Empathy Agency,FolkPsychology,andtheHumanSciences KarstenR.Stueber ABradfordBook TheMITPress Cambridge,Massachusetts London,England (2006MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyformbyanyelec- tronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storageandretrieval)withoutpermissioninwritingfromthepublisher. MITPressbooksmaybepurchasedatspecialquantitydiscountsforbusinessorsales promotional use. For information, please email [email protected] or write to Special Sales Department, The MIT Press, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA02142. ThisbookwassetinStoneSerifandStoneSanson3B2byAscoTypesetters,Hong Kong,andwasprintedandboundintheUnitedStatesofAmerica. LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Stueber,KarstenR. Rediscoveringempathy:agency,folkpsychology,andthehumansciences/Karsten R.Stueber. p. cm. ‘‘ABradfordbook.’’ Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN-13:978-0-262-19550-8(hc:alk.paper) ISBN-10:0-262-19550-X(hc:alk.paper) 1.Psychology—Philosophy. 2.Scienceandpsychology. 3.Empathy. I.Title. BF64.S78 2006 152.401—dc22 2005058414 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Inmemoryofmyfather,KurtStu¨ber Contents Preface ix Introduction 1 1 EmpathyandKnowledgeofOtherMinds:AHistoricalPerspective 5 2 ArguingforEmpathySystematically 19 3 BriefExcursus:Empathy,Sympathy,andSocialPsychology 26 1 FolkPsychologyandRationalAgency 33 1.1 EliminativismandtheAllureoftheDetachedConceptionofFolkPsychology 34 1.2 HumansasRationalAnimals:ClearingUpaConfusionintheRationalityDebate 48 2 CharityandRationalContextualism 65 2.1 InDefenseofGlobalCharity 66 2.2 RationalContextualismversusBoundedRationality 80 3 TheTheoryofMindDebate 99 3.1 TheTheory-TheoryParadigm 105 3.2 TheSimulationParadigm 111 4 BasicEmpathyandReenactiveEmpathy 131 4.1 Mindreading,Folk-PsychologicalConcepts,andMirrorNeurons 132 4.2 TheEssentialContextualityandIndexicalityofThoughtsasReasons 152 5 FolkPsychologyandNormativeEpistemology 173 5.1 Empathy,Folk-PsychologicalPredictions,andExplanations 178 6 TheLimitsofEmpathy 195 6.1 ObjectionsandMisconceptionsinthePhilosophyofSocialScience 196 6.2 EmpathyandthePrejudicialNatureofUnderstanding 204 viii Contents ConcludingRemarks 219 Notes 221 References 251 Index 271 Preface This book constitutes a systematic and historically informed defense of the controversial thesis that empathy is epistemically central to our folk- psychological ability to understand other agents. I will develop the argu- ment for empathy in the context of current philosophy of mind and the interdisciplinary debate about the nature of our mindreading abilities, a debatethatinvolvesamultitudeofdisciplinesrangingfromphilosophyto neuroscience. As I will explain in the introduction, one can defend em- pathy successfully in the current context only if one is also aware of the historicaloriginsof,thecriticaldebatesurrounding,andtheeventualrejec- tionoftheviabilityoftheconceptofempathyinthephilosophyofsocial science. A systematic defense of empathy has to be able to address the prima facie plausible objections raised within the philosophy of social science. According to the prevalent view in the philosophy of the social sciences, to conceive of empathy as epistemically central to our ability to understand other agents is an expression of epistemic naivete´, a proposal tainted by its association with an objectionable Cartesian conception of the mind. By countering these objections this book attempts philosophi- cally to rehabilitate the empathy thesis that was popular at the beginning ofthetwentiethcentury. Having found my philosophical bearing in an environment that was skepticalaboutempathy,Iwasratherprejudicedagainsttheclaimsofsim- ulation theorists—today’s equivalent of empathy theorists—when I first encountered them. Yet at the same time I was intrigued by the ongoing debate about our mindreading abilities. My book is the culmination of my thinking about empathy in the current context and the outcome of a process of overcoming my own philosophical doubts about empathy’s