Reconsidering Stagnation in the Brezhnev Era: Ideology and Exchange PDF
Preview Reconsidering Stagnation in the Brezhnev Era: Ideology and Exchange
Reconsidering Stagnation in the Brezhnev Era Reconsidering Stagnation in the Brezhnev Era Ideology and Exchange Edited by Dina Fainberg and Artemy Kalinovsky LEXINGTONBOOKS Lanham•Boulder•NewYork•London PublishedbyLexingtonBooks AnimprintofTheRowman&LittlefieldPublishingGroup,Inc. 4501ForbesBoulevard,Suite200,Lanham,Maryland20706 www.rowman.com UnitA,WhitacreMews,26-34StannaryStreet,LondonSE114AB Copyright©2016byLexingtonBooks Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyformorbyany electronicormechanicalmeans,includinginformationstorageandretrievalsystems, withoutwrittenpermissionfromthepublisher,exceptbyareviewerwhomayquote passagesinareview. BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationInformationAvailable LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Names:Fainberg,Dina.|Kalinovsky,ArtemyM. Title:ReconsideringstagnationintheBrezhnevera:ideologyandexchange/editedbyDinaFain- bergandArtemyKalinovsky. Description:Lanham:LexingtonBooks,2016.|Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. Identifiers:LCCN2016002159|ISBN9781498529938(cloth:alkalinepaper)|ISBN 9781498529945(electronic) Subjects:LCSH:SovietUnion--Politicsandgovernment--1953-1985.|Brezhnev,LeonidIl?ich, 1906-1982--Politicalandsocialviews.|Brezhnev,LeonidIl?ich,1906-1982--Influence.|Stag- nation(Economics)--Socialaspects--SovietUnion--History.|SovietUnion--Economiccondi- tions--1965-1975.|SovietUnion--Economicconditions--1975-1985.|Ideology--Socialaspects-- SovietUnion--History.|Politicalculture--SovietUnion--History.|SovietUnion--Relations-- Westerncountries.|Westerncountries--Relations--SovietUnion. Classification:LCCDK277.R432016|DDC947.085/3--dc23LCrecordavailableathttp:// lccn.loc.gov/2016002159 TMThepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsofAmerican NationalStandardforInformationSciencesPermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibrary Materials,ANSI/NISOZ39.48-1992. PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica Contents Introduction:StagnationandItsDiscontents:TheCreationofa PoliticalandHistoricalParadigm vii DinaFainbergandArtemyM.Kalinovsky Part1:IdeologybetweenPublicandPrivateSpheres 1 1 ConsumersasCitizens:RevisitingtheQuestionofPublic DisengagementintheBrezhnevEra 3 NatalyaChernyshova 2 TheLifeandDeathofBrezhnev’sThaw:ChangingValues inSovietJournalismafterKhrushchev,1964–1968 21 SimonHuxtable 3 PeopleontheMoveduringthe“EraofStagnation”:The RuralExodusintheRSFSRduringthe1960s–1980s 43 LewisH.Siegelbaum 4 Brezhnev’s“LittleFreedoms”:Tourism,Individuality,and MobilityintheLateSovietPeriod 59 ChristianNoack 5 EverythingWasOverbeforeItWasNoMore:Decaying CivilizationinLateStagnationCinema 77 AndreyShcherbenok Part2:TheSovietUnionandtheWest 85 6 StagnationorNot?:TheBrezhnevLeadershipandEast- WestInteraction 87 SariAutio-Sarasmo 7 StagnantScience?:ThePlanningandCoordinationof BiomedicalResearchintheBrezhnevEra 105 AnnaGeltzer 8 IfYou’reGoingtoMoscow,BeSuretoWearSomeFlowers inYourHair(andBringaBottleofPortWineinYour Pocket):TheSovietHippie“Sistema”andItsLifein, Despite,andwith“Stagnation” 123 JulianeFürst v vi Contents 9 NortonDodgeinLianozovo:TransnationalCollaboration andtheMakingoftheSovietUnofficialArtist 147 CourtneyDoucette 10 ChangingDynamics:FromInternationalExchangesto TransnationalMusicalNetworks 163 SimoMikkonen Bibliography 185 Index 193 AbouttheEditorsandContributors 195 Introduction Stagnation and Its Discontents: The Creation of a Political and Historical Paradigm Dina Fainberg and Artemy M. Kalinovsky “Marxismisatheoryofmovement,notofstagnation.”1 —LeonTrotsky Thepurposeofthisvolumeistotestthebynowwell-establishedimpres- sionthattheperiodinSoviethistorybetweenNikitaKhrushchev’souster in 1964 and Mikhail Gorbachev’s election as General Secretary in 1985 was one of stagnation. Accepting the stagnation paradigm generally means seeing the period as one where resistance to change, corruption, moraldecay,andothernegativetrendswerecombinedwithariseinthe standard of living and foreign policy successes abroad (at least until the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979). The failure to confront sys- temic problems, this view holds, led the Soviet Union to a near crisis pointby1985.The“stagnation”label,weargue,createdanimpressionof the period as one endless monolith, and therefore glossed over political, social, and cultural developments, as well as the state’s attempts to lead andinitiatechange.Theassumptionthattheperiodasawholewaschar- acterized by rampant cynicism and decline of faith in the socialist creed obscuredthepersistenceofpopularengagementwiththesocialistideolo- gyandthepoweritcontinuedtowieldwithintheSovietUnion. ItwasGorbachevwhogavetheeraitsappellation.AttheXXVIIParty Congress in 1986 he spoke of the leaders’ failure to deal with mounting problemsinthecountry: Overthecourseofmanyyears,andduenotjusttoobjectivefactorsbut alsotoprimarilysubjectiveones,thepracticalworkofpartyandstate organsfellbehindthedemandsofthetimes,oflifeitself.Problemsin thecountry’sdevelopmentsweregrowingratherthansolutions.Iner- tia, freezing of forms and methods of management, declining dyna- misminwork,growthofbureaucratization—allofthisdidsignificant damagetoourwork[delu].Phenomenaofstagnationbeganappearing inthelifeofsociety.2 vii viii DinaFainbergamdArtemyM.Kalinovsky Gorbachev,ofcourse,wassettingthestageforamajorpoliticalshake-up, astepinhissearchforacureforthecountry’sillsthatwouldbepossible only once the disease was properly identified. Nearly a year into his tenure, he already became frustrated with the friction his proposals for reform faced within the party, government, and security structures. The stagnationlabelwasanimportanttoolindrawingthelinebetweenthose whosupportedthepartyandcountry’srenewal,andthosewhoopposed Gorbachev’sprogram: Ourpartyisahealthyorganism,onethatrefinesthestyleandmethods ofitsactivity,rootsoutformalism,bureaucratismandredtape(kazens- chinu), cuts out everything stagnating and conserving that impedes movement forward, frees itself from those who have compromised themselveswithpoorworkorunworthybehavior.3 In representing stagnation as alien to the true spirit of the Communist Party, Gorbachev was attempting to justify his future reforms, and to mobilizetheparty’srankandfiletojointheeffort.Todosoeffectively,he positionedhisreformsasareturntothetrueprinciplesofLeninism,asa rallyingcrytohealthepartyafteralongperiodofdegeneration. In evoking the binaries of stagnation and revival, Gorbachev em- barkedonawell-travelledhistoricalandintellectualpath.Onmorethan oneoccasion,concernswithcorruption,stagnationanddegenerationhad arisenasaprelude to campaignfor thetransformationofSoviet society. Inthe1920stheseconcernswereattheheartofthedebateoverNEP.As earlyas1922LeninstressedthepotentialoftheBolsheviks’degenerating by adopting “bourgeois culture.” Trotsky warned that “bureaucratiza- tion” in the state and party apparatus “under certain social conditions, mightsapthebasisoftherevolution.”4StudentsoftheFrenchrevolution, theBolsheviksworriedthatanewThermidorwasjust aroundthebend. By the end of the 1920s fears of this double stagnation had pushed vari- ous factions in the party to support a break with NEP, even if they dis- agreedabouthowtomovetowardthenextstageindevelopment.5 After Stalin’s death, critiques of bureaucratization and stagnation were mobilized to support a break with the Stalinist past. As in the late 1920s, Khrushchev positioned his reforms as a return to the true princi- ples of revolution and Leninist methods. Attacks on bureaucratization andelitism,aswellasstagnationintheconstructionofsocialismbecame the central components of the culture of the Thaw and Khrushchev’s attacks on Stalin.6 Sometimes the term stagnation was used in a more limitedsense.Thus,speakingatthe20thPartyCongress,MikhailSuslov usedittointerveneinthedebateoverprioritiesindevelopment,criticize “ill-starred economists who were spreading anti-Marxist views on the need to slow down the pace of developing heavy industry, [and thus] spreadatheoreticaljustificationforstagnationandconservatismintech- nology.”7
Description:The list of books you might like
