BORN AGAIN: NATALITY, NORMATIVITY AND NARRATIVE IN HANNAH ARENDT’S THE HUMAN CONDITION Rebecca Seté Jacobson Submitted to the University of Hertfordshire in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. June 2012 To Norm. For BT, BB, REL, JHT and AMGT. In memory of Lindie. Under any and all circumstances tell yourself often and mean it—I don’t believe in defeat. —Norman Vincent Peale ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS If I had my druthers, my acknowledgements would fill at least as many pages as those used to discuss the works of Hannah Arendt. Since that is not a possibility, I will name just a few faculty, friends and family members without whom I would not have been able to complete this dissertation. I do so, however, with the caveat that there are many, many more amazing people whom I love and appreciate for the beauty, richness and warmth they bring to my life. I will trust that they know who they are, and that they understand their importance to transcend any words I could ever put on a page. With that said, let me begin by offering my deepest and most profound gratitude to Shaun Gallagher. I marvel every single day at the fact I am mentored by a scholar of his renown. Not only does he possess an unparalleled intellect, which he employs to prolifically produce the brilliant scholarship which is reshaping the way we think about the mind and the body, he is also a kind and gentle man. He has generously given me his time and attention, calmed me in my more neurotic and high-strung moments, pushed me when he knew I could produce better work, always believed in my ability and respected my voice, and has been immeasurably generous in offering me amazing professional opportunities to supplement my studies. I know with absolute certainty that I will never be able to repay Shaun for all he has done, but I will strive to at least be worthy of the gifts he has given to me. I must also thank my other two Supervisors, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and Daniele D. Hutto. Both Danièle and Dan are scholars of the highest caliber, and my work has been greatly influenced by their attention to detail, academic rigor and insightful feedback. I am privileged to have had their guidance. Furthermore, this dissertation has benefited greatly from the involvement of Jonathan Tennis, who remained steadfast in his commitment to read and comment on my work even when the process proved itself to be a test of mental strength and endurance. Additionally, I would like to acknowledge the copyediting and formatting skills of Lee Davidson. The Sixteenth Edition of The Chicago Manual of Style is 1026 pages long and, therefore, something I was grateful not to have to tackle without her expertise. Beyond the excellent academic and technical advisement I received, I simply would not have survived writing this dissertation without an immense amount of moral support and encouragement. I would like to especially acknowledge my parents, Stephen and Rena, who raised me to believe that the pursuit of knowledge and of understanding are worthy ends in and of themselves. I am also grateful to Jim and Anna Annarelli, and Norman Smith. Jim always took the completion of my dissertation to be an absolute and unquestionable given, which, in darker hours, provided necessary motivation. Anna unfailing made me feel as though writing this paper was akin to hanging the stars in the sky, and I will never cease to appreciate how smart and special she believes me to be. For a dozen years now, Norm has offered advice and encouragement at crucial decision-making points, and I shudder to think how lost I would be without his well-reasoned opinions. I would be absolutely remiss if I did not acknowledge my indebtedness to Sarah Kay, Liz Kicak, Angelina Garcia Tennis, Brianna Day, Jaya Eeten and Bryan Thompson who were, without a doubt, my front-line dissertation ground troops. Sarah understood with absolute clarity the power of an encouraging card, text, call or email. Liz possessed an uncanny ability to know just when to check in and make sure everything was all right, which, at the moment she would call, it almost never was. In the course of writing the paper, Angelina gave me a graduate education in what it means to be a family and, in the process, even coined the phrase, “See you later, dissertator!” Brianna reminded me that there is nothing more powerful than finding the courage to face our deepest fears in order to build a better future for ourselves. Jaya, as she has for the past 20 years, centered my universe, and I know without question how much of this project is owed to her. Finally, anything I could say about Bryan, my beautiful, brilliant, kind and soulful husband, would be woefully insufficient. 5 He is my blue sky, my best friend, my heart, my home and my reason for being. He sees me for “who” I am and, like a miracle, he loves me anyway. I cannot thank him enough for helping me fulfill my dream of becoming a doctor (although not the kind that helps people!). 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 Contributions to Knowledge 4 Structure of the Project 7 CHAPTER 2: OUR BIO-ONTOLOGICAL NATALITY 10 The Birth of Natality 10 The Private Realm, Labor, and Our Bio-Ontological Natality 18 Labor and the Fulfillment of Biological Necessity 22 The Work of Our Hands: Building a Common World 26 The Space of Appearance, Action and Our Existential Natality 31 CHAPTER 3: POTENTIALITY TO ACTUALITY: OUR EXISTENTIAL NATALITY 34 Labor Pains: Three Formulations of the Second Birth 35 The Enacted Story and the Web of Relationships 46 CHAPTER 4: REIFICATION, RECOGNITION AND REMEMBRANCE 54 Reification and Recognition 54 Reification and Remembrance: Honneth Meets Hannah 58 Spectator Judgment 64 From Heroes to No-Bodies 70 CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL COGNITION AND THE HUMAN CONDITION 77 Social Cognition 78 Primary Intersubjectivity 81 Secondary Intersubjectivity 91 Participatory Sense-Making 97 CHAPTER 6: NARRATIVE 103 Selfhood and the Story: Lived Narratives and Retrospective Recountings 103 Defining Arendtian Narratives 111 Reified Work and Conditioning Object: The Two Functions of Arendtian Narratives 119 CHAPTER 7: RUBY 122 Arendt’s “Reflections on Little Rock” 122 Observations on New Orleans 125 Steinbeck and the Cheerleaders 132 Rockwell Gets Real 135 Robert and Ruby 138 Conclusion 144 NOTES 149 BIBLIOGRAPHY 189 ABSTRACT Within the text of The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt circumscribes the concept of natality in ways that tend to conflate its biological, historical, institutional and phenomenological dimensions. This dissertation seeks to clarify this concept and the conceptual territory that surrounds it. Specifically, it is argued that Arendt’s construction of the concept of natality is inherently dual. Each person is delivered into a worldly environment through her primary, biological birth. As soon as she is born, she begins to be conditioned to the accepted normative standards of her community. A gap necessarily exists, however, between the person she is socio-culturally conditioned to be, and who she is explicitly, uniquely and authentically. When deeds and words are employed in service of revealing someone’s individual identity or essence, and thereby showing her to be more than simply a mirror of her cultural conditioning, it heralds a second birth, one which is existential instead of biological. According to Arendt, this existential natality must take place in the presence of other existential agents, and also may be witnessed by a spectator who then seeks to express the significance of what has occurred to those removed from the original event either by space and/or time. This expression takes the form of artifactual objects, including works of art, architectural monuments and various forms of narratives. Arendt’s theory concerning the creation of these objects contains two major problems that are critically addressed within this project. The first problem concerns the spectator’s capacity for making judgments. Works written after The Human Condition are shown to demonstrate Arendt’s attempts to address this issue. The second problem concerns the way in which Arendt portrays the issue of embodiment. This issue must be reconciled both by appealing to work from within her canon, as well as through the introduction of recent scholarship from the field of social cognition. The project concludes with the presentation of a concrete, historical example intended to be illustrative of the preceding theoretical material. i CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Hannah Arendt died unexpectedly of a heart attack in her New York apartment on December 4, 1975. Two months later, a tribute written by Hans J. Morgenthau, her friend and colleague at the New School for Social Research, was published in the journal Political Theory. Therein, Morgenthau stated that she was “propelled forward by a passion whose object was thinking itself. As others enjoy playing cards or the horses for their own sake, so Hannah Arendt enjoyed thinking. The analogy is, however, correct only with the important qualification that she did not play games with thoughts but was deadly serious about them.” He then added, “To tell the truth as she saw it or at least to demolish error parading as truth was for her a high vocation.”1 Of course, errors parading as truths are not limited to any one discipline or domain of thought, and it is therefore not surprising that Arendt published works of journalism, literary criticism, history, political theory and, of course, philosophy.2 No matter the subject, Morgenthau stated in summary of her work, “Familiar concepts and issues looked different after her mind had worked them over.”3 In her 1958 text The Human Condition, Arendt engaged just the sort of familiar concepts and issues Morgenthau referenced, including what she termed “action.” Arendt’s formulation of the concept was, however, so complex and multi- faceted—encompassing birth and death, words and deed, the public and private, the individual and the plurality—that, even before The Human Condition was published, she had started writing another book which would have offered needed clarification.4 In a grant application submitted to the Rockefeller Foundation seeking support for the project, Arendt stated that The Human Condition “actually is a kind of prolegomena to the book which I now intend to write. It will continue where the other book ends. In terms of human activities, it will be concerned exclusively with action and thought.”5 Arendt went on to detail how this new book, which she had tentatively titled 1 Introduction Into Politics, would contain two areas of focus: “First, a critical reexamination of the chief traditional concepts and conceptual frameworks of political thinking—such as means and ends, authority, government, power, law, war, etc.” Second, Arendt would provide a systematic account that was not so much concerned with politics per se, as with the fundamental categories of human activities from which anything political must start: Here I shall be chiefly concerned with the various modi of human plurality and the institutions which correspond to them. In other words, I shall undertake a reexamination of the old question of forms of government, their principles and their modes of being together: to be together with other men and with one’s equals, from which springs action, and to be together with one’s self, to which the activity of thinking corresponds. Hence, the book should end with a discussion of the relationship between acting and thinking, or between politics and philosophy.6 Much of the material Arendt completed for Introduction Into Politics had to do with the first area of focus outlined in her grant proposal; those writings became part of Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought, which was published in 1961. Arendt did not, however, meaningfully reengage with many of the issues she intended to address in the second part of Introduction Into Politics for more than a decade after she wrote to the Rockefeller Foundation. At that point, it seemed as though Arendt intended to bring many key concepts full-circle through The Life of the Mind, a trilogy dedicated to explicating the faculties of thinking, willing and judging. These mental activities—considered in antiquity and the Middle Ages to be the purview of the solitary man living a life of contemplation, a vita contemplativa—were to stand in contrast to the pluralistic and worldly life of the vita activa that Arendt described in The Human Condition, a life focused on another triad: labor, work and action.7 2
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