Table Of Content

(cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) Reasons without Persons (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) Reasons without Persons Rationality, Identity, and Time Brian Hedden 1 (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OXDP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries ©BrianHedden Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin Impression: Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber: ISBN –––– Printedandboundby CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CRYY LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) Acknowledgments Thisbookisadefenseofapictureofrationalitycenteredontheagent-at-a-time ratherthanontheagent-over-time.Rationalityisconcernedfundamentallywith howyouareatparticularinstants,ratherthanwithhowyourattitudesandactions at different times fit together. It puts the time-slice at the center of theorizing about rationality. The title is inspired by Derek Parfit’s justly renowned Reasons andPersons(),whichhasdeeplyinfluencedmythinkingonawiderangeof issues relating to ethics, rationality, and metaphysics. He perfectly captures the essence of the time-slice-centric view that I will defend, writing that, “when we areconsideringboththeoreticalandpracticalrationality,therelationbetweena personnowandhimselfatothertimesisrelevantlysimilartotherelationbetween differentpeople”(p.). Iamdeeplyindebtedtomanycolleaguesandteacherswhohavediscussedthe ideasinthisbookandinmanycasesreadsubstantialportionsofthedraft.Iwould like to thank Frank Arntzenius, Boris Babic, Michael Bratman, Rachael Briggs, John Broome, Jessica Brown, Cian Dorr, Tom Dougherty, Antony Eagle, Kenny Easwaran, Jane Friedman, David Gray, Hilary Greaves, Daniel Greco, Daniel Hagen, Alan Hájek, John Hawthorne, Richard Holton, Sophie Horowitz, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio,HarveyLederman,HeatherLogue,AnnaMahtani,SarahMoss, Tyler Paytas, Douglas Portmore, Agustín Rayo, Jeff Russell, Joshua Schechter, Miriam Schoenfield, Paulina Sliwa, Matthew Noah Smith, Declan Smithies, Robert Stalnaker, Michael Titelbaum, Chris Tucker, Roger White, Timothy Williamson, and Steve Yablo. Thanks also to two referees for Oxford University Press,fortheirdetailedandinsightfulcomments. I presented material from this book at a number of conferences and univer- sities. Thanks to audiences at the  Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, the BellinghamSummerPhilosophyConference,theFormalEpistemology Festival,theUniversityofSt.Andrews/Arché,OxfordUniversity,CambridgeUni- versity, MIT, the Australian National University, the University of Sydney, the University of Arizona, Arizona State University, Princeton University, and Yale University. I am grateful for permission to use material originally published in various journals. Chapter  is adapted from “Options and the Subjective Ought,” Philo- sophical Studies  (): –, and Chapters  and  draw on “Options and DiachronicTragedy,”forthcominginPhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch. (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) vi acknowledgments The backbone of the argument of the book is presented in condensed form in “Time-Slice Rationality,” forthcoming in Mind. This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheJohnTempletonFoundation. My greatest debt is to Caspar Hare, who served as my doctoral supervisor at MIT. He helped me to see connections between parts of my research that I had previously seen as separate and first encouraged me to develop my ideas into a book. His helpful suggestions and incisive criticisms have left their mark throughout. (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) Contents . Time-SliceRationality  . Rationality,Personhood,andTime  . Time-SliceRationality  . TheRolesofRationality  . LookingAhead  . GeneralMotivations  . PersonalIdentity  . Internalism  . AgainstDiachronicPrinciples  . Introduction  . AgainstConditionalization  . DiachronicPrinciplesforPreferences  . AgainstReflectionPrinciples  . ReflectionforBeliefs  . ReflectionforPreferences  . TheDiachronicTragedyArgument  . ConditionalizationandReflection  . UtilityConditionalization  . PreferenceReflection  . OtherCasesofDiachronicTragedy  . CommonStructure  . OptionsandTime-SlicePracticalRationality  . Introduction  . RationalityandtheSubjectiveOught  . TheProblemofOptions  . SkirtingtheIssue:AMinimalistProposal  . DesiderataforaTheoryofOptions  . UnsuccessfulTheoriesofOptions  . OptionsasDecisions  . OptionsandtheSemanticsofOught  . OptionsandDiachronicTragedy  . DiachronicTragedyandthePrisoner’sDilemma  . DepragmatizationandtheNoWayOutArgument  . RationalityandtheStabilityofIntentions  (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) viii contents . ReplacingDiachronicPrinciples  . ReplacingConditionalization  . ReplacingUtilityConditionalization  . Coda:Uniqueness,Coherence,andKolodny  . ReplacingReflectionPrinciples  . ExpertDeference  . PreferenceDeference  . DoxasticProcessesandResponsibility  . DoxasticJustification  . WhataboutReasoning?  . RationalEvidence-Gathering  . RationalityandtheSubject’sPointofView  Bibliography  Index  (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2)  Time-Slice Rationality Thisbookisaboutwhatittakestoberational.Asaroughfirstpass,wecansay that being rational is a matter of being sensible, given your perspective on the world. It is a matter of believing, desiring, and acting in sane, reasonable ways. Rationality does not require that you always get things right, but only that you makethebestpossibleuseofthelimitedinformationavailabletoyou.Ofcourse, thisisnottogiveareductiveanalysisofrationality,onewhichavoidsuseofrelated normativetermslike“sensible,”“sane,”and“reasonable,”butIdoubtwhethersuch areductiveanalysisispossible.Norisareductiveanalysisneededinordertofix ideas.Exampleswilloftensufficeforthat. Suppose that your friend has a headache, and you have some pills that you justifiably believe to be pain relievers. But you’re wrong. They are really poison. Giventhatyouwanttohelpyourfriend,yourationallyoughttogivehimthepills, eventhoughtheywillinfactdohimharm.Youwouldbequiteirrationalif,despite yourconfidencethatgivinghimthepillswillrelievehisheadacheandyourdesire to help him, you neglected to offer him the pills. Of course, when your friend windsupwrithingaroundonthefloorandfoamingatthemouth,youwillquite rightlyregretofferingthepills,butthisdoesnotmeanthatyourinitialdecision wasirrational.Itjustmeansthatbeingrationalisnoguaranteeofsuccessinyour endeavours. So,whatyourationallyoughttobelieveisnotjustwhateverisinfacttrue,and whatyourationallyoughttodoisnotjustwhateverwillinfactsatisfyyourdesires ormakeyouhappy.Rather,whatyourationallyoughttobelievedependsonthe evidenceavailabletoyou,andwhatyourationallyoughttododependsonwhat yourevidencesuggestswouldbestsatisfyyourdesires.Thisisasubjectivenotion of rationality, on which how you rationally ought to be depends on your—the subject’s—perspective rather than on an objective, god’s-eye perspective on the world.1 1 SeeNagel()fordiscussionofobjectivevs.subjectivepointsofviewandtheimportanceof thisdistinctionforanumberofphilosophicalproblems. (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2)