Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery

464 Pages·1996·43.67 MB·English

by  Karl Popper

REALISM AND THE AIM OF SCIENCE
Titles by Karl Popper
available from Routledge
THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES VOLUME I
THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES VOLUME II
THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM
THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS
UNENDED QUEST
THE SELF AND ITS BRAIN (with J. C. Eccles)
THE OPEN UNIVERSE
QUANTUM THEORY AND THE SCHISM IN PHYSICS
IN SEARCH OF A BETTER WORLD
KNOWLEDGE AND THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM
THE MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK
THE LESSON OF THIS CENTURY
THE WORLD OF PARMENIDES
ALL LIFE IS PROBLEM SOLVING
REALISM
AND THE AIM OF
SCIENCE
KARL POPPER
From the POSTSCRIPT TO THE LOGIC OF
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
Edited by W. W. Bartley, III
R Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK
First published 1983
Paperback edition 1985
Reprinted 1992, 1994, 1996
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
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Reprinted with corrections 1999 and 2000
Transferred to Digital Printing 2005
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
©1956, 1983 Karl Popper
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress
ISBN 0-415-08400-8
TO MY EDITOR
For his rescue of the Postscript

CONTENTS
Editor's Foreword xi
Acknowledgements xvn
Introduction, 1982 xix
REALISM AND THE AIM OF SCIENCE
Preface, 1956 5
PART I: THE CRITICAL APPROACH
Chapter /. INDUCTION I I
1. (* 1) A Puzzled Philosopher Abroad.
2. (*2) The Critical Approach. Solution of the Problem
of Induction.
3. (*3) On So-Called Inductive Procedures, with Notes
on Learning, and on the Inductive Style.
4. (*4) A Family of Four Problems of Induction.
5. (*5) Why the Fourth Stage of the Problem is
Metaphysical.
6. (*6) The Metaphysical Problem.
7. (*7) Metaphysical Realism.
8. (*8) Hume's Metaphysics. 'Neutral' Monism.
9. (*9) Why the Subjective Theory of Knowledge Fails.
10. (*10) A World Without Riddles.
11. (* 11) The Status of Theories and of Theoretical
Concepts.
Note on Numbering of Sections. The sections in each of the three
volumes of the Postscript, and in the two parts of the first volume, are
numbered consecutively, beginning with section 1. The original section
numbers, indicating the order of the sections within the Postscript as a
whole, are given in starred brackets in the Tables of Contents. Ed.
vii
CONTENTS
12. (*12) Criticism of Instrumentalism. Instrumentalism
and the Problem of Induction.
13. (»13) Instrumentalism Against Science.
14. (*14) Science Against Instrumentalism.
15. (*15) The Aim of Science.
16. (*16) Difficulties of Metaphysical Realism. By a
Metaphysical Realist.
Chapte r II.
DEMARCATION
17. (*17) The Significance of the Problem of Demarcation.
18. (*18) A Case of Verificationism.
19. CM 9) Testability But Not Meaning.
20. (*20) Non-Testable Statements.
21. (*21) The Problem of <Eliminating, Metaphysics.
22. (»22) The Asymmetry between Falsification and
Verification.
23. (*23) Why Even Pseudo-Sciences May Well Be
Meaningful. Metaphysical Programmes for
Science.
Chapter III. METAPHYSICS: SENSE OR NONSENSE?
24. (*24) Logical Remarks on Testability and Metaphysics.
25. (*25) Metaphysical Terms Can Be Defined by Empirical
Terms.
26. (*26) The Changing Philosophy of Sense and
Nonsense.
Chapter IV. CORROBORATION
27. (*27) Corroboration: Certainty, Uncertainty,
Probability.
28. (*28) 'Corroboration' or'Probability'?
29. (*29) Corroboration or Confirmation?
30. (*30) The Problem of Degree of Corroboration.
31. (*32) Corroboration.
32. (::*32A) Some Further Comments on the Definition of
Degree of Corroboration.
33. (::"33) Humanism, Science, and the Inductive Prejudice.
(*31) Addendum: Critical Remarks on Meaning
Analysis.
vni
CONTENTS
PART II. THE PROPENSITY INTERPRETATION OF
PROBABILITY
Chapte r I. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES 281
1. (*34) The Meanings of Probability.
2. (*35) Relative and Absolute Probabilities.
3. (*36) The Propensity Interpretation. Objective and
Subjective Interpretations.
4. (*37) Experimental Tests and their Repetition:
Independence.
5. (*38) The Logical Interpretation.
6. (*39) Comparing the Objective and the Subjective
Interpretation.
7. (*40) The Objectivist and Subjectivist Interpretations of
V in 'pfaby
Chapter II. CRITICISM OF PROBABILISTIC INDUCTION 301
8. (Ml) The Simple Inductive Rule.
9. (*42) How to Interpret the Simple Inductive Rule
Where It Works.
10. (*43) Summing up of the Status of (by in 'p(ayby
11. (*44) The Diminishing Returns of Learning by
Induction.
12. (*45) The Paradox of Inductive Learning.
13. (*46) An Inductive Machine.
14. (*47) The Impossibility of an Inductive Logic.
15. (»48) Probability Logic vs. Inductive Logic.
16. (»49) The Inductivist Interpretation of Probability.
17. (*50) The Redundancy of Theories.
18. (*51) No Point in Testing a Theory.
19. (*52) Summary of this Criticism.
Addendum 1981: A Brief Summary of the
Criticism of Probabilistic Induction.
Chapte r III.
REMARKS ON THE OBJECTIVE THEORIES OF
PROBABILITY 347
20. (*53) The Case for Propensities.
21. (*54) Where the Frequency Theory Succeeds.
22. (-55) Where the Frequency Theory Fails.
23. (-56) The Significance of the Failure.
24. (-57) The Neo-Classical and the Frequency Theory
Contrasted.
IX