Radicalization and al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia

20 Pages·2014·0.48 MB·English

ISS PAPER 266 | SEPTEMBER 2014
Radicalisation and al-Shabaab
recruitment in Somalia
Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile
Summary
Effective counter-radicalisation strategies should be based on an empirical
understanding of why people join terrorist organisations. Researchers interviewed
former al-Shabaab fighters and identified a complex array of reasons for why they
joined the organisation. Interviewers developed a profile of typical al-Shabaab recruits
and identified factors facilitating their recruitment, including religious identity, socio-
economic circumstances (education, unemployment), political circumstances and the
need for a collective identity and a sense of belonging. The reasons for al-Shabaab’s
rise are discussed and recommendations are made to the Somali government,
countries in the region and international organisations and donors on how to counter
radicalisation and recruitment to al-Shabaab.
THIS STUDY IS BASED on the belief Counter-radicalisation measures have in terms of the broad political
that counter-radicalisation strategies proved to be ineffective and even socialisation process rather than from
should be informed by a better counterproductive if they are not based the perspective of a single root cause,
understanding of why people join terrorist on a clear understanding of what or conditions conducive to terrorism
organisations. This understanding should causes individuals to be susceptible to that, although useful, are too broad.
be based on empirical evidence and violent extremism. Because socialisation is a life-long
not guesswork or analysis of completely process, the study considers a range of
There is no shortage of publications on
different organisations in other countries socialisation agents that affect the
the root causes of terrorism. However,
or regions. Although such studies most concentrate on the broad radicalisation process.
contribute to a better understanding circumstances that motivate people to In order to gain insight into the
of radicalisation, counter-radicalisation commit acts of terrorism and are radicalisation and recruitment
strategies should be tailored to address therefore not always applicable. While processes that al-Shabaab recruits
specific issues that explain why a acknowledging the influence of external in Somalia go through, the Institute
particular type of person joins a particular factors, this study intends to explain for Security Studies and Finn Church
organisation in a specific locality or radicalisation from the perspective of Aid collaborated to conduct this
country. A single factor, such as poverty, individual, self-professed members of study. Southlink Consultants Ltd were
can rarely be blamed for radicalisation. al-Shabaab. It will explain radicalisation commissioned to conduct fieldwork
for the study from 14 to 28 April 2014 develop the ability to think ideologically,5
in Mogadishu, Somalia.1 Using local i.e. to politically identify with subgroups
contacts, researchers were able to in society, which is a crucial step in
identify former fighters in a number of establishing their political ‘selves’.6 During
sites in the Mogadishu area, including this period they also form ‘worldview
internally displaced persons’ camps beliefs’ that influence how they perceive,
that are known to house many former
interpret, and respond to their social and
al-Shabaab fighters.2 A total of 88
interpersonal environments.7
respondents were interviewed, while
Because they are not used to the
another seven interviewees, including
realities of political and socio-economic
two former members of Amniyat (al-
Shabaab’s intelligence service), agreed participation, young people are
to be interviewed off the record. Despite more idealistic and reform minded,
numerous challenges,3 the team achieved and are therefore impatient with the
the fieldwork’s objective of generating compromising methods of their elders
empirical data about the radicalisation and and are therefore easily drawn into
recruitment process used by al-Shabaab. unconventional political behaviour.8
Instead of accommodation or
Profile of interviewees
manipulation (the favourite political tactics
In keeping with its name, which means of the older generation), young people
‘The Youth’, al-Shabaab targets favour confrontation. Because they are
adolescents and young adults: only 9% particularly susceptible to influences
of interviewees joined after their 30th during their mid-to-late teens, it is not
birthdays (Figure 1). surprising that it is during this period that
Figure 1: Age at which interviewees joined al-Shabaab
45
40
40
35
30
25
% 25
20
21
15
10
5
1 4 5 2 2
88 0
<10 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 >40
It is important to note that during the they are often radicalised and recruited.
THE NUMBER OF FORMER period between puberty (ages 12–17) Generally young people are particularly
AL-SHABAAB FIGHTERS WHO and early adulthood (18–22) people are vulnerable to radicalisation for two
WERE INTERVIEWED at their most impressionable and most primary reasons: their impatience with
open to outside influence, because they the status quo and their desire to change
7
are both becoming increasingly aware of the political system – if necessary,
the social and political world around them through the use of violence.
and simultaneously establishing their own
Among the sample group, 34% grew
THE NUMBER OF OTHERS identities and political ‘selves’.4
up without a father, while 16% grew up
INTERVIEWED OFF
Individuals form their identities between without a mother. What is particularly
THE RECORD
the ages of 12 and 16, when they telling is the age at which interviewees
2 RadicaliSation and al-Shabaab RecRuitment in Somalia
lost their fathers or mothers: 23% lost It can be expected that an individual’s Radicalisation and
their fathers and 8% their mothers position in the organisation will have recruitment
when they were younger than five, 68% a direct impact on the way in which
Although a number of definitions of
lost their fathers and 69% their mother questions will be answered in interviews.
radicalisation are available, Gurr defines
The majority of interviewees (60%)
between the ages of 16 and 18, while
the concept as:
categorised themselves as ‘fighters’
9% lost their fathers and 23% lost their
(see Figure 4), thus representing the A process in which the group has
mothers between 19 and 20.
grassroots levels of the organisation been mobilized in pursuit of a social
Most interviewees who lost a parent (Figure 3). The figures given in Figure 3 or political objective but has failed
or both parents did so between early indicate how interviewees ranked their to make enough progress toward
adolescence and early adulthood, at a position in al-Shabaab structures. Note the objective to satisfy all activists.
time when individuals are particularly that it is possible that members of Some become disillusioned and
vulnerable to losses of this magnitude. middle management and the higher discouraged, while others intensify
At the other end of the spectrum, the echelons of the organisation would be their efforts, lose patience with
majority of interviewees had a father more committed to al-Shabaab and its conventional means of political
(66%) and mother (84%) present in ideals, which could form the basis of a action, and look for tactics that will
their lives. future study. have greater impact. This is the
kind of situation in which modelling
In terms of whether marital status and Figure 3: Interviewees’ position
in al-Shabaab or ‘imitative’ behaviour occurs.
having children of their own at the time
Impatience and frustration provide
50
of joining al-Shabaab had any impact
an expressive motivation (anger)
45
on their recruitment, the majority of 44 and rationalistic grounds (dramatic
40
interviewees were single (Figure 2).
35 37 episodes of violence elsewhere) that
make it likely that some activists
Figure 2: Interviewees’ marital 30
will decide to experiment with terror
and parental status %25
tactics. The choice is made, and
20
justified, as a means to the original
60 15
ends of radical reform, group
10
50 51 autonomy, or whatever. And the
5 7
47 2 0 dynamics of the process are such
40 0
1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 that the terrorists believe that they
34
% 30 Note: Rating on a scale of 1–10, where 1 enjoy the support of some larger
indicates ‘lowest ranked’ and 10 indicates
‘highest ranked’. community in revolt.9
20
10 15 Figure 4: Interviewees’ roles in al-Shabaab
2
0Single Married Divorced Widower4 ChildrSei nn g l e a nchdi l d r en 7600 60
50
Although the majority were single,
40
however, marriage and having children %
did not prevent interviewees from 30
joining al-Shabaab. The relatively fewer
20
married recruits should be interpreted
together with interviewees’ age at the 17
10
time of their recruitment, remembering 2 3 2
6 5 5
that al-Shabaab tends to attract 0
Casual Collect Fighter Intelligence Recruiter Religious Security Trainer
younger individuals. worker money scholar
RadicaliSation and al-Shabaab RecRuitment in Somalia ISS PAPER 266 • SEPTEMBER 2014 3
The duration and process of radicalisation indicated that they would remain friends
differ from person to person, although it with those they did not agree with, while a
is commonly accepted that the process further 60% indicated that they would not
occurs gradually over a period of time. listen to friends’ advice. Interviewees who
Conscious decisions to, for example, join indicated that they would listen to others
a terrorist organisation or use violence for (40%) referred to elders, parents, religious
political ends are not made suddenly, but leaders, community members and friends.
entail a gradual process that includes a
When asked how long the period was
multitude of occurrences, experiences,
between being introduced to and joining
perceptions and role players.
the organisation, a large proportion (48%)
Having contact and listen to others with indicated a short period of between one
different opinions are important facilitators and 30 days (Figure 5). This should be
preventing radicalisation, because interpreted in terms of the primary reasons
discussions with people with different why interviewees joined al-Shabaab
opinions force people to constantly (Figure 7), i.e. religion and the economic
rethink and refine their own positions. On benefits al-Shabaab offered.
the other hand, sharing one’s opinions
The short period between being
with people who hold similar viewpoints
introduced to and joining al-Shabaab
will reinforce one’s position, identify
might reflect an emotional and poorly
common problems and provoke collective
thought through decision in which
action.10 This form of isolation leads to
interviewees experienced two central
‘groupthink’, which can be described as
emotions: anger and fear (Figure 6).
an irrational style of thinking that causes
group members to make poor decisions.11 Anger is probably one of the most
With this in mind, only 9% of interviewees common and powerful emotions
associated with political violence and
Figure 5: Period between being
terrorism. This emotion normally occurs in
introduced to and joining
response to a particular circumstance or
al-Shabaab
event in an attempt to regain control and/
60 or remove the reason for anger, and is
50 directed at those considered to be causing
48
40 it.12 According to Huddy et al.,13 anger is
%30 31 intensified when the responsible party is
20 perceived to be unjust and illegitimate.
10 16 Anger seldom enables the person to
5
0 reasonably evaluate the information
1-30 2-6 7-12 1-5
days months months years surrounding its cause. Consequently,
Figure 6: Emotion associated with joining al-Shabaab
9%
30
25 26
24
20
% 15 18
THE pERCENTAGE OF
10
INTERVIEWEES WHO 10
5
INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD 5 2 2 5
0
RETMHEAYIN D FOR INEONTD SA GWRITEHE TWHITOHSE Anger An g e r a nhda t red An g e r a n d fear Fear Hatred Haatrned df ear Guilt Contempt
4 RadicaliSation and al-Shabaab RecRuitment in Somalia
affected individuals are often unable to The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy It is clear from Figure 7 that religious
recognise additional threats that might identifies ‘conducive conditions’ and economic factors were central to
contribute to unnecessary risk taking. to terrorism. These ‘push factors’ explaining why interviewees joined al-
They tend to resort to stereotyping, or enabling circumstances include Shabaab. These factors, together with
making them vulnerable to individuals political circumstances, including the political circumstances in which the
attempting to convince them to poor governance, political exclusion, decision to join the organisation was
respond,14 leading to hatred and the lack of civil liberties and human rights made, are discussed below.
desire for vengeance.
abuses; economic circumstances;
Mohamud (not his real name) was
The level of frustration interviewees sociological circumstances, e.g.
barely 14 years old when he joined
experienced was a relatively minor religious and ethnic discrimination;
al-Shabaab. He was a schoolboy in
contributing factor: the majority (56%) counter-terrorism operations and their
Marka, and when the three-month
of interviewees rated their levels of impact; and perceived injustice and
long holidays approached in 2009,
frustration at between 1 and 4 on a scale international circumstances. Although a
he was advised by friends to join the
of 1–10 (with 1 indicating ‘not frustrated’ basic understanding of these conditions
organisation. ‘When you join, they give
and 10 ‘highly frustrated’). Forty-two provides an insight into radicalisation,
you a mobile phone and every month
per cent referred to frustration levels of without pressure from domestic and
you get $50’, he said. ‘This is what
between 5 and 7, while only 2% rated personal circumstances individuals might
pushes a lot of my friends to join.’
their frustration levels between 8 and support the ideas of extremists (non-
10. The fact that the majority did not
violent extremism) without becoming
recall high frustration levels suggests Religious identity
actively involved in acts of terrorism
that they either wanted to minimise their
(violent extremism). Secondly, not all As explained in the discussion of
commitment to and involvement with al-
people faced with the same set of the role of the family in radicalisation
Shabaab or were not driven to accept the
circumstances will become radicalised, (see ‘political circumstances’, below),
cause it represented by frustration alone.
while not all of those who are radicalised political socialisation also include the
Circumstances facilitating will join a terrorist organisation or commit development of a social identity as ‘part
interviewees’ recruitment to acts of violence and terrorism. of the individual’s self-concept which
derives from one’s knowledge of his
al-Shabaab
Despite these circumstances, it is still the
or her membership in a social group
individual who decides to join a terrorist
Radicalisation involves both external or groups together with the value and
and internal factors. External factors organisation or is drawn to the ideals emotional significance attached to
can be subdivided into domestic and and activities of extremist organisations. that membership’.16 This gives rise to
international circumstances, as presented Ultimately one realises that human a collective identity that Abádi-Nagy
in the United Nations Global Counter- behaviour is extremely complex and that defines as ‘the set of culture traits, social
Terrorism Strategy.15 Internal or personal the key to radicalisation is the individual’s
traits, values, beliefs, myths, symbols,
interpretations of the external environment response to the circumstances described
images that go into the collective’s self-
are influenced by psychological factors above. Interviewees identified the reasons
definition’.17 Simon and Klandermans
that refer directly to political socialisation. why they joined al-Shabaab (Figure 7). explain the importance of collective
identity in an individual’s psychological
Figure 7: Interviewees’ reasons for joining al-Shabaab makeup, stating that it:
30 • Confirms the individual’s membership of
25 27 a particular group in society
25
20
• Provides distinctive characteristics to
% 15 identify others who are not members of
15
10 13 this group
5 1 1 7 4 3 4 • Ensures respect from those sharing the
0Adventure Econo m i c Eacnod naodvmiec n t urepersonal Forced Religious R elaingid ofuosr ce d aRneldi geicoouns omi c aRnelid gipoeurss on al R e l iaginodu se thnic • iLsneedlafi-vdeidss utteoael ’asm sp beoyns sipteior oonvf i idnsie nslfgo- crueienstdpyee rcstt aonr ding
RadicaliSation and al-Shabaab RecRuitment in Somalia ISS PAPER 266 • SEPTEMBER 2014 5
of or meaning to the social world the In addition to the general motivation
individual is part of that they perceived Islam to be under
threat, interviewees referred to the
• Provides a sense of solidarity with
limited role of a religious figure in the
others and reminds the individual that
recruitment process: only 4% of them
he/she is not alone18
were encouraged to join al-Shabaab by
In light of the above, it is significant that
a religious figure. Despite this, the single
all the interviewees grew up in areas
largest group (27%) were introduced to
where Muslims were in the majority and
al-Shabaab at a mosque, implying the
that they had a very negative perception
involvement of other individuals who
of religious diversity and acceptance of
used the space and opportunity for
other religions (Figure 8).
recruitment purposes.
Figure 8: Interviewees’ religious perceptions
According to one interviewee,
‘preachers delivered sermons for hours

about destiny and the sweetness of
100 100 the holy war. They distributed leaflets
97 96 97 97 on Islam, showed video recordings
80
from other jihadist in the world and
79
how AMISOM [the African Union
% 60
Mission in Somalia] or the Christian
40 crusaders invaded our beloved country
and were converting our children to
20
Christianity.’
0 Re l iegiqounals (no)Re l i gi o u s d i v (enresitgya tive) Re l i gi o n immopsto rtant M a r r y i n troe liotgihoenr (no) Ac c erpelti goitohnesr ( no) H a t e o trehliergi ons Incnoutemnrtvbeixeetrw, ocefle aesnt hsa.nlsico gcraomuep sfr oorm, i na tlhaerg Se omali
This confirms not only al-Shabaab’s Ahmadey Kusow, a Somali-Bantu,
strong religious motivations, but links joined the al-Shabaab voluntarily and
directly to interviewees’ perception that became a loyal member of the group.
their religion (Islam) was under threat, He is one of hundreds of young men
which was the belief of a highly significant belonging to the Somali-Bantu and
98% of interviewees (Figure 9). This minority clans who have freely joined
threat was often associated with non- the militant group because they feel
Muslim countries. they have been marginalised since
the collapse of the Somali state. They
say recruitment to al-Shabaab as
Figure 9: Interviewees’ perception
that Islam is under threat an opportunity to take revenge and
98% empower themselves against majority
120
tribes who grabbed their farming areas
100
98 and (to some extent) property.
80
%60 69
In addition to local Somali nationals, al-
THE pERCENTAGE OF 40
INTERVIEWEES WHO 20 29 Shabaab also attracts Somali nationals
pERCEIVED ISLAM TO BE 0 living abroad, other foreign fighters and
0
UNDER THREAT Islam physical Ideological physical nationals from neighbouring countries to
under threat threat and
threat ideological join the organisation.
6 RadicaliSation and al-Shabaab RecRuitment in Somalia
educated people tend to participate in Figure 11: Interviewees’ school-
Abu Aisha came from the United
conventional politics, for various reasons: leaving age
States and joined al-Shabaab after
being recruited through the Internet. • They feel that they can influence the 60
He fought for three years, but became political process more than less- 50 52
46
discouraged by the way in which educated people because they can 40
jihad was conducted. He was among articulate their opinions better %30
20
a handful of Somali-Americans who • They are more aware of the impact of
had drifted to al-Shabaab over the government on their lives 10 928
years. A number of recruitment 0
• They generally have opinions on a 7-9 10-14 15-19
agents and support networks have
wider range of political topics. They are
been uncovered in the United States
also more likely to engage in political Interviewees also identified education
that approach potential targets
discussions with a wide range of and employment as two central
through mosques, the Internet and
people, while the less educated are components of attempts to find a
community contacts. The English-
more likely to avoid such discussions solution to Somalia’s problems, together
language skills and social disconnect
with peace, stability, reconciliation, etc.
• Educated people are more likely to have
of Somali-Americans may be assets to
confidence in the political process and (Without these latter attributes, education
al-Shabaab. Due to both the trauma
be an active member of a legitimate and sustainable development will remain
experienced by recruits’ parents
political organisation19 an illusive dream.)
when fleeing Somalia’s long period of
anarchy, and cultural and economic The unfortunate reality in Somalia is that Higher levels of education also
problems they encountered when the formal education system came to a decrease individuals’ propensity to
attempting to integrate into US society, standstill when the Somali state collapsed engage in civil strife.20 Ultimately, the
some angry teens have become fertile in 1991, leaving an entire generation solution to radicalisation is not
targets for al-Shabaab recruitment. uneducated: 40% of interviewees received education as such, but the quality and
no education, while the remaining 60% type of education provided. Students
Socio-economic received only limited education (Figure 10). need to learn from other disciplines,
circumstances such as the social sciences, history
Figure 10: Education received and philosophy, that can equip them
Interviewees were asked to identify
by interviewees to be open to other opinions, to argue
their most important reasons for joining
50 intelligently, and to understand domestic
al-Shabaab. While the majority referred
45 and international realities.
to religion (see above), 25% combined 40 43
religion with economic reasons, while a 40 Unemployment
35
further 1% referred to economic reasons
30 Lack of education adversely affects
and the desire for adventure. These
%25 employment opportunities. Self-
interviewees thought that al-Shabaab
20 employment is an option when formal
membership would become a career,
15 employment opportunities are limited, but
which casts doubt on their ideological
lack of education is a limiting factor here
10
commitment to the organisation’s aims.
5 9 8 too. In a study conducted in Uganda,
One can possibly conclude, therefore,
Tushambomwe-Kazooba showed that
0
that if most interviewees had been
No private Religious private the majority of new business owners
given access to other employment education and
religious were not properly trained, leading to poor
opportunities, they would not have
business planning and management
joined al-Shabaab. The majority of interviewees who
decisions.21 In an attempt to assess the
received a religious education or
Education potential role unemployment plays in
attended a madrassa recalled the level
radicalisation, interviewees’ employment
Education is identified as crucial to of focus on the Qur’an. Of those who
levels are summarised in Figure 12.
preparing young people to obtain received some form of education, the
employment. Education can also counter majority left school between the ages of All those who were employed had
later radicalisation, because better- 10 and 14 (Figure 11). low-income jobs, largely because they
RadicaliSation and al-Shabaab RecRuitment in Somalia ISS PAPER 266 • SEPTEMBER 2014 7
Figure 12: Interviewees’
employment status fighter and was killed in 2011. Amina
reported that she still bore the scars
60
from severely beatings she suffered
50
49 50
when she tried to escape. Eventually
40
she pretended that her mother was
%30
ill and fled into the bush when the
20
guards were praying as she was
10
1 being escorted to see her mother. ‘I
0
Employed Unemployed Student was later rescued by herders who
assisted me with a change of clothing
did not have the education needed to before I ended up in Mogadishu’, she
obtain better jobs. It was therefore not told the interviewer.
surprising that interviewees who defined
adverse economic circumstances as a
Political circumstances
recruitment factor saw al-Shabaab as
a potential employer, claiming that they As discussed above, prior political
were paid between $150 and $500 experiences are an important indicator of
per month. the extent to which people trust politicians
and the political system. This starts at the
family level in that children growing up
Amina (not her real name), a widow,
in families where politics is discussed or
was brought up in Burhakaba.
where parents are interested in politics are
Her parents were staunch Muslim
more likely to see the value of participating
farmers and herders. In 2004 she
in the political process. This extends to
married a farmer from her clan
peer groups, in which the level of political
and had two children. In 2009 her
discussion will mirror group members’
husband was approached by several
sense of political efficacy. Finally, actual
young men who claimed to represent
events will impact on individuals’ political
al-Shabaab. He was told to join
socialisation and contribute to their
and fight for his people, community
political perceptions and values.
and religion against their external
enemies and infidels. ‘We will protect The family serves as a child’s first
you and once you join we will pay introduction to the political culture
you $300 per month’, they told him. of his/her country. Despite Somalia’s
Amina feared for her husband’s life violent past, only 17% of interviewees
when they threatened him later. indicated that their parents discussed
She and her husband later yielded politics in their presence while they were
to the coercion and decided to join growing up. Asked if they agreed with
the group. They were paid $300 for their parents’ political opinions, only 7%
the first few months, but later were answered in the affirmative. This limited
$150 – informed that they would not be paid political interaction between parent and
and had to work hard and fight for child reflects a generation gap, and could
$500 the sake of Islam if they wanted to go be extended to the possibility that the
to heaven. Amina cooked, washed ideology al-Shabaab represents is not
clothes and collected firewood in historically embedded in Somalia and
the presence of guards, while her that parents fear any form of political
pER MONTH
husband first inspected roads before discussion with their children. This was
AMOUNT INTERVIEWEES becoming a fundraiser working in reflected in the fact that only 5% of
WERE pAID BY AL-SHABAAB nearby villages. He later became a interviewees indicated that a parent was
aware of their decision to join al-Shabaab.
8 RadicaliSation and al-Shabaab RecRuitment in Somalia
Only 3% specifically informed a parent of interviewees joined al-Shabaab between Interviewees’ experience
their joining the organisation, while 3% the ages of 15 and 19; see Figure 1). of politics
informed another sibling. To put these This is also the period when the individual
In Somalia, an entire generation grew up
figures in context: 57% of interviewees begins to take a more active interest and
informed another person. It is therefore participates in specifically political affairs.22 without the experience of an effective
improbable that family members agree political system, despite various
The fact that the majority of interviewees
with al-Shabaab’s ideology or even accept attempts to consolidate political power
joined with friends testifies to peer
it as the norm. parents of interviewees following the collapse of the Siad Barre
pressure, but it also affects how
clearly played a lesser role in transferring regime in 1991.23
interpersonal relationships should be
their political orientations to their children
interpreted. The strength of peer groups
through the socialisation process.
is based on two key pillars: the emotional Figure 14: Interviewees’ political
Instead, peers played a greater role in experiences and
link between the individual and the peer
interviewees’ political socialisation, which perceptions
group, and the access the individual has
will be discussed below.
to the group, and vice versa. 90
In addition to the relatively limited 80 82
involvement of their parents in Abdi (not his real name) is 24 years 70
69
interviewees’ recruitment by al-Shabaab, old and was born and brought up 60
siblings played the smallest role, in Baidoa, but is currently living in 50
%
introducing only 2% of interviewees to Mogadishu. He was 20 years old 40
39
the organisation. Secondly, only 3% of and was idle, just like many Somali 30
interviewees indicated that they had joined youth who are desperate for the 20
with family members, while 3% recruited ever-illusive source of a livelihood. 10 17
family members to al-Shabaab. The reality Abdi was approached by a friend 7 2
0
iimsts et hpmaobtli teiifcr tsah,l e oo tfrahiemenrit lasyot iisoc niauslni sataobt liieots nt o yao gtureannngtsesfr ea rr e wmbeheeomn w beeanrsg. aIanglirteeiadaldl yiny s ashonoc caikal-elS adhc,a thibvaaitviaeinbsg Di s c uspsoliAtig c r se e j w ioptiVahno ritenengdt salb-efSohrae bTrauastb elTrduersts politiElci e a c tni s o n s b ricnhgange
likely to be more influential. that al-Shabaab did not permit, Abdi
rejected the idea, but later joined
The role of friends in interviewees’
the group after being persuaded When asked whether they trusted
decision to join the organisation was
by his friend. After joining, he was politicians and the political system,
unmistakable: friends introduced 30% of
instructed to abandon his lifestyle of 39% of interviewees indicated that they
interviewees to al-Shabaab, while 22% of
smoking and chewing miraa, which trusted politicians (Figure 14). In contrast,
interviewees stated that they had recruited
he found difficult, earning him several 82% trusted clan elders, while a further
other friends. Friends were also the largest
punishments. He escaped several 69% trusted the political process to
group (42%) that interviewees informed of
times, but was caught and returned bring about change, despite the fact that
their decision to join the organisation. This
to the al-Shabaab camp. To retain only 2% had participated in the election
is because the family’s influence wanes at
him, the camp elders supported his process before joining al-Shabaab.
13 or 14 years of age (note that 40% of
habits and bought him cigarettes
Interviewees’ trust in elders is a positive
Figure 13: Influence of friends and and miraa. He became an informer finding that the Federal Government
family on interviewees and a link with local farmers, from
could build on. However, 18% of inter-
who he used to collect $50 a month.
70 viewees believed that elders were only
Abdi finally left al-Shabaab when the
60 64 looking after their own personal interests
group reneged on its promise to pay
and that of close family members.
50
him $250 a month. He ran away and
40 When asked whether they thought that
% relocated to Kismayu before travelling
30 33 elections would bring about change,
to Mogadishu. Almost a year since
20 22 37% of interviewees did not consider
leaving the group, Abdi still lives in
10 3 3 fear that once one joins al-Shabaab, it elections to be ‘free and fair’, while a
0 is very hard to walk away from it. further 55% did not consider elections to
Joined Joined Joined Recruit-Recruit-
with with alone ed ed be ‘free and fair’ and believed that they
friends family family friends
RadicaliSation and al-Shabaab RecRuitment in Somalia ISS PAPER 266 • SEPTEMBER 2014 9
were not able to register a political party situations, collective identity might
that represented their ideas. become more prominent:
Despite positive perceptions that • When individuals are increasingly
elections can bring change, the vast unable to provide for themselves
majority of interviewees agreed with the and/or their families
statement that ‘government only looks
• When they are confused by social
after and protects the interests of a few’.
and political chaos around them
When asked whether ‘opposing the
government is legal and just’, only 4% • When they feel threatened by
did not agree with this statement another group
(Figure 15).
In an attempt to address these
circumstances, individuals will turn to
Figure 15: Interviewees’ views on
the government an ideological movement to provide
them with an identity or will enhance
98,5
their identification with a religious,
98
98
ethnic or political group. In Somalia
97,5
al-Shabaab presents Islam as the
97
% single overarching factor that binds
96,5
all the different clans together and
96
96 provides a solution to years of social
95,5
and political upheaval. That being said,
95
Government only Revolt is legal it should be stressed that although
protect own interests
religion serves as a nation-building
factor, al-Shabaab does not represent
From interviewees’ answers, it is clear Islam as such, but rather a particular
that politicians and the government face interpretation of Islam as a solution to
a serious legitimacy crisis. In other words, Somalia’s problems.
if the government wants to present a
Collective identity manifests in the way
meaningful option to unconventional
in which individuals categorise people
political participation, it needs to meet
in terms of concepts such as ‘us’, ‘we’
people’s expectations. Most interviewees
or ‘ours’ when referring to the in-group,
referred to the government’s duty to
versus ‘they’, ‘them’ or ‘theirs’ in
provide safety and protect people’s
terms of the out-group or ‘enemy’. In
rights, while a few also included the
Somalia, even among interviewees who
responsibility to govern (in terms of their
stated that they were forced to join the
perceptions of what this meant).
organisation, al-Shabaab managed
to establish itself at the centre of
Collective identity and
its members’ terms of reference.
a sense of belonging
Fifty-eight per cent of interviewees
A sense of collective identity can be grouped al-Shabaab and being
easily politicised if the majority of the in- Muslim in the same category (‘us’)
82% group share their feelings of injustice or and saw al-Shabaab as the defender
inequality and thus turn ‘my grievances’ of Islam against other religions (with
into ‘our grievances’. The next step is to specific reference to Christians) and
identify the ‘other’ or out-group that can other countries (‘them’). It was also
THE pERCENTAGE OF
be blamed for these grievances, leading unsurprising to note that no interviewee
INTERVIEWEES WHO TRUSTED
to its stereotyping. Consequently, when referred to a Somali national identity or
CLAN LEADERS
the individual is faced with particular ‘Somalis’ (Figures 16 and 17).
10 RadicaliSation and al-Shabaab RecRuitment in Somalia