Quintilian's Theory of Certainty and Its Afterlife in Early Modern Italy Charles J. McNamara ...

197 Pages·2016·0.57 MB·English

Quintilian’sTheoryofCertaintyandItsAfterlifeinEarlyModernItaly
CharlesJ.McNamara
Submittedinpartialfulfillmentofthe
requirementsforthedegreeof
DoctorofPhilosophy
intheGraduateSchoolofArtsandSciences
COLUMBIAUNIVERSITY
2016
©2016
CharlesJ.McNamara
Allrightsreserved
ABSTRACT
Quintilian’sTheoryofCertaintyandItsAfterlifeinEarlyModernItaly
CharlesJ.McNamara
Thisdissertationexploreshowantiquityandsomeofitsearlymodernadmirersunder-
standthenotionofcertainty,especiallyasitistheorizedinQuintilian’sInstitutioOratoria,
a first-century educational manual for the aspiring orator that defines certainty in terms
ofconsensus. Aspartofalargerdiscussionofargumentativestrategies,Quintilianturns
to the “nature of all arguments,” which he defines as “reasoning which lends credence to
what is doubtful by means of what is certain” (ratio per ea quae certa sunt fidem dubiis
adferens: quaenaturaestomniumargumentorum,V.10.8). Thesecertainties,helaterspec-
ifies,includenotmattersofscientificdemonstrationorobjectivefact,buttheagreements
of various communities: the laws of cities, local customs, and other forms of consensus.
As the foundation of persuasive rhetoric, these consensus-based certainties situate ar-
gumentationasthepracticeofcraftingagreementsratherthandemonstratingnecessary
conclusions.
Taking as its point of departure Quintilian’s novel understanding of certainty, this
study looks to some of Quintilian’s intellectual forebears as well as his later readers to
show how his work is both a nexus of earlier intellectual developments as well as an
important inspiration for later accounts of certainty, even into the early modern period.
After illustrating in the first chapters of this dissertation how Quintilian’s manual incor-
porates elements from Aristotelian notions of dialectic and rhetoric as well as from Ci-
ceronian skeptical approaches to epistemology, I show how Quintilian’s curriculum for
theoratorshapesthethoughtofItalianhumanists,especiallythatofLorenzoValla(1406–
1457), a reformer of scholastic logic and dialectic, and Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), an
influential Neapolitan jurist. Adopting Quintilian’s rendering of certainty as a matter of
agreements and conventions, these later authors elaborate their own novel approaches
to various fields—including law, language, and logic—through this ancient understand-
ing of certum. Contrary to modern notions of certainty as objective or scientific fact,
Quintilian’shumanistreaderscontinuetorootthisconceptinconsensus,bothwithinthe
courtroomandwithout.
Contents
Acknowledgments ii
Introduction 1
1 Aristotle’sEnthymemeandtheRoleofAgreementinRhetoric 13
2 SkepticismandPropertyinCiceronianCertainty 55
3 TheStatusofSkepticisminQuintilian’sTheoryofCertainty 89
4 CertumatqueConfessum: VallaontheForensicsofCertainty 118
5 AVichianCoda: TheEndofHumanistCertainty 143
Conclusion 174
Bibliography 179
i
Acknowledgments
My utmost gratitude goes to Kathy Eden, not only for her careful and generously given
academicadvicewhileIwrotethisdissertationbutalsoforheryearsofintellectualfriend-
ship during my graduate education. I thank also Katja Vogt for her insightful guidance
fromtheearlieststagesofmyresearchandthroughitsfinalrevisions. Theothermembers
ofmycommittee—GarethWilliams,ElliotPaul,andMatthewMcGowan—deservethanks
fortheirattentivereadingofmyworkandtheirthoughtfulsuggestionsforimprovingit.
I am grateful to Elizabeth Irwin and Elizabeth Scharffenberger, too, for facilitating my
researchandteachingwhileIwrotethisdissertation.
Special thanks is due to Joe Sheppard, who read parts of this dissertation and offered
helpful suggestions for both style and argument. Molly Allen, Kate Brassel, Claire Cate-
naccio,andMathiasHansesallprovidedcrucialmoralsupportascompatriotswhileteach-
inginColumbia’sCoreCurriculumoverthepasttwoyears. AndCalebDance,alimitless
sourceofcomicfraternity,canneverbethankedsufficientlyforhiscompanionshipduring
mygraduatestudies.
Several others among the graduate students at Columbia have been helpful while
working on this project: Colin, James, Zoë, Sarah, Sam, and others have provided in-
dispensablelevityandintellectualstimulationovertheseseveralyears.
ii
My parents, Michael and Beverly, have my eternal gratitude not only for support-
ing my many years of education but also for modeling the joys of learning and reading
throughoutmylife. MybrotherJohn,too,hasbeenamuch-neededsourceoflaughter,as
havemyauntMaryLizanduncleRick.
Finally, I thank all my students. From my English students at Central High School
inHelena-WestHelena,Arkansas,tomysophomoreinterlocutorsinContemporaryCiv-
ilization at Columbia, the inquisitive minds in my classroom have always propelled my
ownstudies. Tothem,Iwillalwaysbegrateful.
iii
FormygrandmotherMaureen,
whotaughtmetolovewords
iv
Introduction
In his 1689 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the English philosopher John
Lockeinsiststhat“thehighestprobability,amountsnottocertainty;withoutwhich,there
can be no true knowledge.”¹ At least for Locke and his like-minded contemporaries, the
notion of certainty is identified with unassailable knowledge: what is certain is invari-
ableandassured. AndasLockeexplainslaterinhisessay,hisunderstandingofcertainty
extends to matters within ethics and politics as well as to other matters, for he insists
that “moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty, as mathematics.”² This notion of
certainty in the English language as empirically verified knowledge persists throughout
the thinking and writing of later philosophers as well, a tradition that continues within
contemporarydiscussionsofscienceandpoliticsalike. FromBenjaminFranklin’smaxim
that “nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes” to Werner Heisenberg’s
contributions to quantum physics, in which “uncertainty” points to the instability and
imprecision of laboratory measurements, the status of certainty in modern English in-
tellectual discourse—whether in matters of taxes or physics—is closely tied to notions of
predictability,immutability,andso-calledscientificobjectivity.
¹IV.12. CitationsofAnEssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding aretakenfromKennethWin-
kler,ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett,1996).
²IV.7.
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But this notion of certainty—what is certum—has not always carried this valence of
stable,objectiveknowledge,especiallyasitwasunderstoodbytheRomanrhetoricaltra-
dition. While empiricist reformers of the seventeenth century like Locke will claim that
“impartiality [should be] expected of judges as much as of scientists,” several earlier au-
thorsviewtherhetoricalcertaintyoftheancientoratorandthedemonstrativecertaintyof
themodernphysicistasessentiallyseparatecategoriesofknowledge.³ Particularlywithin
oneinfluentialthreadofrhetoricalthinking,theancientunderstandingofcertaintydoes
not point to unimpeachable fact but instead toward matters of consensus. This more un-
stableconceptualizationofcertaintylikelymotivatesFrancisBacon’sremarksinhis1605
Advancement of Learning that caution, “if a man will begin with certainties, he shall end
indoubts.”⁴ OnlyafewdecadesbeforeLockewritesofhisutmostconfidenceintheepis-
temicvalueofcertaintyas“trueknowledge,”Baconshowsananxietyaboutitsreliability
forgroundingscientificdiscovery.
While Bacon cautions against using certainties as the foundation for proofs, one
prominent tradition within ancient rhetorical thought advocates for certainty’s indis-
pensable role in argumentation. At the center of this tradition sits Quintilian’s Institutio
Oratoria, a first-century rhetorical manual whose twelve books aim to educate the ideal
rhetorician: the “good man skilled in speaking.”⁵ As part of a larger discussion of the
natureofrhetoricalproof,adiscussionthatstarklycontrastswithBacon’swarningabout
³Shapiro(1983,p.190).
⁴V.8. Citations of Francis Bacon are taken from The Works of Francis Bacon, James Spedding,
RobertLeslieEllis,andDouglasDenonHeath,eds. (NewYork: GarrettPress,1968).
⁵Sit ergo nobis orator quem constituimus is qui a M. Catone finitur vir bonus dicendi peritus,
XII.1.1. Translations of Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria are adapted from D.A. Russell, ed. and
trans. (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2001).
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