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Quantum randomness extraction for various levels of characterization of the devices Yun Zhi Law,1 Le Phuc Thinh,1 Jean-Daniel Bancal,1 and Valerio Scarani1,2 1Centre for Quantum Technologies, National University of Singapore, 3 Science Drive 2, Singapore 117543, Singapore 2Department of Physics, National University of Singapore, 2 Science Drive 3, Singapore 117542, Singapore (Dated: October 16, 2014) Theamountofintrinsicrandomnessthatcanbeextractedfrommeasurementonquantumsystems dependsonseveralfactors: notably,thepowergiventotheadversaryandthelevelofcharacterization ofthedevicesoftheauthorizedpartners. Afterpresentingasystematicintroductiontothesenotions, 4 in this paper we work in the class of least adversarial power, which is relevant for assessing setups 1 operated by trusted experimentalists, and compare three levels of characterization of the devices. 0 2 Many recent studies have focused on the so-called “device-independent” level, in which a lower bound on the amount of intrinsic randomness can be certified without any characterization. The ct other extreme is the case when all the devices are fully characterized: this “tomographic” level O has been known for a long time. We present for this case a systematic and efficient approach to quantifying the amount of intrinsic randomness, and show that setups involving ancillas (POVMs, 5 pointer measurements) may not be interesting here, insofar as one may extract randomness from 1 the ancilla rather than from the system under study. Finally, we study how much randomness can beobtainedinpresenceofanintermediatelevelofcharacterizationrelatedtothetaskof“steering”, ] inwhichBob’sdeviceisfullycharacterizedwhileAlice’sisablackbox. Weobtainourresultshere h by adapting the NPA hierarchy of semidefinite programs to the steering scenario. p - t n I. INTRODUCTION ied this way was quantum key distribution [6]; it a was followed by the task of generating certified ran- u q domness [7, 8] and by the quantifications of some The quantum information community has always [ entanglement measures [9, 10]. duly acknowledged Bell’s work as pioneering. In- Device-independent certification still requires 3 deed, Bell’s discovery [1] that an apparently philo- some assumptions on the devices, that we are go- v sophical issue can actually be settled by experiment 3 ing to describe in detail in the next section: these was a precursor to the approach of stopping com- 4 assumptions define the minimal level of characteri- plaining about quantum weirdness and putting it 2 zation of the devices that is required to be able to 4 to practical use. Once this novel approach was certify some quantum behavior. On the contrary, . adopted, however, there seemed to be little scope 1 the bulk of the quantum information literature usu- left for Bell inequalities: Bell having done its job by 0 ally works under the assumption that the degrees of showing that local variables don’t exist, one should 4 freedom under study (“system”) and the measure- 1 focus on entanglement as a resource. A few authors ments are fully characterized — intriguingly, this : triedtofindlinksbetweenBellinequalitiesandsome v is the case even in quantum cryptography: for in- usefultasks,butthereportedexampleshappenedto i stance, the unconditional security of the BB84 pro- X be either artefacts of restrictive assumptions [2] or tocolreliesonthefactthatthesystemsusedbyAlice r ad hoc constructions [3]. and Bob are qubits [11]. Between the two extremes, a The practical role of Bell inequalities in quantum several semi-device-independent levels of trust can information was fully clarified around the year 2007 be relevant. (see [4, 5] for a review of those developments): the The goal of this paper is to discuss how the pro- violationofBellinequalitieswitnessesentanglement ductionofquantumrandomness dependsonthelevel withoutanyneedtospecifythedimensionalityofthe with which the devices involved are characterized. system under study or the measurements that are Our results will be derived in the minimal adversar- performed on it. This means that one can certify, ial class which is relevant to assess setups produced and even more, quantify, the entanglement shared and operated by honest experimentalists. We begin between two or more black boxes. This possibility, byclarifyingallthesescenarios(SectionII),thenwe unique to Bell inequalities, has been called device- introduce the mathematical tools (Section III) and independent certification. The first task to be stud- present an explicit comparison between three levels of characterization (Section IV). Finally, we high- A. Classes of adversarial power light some subtleties proper to randomness extrac- tioninascenarioofcompletecharacterizationofthe Throughout the paper, we are going to as- system and the measurements (Section V). sume that quantum theory holds; in particular, we don’t discuss the possibility of certifying ran- domness against an adversary limited only by no- signaling [12, 14–16, 20, 21]. The power given to Eve can be divided in three main classes: II. SCENARIOS FOR QUANTUM RANDOMNESS Class (I) Eve has no access to the devices. Because of the Kerchhoff-Shannon principle (one should not look for security in hiding details of the hardware or the protocol), we assume that z q ⇢ � � even though she cannot influence it, Eve has X� knowledgeoftheexperimentalsetup. Thus,she M ⇢ mayknowineachrunwhichquantumstateen- z ters the box, and which measurement is used. Her description of both state and measure- ments may be better than that of both Al- c ice and the provider: for instance, she may be able to describe the state as pure in each FIG. 1. Generic setup of quantum randomness extrac- runbyknowingwhichdecompositionofapos- tion. The authorized party inputs z into a box and re- ceives the outcome c, whose randomness one wants to sible mixture is being used. Since the choice guarantee with respect to an adversary Eve. Inside the of measurement in each run is known to Eve, box, the role of z consists in selecting a possible mea- no initial private randomness is required here. surement M to be performed on a state ρ, and c is the We can define two subclasses, according to z outcome of that measurement. The assumption of mea- whetherEvedoesnot(a)ordoes(b)holdapu- surement independence (which is enforced here, though rificationofthestateinaquantummemory(in it could be partially relaxed) means that in each run z the literature on quantum cryptography one and ρ must be uncorrelated. Various scenarios can be finds also intermediate situations between (a) considered based on the power given to Eve (discussed and (b), the so-called bounded-storage mod- inparagraphIIA)andthelevelofcharacterizationthat els [22] and noisy storage models [23]). Be- theauthorizedpartyhasofherdevices(paragraphIIB). cause quantum theory is no-signaling, holding apurificationdoesnotallowEvetochangethe stateρ,butmaygivehermoreguessingpower We start this paper by a concise review of vari- since she will be able to steer towards a spe- ous scenarios for quantum randomness. The generic cific decomposition (by performing a specific setupforquantumrandomnessissketchedinFig.1. measurement on her reduced state). As explained in the caption, the goal of the autho- rized party is to certify the randomness of the out- Class (II) Eve distributes the state to the users, but come c with respect to Eve’s knowledge. There is a has only classical, though perfect, knowledge priori placeforathirdparty,theprovider,whomay about the set of possible measurements. Note have produced some of the devices but has no inter- that in this case, the measurement settings est in learning c. A scenario will be defined by the shouldnotbeknownbyEveinadvance,other- power given to Eve and the level of characterization wiseshecouldpreparethestateaccordinglyto of the devices. We address them in this order. obtain full knowledge of the outcomes. Thus, For definiteness, we focus exclusively on the case aninitialamountofprivaterandomnessisnec- of measurement independence: namely, we assume essarytoruntheprotocol. Wecanagaindefine that the state to be measured ρ and the choice of subclasses (a) and (b) as above. Class II(b) the measurement z are fully uncorrelated in each is a natural analog of the entanglement-based run. It is remarkable that even this assumption can schemeinwhichquantumcryptographycanbe be partially relaxed, giving rise to the possibility of proven “unconditional secure”: as such, most randomnessamplification[12–19],butwedon’tcon- papers on quantum randomness have consid- sider this task in this paper. ered it [21, 24–26]. This class is natural in the 2 Class I Class II Class III Eve... has no access to the devices distributes the state prepares the devices Subclass (a) randomness holds classical side information generation randomness no expansion randomness Subclass (b) randomness holds quantum side information generation TABLEI.Randomnessprotocolsinpresenceofmeasurementindependencewithdifferentclassesofadversaries. The gray cell corresponds to the trusted provider assumption, which describes the class of adversaries considered in this work. case where Alice holds two subsystems situ- seed must indeed guarantee measurement indepen- atedinsecured,butpossiblydistantlocations. dence, i.e. z must be “random” with respect to the choice of the state in each run, and viceversa; while Class (III) The maximal class is that in which Eve is the randomness we want to extract must be unpre- the provider, namely she prepares both the dictable for Eve. Therefore, if one works in Class I, measurement devices and the state: the only norandomnesswithrespecttoEveisrequiredinthe power left with Alice is the choice of z in each input seed: even if Eve knows z, she cannot adapt run. The claim is frequently made, at least in the state to it. Similarly, the random seed needed semi-popular accounts, that quantum physics to extract the final random bits from the output c could provide security against an adversarial throughtheleft-overhashlemmaneedsonlyberan- provider. The correct statement is that one dom with respect to the outputs themselves. It can may be able to certify the quantumness of the thusbeknowntotheadversary. Onecanthenspeak process that generates c, typically in the case of randomness generation [28]. On the contrary, in of a loophole-free Bell test. However, an ad- Classe II, since Eve prepares the state, the inputs versarial provider would certainly find a way z must be generated with a process that is a priori to hide a transmitter in the devices, with the guaranteed to be unknown to Eve. In other words, taskofleakingoutthevaluesofcattheendof in these classes there is no randomness generation, the protocol, or may employ attacks discussed butonlyrandomnessexpansion —and,afteraseries in [27]. Therefore, however certifiably quan- ofpartialresults[24,28,29],ithasbeenprovedthat tum the process that generated the outcomes such expansion can in principle be unbounded [21]. may have been, there cannot be any random- The different adversarial classes discussed here are ness with respect to an adversarial provider. summarized in Table I. So we won’t consider this class any longer in this paper. A point worth stressing is the amount of random- nessneededtogeneratetheseedz. Thechoiceofthis Finally recall that we are assuming strict mea- B. Levels of characterization of the devices surement independence. If partial measurement de- pendence is taken into account, one would have to The second defining feature of a scenario is the refine the definition of these classes: for instance, level of characterization that Alice has of the work- by specifying whether the dependence is introduced ing of her devices. We sketched it in the introduc- unwittingly by the provider or maliciously by Eve. tion, now we can be more precise: • The tomography level of characterization usu- ally means that Alice knows the behavior of her devices as well as Eve does. This is what 3 we shall consider in this paper. Of course, in knowledge of the degree of freedom, but as- the vast literature on quantum tomography, sume an upper bound on the dimensionality the possibility of partial knowledge of the de- of the systems under study [39]. In this pa- viceshasbeenconsidered[30–33],soonecould per,weshallconsiderexplicitlythecasecalled refine this level of characterization in several one-sided device-independent, in which entan- sublevels. In all cases, though, it is assumed glement is certified by two devices, Alice’s be- thatAliceknowsexactlywhichdegreesoffree- ingtomographicandBob’sunknown;thiscase dom are relevant to the measurement (polar- was studied for quantum key distribution [40]. ization, spin, quadrature of a field...). When this trust in the characterization is un- warranted, a Class II Eve may successfully C. Assumptions of this paper hack thedevices. Inparticular,Evemayknow that some degrees of freedom, others than the Inthispaper,weconsiderEveinClassI(a),which onesAliceisawareof, playaroleinthephysi- wascalled“trustedprovider”inpreviousworks[41]. calprocess,andmaythusinfluencethebehav- In real life, this class describes randomness genera- ior of the boxes by addressing those degrees tion in an experiment performed by a trusted labo- of freedom. For instance, this was the case in ratory: therefore,evenifitdoesnotexploretheulti- theseriesofexperimentsthathackedquantum matelimitsofquantumpower,itisarguablyrelevant cryptographydevicesbyexploitingthephysics for physics [42, 43]. The randomness is guaranteed of photodetectors [34–36]. Similarly, a Class against any Eve that is not involved in setting up I Eve could also take advantage of her knowl- or running the experiment. Furthermore, Eve not edgeaboutwhathappensinadditionaldegrees beinginthelab,shecouldholdthepurificationonly of freedom if a setup happens to use them. if those degrees of freedom were “radiative” and she had the power to collect them: this, together with • The device-independent level of characteriza- the state-of-the-art of quantum memories, makes it tion means that Alice does not rely on a veryreasonabletorestricttosubclass(a)atleastfor description of her devices but only on the a few years to come. observed statistics. Since the statistics on Also, we consider only the asymptotic limit of in- a single quantum system can always be re- finitely many runs where each run is assumed to be produced with classical randomness, device- independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) ac- independencerequiresaloophole-freeviolation cording to some strategy of Eve. Corrections due of a Bell inequality. Specifically, it is crucial to finite samples, and extension to non-i.i.d. scenar- to close the detection loophole, while the no- ios can in principle be done with the techniques in signaling condition may be justified in other [28, 44, 45]. ways than by arranging spacelike separation. Inanycase,Alicemayactuallyholdbothmea- surement devices in her lab. Nevertheless, for III. COMPUTING RANDOMNESS FOR convenience we shall speak of Alice and Bob DIFFERENT LEVELS OF when it comes to device-independence. We CHARACTERIZATION also note that, as it happens for measurement independence,thestrictno-signalingcondition A. Definitions and notation maybepartiallyrelaxed,butwedon’tconsider this relaxation in this paper [37]. Let us introduce the basic notions to study ran- • One can define intermediate levels of charac- domness (cf. [46]). The authorized party can in- terization, collectively known as semi-device- put z ∈ {1,...,m} in the box and obtain output independent. For instance, in the con- c∈{1,...,d} (see Fig. 1). In the asymptotic limit of text of quantum cryptography, the idea infinitely many runs, she can reconstruct the statis- of measurement-device-independence has been tics P(c|z). This statistical distribution may reflect put forward after noting that hacking usually either accidental randomness (due to ignorance of involves detectors (which are therefore bet- some details of the state or the device) or intrinsic ter left untrusted) rather than sources (which randomness, due to the unpredictability of the out- may therefore be trusted) [38]. Other works come of quantum measurements. We are interested relax the tomographic requirement of perfect in the latter because for Eve, in any of the Classes 4 defined above, there is no accidental randomness. Now we are going to explain how randomness In this section, the states |ψ(cid:105) or ρ refer to every- can be computed in each of the three levels of thing that is in the box, so that the measurements characterization of our concern. For the device- can be assumed to be projective. When the box independent level of characterization, randomness is fully characterized, it becomes possible to distin- generation against a Class Ia Eve have been pre- guish between the system and a possible ancilla, i.e. sented in [41, 48], so we don’t repeat this here. to discuss the case of POVMs as distinct. We do this in section VB. Ifthestateispure,thereisnoaccidentalrandom- B. Tomography level of characterization ness for von Neumann measurements. Then, the randomness of c obtained from a given z is quanti- For the case of tomography level of characteriza- fiedbytheprobabilityG(|ψ(cid:105),z)ofguessingtheout- tion,weareonagroundfamiliarformostphysicists. come correctly. Since the best strategy for guessing Ifaqubitispreparedinthestate|+z(cid:105),tosaythata istoguessthemostprobableoutcome,thisguessing measurement of σ provides a perfect random bit is x probability is justarephrasingofelementarytextbookknowledge. The example of a qubit prepared in the maximally G(|ψ(cid:105),z)=maxP(c|z,|ψ(cid:105)). (1) c mixedstate1/2isonlyslightlymoreinvolved: then, a measurement of a single observable (say) σ does If the state shared by Alice and Bob is mixed, we x not guarantee any randomness, because the state have to separate the intrinsic randomness from the may have been prepared by mixing eigenstates of accidental one. For measurement z, the average that operator, in which case Eve would have full guessing probability that quantifies intrinsic ran- knowledge of the outcome of each run. However, domness is then given by theuncertaintyrelationsprovideawayaroundit: if in each run Alice can choose to measure either σ G(ρ,z)= max q G(|ψ (cid:105),z), (2) x {qλ,ψλ}(cid:88)λ λ λ tohreσrezf,onreotphreerpeairsartaionndocmannebsesawnitheigreesnpsteacttetoofEbvoetahs, where ρ = q |ψ (cid:105)(cid:104)ψ |, and the maximization is long as she does not hold a purification (see [49] for λ λ λ λ taken over all possible such decompositions. how uncertainty relations must be modified if Eve For the d(cid:80)evice-independent level of characteriza- does hold a purification). tion, Alice cannot write down a quantum state but Now we provide a general recipe to compute the needs to use only the observed probability distribu- intrinsic randomness for projective measurements; tion P. Then the guessing probability that quanti- the case of POVMs will be discussed in paragraph fies intrinsic randomness is VB. Sincethestateρcanbereconstructedandisthere- G(P,z)= max G(ρ,z), (3) fore part of the observed data, we need to perform (ρ,M)→P the maximization of Eq. (2). In the decomposition, where the maximization is taken over all quantum it is not a priori obvious how many quantum states states ρ and measurements M compatible with the |ψλ(cid:105) are to be considered. Fortunately, the argu- probability distribution P. ment used in [41] can be transposed directly from Inallthesecases,thenumberofrandombitsthat probability distributions to density matrices. In a can be extracted per run is quantified by the min- nutshell, all the lambdas for which the inner max- entropy imization is achieved by the same argument c can be grouped together into a unique lambda (which is Hmin(G)=−log2G. (4) relabeled as c). Thus, it is sufficient to consider one state per outcome. Finally, one may consider extracting randomness Therefore, for a projective measurement M ≡ out of several settings, rather than a single one. If {Π ,c=1,...,d} with d outcomes, one has to solve c Eveisallowedtokeepapurificationofthestate[sub- classes (b)], upon learning which settings have been G(ρ,M)=max Tr ρ Π (5) used in a given run, she may be able to steer the {ρc} c c c state to the decomposition that maximizes (2) for (cid:88) (cid:2) (cid:3) those settings [47]. If Eve does not hold a purifica- under the constraints that ρ = ρ , ρ ≥ 0. Like c c c tion [subclasses (a)], however, using several settings in the case of device-independence, this maximiza- is known to be advantageous [41]. tion is a semi-definite program ((cid:80)SDP), the only dif- 5 ference being that the matrix that must be posi- withA ={Πx}andB ={Πy}denotingAliceand x a y b tive is the quantum state itself, not a matrix of mo- Bob’slocalmeasurements. Theguessingprobability mentaoftheobservedstatistics. Moreover, herethe is analog to (3) and given by SDP solves the problem of interest directly, rather G(P,z)= max G(ρ,A ,B ) than a relaxation thereof. Given the tomography x y (ρ,Ax,By)→P levelofcharacterization, Alicecanchoosetoextract = max P (c|z) (9) randomnessfromany measurement,andwillchoose c that for which the guessing probability in (5) is the (ρc,Ax,By)→P(cid:88)c lowest. Hence, for a given state ρ, where ρ = cρc, and Pc(a,b|x,y) = Tr(ρcΠxa ⊗ Πy). The constraints for the optimization are the G(ρ)=minG(ρ,M) [one measurement]. (6) obbserved sta(cid:80)tistics P(a,b|x,y), and the knowledge M of the state and measurements on Bob’s side. Further, when Eve is not allowed to hold a purifica- Such optimization is very similar to the one used tion, it may be advantageous to extract randomness for the device-independent level of characterization from more measurements. If setting Mz is chosen in [41, 48], where one can use the hierarchy intro- with probability qz, the average guessing probabil- duced in [52] to provide upper bounds. In that ity will be case, from the set of local measurements and de- pending on the hierarchy’s level, one forms a cer- m G(ρ,{Mz}z)=m{ρaCx} C z=1qzTr ρCΠzcz tuaeisnwmitahtriρxcΓocfwphroodseucetlsemoefnotpsearraetoerxspoecfttahtieonfovrmal-: (cid:88)(cid:88) (cid:2) (cid:3) (cid:104)M ⊗1(cid:105),(cid:104)1⊗M (cid:105),(cid:104)M ⊗M (cid:105),(cid:104)M M(cid:48) ⊗1(cid:105),(cid:104)1⊗ =max Tr ρCMC , (7) M AM(cid:48) (cid:105), (cid:104)M MB(cid:48) ⊗MAM(cid:48) (cid:105)B, etc, wAherAe M ,M(cid:48) , {ρC}(cid:88)C (cid:2) (cid:3) anBd MBB,MB(cid:48)AareAoperaBtorsBfrom the set of AAliceA’s wherewehavedenotedM = m q Πz ;thecon- and Bob’s local measurements (union the identity), straints are as above, andCnow Cz==1 (zc ,czc ,...,c ), respectively (see [52] for a detailed description of 1 2 m so the maximization now invo(cid:80)lves a decomposition this matrix). Some elements of Γc are related to on dm states. The fact that Eve cannot steer Al- the Pc(a,b|x,y) mentioned above, while others are ice’s mixture is explicit in that the decomposition extra unknown variables in the optimization. By ρ = CρC is independent of z. As above, Alice constraining Γc to be positive semi-definite and the is allowed to choose the set of measurements that sum over c of Pc(a,b|x,y) to be the observed statis- minim(cid:80)izes the guessing probability, so tics, one can bound the guessing probability in the device-independent level of characterization. G(ρ)= min G(ρ,{Mz}) [more measurements].(8) Nowintheone-sideddevice-independentcase, we {Mz} impose further constraints on the elements of Γ c Notice that unlike the optimization (7) which is an based on the knowledge of Bob’s measurements. SDP, this last optimization over the choices of mea- Namely, we use the algebraic relations satisfied by surement settings is not a SDP. these operators to constraint the moments of Γc which involve them. For instance, if B = (B + √ 3 1 B )/ 2 or B B = −B B , the relations (cid:104)OB (cid:105) = 2 1 2 √ 2 1 3 C. One-sided device-independent level of ((cid:104)OB (cid:105)+(cid:104)OB (cid:105))/ 2or(cid:104)OB B (cid:105)=−(cid:104)OB B (cid:105)are 1 2 1 2 2 1 characterization imposed for all product of operators O. This re- duces the number of independent variables in the The one-sided device-independent level of charac- optimization. Theserelationsareimposedoneachc terization, to our knowledge, has never been consid- in (9), as they should hold for each of the ρ in the c ered before in the context of randomness. The sce- decomposition. Notethatwedonotdirectlyusethe narioisverysimilartosteering[50,51]: thesetupis knowledge of Bob’s local state to further constraint actuallythesame,butthefigureofmeritisdifferent. the optimization. We thus obtain an upper bound Indeed,insteadofhavingAlicetoconvinceBobthat on the guessing probability. shecansteerhisstate,wejustletthemperformtheir Just like in the other levels of characterization, measurements locally and ask whether randomness onecouldconsiderextractingrandomnessfrommore can be extracted from their outcomes. than one measurement here, if Eve does not hold a Like before, we consider first the amount of ran- purificationofthemeasuredstate. Theoptimization dom bits that can be extracted from the outcomes problem can be set up in a manner analogous to c=(a,b)ofasinglepairofmeasurementsz =(x,y) what we have been considering. 6 IV. COMPARISON OF THE YIELDS OF THREE LEVELS OF CHARACTERIZATION 2 1.8 Tomography One−sided device−independent Inordertocomparetheyieldsofthevariouslevels 1.6 Device−independent of characterization, we need a common set of data. 1.4 We assume that the data come from measuring a 1.2 two-qubit Werner state ρ = V|Φ+(cid:105)(cid:104)Φ+| + (1 − V)1/4; Alice measures eithVer A = σ or A = σ , Hmin 1 1 x 2 z Bob measures one of the four B1 = σx, B2 =√σz, 0.8 B3 = σ+ or B4 = σ− with σ± = (σx ± σz)/ 2. 0.6 These measurements can lead to non-trivial assess- 0.4 ment for all the level of characterization we are in- 0.2 terestedin. Indeed, (A ,A ;B ,B )canbeusedfor 1 2 1 2 partialtomographyandidentify|Φ+(cid:105)uniquelywhen 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 V =1; for device-independence, (A ,A ;B ,B ) vi- Visibility 1 2√ 3 4 olate the CHSH inequality for V > 1/ 2 and cer- √ tify |Φ+(cid:105) for V = 1 because CHSH = 2 2 [53]; for FIG.2. AmountofrandomnessextractedHmin fromthe one-sided device-independence, a similar argument outcomes of the setting pair A2,B1 from three different levels of characterizations. holds for (A ,A ;B ,B ) and the steering inequal- 1 2 1 2 ity S defined in [54]. Anyway, in what follows, the 2 amountofrandomnessiscomputeddirectlyfromthe is certified from an optimal violation of the CHSH observed statistics, without processing them into a inequality specific tomography protocol or inequality. As mentioned before, we focus on the random- CHSH=(cid:104)A B (cid:105)+(cid:104)A B (cid:105)+(cid:104)A B (cid:105)−(cid:104)A B (cid:105)≤2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 ness generated by a single pair of setting. In the (10) device-independent case, we bound the amount of withthesamestate,andfromaoptimalviolationof random bits using the second level of the hierar- a modified CHSH inequality chy [52], as described in (3) (see [41, 48] for more CHSH =(cid:104)A B (cid:105)+(cid:104)A B (cid:105)+(cid:104)A B (cid:105) details). For the one-sided device-independent case, 3 1 1 1 2 2 1 we use the method described in section IIIC at the −(cid:104)A2B2(cid:105)+(cid:104)A1B3(cid:105)≤3. (11) same level of the hierarchy, together with the al- Theselasttwocomputationsareperformedbyfixing gebraic relations generated by Bob’s measurements √ √ the value of the inequality rather than the value of (includingB =(B +B )/ 2,B =(B −B )/ 2, 3 1 2 4 1 2 the correlations in the corresponding SDP. The re- B B = −B B , B B = −B B , etc.). Finally, 1 2 2 1 3 4 4 3 sult is shown in Fig. 3: 2 bits of randomness can be for tomography characterization, we compute the extracted indeed from CHSH when the pair of per- amount of randomness based on (7), as explained 3 fectly uncorrelated measurements Z ,X are used. in section IIIB. A B However, no such measurements are available when The main result we obtained for three different CHSH is maximally violated. levels of characterization is shown in Fig. 2. As ex- NotealsothatinFig.2and3,randomnesscanbe pected, for any visibility V the amount of random- extracted in the device-independent case only pro- ness increases with the level of characterization of vided that a Bell inequality is violated, i.e. when √ √ the devices, with the tomographic level giving the V < 1/ 2 for CHSH and V = 3/(2 2+1) ≈ 0.78 largest amount of randomness. forCHSH . Inother words, norandomness is found 3 Note that for all three different levels of charac- when a local hiddenvariable modelcanproduce the terization, two bits of randomness can be extracted observed correlations. when V =1. In the device-independent case, this is In the one-sided device-independent case, how- more randomness than the ∼ 1.23 bits that can be ever, randomness can be extracted from all Werner certifiedfromthemaximalviolationoftheCHSHin- state, except the completely mixed state. Yet, it is equality [7]. To understand this difference, we com- knownthatWernerstatesarenon-steerableforV ≤ paretheamountofrandomnessthatcanbecertified 0.5 [50], i.e. such states admit a Local Hidden State in this scenario from different constraints. (LHS) model. Thus, our result shows that one can Namely, we consider the randomness that can be certify randomness in one-sided device-independent certified from the correlations above, the one that context even in presence of a LHS model. 7 ρ = 1/2, against an adversary of Class I(a). We 2 recover known results on uncertainty relations and 1.8 CHSH shownumericalevidenceformoregeneralsituations. Modified CHSH AsmentionedatthebeginningofparagraphIIIB, 1.6 Full Probability forasinglemeasurement[Eq.(6)]onehasG(1/2)= 1.4 0: for whatever measurement being performed be- ingperformed,themixturemayhavebeenprepared 1.2 by mixing the two eigenstates of the measurement Hmin 1 and this information could be available to Eve. So 0.8 to bound the guessing capability of Eve, we need to consider more than one measurements. We thus 0.6 refer to Eqs (7) and (8) from now onwards. 0.4 Letusdenote{M } theN projectivemea- k k=1,...,N 0.2 surements: foranystringofvaluesC =(c1,...,cN)∈ {−1,+1}N, the effective measurement operator is 0 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1 Visibility 1+(cid:126)n ·(cid:126)σ N M = C with (cid:126)n = q c (cid:126)n .(12) C 2 C k k k FIG. 3. The amount of randomness computed with dif- k(cid:88)=1 ferent constraints: CHSH, CHSH3, and full observed With this notation, we have statistics. H ofCHSHcorrespondstothesettingpair min A2,B3, while others correspond to A2,B1. G(1/2,{M })= 1+maxC|(cid:126)nC| . (13) k 2 This can be understood by the fact that a local Indeed, the r.h.s. is obviously an upper bound, hidden state model only ascribes fixed outcomes to since it is the largest of the eigenvalues; and themeasurementofoneparty. Theotherone,Bobin it can be achieved by the decomposition 1/2 = ourcase,receivesaquantumstatetomeasure. How- 21|+(cid:126)nC¯(cid:105)(cid:104)+(cid:126)nC¯|+ 12|−(cid:126)nC¯(cid:105)(cid:104)−(cid:126)nC¯| where C¯ is defined ever, Bob enjoys in this context a tomographic level by |(cid:126)nC¯| = maxC|(cid:126)nC|. Finally, we are allowed to of characterization of his system. He can thus al- choose the N most favorable measurements, i.e. waysextractsomerandomnessfromthisstate. This Eq. (8) becomes G(1/2,N)= 1+2gN for is the case unless all the quantum states given to g ≡ min max|(cid:126)n |. (14) Bob can all be chosen in the same basis, as possible N {Mk,qk} C C when V =0. Now, since |(cid:126)n |=1, we have NotethatrandomnesscanbeextractedforallV > k 0thienrtahnedtoommnoegsrsaaplhsiocdleisvaeplpoefatrrsustthearsewwehlle.nHVow=eve0r, |(cid:126)nC|2 = qk2+ (ckqk(cid:126)nk)·(ck(cid:48)qk(cid:48)(cid:126)nk(cid:48)).(15) k k(cid:54)=k(cid:48) i.e. whentheWernerstateiswhitenoise. Inthenext (cid:88) (cid:88) section,wediscusshowrandomnesscanbeextracted Notice that the second term can always be made from the white noise by using several measurement non-negative by the maximization over C. Indeed, settings. it follows from (ckqk(cid:126)nk)·(ck(cid:48)qk(cid:48)(cid:126)nk(cid:48))=0 (16) V. MORE RESULTS ON THE c1(cid:88),...,cNk(cid:88)(cid:54)=k(cid:48) TOMOGRAPHIC LEVEL OF that maxC k(cid:54)=k(cid:48)(ckqk(cid:126)nk)·(ck(cid:48)qk(cid:48)(cid:126)nk(cid:48)) ≥ 0. There- CHARACTERIZATION fore,intheminimization,thebestchoicewouldcon- sist in choo(cid:80)sing all the vectors mutually orthogonal, A. Randomness from single-qubit white noise but this is possible only for N = 2,3. In these and uncertainty relations cases, iti√ssimpletofinishtheoptimiz√ation: wefind g = 1/ 2 ≈ 0.7071 and g = 1/ 3 ≈ 0.5774. 2 3 Notice that, translated in min-entropy, the case Among the many possible illustrations of ran- domness in the tomographic level of characteriza- for N = 2 bound saturates the uncertainty rela- tion for two min-entropies, Eq. (9) of [55], namely tion, we consider the case of randomness extraction √ from a single qubit in the maximally mixed state H (σ )+H (σ )≥log(1+1/ 2). min z min x 2 8 To go further, we resort to numerical optimiza- bound. In particular, we can choose tion to obtain upper bounds on g . For N = 4, N the optimal choice of measurements is found to be ρ = Πc , q = Tr Πc (18) {(σ ,1−3q),(σ ,q),(σ ,q),(−σ ,q)}wherethevec- c Tr Π c d z 1 2 3 c (cid:2)s (cid:3) tors (cid:126)n are 120 degrees apart from each other in 1,2,3 thex−yplane;knowingthisgeometry,onecanfinish which indeed gives (cid:2) cq(cid:3)cρc =1/ds. Then the optimization analytically to find g = 4/13≈ 4 G(1/d(cid:80),{Π }) 0.5547 for q =3/13. For N =5 and N =6, we find s c g5 ≈ 0.5422 and g6 ≈ 0.5270. This trend(cid:112)suggests ≥ n Tr Πc Tr Πc Π tthhaatt,twhhisenwoNuld→b∞e ,thoenecahsaesigfNth→e o12p;tiwmealchcehcokiecde (cid:88)c=1 d(cid:2)s (cid:3) (cid:20)Tr[Πc] c(cid:21) would consist in spreading the (cid:126)nk uniformly in the = n 1 Tr Π2 . (19) half-sphere. d c c=1 s (cid:88) (cid:2) (cid:3) EachΠ canbewrittenasitsspectraldecomposition c B. Randomness from POVMs rc Π = µ |k (cid:105)(cid:104)k | (20) c c,k c c As we have just seen and also mentioned in para- k(cid:88)=1 graph IIIB, no randomness can be extracted from where r = rank(Π ) and µ are the eigenvalues c c c,k a single projective measurement on the maximally of Π , with |k (cid:105)(cid:104)k | to be the corresponding projec- c c c mixed state, because Eve may know the decom- tor. Substituting the spectral decomposition into position in the eigenvalues of that measurement. Eq. (19) gives The reasoning does not seem to apply to POVMs, though: even knowing a pure state, in general Eve n 1 1 n rc Tr Π2 = µ2 (21) cannot guess with certainty the outcome of a non- d c d c,k projective POVM. Is it therefore possible to extract (cid:88)c=1 s (cid:2) (cid:3) s (cid:88)c=1k(cid:88)=1 randomness from a single POVM on the maximally But using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have mixed state? The answer is, yes, but the origin of the randomness makes the problem trivial. Indeed, n rc n rc n rc 2 µ2 12 ≥ µ because of Neumark’s theorem, a POVM is noth- k,c c,k ing else than a projective measurement on the sys- (cid:20)(cid:88)c=1k(cid:88)=1 (cid:21)(cid:20)(cid:88)c=1k(cid:88)=1 (cid:21) (cid:20)(cid:88)c=1k(cid:88)=1 (cid:21) tem and some additional degrees of freedom. We that is, are going to show that a POVM on the maximally mixed state cannot provide more randomness than n rc d2 µ2 ≥ s , (22) that present in the ancilla — thence it is pointless c,k n r toperformthePOVMforrandomnesspurposes,one (cid:88)c=1k(cid:88)=1 c=1 c could have measured the ancilla directly. because n rc µ = (cid:80)n Tr Π = d . By c=1 k=1 c,k c=1 k s To see this, let us first denote the system’s di- substituting this inequality into Eq. (21), we find mensions by d . The n-outcomes POVM elemenets finally th(cid:80)e foll(cid:80)owing lower (cid:80)bound on(cid:0) th(cid:1)e guessing s are written as {Πc}c=1,...,n. Given that the state we probability: have is white noise, the probability for Eve to guess the outcomes correctly is G(1/d ,{Π })≥ ds (23) s c n r c=1 c G(1/d ,{Π }) s c that is, the upper bound on th(cid:80)e min-entropy n = max q Tr ρ Π (17) c c c H (1/d ,{Π })≤log( r )−logd . (24) {qc,|ψc(cid:105)}c=1 min s c c s (cid:88) (cid:2) (cid:3) c (cid:88) where 1/d = q ρ and, as previously, ρ InthetensorproductimplementationofthePOVM, s c c c c groups all the states in the decomposition for which which uses an ancilla of dimension d , we have a maxc(cid:48)Tr[ρΠc(cid:48)] = (cid:80)Tr[ρΠc]. Since the maximization crc = dsda; whence the maximum min-entropy in Equation (17) is taken over all possible decompo- is logd , which comes solely from the ancilla. In a sition, any specific decomposition provides a lower (cid:80)the direct sum implementation, r = d +d is c c s h (cid:80) 9 theminimumtotaldimension(system+hiddensub- one should ignore the atom and extract randomness space) required to implement the POVM [56]: since directly from the laser. For yet other pointer mea- log(d + d ) ≤ logd + logd , the min-entropy is surements, it may not even be feasible to measure s h s h upper bounded by logd . In both cases, we have the pointer in a complementary basis (certainly it h proved our claim: all the randomness that can be would be challenging for the Stern-Gerlach setup). obtained in a POVM on the maximally mixed state It is not our aim to propose concrete schemes to canbeascribedtotheadditionaldegreesoffreedom extractrandomnessatthetomographylevelofchar- used to implement the POVM. Finally notice that, acterization. Rather,thebottom-linemessagecould as far as our proof goes, this conclusion applies only beputthisway: wheneveraquantumdegreeoffree- when the system is in the maximally mixed state: dom is measured by coupling it to a pointer, the it remains an open problem whether, in other cases, pointer is usually in a well-defined quantum state. POVMsmayextractmorerandomnessfromthesys- So, if the goal is to extract randomness, it is worth tem than projective measurements. considering the possibility of getting it directly from the pointer. C. Randomness from pointer measurements VI. CONCLUSION The previous observation on POVMs extends to another case in which additional degrees of freedom In this work, we have quantified the randomness are used: that of measurement by coupling the rele- that can be extracted from a given quantum de- vantdegreeoffreedomtoapointer. Thebestknown vice with the device-independent, one-sided device- textbook example is the Stern-Gerlach experiment. independent, and tomographic level of characteriza- More common nowadays is the measurement of the tion. Specific tools were introduced to perform this polarization of a photon: thephotonissentonapo- quantification in the one-sided device-independent larizing beam-splitter (PBS), the two output ports and tomographic cases. For the latter, we have also of which are correlated with orthogonal polariza- shownthatnotallconceivableprocedurestoextract tions. It is by detecting in which beam the photon randomness are actually relevant: in particular one is(pointer)thatpolarizationisinferred. Now,ifone must be careful whenever ancillas are involved since sets up an experiment to extract randomness from the randomness may just come from them rather the polarization qubit [57, 58], the same setup pro- than from the system under study. We have fo- videsanotherdegreeoffreedom,whosestatemustbe cusedontheminimalclassofadversarialpower,rele- very close to pure if the measurement has to make vant for the study of implementations performed by sense at all: indeed, the beam must come from a trusted experimentalists; a similar study could be well-defined direction for the PBS to work as ex- conducted for randomness extraction against more pected. Thence, in principle one can extract more powerful adversaries. randomnessbyignoringpolarizationandsendingthe photononanormalbeam-splitter[59,60]. Westress that this argument bears on the amount of random- nessandonsimplicity“onpaper”: polarizationmay ACKNOWLEDGMENT be preferable to deal with other practical concerns [57]. This work is funded by the Singapore Ministry of Forotherqubits,thingsmaybemoresubtle. Con- Education (partly through the Academic Research sider for instance the probing of an atomic qubit Fund Tier 3 MOE2012-T3-1-009) and by the Singa- withalaserbeam: alaserbeamalonecanbeusedto pore National Research Foundation. We thank two generaterandomness[61],butwithadifferentdetec- anonymousrefereesforusefulcommentsthatleadto tionschemethantheoneusedinprobingatomicex- improving the structure of the paper, and Gonzalo citations;soitmaynotbeimmediatetosuggestthat de la Torre for discussions. [1] J. S. Bell, Physics (Long Island City, N.Y.) 1, 195 [2] V. Scarani and N. Gisin, Physical Review A 65, (1964). 012311 (2002). 10

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