Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in US Lawmaking, 1953-2004

210 Pages·2010·1.13 MB·English

by  Matthew N. Beckmann

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PUSHINGTHEAGENDA
Today’spresidentsenterofficehavingcampaignedonanambitiouspolicy
agenda,eagertoseeitenacted,andwillingtopushsothatitis.Thecen-
tralquestionofpresidents’legislativeleadership,therefore,isnotaques-
tion of resolve but a question of strategy: By what means can presidents
build winning coalitions for their agenda? Pushing the Agenda uncovers
theanswer.Itrevealsthesystematicstrategiespresidentsemploytoinflu-
ence Congress and the conditions that determine when those strategies
work–ordon’t.Drawingonaneclecticarrayoforiginalevidence–span-
ning presidentsfromDwight Eisenhowerto George W. Bush – Matthew
N.Beckmannfindsthatmodernpresidents’influenceinCongressisreal,
oftensubstantial,and,todate,largelyunderestimated.
Matthew N. Beckmann is Assistant Professor of political science at the
University of California, Irvine, where he studies Washington politics,
particularly those involving the White House. His work has appeared in
the Journal of Politics, theJournal of Theoretical Politics, Political Research
Quarterly, and Political Communication. Professor Beckmann received his
BAfromtheUniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles,andhisPhDfromthe
UniversityofMichigan.
“Acriticalpartofthenewgenerationofpresidencyresearch,Matthew
Beckmann’sPushingtheAgendatakescomplexformalandinformalthe-
oriesseriouslyandthenasks,‘isthisreallyhowpresidentialinfluence
works?’ His distinction between endgame, where votes matter most,
and‘earlygame,’wherecooperationoveragendasmattersmost,con-
stitutesanoriginaltheoreticaswellasempiricalcontributionthataca-
demicsineverysettingwillbegintotakeupintheirownresearch.His
analysisofpresidential‘influence’withinthesetwocontextsbreathes
newlifeintoatraditionalconceptrenderedmoribundbytwodecades
of identification with measures of ‘voting success’ by demonstrating
that when agendas matter and when votes matter, presidents matter
andnotatthemarginseither,butatthecore.Thisbookrepresentsa
foundationonwhichtoconstructanewgenerationofunderstanding
andrelevancyforpresidencyresearch.”
–TerrySullivan,HooverInstitution,StanfordUniversity,
andUniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill
“MatthewBeckmann’sPushingtheAgenda:PresidentialLeadershipinU.S.
Lawmaking, 1953–2004, is a major contribution to our knowledge
aboutpresidentiallegislativepower.Heusesrichandinnovativequan-
titative and qualitative analysis of the last half-century’s presidential-
congressional interactions to explain presidential power on the Hill.
Hiswell-writtenanduniqueanalysisfocusesonpresidentialstrategies
andsuccessesandfailuresofpresidentialinfluenceinCongress.Itis
amust-readforanyoneinterestedinthepresidencyandCongress.”
–JamesA.Thurber,AmericanUniversity
Pushing the Agenda
Presidential Leadership in
U.S. Lawmaking, 1953–2004
Matthew N. Beckmann
UniversityofCalifornia,Irvine
CAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITYPRESS
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Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521760140
© Matthew N. Beckmann 2010
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the
provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part
may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published in print format 2010
ISBN-13 978-0-511-71259-3 eBook (NetLibrary)
ISBN-13 978-0-521-76014-0 Hardback
ISBN-13 978-0-521-16291-3 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy
of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication,
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
Contents
Figures pagevii
Tables ix
Acknowledgments xi
1 Introduction 1
2 ATheoryofPositivePresidentialPower 27
3 CaseStudy:PushingPresidentBush’s2001TaxCut 68
4 WinningKeyVotes,1953–2004 106
5 SigningNewLaws,1953–2004 128
6 ThePracticeandPotentialofPresidentialLeadership 150
Appendix: ArchivalStudyTechnicalDetails 163
References 177
Index 187
v
Dedicatedtomyparents,BobandMaryLou
Figures
1.1 ThePivotalPoliticsModelofLawmaking page8
1.2 Presidents’LegislativeInfluenceviaAgendaSetting 19
1.3 Presidents’LegislativeInfluenceviaLobbying 22
2.1 AModelofLawmaking 30
2.2 ImplicationsoftheLegislativeEndgame 32
2.3 FilibusterPivotsintheEighty-Third(1953–54)and
Eighty-Sixth(1959–60)Congresses 35
2.4 RangeofPotentiallyPassablePoliciesforDifferent
StatusQuos 38
2.5 Presidents’andSupportiveLeaders’Preferences 39
2.6 TheBasicPolicymakingGameunderUnifiedand
DividedGovernment(withClosedRules) 43
2.7 AModelofLawmakingwithPresidentialLobbying 46
2.8 Vote-CenteredLobbying 48
2.9 PresidentialInfluenceviaVote-CenteredLobbying 49
2.10 Agenda-CenteredLobbying 56
2.11 PresidentialInfluenceviaAgenda-Centeredand
Vote-CenteredLobbying 60
3.1 HouseofRepresentativesPreferenceDistribution,
107thCongress 77
3.2 U.S.SenatePreferenceDistribution,107thCongress 78
3.3 Senators’PreferenceDistribution,inSampleandTotal 87
3.4 SourcesofAdministration’sLobbyingContacts,2001
TaxCutDebate 92
3.5 LocationsofPresidentBush’s“Going-Public”Events,
2001TaxCutDebate 93
vii
viii figures
4.1 PresidentialParty’sPercentageofMembersand“Key”
VoteWins:HouseofRepresentatives 107
4.2 PresidentialParty’sPercentageofMembersand“Key”
VoteWins:Senate 109
4.3 PresidentialSuccessin“Key”DomesticVotes,bythe
President’sInvolvement,1953–2004 114
4.4 PredictedProbabilityofWinningandLosing“Key”Votes
intheHouse,bythePresident’sInvolvement 120
4.5 PredictedProbabilityofWinningandLosing“Key”Votes
intheSenate,bythePresident’sInvolvement 121
4.6 PredictedProbabilityofReachingandWinning“Key”
Votes:House 124
4.7 PredictedProbabilityofReachingandWinning“Key”
Votes:Senate 124
5.1 LegislativeOutcomesVis-a`-VisthePresident’s
Preference,1953–2004 130
5.2 LegislativeOutcomesVis-a`-VisthePresident’s
Preference,byAdministration 131
5.3 PresidentialInvolvementandLegislativeSuccess,by
PoliticalCapital 136
5.4 PredictedProbabilityofthePresident’sLegislative
Success 144
5.5 ActualandPredictedLevelsofthePresident’s
LegislativeSuccess 145
5.6 DifferencebetweenActualandPredictedSuccessWhen
PresidentsLobbied 146
A.1 TheSample’sDistributionofPolicyDomains 167
A.2 President’sSuccessinCongressionalQuarterly’sKeyVotes,
byPresident,1953–2004 170