Public Policy and Private Interests: The Institutions of Compromise

441 Pages·1975·42.979 MB·English

by  D. C. Hague, W. J. M. Mackenzie, A. Barker (auth.)

PUBUC POLICY AND PRIVATE INTERESTS
Also by D. C. Hague
Managerial Economics
Pricing in Business
Economics of Man-made Fibres
A Textbook of Economic Theory (co-author)
The Dilemma of Accountability in Modern Government
(co-editor with Bruce L. R. Smith}
Devaluation and Pricing Decisions (co-author)
Also by W. ]. M. Mackenzie
Central Administration in Great Britain
(co-author with]. W. Grove)
Free Elections
Five Elections in Africa
(co-editor with K. Robinson)
Politics and Social Science
The Study of Political Science Today
Power, Violence, Decision
Explorations in Government: Collected Papers 1951-1968
Also by A. Barker
The Member of Parliament and his Information
(co-author with M. Rush}
PUBLIC POLICY
AND
PRIVATE
INTERESTS
The Institutions of Compromise
D.C. HAGUE
W. J. M. MACKENZIE
A. BARKER
© D. C. Hague, W. J. M. Mackenzie and A. Barker 1975
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1975 978-0-333-14768-9
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without permission
First published 1975 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke
Associated companies in New York
Dublin Melbourne Johannesburg and Madras
ISBN 978-1-349-01870-3 ISBN 978-1-349-01868-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-01868-0
Typeset in Great Britain by
PREFACE IlMITED
Salisbury, Wilts
This book is sold subject
to the standard conditions
of the Net Book Agreement
Contents
Preface Vll
1 Introduction 1
2 Administrative Control, Collusive Conflict and
Uncoupled Hierarchies W. J. M. Mackenzz"e and
C. C. Hood 34
3 Self-Nationalisation 48
3.1 Rolls-Royce Martz"n Edmonds 53
4 Quasi-Non-Governmental Organisations 91
4.1 National Research Development Corporation
D. C. Hague and Graham Haz"gh 93
4.2 The National Computing Centre
D. C. Hague and Graham Haz"gh 115
4.3 Manchester Business School D. C. Hague 130
4.4 Postscript 153
5 Partnership in Research and Development: The
Industrial Research Associations 166
5.1 British Research Associations 168
5.2 The British Ceramics Research Association
John Kockelberg 175
5.3 The Lambeg Industrial Research Association
John Kockelberg 187
5.4 The Government and the Research
Associations 194
6 The Research Councils 202
6.1 The Medical Research Council
Fanny Mz"tchell 204
6.2 Postscript D. C. Hague 244
Vl Public Policy and Private Interests
7 The Arts, Sport and the Mass Media 249
7.1 Films and Television C. C. Hood 257
8 Social Innovation 284
8.1 Accountability and Social Innovation: Some
British Experience Gerald Rhodes 287
9 Self-Regulation and Consumer Power 327
9.1 The National House Builders Registration
Council Anthony Barker 333
10 Conclusions 356
Appendix I: The Quasi-Non-Governmental
Organisation Alan Pifer 380
Appendix II: The Non-Governmental Organisation
at Bay Alan Pifer 395
Appendix III: The Problem of Classifying Institutions
C. C. Hood and W. ]. M. Mackenzie 409
Index 425
Preface
As we shall explain in greater detail in Chapter 1, this book is one
outcome of a collaborative project financed by the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, spread over about five years. It
brought together British and American politicians, civil servants,
other public officials, academics and businessmen. This par
ticular volume has been greatly influenced by formal and
informal discussions which took place between changing groups
of those interested in the Carnegie project, but its main
function is to report on what came out of a number of case
studies made in our three institutions.
Because the case studies deal with a variety of situations, we
are keenly aware of the need to help the reader to see how each
chapter fits into the book as a whole. We have therefore
provided a headnote for most chapters, and in some cases a
postscript as well, explaining how the chapter relates to our
main theme. We also felt the book needed a reasonably uniform
style. Douglas Hague therefore agreed to produce the final
draft, with the aim of making this a coherent volume and of
reducing stylistic differences between the contributors.
We must thank a number of people for their help with this
book. First, we are indebted to the research assistants named in
Chapter 1 who wrote, or helped to write, case studies, as well as
to Gerald Rhodes who wrote the study in Chapter 8. Second,
we should like to thank all those who gave us information.
Since they are so many, we hope they will forgive us if we do
not mention any one by name. We should, however, like to
thank them sincerely for being, without exception, both helpful
and courteous. Third, we should like to thank all the partici
pants in our discussions and conferences in Britain and America
which formed an important part of the Carnegie project. They
contributed significantly to the development of our ideas.
Finally, we must thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York
for the finance which made the project possible.
While we believe that the order in which we list our names
below gives a rough indication of the work we have each done
Vll
Publt'c Policy and Private Interests
Vlll
in writing the present volume, we should find it impossible to
provide a similar ranking for the contribution we, or others
concerned with the Carnegie project, have made to the thinking
in this volume. One of the attractions of the Carnegie project
has been the enthusiasm with which all concerned in it have
contributed to the development of understanding in a difficult
field.
D. C. HAGUE
Manchester Business School
J.
W. M. MACKENZIE
University of Glasgow
A. BARKER
University of Essex
1 Introduction
This book reports on a project financed by the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, which included two conferences
between senior British and American politicians, public servants
and academics as well as research in three British universities.
One conference was held in England, at Ditchley, near Oxford,
in 1969, and the other at Williamsburg, in Virginia, in 1971.
The Carnegie project began by trying to answer a difficult
question, though it was one which could be stated in familiar
terms. It was: how can we decentralise public activities and yet
ensure that those to whom these activities are devolved remain
accountable? Managers appear to do this successfully in other
organisations, especially private business. Can it be done in
government too? 'Big industry' and 'big government' share a
dilemma that was stated in the first book on the Carnegie
project.1 This contained the papers and the record of the
discussion of the Ditchley Conference, which had forty partic
ipants, about half from Britain and half from the United States.
The dilemma was this: Do we insist on holding all public and
quasi-public bodies accountable in detail for what they do, and
so destroy their initiative? Or do we insist on their autonomy,
and so lose effective control over them?
This dilemma was discussed at length at the Ditchley
Conference, but of course it was not resolved there. The most
we could claim was that we had recognised that the dilemma
exists; that there is here a problem for which there is no clear
solution, certainly no unique solution. There was lengthy
discussion at Ditchley of the instruments of public control over
quasi-public bodies, for example through committees of the
legislature and arrangements for statutory audit, as by the
Comptroller and Auditor-General. There was also discussion of
the extent to which 'countervailing power' can be exerted by
one institution or group on another. There was general
agreement at Ditchley on the way in which such old-established
institutions and arrangements would have to be changed if they
were to be modernised. But while it was agreed that changes
1