Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus Mershon Series

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Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus Mershon
Series: Research Programs and Debates
Author(s): Ole R. Holsti
Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 439-466
Published by: Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of The International Studies Association
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InternationaSl tudiesQ uarterly(1 992) 36, 439-466
Public Opiniiona nd ForeignP olicy:C hallenges
to theA lmond-LippmannC onsensus
MershonS eries:R esearchP rogramasn d Debates
OLE R. HOLSTI
Duke University
This articles urveysa nd assesses theoriesa nd researcho n public opinion
and foreignp olicy.M ost of the evidence is drawnf romt he literatureo n
the United States. Three twentieth-centurwya rs have had a significant
impact on theorya nd scholarship.W orld War I-the firstp ublic rela-
tions war-and postwar effortst o create a new internationalo rder
directedm uch attentiont o the nature of public opinion and its impact
on foreigna ffairs,is sues on which realistsa nd liberals came to quite
differencto nclusions.T he period surroundingW orld War II coincided
witht he developmento f scientificp olling. Much of the attentiond uring
and immediatelya ftert he war focused on the extentt o which the public
might support or oppose an internationalisAt merican role. Extensive
researchd uringt he firstt wod ecades afterW orld War II yielded a broad
agreement (the "Almond-Lippmannc onsensus") on three propositions
about public opinion: (1) it is volatile and thus provides inadequate
foundationsf or stable and effectivef oreignp olicies, (2) it lacks coher-
ence or structureb, ut (3) in the final analysis,i t has littlei f any impact
on foreignp olicy.T he VietnamW ar and its aftermaths timulateda new
outbursto f researcha ctivityon public opinion and foreignp olicy,m uch
of which has challenged each of these three propositions.T he article
concludes with suggestionsf or furtherr esearch effortsi,n cluding: (1)
case studiese mployinga rchivals ources to assessm ore directlyt he impact
of public opinion, (2) cross-nationals tudies, (3) developmento f stan-
dard questionsi n order to encourage betterc umulationo f surveyr esults,
and (4) researcht hatw ille nable us to distinguishf indingst hata re time-
and context-boundf romt hose thatt ranscendt he Cold War period.
Introduction
Many questions about the role of public opinion in foreign policy are at the center
of persisting debates between the liberal-democratic and realist approaches to
foreign affairs.I s public opinion a force for enlightenment-indeed, a necessary if
not sufficientc ondition for sound foreign policy-as celebrated by the Wilsonians
Author'sn ote: For helpfulc ommentsa nd suggestionso n an earlier drafto f this paper I am gratefult o Stephen
Earl Bennett,W illiamC hittick,T homas Graham,J on Hurwitz,B enjamin Page, Mark PeffleyP, hilip Powlick,B ruce
Russett,E ugene Wittkopfa,n d twoa nonymousr eviewerfs orI nternationSalt udiesQ uarterly.
?) 1992 InternationalS tudiesA ssociation
440 Public Opiniona nd ForeignP olicy
and otherl iberals?T here is a long,l iberal-democratitcr aditiond, atingb ack at least
to Kant and Bentham,t hatf oreignp olicies of democraciesa re more peaceful,a t
least in part because the public can play a constructivreo le in constrainingp olicy
makers;o nlya ccountabilityto the public can restraint he war-makinpgr oclivitieosf
leaders.1
Alternativelyar, e Hans Morgenthaua nd otherso f the realists chool correcti n
describingp ublic opinion as a barriert o thoughtfualn d coherentd iplomacy,h in-
deringe fforttso promoten ationali nterestst hatt ranscendt he moods and passions
of the moment?T he realistt raditioni s intenselys kepticalo f the public's contribu-
tion to effectivef oreignp olicy.A t the verym inimum,m ost realistsw ould distin-
guish between foreignp olicy and other public policyi ssues; the public mightb e
sufficientliyn formedt o deal withl ocal issues thati mpingeo n theird ailyl ives,b ut
foreigna ffairsa re too remote fromt heire xperience,a nd in any case theyh ave
littlei nclinationt o become more informeda bout such complex and remotei ssues.
Finally,t he effectivec onduct of diplomacyr equires secrecy,f lexibilitya,n d other
qualities thatw ould be seriouslyje opardized were the public to have a significant
impacto n foreignp olicy.T hus, to permitt he public a strongv oice in policyw ould
be to place the democracies,i fn ot the stabilityof the internationasl ystemit selfa, t
a distinctd isadvantage.M oreover,i t would permitt he emotional to govern the
rational.H ans Morgenthaus ummarizedt he case againsta n activer ole for public
opinion in words that would gain the support of most if not all realists:" The
rationalr equirementso f good foreignp olicyc annot fromt he outsetc ount upon
the support of a public opinion whose preferencesa re emotional rather than
rational"( Morgenthau,1 978:558).
The long-standingd ebate betweenl iberalsa nd realistsw as intensifiedb y World
War I, whichm ightb e describeda s the firstp ublic relationsw ar.F romi tsi nception
both the Allied and Central Powers tried to win over "worldo pinion" in various
ways,i ncluding publication by many governmentso f highlys electived ocument
collections-the so-calledc olor books-all of whichw ere intendedt o absolve them
and to place the blame for the war on their adversaries.T he propaganda war
duringt he conflictw as almosta s intensea s thato n the battlefield.
PresidentW ilson's hopes fora new postwarw orld order depended significantly
on democratizingf oreign affairsa nd diplomacy. Elihu Root, a distinguished
Republican and formerS ecretaryo f State,e ffectivelsyu mmarizedt he positiono f
those who welcomed an increasingr ole for the public in the conduct of foreign
affairs.
When foreigno fficesw ere ruled by autocracies or oligarchiest he danger of war
was in sinisterp urpose. When foreigna ffairsa re ruled by democraciest he danger
of war will be in mistakenb eliefs.T he world will be gainer by the change, for,
while therei s no human wayt o preventa kingf romh avinga bad heart,t herei s a
human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion. (Root,
1922:5)
By more effectivein ternationale ducation, "the people themselvesw ill have the
means to testm isinformatioann d appeals to prejudicea nd passion based on error"
(Root, 1922:5).
But not all observersjo ined Wilson and Root in applauding the prospect of
popular diplomacy. During the postwar era, the journalist Walter Lippmann
published two trenchantc ritiqueso f the central premiseso f classical liberalism
(Lippmann, 1922, 1925). Accordingt o Lippmann, the common man is too fully
engaged in the requirementso f earning a livinga nd otherwisea ttendingt o his
1 Recent research has found that the foreignp olicies of democracies are indeed differentf romt hose of other
politiesa nd, furthert,h atd emocraciesd o n-ote ngage in war againste ach other.
OLE R. HOLSTI 441
most immediaten eeds to have the time or inclinationt o satisfyt he heroic, but
clearlyu nrealistica,s sumptionsa bout the informeda nd engaged citizenc elebrated
in classicald emocratict heory.T he chasm between theorya nd realityi s especially
wide on foreigna ffairsw, hicha re typicallyfa rr emovedf romt he directe xperiences
of the mass public. Consequently,t he "picturesi n the head" of the average citizen
are unlikelyt o have much correspondencew ith the real world of international
affairsM. oreover,j ournalist Lippmann became increasinglys kepticala bout the
abilityo f his own professione ffectiveltyo filli n the gap betweent he real worlda nd
the averagec itizen'ss tereotypesH. is studyo f the Russianr evolutiona, s depicted in
the pages of the NewY orkT imesd uringt he period 1917-20, did nothingt o assuage
his pessimism about the ability of the media to serve as a source of valid
informationa bout the world for the public (Lippmann and Metz, 1920). The
events of the 1930s and the outbreak of World War II, which seemed to raise
serious questions about Wilsonian assumptions while apparently providing
compelling empirical confirmationf or the realist approach to international
relations,f urthert ipped the balance of the debate on public opinion and foreign
policyi n favoro f the skeptics.
The period encompassingW orld War II and its immediatea ftermathco incided
witht he inceptiono f scientificp ublic opinion polling. Despite the wounds to the
reputationo f polling and pollstersi nflictedb y the LiteraiyD igest debacle in the
Roosevelt-Landone lection, we can date the era of scientifics urveysf rom the
establishmenot f the Gallup poll in 1936 or of the Public Opinion Quarterlyt woy ears
later.I t mayb e worthn otingt hatP residentR ooseveltw as a pioneer in the use of a
public opinion consultant-Hadley Cantril,o ne of the foundingf atherso f the new
science-for guidance on policy.
Policy makersa nd manyo thersw ho feltt hat an irresponsibleA merican isola-
tionisma fter1 919 had contributedt o the outbreako f World War II worriedt hat
the public mood might trace out a pattern resemblingt he experience of the
period afterW orld War I: wartimei dealism and internationalismf,o lloweds oon
thereafterb y cynicisma nd disenchantmentw ith active American leadership in
effortts o create a more stable internationaol rder.2T his concern was reflectedi n
the frequencyw ithw hichp ollingo rganizationsd uringW orldW ar II asked respon-
dents general questionsa bout the United Statest akinga n activer ole in, or staying
out of, world affairs,a nd specific queries about support for or opposition to
Americanm embershipi n the UnitedN ations.
These two features-an empirical approach that relied heavilyo n systematic
polling data and a normativec oncern that an isolationistp ublic mightl ead the
United Statest o repeat the failedi solationistp olicies of the interwarp eriod-may
be found in two of the pioneeringw orkso n public opinion and foreignp olicy:
Thomas Bailey's The Man in theS tree(t1 948) and Gabriel Almond's TheA merican
Peoplea ndF oreignP olicy(1 950).
The Post-WorldW ar II Consensus
The availabilitya fter World War II of growing sets of polling data and the
institutiono f systematisct udieso f votingb ehavior,c ombined witht he assumption
2Justb eforeP residentR ooseveltl eftf ort he Yalta Conferencei n 1945, Hadley Cantrilg ave the presidenta memo
which stated: "Although the overwhelmingm ajorityo f the American people now favor a strong international
organizationn ecessarilyd ominated by the big powers,i t is unrealistict o assume thatA mericansa re international-
minded. Their policy is rathero ne of expediency,w hich,a t the moment,t akes the formo f internationalismT. he
presenti nternationalismre stso n a ratheru nstablef oundation:i t is recent,i t is not rooted in anyb road or long-range
conceptiono f self-interesitt, h as littlei ntellectualb asis" (Cantril,1 967:76).
442 Public Opiniona nd ForeignP olicy
of a leadership role in world affairsb y the United States,s erved to stimulatea
growthi ndustryin analyseso f public opinion. The consensusv iewt hatd eveloped
duringt hisp eriod of some fifteeno r twentyy earsa ftert he end of World War II
and just priort o theV ietname scalationc enteredo n threem ajor propositions:
* Public opinion is highlyv olatilea nd thus it providesv eryd ubiousf oundationsf or a
soundf oreignp olicy.
* Public attitudeso n foreigna ffairsa re so lacking in structurean d coherencet hat they
mightb estb e describeda s "non-attitudes."
* At the end of the day, however,p ublic opinion has a veryl imited impact on the
conducto fforeignp olicy.
Let us examine each of these propositions,a nd the evidence upon which they
rested,i n more detail.
PublicO pinionI s Volatile
As noted earlier,W alterL ippmann's books of the interwarp eriod described the
mass public as neithers ufficientliyn terestedn or informedt o play the pivotalr ole
assigned to it by classicald emocratict heoryA. t the heighto f the Cold War thirty
yearsl ater,L ippmann had become even more alarmed,d epictingt he mass public
as not merelyu ninteresteda nd uninformedb, ut as a powerfufl orcet hatw as so out
of synchw ithr ealitya s to constitutea massivea nd potentiallyf atalt hreatt o effec-
tiveg overnmentan d policies.
The unhappy truthi s that the prevailingp ublic opinion has been destructively
wronga t the criticajlu nctures.T he people have impresseda criticalv eto upon the
judgments of informed and responsible officials.T hey have compelled the
governmentw, hichu suallyk neww hatw ould have been wiser,o r was necessaryo, r
whatw as more expedient,t o be too late witht oo little,o r too long witht oo much,
too pacifisti n peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralisto r appeasing in
negotiationso r too intransigentM. ass opinion has acquired mountingp ower in
this country.I t has shown itselft o be a dangerous mastero f decision when the
stakesa re lifea nd death. (Lippmann, 1955:20)
Similarly pessimistic conclusions and dire warnings were emerging from
disparateo ther quartersa s well. Drawingo n a growingb ody of polling data and
fearing that the American public might relapse into a mindless isolationism,
because onlya thinv eneer of postwari nternationalismco vered a thickb edrock of
indifferencet o the world,G abriel Almond depicted public opinion as a volatile
and mood-drivenc onstraintu pon foreignp olicy: "The undertowo f withdrawails
still veryp owerful.D eeply ingrained habits do not die easy deaths. The world
outside is stillv eryr emote for most Americans;a nd the tragicl essons of the last
decades have not been fullyd igested"( Almond,1 950:85). Consequently," Perhaps
the gravestg eneral problem confrontingp olicy-makeriss thato f the instabilityof
mass moods, the cyclicalf luctuationsw hich stand in the way of policy stability"
(Almond,1 950:239).3S ix yearsl ater,A lmond restatedh is thesisi n Lippmannesque
language, citingn ot only the instabilityof public moods, but other deficienciesa s
well. He told an audience at the National War College, "For persons responsible
for the makingo f securityp olicyt hese mood impactso f the public have a highly
3 Almond's use of the term "mood" differsf rom that of Frank Klingberg.A lmond referst o sudden shiftso f
interesta nd preferences,w hereas Klingbergh as used the term to explain American foreign policy in termso f
generation-longs ocietal swingsb etween introversiona nd extraversionF. or the latteru sage, see Klingberg( 1952,
1979, 1983) and Holmes (1985).
OLE R. HOLSTI 443
irrationale ffectO. ften the public is apatheticw hen it should be concerned,a nd
panickyw hen it should be calm" (Almond,1 956:372,3 76).
Othersw hose writingps rovideds upportf ort he main outlineso f the pessimistic
Almond-Lippmannt hesis included a distinguishedl ist: the dean of American
diplomatic historians( Thomas A. Bailey); the foremostp roponent of a realist
approach to internationala ffairs( Hans J. Morgenthau); and the diplomat-histo-
rian who has oftenb een depicted as the intellectualf athero f the Americanp olicy
of containment,G eorge F. Kennan. For the latter,t he metaphor of a dinosaur
vividlyd epicted the problemso f democraticf oreignp olicy.
But I sometimesw onderw hetheri n thisr especta democracyi s not uncomfortably
similart o one of those prehistoricm onstersw itha body as long as thisr oom and a
brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his comfortablep rimevalm ud and pays
littlea ttentiont o his environment;h e is slow to wrath-in fact,y ou practically
have to whackh is tail offt o make him aware thath is interestsa re being disturbed;
but, once he graspst his,h e laysa bout him withs uch blind determinationt hath e
not only destroysh is adversaryb ut largelyw recksh is native habitat. (Kennan,
1951:59)
Furthers upportf or the criticsa nd skepticse merged fromt he growingb ody of
polling data whichy ielded ample evidence of the public's limiteds toreo f factual
knowledgea bout foreigna ffairsI.n numerables urveyrs evealeds uch stunningg aps
in informationa s: X percent of the Americanp ublic are unaware that there is a
communistg overnmenti n China, Y percent believe that the Soviet Union is a
membero f NATO, or Z percentc annot identifya single nation borderingo n the
PacificO cean. Such data reinforcedt he case of the criticsa nd led some of themt o
propose measurest o reduce the influenceo f the public. Thus, Lippmann (1955)
called for strongere xecutivep rerogativesin foreigna ffairsa,n d Bailey (1948:13)
wonderedw hethert he requirementso f an effectivfe oreignp olicym ightm ake it
necessaryf ort he executived eliberatelyt o misleadt he public.
PublicO pinionL acksS tructuraen d Coherence
A growingv olume of data on public opinion and voting behavior, as well as
increasinglys ophisticatedm ethodologies,e nabled analystsn ot only to describe
aggregater esultsa nd trends,b ut also to delve into the structureo f politicalb eliefs.
Owing to immediatep olicyc oncernsa bout the U.S. role in the postware ra, many
of the earlys tudiesw erel argelyd escriptivef,o cusingo n such issuesa s participation
in internationalo rganizationsa nd alliances, the deploymento f troops abroad,
securityc ommitmentsf, oreigna id, trade and protectionisma, nd the like. The
underlyingp remisew as that a single internationalist-isolationdiismt ensionw ould
servet o structurfe oreignp olicyb eliefs,m uch in the wayt hata liberal-conservative
dimensionw as assumed to providec oherence to preferenceso n domestici ssues.
In a classic studyb ased on data from the late 1950s and early 1960s, Philip
Converse (1964) concluded thatt he politicalb eliefso f the mass public lack a real
structureo r coherence. Comparingr esponsesa cross severald omestica nd foreign
policyi ssues,h e found littlei f any "constrainto"r underlyingid eological structure
thatm ightp rovides ome coherence to politicalt hinkingI.n contrast,h is analyses
of elites-congressional candidates-revealed substantiallyh igher correlations
among responsest o variousi ssues. Moreover,C onversef ound thatb oth mass and
elite attitudeso n a given issue had a short half-lifeR. esponses in 1956 only
modestlyp redictedr esponsest woy earsl ater,m uch less in 1960. These findingsle d
him to conclude that mass political beliefsa re best described as "non-attitudes."
AlthoughC onverse'sf indingsw ere latert o become the centero f an actived ebate,
it should be emphasized thath is was not a lone voice in the wilderness.H is data
were drawnf romt he National Election Studies at the Universityof Michigan,a nd
his findingsw ere only the mostw idelyq uoted of a serieso f studiesf romt he NES
444 Public Opiniona nd ForeignP olicy
that came to essentiallyt he same conclusion about the absence of structure,
coherence,o r persistencei n the politicalb eliefso f the mass public-especially on
foreigna ffairs(C ampbell,C onverse,M iller,a nd Stokes,1 964).
PublicO pinionH as LimitedIm pacto nF oreignP olicy
A significanrte ason fori nterestin public opinion on foreigna ffairasr isesf romt he
assumptiont hati n some waysa nd at least some of the time it has an impact,f or
bettero r worse,o n the conduct of the nation's externalp olicy.C ertainlyit is easy
to find public expressionsb y policy makers avowing the importanceo f public
opinion. Duringh is debates withS tephen Douglas, AbrahamL incoln assertedt hat,
"withp ublic sentimento n its side, everythings ucceeds; with public sentiment
against it, nothings ucceeds"; and in 1936 Secretaryo f State Cordell Hull stated
that," sincet he timew hen ThomasJeffersonin sistedu pon a 'decent respectt o the
opinions of mankind,'p ublic opinion has controlledf oreignp olicy in all demo-
cracies" (New YorkT imesD, ec. 6, 1936).
Althoughs uch hyperbolics tatementasr e unlikelyt o withstands eriouse mpirical
scrutinyt, he drivingf orce behind much of the post-WorldW ar II attentiont o
public opinion on foreignp olicy issues was the fear that an ill-informeda nd
emotional mass public would serve as a powerfulc onstrainto n the conduct of
American diplomacy, establishing unwise limits on policy makers, creating
unrealistice xpectationsa bout whatw as feasiblei n foreigna ffairso,t herwised oing
seriousm ischieft o Americand iplomacya nd, givent heA mericanr ole in the world,
perhaps even to internationasl tabilityA. s BernardC ohen (1973) demonstratedin
a criticals urveyo f the literatureh, owever,t he constrainingr ole of public opinion
was oftena ssertedb ut rarelyd emonstrated-or even put to a systematitce st.
By the middle of the 1960s a consensus in fact seemed to emerge on a third
point: Public opinion has little if any real impact on policy. Or, as the point
was made most pithilyb y one State Department official:" To hell with public
opinion.... We should lead, and not follow" (quoted in Cohen, 1973:62). The
weight of research evidence cast doubt on the potency of public opinion as a
drivingf orceb ehind, or even a significancto nstraintu pon, foreignp olicy-making.
For example, a classic studyo f the public-legislatorr elationshipr evealed that
constituentsa' ttitudeso n foreignp olicyh ad less impacto n memberso f the House
of Representativest han did their views on domestic issues (Miller and Stokes,
1963). Cohen's research on the foreignp olicy bureaucracyi ndicated that State
Departmento fficialsh ad a ratherm odest interesti n public opinion, and to the
extent that they even thought about the public, it was as an entityt o be
"educated" rather than a lodestar by which to be guided (Cohen, 1973). The
propositiont hatt he presidenth as "almosta freeh and" in the conduct of foreign
affairsr eceived support from other analysts,i ncluding Lipset (1966), LaFeber
(1977), Levering( 1978), Paterson (1979), and Graebner (1983).
This period also witnesseda proliferationo f case studieso f keyf oreignp olicy
decisions; with rare exceptions, however, they make no reference to public
opinion. But it is not alwaysc lear whethert hati s because: (1) public opinion was
irrelevanta s an explanation to the decisions under consideration,( 2) decision-
makersq uietlya nticipatep ublic opinion withoutc onsciouslyd oing so, (3) it was
excluded from the research design and thus no effortw as made to assess its
impact,o r (4) disproportionater esearcha ttentiont o internationacl rises-events
thata re usuallyc haracterizedb y shortd ecision time-tended to exclude episodes
in whichd ecisions are the culminationo f a long politicalp rocess; all other things
being equal, the more protractedt he decision process,t he more likelya re policy
makerst o be subjected to the impact of public opinion throught he activitieso f
Congress,p ressureg roups,t he media, and opinion leaders.
OLE R. HOLSTI 445
Although these studies did not answer all questions about the impact of the
public-for example, the realitieso f researcha ccess required Cohen to focus on
preciselyt hose personsw ho are most shelteredf romt he effectso f elections-the
weighto f the evidence would at least have assuaged those who shared fearst hat
mass public opinion "has shown itselft o be a dangerous mastero f decision when
the stakesa re lifea nd death" (Lippmann, 1955:20).
The Renaissance of Interesti n Public Opinion and ForeignP olicy
Justa s World War II and fearso f postwari solationisma mong the mass public gave
rise to concern about public opinion and its impacto n foreignp olicy,t he war in
Vietnamw as the impetusf ora renewedi nterestin the subject.I t was a majorc atalyst
in stimulatinga reexaminationo f the consensust hath ad emergedd uringt he two
decades afterW orld War II. The VietnamW ar had at least twod irecte ffectsM. ost
broadlym, anyo f thosew ho had believedt hata strongere xecutiveh and on the tiller
of public policy,r elativelyf reef romt he whimsa nd vagarieso f public moods, best
servesb oth national interestsa nd global stabilityc,a me to reexaminet heirv iewsi n
the lighto f the VietnamW ar. Indeed, the widelyr ead columnistW alterL ippmann,
who only a littlem ore than a decade earlier had despaired of the tyrannyo f a
fecklessp ublic and had called for a strongere xecutive to counteractt he mass
public, became a leading critico f the Johnson administration'Vs ietnam policy;
eventuallyh e came to regardt he public,w hichh ad become increasinglysk epticalo f
thew are fforta,s more enlightenedt hant he administration.
At a narrowelre vel, some criticso f the war became increasinglyp ersuaded that
the Gallup, Harris,a nd other commercialp olls distortedp ublic attitudest oward
the war by posing excessivelyr estrictivaen d simplisticq uestions. For example,
among the most widelya sked questions was whetherr espondentss upported or
opposed currentA merican policy in Vietnam; deeper probes that might have
offeredr espondents an opportunityt o express their views about other policy
optionsw ere farl ess commonlye mployedb y these polling organizationsT. hus, in
addition to secondarya nalyseso f surveyd ata relatingt o the war (e.g., Mueller,
1973), the conflicti n SoutheastA sia also stimulatedi ndependents urveyds esigned
specificallyt o assess foreignp olicyi n greaterd epth and breadth than the typical
surveyc onductedb yG allup and the otherm ajorp ollingo rganizations.
The firsto f these studies, the Verba-Stanfords urveysf, ocused on American
policy in Vietnam (Verba, Brody,P arker,N ie, Polsby,E kman, and Black, 1967;
Verba and Brody,1 970). Verba and his colleagues in factf ound supportf or the
administration'sV ietnam policy, but they also unearthed approval for such
alternativep olicies as negotiatinga n end to the conflictT. he period followingt he
Verba-Stanfordp olls has witnesseda proliferationo f studiesw itha foreigna ffairs
focus,i ncluding surveyso f both the mass public (Rielly,1 975, 1979, 1983, 1987,
1991; Hurwitz and Peffley,1 987, 1990; Americans Talk Security,1 987-1991;
Americans Talk Issues, 1991) and of opinion leaders (Barton, 1974-75, 1980;
Rielly, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991; Russett and Hanson, 1975; Holsti and
Rosenau, 1984, 1988, 1990; Chitticka nd Billingsley1, 989; Koopman, Snyder,a nd
Jervis1, 990a, 1990b, 1991). As a consequence, we are no longer totallyd ependent
on evidence generated by the major polling organizations. Moreover, these
independent surveysa re oftend esigned withp olicy and/or theoreticalc oncerns
thatc an onlyi mperfectlbye probed by secondarya nalyseso f the Gallup and other,
more generalp ublic opinion polls.
Thus, armed with growingc entral archives of data generated by the major
polling organizationsa s well as evidence produced by the independent surveys,
duringt he past twod ecades analystsh ave begun to challenge importanta spectso f
the consensusd escribeda bove.
446 Public Opiniona nd ForeignP olicy
Challeng#e 1:I s PublicO pinionR eallyS o Volatile?
WilliamC asparyp resentedt he firsts ystematicch allenge to the Almond thesist hat
public opinion on foreigna ffairsis best characterizedb y volatilem oods.4H e took
issue withA lmond's heavyr elianceo n a singleq uestioni n whichr espondentsw ere
asked to identify"t he most importanti ssue today."C aspary'sa nalysiso f a broader
set of questions led him to conclude that "Americanp ublic opinion is character-
ized by a stronga nd stable permissivem ood" towarda ctivei nternationailn volve-
ment (Caspary,1 970:546).
Mueller's (1973) studyo f public opinion towardt he Korean and Vietnamw ars
posed another challenge to the thesiso f mindlessc hanges in public attitudesT. o
be sure,p ublic supportf ort he U.S. war efforitn both conflictse ventuallyc hanged,
but in wayst hats eemed explicable and rational,r athert han randoma nd mindless.
More specificallyh,e foundt hati ncreasingp ublic oppositiont o the conflictst raced
out a patternt hatf ita curveo f risingb attled eaths,s uggestingt hatt he public used
an understandablei,f s imple,h euristict o assessA mericanp olicy.5
The most comprehensive challenge to the Almond-Lippmann thesis has
emergedf roms tudiesc onductedb y BenjaminP age and RobertS hapiro. Their evi-
dence includes all questionst hath ave been posed by major polling organizations
since the inception of systematics urveysi n the 1930s. Of the more than 6000
questions,a lmost 20 percent have been asked at least twice,p rovidingP age and
Shapiro witha large data set to assess the degree of stabilityan d change in mass
public attitudes.E mployinga cutoffp oint of a differenceo f 6 percentf romo ne
surveyt o another to distinguishb etween continuitya nd change, theyf ound that
mass opinion in the aggregatei s in factc haracterizedb y a good deal of stability,
and that this is no less true of foreignp olicy than on domestici ssues (Page and
Shapiro, 1988). More importantw, hen attitudes hiftst ake place, theys eem to be
neither random nor 180 degrees removed from the true state of world affairs.
Rather, changes appear to be "reasonable, event driven" reactions to the real
world,e ven ift he informationu pon whicht heya re based is marginallyad equate at
best.T hey concluded that,
virtuallyal l the rapid shifts[ in public opinion] we found were related to political
and economic circumstanceso r to significanetv entsw hichs ensiblec itizensw ould
take into account. In particular,m osta bruptf oreignp olicyc hanges took place in
connection with wars, confrontationso, r crises in which major changes in the
actions of the United States or other nations quite naturallya ffectp references
about whatp olicies to pursue.6
Because theira nalysesa re based on aggregater esponsesr athert han on panel
studies in which the same respondents are interviewedr epeatedly,P age and
Shapiro cannot address definitiveloyn e aspect of the volatilityqu estion: Precisely
whatp roportiono f individualsh ave in factc hanged theirm inds?F or an issue on
which the public divided 50 percent-50p ercenti n each of two time periods,i t is
theoreticallyp ossible thata ll respondentsd id so. However,v olatilityap proaching
4 By 1960, Almond himselfw as backing away from his most pessimisticd iagnoses. See his new preface to a
reprintingo f TheA mericaPne oplea nd ForeignP1o licy.
5 "During the summer of 1965, as the Johnson Administrationw as moving towardf atefuld ecisions regarding
Vietnam,G eorge Ball warned:' We can't win,' he said, his deep voice dominatingt he Cabinet Room. 'The warw illb e
long and protracted,w ithh eavyc asualties.T he most we can hope for is a messyc onclusion. We must measure this
long-termp rice againstt he short-termlo ss thatw illr esultf romw ithdrawal.P' roducinga chartt hatc orrelatedp ublic
opinion withA mericanc asualties in Korea, Ball predictedt hat the American public would not supporta long and
inconclusivew ar" (Clifford1, 991:412).
6 Page and Shapiro (1982:34); see also Page and Shapiro (1983, 1984, 1988, 1992); Page, Shapiro, anidD empsey
(1987); Shapiro and Page (1988).
OLE R. HOLSTI 447
this magnitudes eems highlyu nlikelyb ecause, as Page and Shapiro have shown,
opinion changest end to be in directionst hat" makes ense" in termso f events.
The volatilityth esisc an be tested most directlyb y individual-leverla thert han
aggregate analysiso f opinion data. Using differentm ethods for correctingf or
measuremente rror,s everals tudiesh ave shownc onvincinglyth ata t the individual
level mass foreignp olicy attitudesa re everyb it as stable as domestic attitudes
(Achen, 1975; Peffleya nd Hurwitz,1 992a). These studiesr evealed an impressive
level of stabilityd uring times of constancyi n the internationale nvironmentA.
panel studyb y Peffleya nd Hurwitz( 1992a) also found verys ubstantials tabilityin
policya ttitudesa nd internationali mages even during a period-the late 1980s-
thatw itnessedr apid and dramaticc hanges in Soviet-Americanr elationsa nd other
aspectso f internationaalf fairs.
Similar conclusions,s upportingP age and Shapiro and casting doubt on the
Almond-Lippmannt hesis,h ave also emerged fromo ther studiesJ. entleson( 1992)
found thatd uringt he post-Vietnamer a, variationsi n public supportf ort he use of
force are best explained by differencesb etween force to coerce foreignp olicy
restraintb y others,a nd force to influenceo r impose internalp olitical changes
withina nothers tate;t he formerg oal has receivedm uch strongers upportt han the
latter.7
An interestingv arianto f the "rationalp ublic" thesis stipulatest hat the public
attemptst o moderateA mericanb ehavior towardt he USSR by expressingp refer-
ences for a conciliatorys tance from hawkisha dministrationws hile supporting
more assertivep oliciesf romd ovisho nes (Nincic, 1988). To the extentt hato ne can
generalize fromt his studyf ocusingo n the Cartera nd Reagan administrationtso
otherp eriods or othera spects of foreignp olicy,i t furtherc hallengest he Almond-
Lippmann thesis-indeed, it turnst hat propositiono n its head-for it identifies
the public as a source of moderationa nd continuityr athert han of instabilityan d
unpredictability.
It is important to emphasize that none of these challenges to the
Almond-Lippmannt hesisi s based on some newlyf ounde videncet hatt he public is
in factw ell informeda bout foreigna ffairsN. ot onlyd o polls repeatedlyr evealt hat
the mass public has a very thin veneer of factual knowledge about politics,
economics, and geography;t heya lso reveal that it is poorly informeda bout the
specificso f conflicts,t reaties,n egotiationsw ith other nations, characteristicos f
weapons systemsf, oreignl eaders, and the like. Because the modest factualb asis
upon which the mass public reacts to international affairs remains an
unchallenged-and unchallengeable-fact, we are faced with a puzzle: If a
generallyp oorlyi nformedm ass public does indeed react to internationaal ffairisn
an events-drivenr,a tional manner, what are the means that permiti t to do so?
Recall thata not-insignificanbot dy of researche vidence indicatedt hatm ass public
attitudesla ck the kind of ideological structuret hatw ould provides ome coherence
acrosss pecifici ssuesa nd persistencet hrought ime.
Challeng#e 2:D o PublicA ttitudeLsa ck Structuraen d Coherence?
Philip Converse's (1964) chaptero n mass belief systemsis one of the mostw idely
cited studiesi n the Americanp oliticals cience literatureI.n recenty earsi t has also
spawned a vast literaturew hich has, on the one hand, vigorouslyc hallenged his
findingsa nd, on the other,s upportedt he main thrusto f Converse's conclusions
7 For additional evidence about the "rationalp ublic," the stabilityo f policy preferences,a nd issue voting,s ee
Bennett (1972:742), Free and Watts( 1980:50), Wittkopf(1 986, 1990), Graham (1986, 1988, 1989), Krosnick( 1988a,
1988b, 1990, 1991), Russett( 1990), and Peffleyan d Hurwitz( 1992a, 1992b).