Table Of Content

Public Choice 106: 409-410, 2001. Public Choice Contents of Volume 106 2001 Volume 106, Nos. 1-2 G. Bulkley, G.D. Myles, B.R. Pearson, On the membership of decision-making committees M. Kolmar, Optimal intergenerational redistribution in a two-country model with endogenous fertility B.U. Wigger, Productivity growth and the political economy of social security H. Weck-Hannemann, Globalization as a challenge for public choice theory C.D. Ramirez, J.B. De Long, Understanding America’s hesitant steps toward financial capitalism: Politics, the Depression, and the separation of commercial and investment banking 93-116 C. Tien, Representation, voluntary retirement, and shirking in the last term 117-130 T. Groseclose, S. Schiavoni, Rethinking justices’ and committees’ strategies in Segal’s separation of powers game 131-135 T.K. Ahn, E. Ostrom, D. Schmidt, R. Shupp, J. Walker, Coopera- tion in PD games: Fear, greed, and history of play 137-155 C.D. Ramirez, C. Eigen-Zucchi, Understanding the Clayton Act of 1914: An analysis of the interest group hypothesis 157-181 Book reviews A. Lupia, M.D. McCubbins, A response to Austen-Smith 183-189 Avinash K. Dixit, The making of economic policy: A transaction- cost politics perspective (R. Congleton) 191-193 Daniel Shaviro, When rules change: An economic and political analysis of transition relief and retroactivity (B. Caplan) 193-196 James M. Buchanan and Richard A. Musgrave, Public finance and public choice: Two contrasting visions of the state (R.G. Holcombe) 196-199 Call for papers 201 410 Volume 106, No. 3-4 P. Pecorino, Market structure, tariff lobbying and the free-rider problem 203-220 B. Grofman, W. Koetzle, S. Merrill, T. Brunell, Changes in the loc- ation of the median voter in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1963-1996 221-232 R.S. Sobel, R.G. Holcombe, The unanimous voting rule is not the political equivalent to market exchange 233-242 M.M. Ting, The “Power of the purse” and its implications for bur- eaucratic policy-making 243-274 A. Tabarrok, President Perot or fundamentals of voting theory illustrated with the 1992 election 275-297 G. Tridimas, The economics and politics of the structure of public expenditure 299-316 M. Limosani, P. Navarra, Local pork-barrel politics in national pre- election dates: The case of Italy 317-326 F. Balassone, R. Giordano, Budget deficits and coalition govern- ments 327-349 M. Allers, J. de Haan, C. Sterks, Partisan influence on the local tax burden in the Netherlands 351-363 U. Witt, Between appeasement and belligerent moralism: The evolution of moral conduct in international politics 365-388 Book reviews Jim F. Couch and William F. Shughart II, The political economy of the New Deal (Gary M. Anderson) 389-390 Mancur Olson, Power and prosperity: Outgrowing communist and capitalist dictators (Ronald Wintrobe) 390-395 Giinther G. Schulze, The political economy of capital controls (Paul Pecorino) 395-399 Irwin L. Morris, Congress, the president, and the Federal Reserve: The politics of American monetary policy-making (Henry W. Chappell, Jr.) 399-403 Instructions to authors 405-406 Author index 407 Volume contents 409-410