Public Choice 1997: Vol 92 Table of Contents

3 Pages·1997·0.69 MB·English

Public Choice 92: 455-456, 1997.
Public Choice
Contents of Volume 92 1997
Volume 92, Nos. 1-2
Review articles
J.R. Lott, Jr., Donald Wittman’s The myth of democratic failure
C.K. Rowley, Donald Wittman’s The myth of democratic failure
Regular articles
S.D. Allen, J. Bray and T.G. Seaks, A multinominal logit analysis of the
influence of policy variables and board experience on FOMC voting
behavior 27-39
R. Cortazar, Non-redundant groups, the assurance game and the origins
of collective action 41-53
R.M. Alvarez and J.L. Saving, Congressional committees and the polit-
ical economy of federal outlays 55-73
L.W. Kenny and M. Toma, The role of tax bases and collections costs in
the determination of income tax rates, seigniorage and inflation - 75-90
P. Pecorino, Exogenous tariff changes with an endogenous lobbying
response 91-108
Y.-K. Che and |. Gale, Rent dissipation when rent seekers are budget
constrained 109-126
H.P. Griiner, A comparison of three institutions for monetary policy when
central bankers have private objectives 127-143
L. Fridstram and R. Elvik, The barely revealed preference behind road
investment priorities 145-168
R. Mudambi, P. Navarra and G. Sobbrio, Voter information and power
dilution: Evidence from Sicilian provincial elections 169-180
L.-E. Borge and J. Rattso, Local government grants and income tax
revenue: Redistributive politics in Norway 1900-1990 181-197
Book reviews
J.C. Pardo and F. Schneider (eds.), Current issues in public choice (M.A.
Vachris) 199-202
J.E. Roemer, Theories of distributive justice (S.J. Brams) 203-207
J.H. Kagel, R.C. Battalio and L. Green, Economic choice theory: An
experimental analysis of animal behavior (J.M. Walker) 207-210
456
B.D. Jones, Reconceiving decision-making in democratic politics: Atten-
tion, choice and public policy (D. Coates) 211-214
B. Goff, Regulation and macroeconomic performance (W. Thorbecke) 215-217
Call for papers 219
Volume 92, Nos. 3-4 1997
C.M. Atlas, R.J. Hendershott and M.A. Zupan, Optimal effort allocation
by U.S. Senators: The role of constituency size 221-229
W. Thorbecke, Explaining house voting on the North American Free
Trade Agreement 231-242
E.M. Uslaner, If you can’t please everyone, must you only please yourself? 243-260
E.J. Brunner, An empirical test of neutrality and the crowding-out
hypothesis 261-279
S. Abizadeh and P. Cyrenne, On distinguishing between Leviathan and
Public Interest governments in a federal state 281-299
J.L. Saving, Human capital, committee power and legislative outcomes 301-316
C.D. Delorme Jr., W.S. Frame and D.R. Kamerschen, Empirical evidence
on a special-interest-group perspective to antitrust 317-335
J.A. Fields, L.S. Klein and J.M. Sfiridis, A market based evaluation of
the election versus appointment of regulatory commissioners 337-351
W. Letterie and O.H. Swank, Learning and signalling by advisor selection 353-367
P. McNutt, Rent-seeking and political tenure: First estimates 369-385
F. Carlsen, Opinion polls and political business cycles: Theory and evi-
dence for the United States 387-406
S. Price, Political business cycles and macroeconomic credibility: A
survey 407-427
M. Gartner, Time-consistent monetary policy under output persistence 429-437
Book reviews
R. Landau, T. Taylor and G. Wright (Eds.), The mosaic of economic
growth (P. Pecorino) 439-442
T. Gais, Improper influence: Campaign finance law, political interest
groups, and the problems of equality (M.C. Munger) 442-446
F.G. Steindl, Monetary interpretations of the Great Depression(M.Toma) 446-449
Call for papers 451
Instructions to authors 453-454
Volume contents 455-456
Author index 457