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Public Choice 1997: Vol 91 Table of Contents PDF

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Preview Public Choice 1997: Vol 91 Table of Contents

Public Choice 91: 437-438, 1997. Public Choice Contents of Volume 91 1997 Volume 91, No. 1 European perspectives on public choice Guest Editor: Bruno S. Frey B.S. Frey, Introduction G. Kirchgassner and A. Meyer Zu Himmern, Expected closeness and turnout: An empirical analysis for the German General Elections, 1983-1994 W. Giith and H. Weck-Hannemann, Do people care about democracy? An experiment exploring the value of voting rights 27-47 A. Schram, Do people care about democracy?: Comment 49-51 B.S. Frey, Do people care about democracy?: Comment 53-55 R. Neck and S. Karbuz, Econometric estimations of popularity functions: A case study for Austria 57-88 F. Oberholzer-Gee, |. Bohnet and B.S. Frey, Fairness and competence in democratic decisions 89-105 Volume 91, No.2 1997 Announcement: The Duncan Black Prize iil M.J. Bailey, The demand revealing process: To distribute the surplus 107-126 T. Caporale, D.R. Lee and R.K. Vedder, Slowing monetary growth since 1984: A public choice explanation 127-137 D. Lowery and V. Gray, How some rules just don’t matter: The regulation of lobbyists 139-147 G. Tullock, Where is the rectangle? 149-159 N. Acocella and G. Ciccarone, Trade unions, nonneutrality and stagflation 161-178 H. Berger and U. Woitek, Searching for political business cycles in Germany 179-197 R. Sloof, Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information: A comment 199-207 E. Rasmusen, Choosing among signalling equilibria in lobbying games: A reply to Sloof 209-214 438 Book review George Ainslie, Picoeconomics: The strategic interaction of successive motivational states within the person (R. Sherman) 215-218 Volume 91, Nos. 3-4 1997 J.R. Lott, Jr., Does political reform increase wealth?: or, why the differ- ence between the Chicago and Virginia schools is really an elasticity question 219-227 K.N. Bickers and R.M. Stein, Building majority coalitions for sub-majority benefit distributions 229-249 B.J. Aiexander, Mechanisms for rent transfers: Subcontracting among military aircraft manufacturers 251-269 D. Epstein, An informational rationale for committee gatekeeping power 271-299 R.D. Banker, S. Das and C.S. Ou, Shareholder wealth effects of legisia- tive events: The case of airline deregulation 301-331 P. Mosser, A theory of the conditional influence of the European Parlia- ment in the cooperation procedure 333-350 K.R. Pedersen, The political economy of distribution in developing coun- tries: A rent-seeking approach 351-373 T.R. Cusack, Partisan politics and public finance: Changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies, 1955-1989 375-395 L. Oulasvirta, Real and perceived effects of changing the grant system from specific to general grants 397-416 Book reviews N.S. Arnold, The philosophy and economics of market socialism: A critical study (P.J. Boettke) 417-419 R.G. Holcombe, Public policy and the quality of life: Market incentives versus government planning (D. Sutter) 419-421 W.C. Mitchell and R.T. Simmons, Beyond politics: Market, welfare,a nd the failure of bureaucracy (T. Husted) 421-425 E.H. Monkkonen, The local state: Public money and American cities (R.G. Holcombe) 425-429 L.W. Levy, A license to steal: The forfeiture of property (B.L. Benson) 429—432 Erratum 433 Instructions to authors 435-436 Volume contents 437-438 Author index 439

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