Protecting the Ballot: How First-Wave Democracies Ended Electoral Corruption PDF
Preview Protecting the Ballot: How First-Wave Democracies Ended Electoral Corruption
PROTECTING THE BALLOT Protecting the Ballot How First- Wave Democracies Ended Electoral Corruption Isabela Mares PRINCE TON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCE TON AND OXFORD Copyright © 2022 by Prince ton University Press Prince ton University Press is committed to the protection of copyright and the intellectual property our authors entrust to us. Copyright promotes the pro gress and integrity of knowledge. Thank you for supporting free speech and the global exchange of ideas by purchasing an authorized edition of this book. If you wish to reproduce or distribute any part of it in any form, please obtain permission. Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be sent to permissions@press . princeton . edu Published by Prince ton University Press 41 William Street, Prince ton, New Jersey 08540 99 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 6JX press . princeton . edu All Rights Reserved ISBN: 978-0-691-24002-2 ISBN (pbk.): 978-0-691-24003-9 ISBN (e- book): 978-0-691-24004-6 British Library Cataloging- in- Publication Data is available Editorial: Bridget Flannery- McCoy and Alena Chekanov Production Editorial: Jenny Wolkowicki Cover design: Karl Spurzem Production: Lauren Reese Publicity: Kate Hensley and Charlotte Coyne Cover image: Svintage Archive / Alamy Stock Photo This book has been composed in Adobe Text Pro and Gotham Printed on acid- free paper. ∞ Printed in the United States of Amer i ca 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 For Andrew CONTENTS Illustrations ix Abbreviations xi Acknowl edgments xiii 1 How Did First- Wave Democracies End Electoral Corruption? 1 2 The Democ ratization of Electoral Practices 25 3 Reforming Campaigns: Reducing the Illicit Use of State Resources 69 4 Limiting Vote- Buying and Treating 111 5 Protecting Voter Autonomy: Ballots, Envelopes, and Isolating Spaces 145 6 Curbing Electoral Fraud 179 7 Conclusion 207 Appendix 217 References 219 Index 231 vii ILLUSTRATIONS Figures 1.1. Pathways to electoral reform 9 2.1. The determinants of demand for electoral reforms 39 2.2. Elite splits and demand for electoral reforms 47 3.1. The relative incidence of electoral strategies politicizing state resources in French and German elections 75 3.2. Determinants of support for vari ous amendments seeking to limit the use of state resources during campaigns 95 3.3. Determinants of support for proposals to limit electoral clientelism 97 3.4. Changing electoral competition for candidates on the right following the breakdown of the electoral cartel (Kartellbündnis) 103 3.5. Correlates of support for the invalidation of elections that politicize state resources: divergence among parties on the right 107 4.1. Relative incidence of vote-b uying in French and German elections 116 4.2. The determinants of support for reforms to limit vote- buying in the French Chamber of Deputies 124 4.3. Average prices of bribes in contested British elections relative to the price of weekly wages 128 4.4. Correlates of resource constraints for Liberal and Conservative candidates 132 4.5. The determinants of demand for reforms to limit campaign expenditures 142 5.1. Support for the introduction of the isoloir during early deliberations 162 5.2. The composition of the electoral co ali tion supporting the isoloir in 1907 166 ix
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