Proceedings of the 17th Academy of Marketing Science World Marketing Congress held August ...

617 Pages·2015·9.06 MB·English

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ENGINEERED CUSTOMER REFERRALS: PREVALENCE AND ANTECEDENTS

Ina Garnefeld, University of Wuppertal, Germany, [email protected]
Sabrina V. Helm, University of Arizona, United States of America, [email protected]

INTRODUCTION

Customer referral programs (CRPs) are a common customer relationship management tool that many s
large service firms use to reward customers who recommend the firm to their friends or acquaintancesg.
CRPs appear in an array of service industries, including online and mail-order retailers, banking,
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insurance companies, and fitness clubs. Service providers turn to CRPs because they provide an
effective tool for new customer acquisition (Schmitt, Skiera, and Van den Bulte 2011). As Biyailgorsky,
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Gerstner, and Libai (2001) further emphasize, CRPs are also efficient because the service provider only
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pays the reward if it actually gains the new customer. Given the growing interest in CRPs it is important
to investigate their possible unintended consequences. Wirtz and Chew (2002, p. 157-e58) expound that
“opportunistic behavior might become an issue” for CRPs and call for a clearer understanding of “the
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potential dangers of design elements of (...) WOM incentive programs”; Schmitt et al. (2011, p. 46)
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particularly voice concern that “stimulated WOM is prone to abuse by opportunistic referrers.” Potential
customers may take advantage of a CRP by engineering an artificial refrerral situation to obtain the
reward (Wirtz and Chew 2002). This means that somebody who hasP already decided to become a
customer of a specific firm learns that it offers a CRP; he or she then searches for a friend or

acquaintance who already is a customer of the firm and asks them to “pose” as a referrer. Then, the
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potential customer purchases from the firm faking the referral situation which invokes a reward that can
be shared between the artificial referrer and the potential Mcustomer or kept by only one of them.
According to anecdotal evidence from the cellular services industry, such opportunistic use of CRPs can
account for more than 50% of all referrals, implying thaWt such programs may not be as effective as often
proclaimed. Furthermore, the conclusions derived from sophisticated customer lifetime evaluations that
consider referral activity (e.g., Schmitt et al. 2011) may also be inconclusive when a “fake” referrer is

assigned value for his or her acquisition of a neyw customer.

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The current research raises the following akey research questions: How prevalent are engineered referrals
in services industries? How do the size of the reward and the reputation of the service firm affect
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engineered referrals?
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
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The creation of a fake referral situation can be characterized as a form of dysfunctional customer
behavior (Fisk et al. 2e010) that is unethical or opportunistic. The intentional engineering of the artificial
referral does not match the firm’s intended use of a CRP; it can be characterized as opportunistic
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behavior because it breaks “generally accepted norms of conduct in consumption situations” (Fullerton
and Punj 2004, p. 1239) by intentionally misleading the firm to pay a reward for a fake referral.

Opportunistic use of marketing instruments has been studied for instance in the context of service
guarantees (Wirtz and Kum 2004) and return policies (Harris 2008). Wirtz and Kum (2004) regard
cheating on service guarantees as a function of the perceived benefits and costs prompted by the
behavior. For example, the potential material gain of a behavior, the perceived injustice in the customer–
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firm relationship, and customers’ dissatisfaction with the firm or the service increase the benefits of
opportunistic behavior, whereas sanctions, the risk of being detected, and feelings of guilt increase costs.
Hence, potential customers engage in engineered referrals when they anticipate that the benefits
outweigh the costs. For example, some people might aim to reinforce their self-concept of being smart
shoppers, increasing the transaction value (Grewal, Monroe, and Krishnan 1998). On the cost side,
engineering an artificial referral situation creates transaction costs as the potential customer must find a
fake referrer and persuade him or her to participate. The risk of being judged negatively by the potential
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fake referrer for engaging in such opportunistic behavior increases social costs. Engineering a referral
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may also invoke psychological costs associated with feelings of guilt for being involved in opportunistic
behavior, or shame in case of detection; however, it is nearly impossible for firms to differenntiate
between authentic and engineered referrals so the likelihood of detection is low. Finally, thei referral
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reward offered clearly has a positive influence on the anticipated outcome of engineering referrals If all
other benefits and costs of engineered referrals are equal, the reward size should positiveely influence
outcomes, such that a potential customer is more likely to engineer a referral when the offered reward is
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larger. Consequently,
H : Consumers are more likely to engage in engineered referrals when a large rceward rather than a
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small reward, is offered. o

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According to neutralization theory (Sykes and Matza 1957), people often justify opportunistic behaviors
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to themselves and others. Past literature has identified several neutralization techniques (Hinduja 2007;
Sykes and Matza 1957), such as denial of the victim, which reinter pr ts any occurrence of damage as
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fair. For music file sharing, for example, many opportunistic users consider it fair to download music
illegally because they believe multinational music corporations charge overly high prices. In the context
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of engineered referrals, potential customers’ ability to neutralize their opportunistic action may depend
on the firm’s corporate reputation. When a firm is held in low esteem, potential customers may deny the
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victim, because they perceive that the disreputable firm deserves the consequences of customers’
opportunistic actions. Guilt costs should be lower when faking referrals than they would be in the case

of a reputable firm. Social costs also might be lower because it is easier to justify opportunistic actions
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against disreputable firms to others. Finally, the benefits from harming a less reputable firm might
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expand to include retaliation for its unfair treatment of others that led to the unfavorable reputation in
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the first place. When a firm has a good reputation, the social and psychological costs of engineering
referrals increase, because the favorarble reputation complicates the neutralization process. There are no
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benefits of retaliation, so customers likely engineer referrals only when reputable firms offer large
rewards in their CRPs. In contprast, for a less reputable firm, customers perceive the costs of behaving
opportunistically as low because their ability to neutralize potential feelings of guilt and shame
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increases. With low costs and additional benefits of retaliation, benefits likely exceed costs. Therefore,
the size of the CRP reward offered by the less reputable firm plays a less important role, whereas the
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reward offered by reputable firms must be great enough to make opportunistic behavior beneficial for a
potential customeTr, ead ng us to hypothesize:
H : Reward size has different effects on customers’ engagement in engineered referrals, depending on
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the firm’s reputation. Reward size has a stronger effect on the likelihood of engineered referrals for
a reputable firm compared to a non-reputable firm.

To answer our research questions, we conducted two studies. The first is an exploratory survey study
which sheds light on the prevalence of engineered referrals; the second study is based on a scenario
experiment and offers insights into the antecedents of engineered referrals.
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STUDY 1

For our exploratory study, we conducted a telephone survey among 1,318 German consumers to identify
service customers who participated in a CRP by referring another person to a certain service provider.
We could identify 155 respondents whom we then asked to recall the last time they participated in a
CRP, the name of the firm offering the specific CRP, and whether they actively recommended the
service (authentic referral) or whether they were prompted by the recipient to do so to attain the reward
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(engineered referral). Approximately one-third of the sample (31.0%) had participated in a CRP as a
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referrer. The most common service industries in which respondents participated in CRPs were retailing
(43.9%); newspaper and magazine subscriptions (17.4%); book, automobile, or fitness clubs (13.5n%);
telecommunications (9.7%); financial services (9.7%); and digital television (3.9%). In the caise of 71
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respondents (45.8%), the last CRP participation was based on an engineered referral. No significant
differences arose regarding the occurrence of engineered referrals between service industriees (χ2(6, 155)
= 3.88, p > .05).
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STUDY 2 c
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In a second study, we analyze the effects of reward size and reputation on intentions to engineer
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referrals. We conducted a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial design andP chose cellular services as the
study setting. To create a representative sample with regard to age and gender, we e-mailed a link to the
survey to potential subjects who fulfilled certain age and gender qu ot When subjects clicked on this
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link, they were randomly directed to one of four online scenarios. We found no differences in age or
gender distribution across cells. At the beginning of the experiment, all subjects were asked to imagine
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that they were about to sign up for a new cell phone contract They learned that the fictitious provider
“mymobile” had a favorable offer for them. We manipulated mymobile’s reputation on two levels, using
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three key attributes of reputation (Helm 2011). Then all subjects were told that, when they visited the
fictitious website of mymobile to close the contract they coincidentally came across the firm’s CRP

offer. To manipulate the reward size, the high reward group viewed a CRP offering a € 50 reward,
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whereas the small reward group was offered € 20. We then measured subjects’ intentions to engineer a
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referral on a 0–100% likelihood scale (Ryu and Feick 2007), as well as their evaluations of mymobile’s
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reputation (Ngyen and Leblanc 2001), the reward size (Ryu and Feick 2007), and the realism of the
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scenarios. Finally, subjects provided age and gender information. We checked the convergent validity of
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the reputation and perceived reward size constructs according to their factor loadings (>.83) and factor
reliability (>.97). We ensured tphat subjects regarded the scenario as realistic and that they could imagine
the situation (M = 5.02 M = 5.17, seven-point scale) and confirmed that the manipulations
realistic m imagine
were successful (firm’s reputation: M = 3.2, M = 4.5, t = 7.76, p < .000; perceived reward
bad_rep good_rep
size: M = 2.7, M = 49, t = 14.5, p < .000, seven-point scales). We tested for a positive effect of
20€ 5e0€
reward size on subjects’ intention to engineer a referral. The ANOVA results reveal a significant direct
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effect (F = 6.2 p < 05) and thus confirm H . In response to a large reward, subjects exhibit a 72.7%
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average intention to engineer a referral; for a low reward, this intention decreases to 62.6%. The direct
effect of reputation on intention to engineer a referral was not significant (F = .1; p > .05), though the
hypothesized interaction between reward size and reputation on intention was significant (F = 4.0; p <
.05). Reward size only matters for reputable firms, because when signing a contract with a more
reputable firm, subjects’ intentions to engineer a referral increase from 59% to 77.3% for a large
compared with a small reward. In contrast, referral engineering intentions for the less reputable firm
remain the same for large and small rewards, in support of H .
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Our exploratory study is in line with anecdotal evidence that CRP programs are frequently exploited by
customers who engineer referrals. Fake referrals require firms to provide the reward even though the
new customer was not actually acquired by the referrer and would possibly have signed up for the
service anyway. Shedding light on the prevalence of engineered referrals is important for managers who
need to evaluate the effectiveness and profitability of CRPs more accurately. To date, no empirical
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research has taken into account the potential opportunistic use of these programs; therefore, our study
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offers several key implications for managers.
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First, managers need to decide whether the unintended consequences of offering a CRPi require
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reconsideration of the program. Our exploratory study indicated that almost half of the referrers engaged
in engineered referrals and that this phenomenon is not specific to any single service induest y. It might
be more or less cost-effective to gain these new customers via alternative acquisition means; however,
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the effectiveness of CRPs is questionable if a large share of customers does not really rely on customer
word-of-mouth in their purchase decision. This is also an important research insighct: the majority of past
studies tout CRPs for their effectiveness due to the high credibility of word-of-omouth among customers.
However, today’s savvy customer may not interpret the offer of a CRP as an invitation to share word-of-
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mouth but simply as an opportunity to receive a discounted product. Here, i may also be instrumental to
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reconsider how CRPs are advertised: advertisement directed only at current customers may be less prone
to exploitation by potential customers seeking financial advantage th an a campaign directed at a broader
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population.

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Second, should managers indeed seek to reduce the number of engineered referrals, this research offers
additional insight. When firms offer large rewards for referrals, they increase the likelihood of
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opportunistic behavior; using smaller rewards might decrease opportunism. However, as other studies
show, the participation likelihood in CRP generally increases for larger rewards (e.g., Ryu and Feick

2007), requiring managers to prioritize: Do they want to increase the number of authentic referrals
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articulated among customers or the number of new customers acquired, irrespective of the authenticity
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of the referral? Managers may also take into account their firm’s reputation. For less reputable firms,
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opportunistic customer behavior likely occurs independent of reward size while reputable firms can
offer smaller rewards to reduce the likrelihood of engineered referrals.
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Despite the susceptibility of CpRPs for engineered referrals firms can still successfully use them and
simply tolerate opportunism by customers as long as new customers are efficiently acquired. In this
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context, it is interesting to note prior studies that indicate consumers regard unequal pricing as unfair
(Campbell 1999; Oliver and Shor 2003). For example, promotion prices exclusively offered to new
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customers may be perceived negatively by current customers. Here, a CRP may offer a solution as new
customers mightT be equally attracted by a referral reward or a new customer promotion reward,
implying that the end justifies the means as both programs could be equally effective for new customer
acquisition. Nonetheless, our findings do put a damper on all studies that proclaim CRP to be effective
because of the credibility and “power of word-of-mouth”.

References Available Upon Request
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NORWEGIAN BEST PRACTICE OF SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS MODELS

Juan Carlos Sosa-Varela, Universidad de Turabo, Puerto Rico, [email protected]
Göran Svensson, Oslo School of Management, Norway, [email protected]
Carmen Padin, Vigo University, Spain, [email protected]
Nils Hogevold, Oslo School of Management, Norway, [email protected]
Beverly Wagner, Strathclyde University, UK, [email protected]
Carlos Ferro, Vigo University, Spain, [email protected] s
Daniel Petzer, North-West University, South Africa, [email protected] g
HB Klopper, Monash University, South Africa, [email protected]
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ABSTRACT i
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The objective of this study is to describe corporate reasons, organizational challenges and the evolution
of economic effects, social boundaries and environmental actions in sustainable busineses practices.

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This study is based on insights gained from eight Norwegian companies in different industries.
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The empirical findings indicate evolutionary changes as companies mrove on a continuum from
superficial to embedded sustainable business models and the applicPation of sustainable business
practices.

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The planning, implementation and evaluation of sustainable business models evolves over time within
companies and their supply chains, as well as in the marketplaMc and society. A limitation of this study is
that it is exclusively undertaken in Norwegian companies, although the companies are from different
industries with different characteristics. W

Future research is clearly necessary and will be conducted in other countries in similar industries, so as

to explore the empirical findings from this stuydy in other contexts. In addition, the interfaces between
environmental actions, economic effects and social boundaries need to be investigated further. The study
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contributes to a growing body of knowleadge on corporate reasons for and organizational challenges of
sustainable business models, as well as environmental, social and economic aspects of sustainable
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business practices.
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This study only sheds initial light on these aspects, and more work is required to confirm and extend the
present findings. Specificmally, further research is required into underlying corporate reasons and
organizational challenges – as well as economic effects, social boundaries and environmental actions.
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The authors believe that the empirical findings provide useful and relevant insights applicable to both
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research and practice in this important and evolving element of contemporary business.

References Available Upon Request
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CULTURAL TRANSITION AND SOCIO-CULTURAL TAXONOMY OF CONSUMERS IN
BRICS COUNTRIES

Gregory J. Kivenzor, Rivier University, USA, [email protected]

INTRODUCTION

BRICS countries (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa), represent a collective market of 3 billion s
consumers with quickly growing purchasing power (O’Neil, 2011). Unlike slow changes in developedg
countries, BRICS markets experience a comprehensive transformation resulting in socio-economic
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processes, affecting life status of consumers, and challenging their present and future behavior (Wong &
Ahuvia, 1998). i
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The present research contributes to the body of knowledge developing a better understanding of changes
in cultural ecology to predict consumer value orientation in BRICS. We start with aen analysis of the
nature and dynamics of socio-economic transition taking place in BRICS to describe multiple risks and
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uncertainties affecting consumers. We examine socio-psychological and cultural research concepts to
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establish a connection between cultural transformation and changes in consumer self-construal under
psychological stress induced by transition. Then, we integrate conceprtual f ndings to develop a
Taxonomy of Cultural Ecology and map dynamics in consumer value oPrientation in BRICS societies.
Using this Taxonomy, marketers will be able to review, analyze and predict cultural changes in the

target markets in a systemic manner.
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TRANSITION AND CONSUMER EMMOTIONAL STRESS

Political regimes may change fast – sometimes literalWly overnight. Economic transition is slower and
conversion of an economic system may be a matter of years. Social transformation takes much longer
time and may last a decade or more. The slowest, by far, is cultural transformation (Triandis, 1972;

Hofstede, 1991): adjustments in cultural valuesy may take generations to set in, e.g., desegregation in the
US, social responsibility movement in Europe and ongoing cultural changes in BRICS. Steep transitions
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cause significant stress: consumer sociaal identity is constantly threatened; life status unexpectedly
changes; and social norms keep shifting (Deaux, 1996; Kivenzor, 2007). Consumers have to cope with
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multiple socio-economic and socio psychological uncertainties related to personal and household
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income, social standing, value orientation, belonging to particular social groups. Transitional processes
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modify prior consumption patterns due to steep changes in “social attachments” (Baumeister & Leary,
1995). m

MIGReATION OF SELF-CONSTRUALS AND SOCIAL TRANSITION

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Social psychologists base value orientation in societies on construals reflecting “fundamental relatedness
of individuals to each other” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 1996; Cuddy, 2009). Therefore, for members
of a society, construals depend on a relative weight of personal vs. social context of values, ideas,
behavior and communications. Greater emphasis on interdependence, communal values, harmony in
social relations, communications is attributed to collectivist cultures. In individualist cultures, higher
priority is given to independent perception of self, personal values, self improvement, etc.
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Thus, under emotional stress, consumers are forced to alter their choices based on a new set of norms
and beliefs. According to the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991; 2002), consumers are guided by
“beliefs about the likely consequences of the behavior (behavioral beliefs), beliefs about the normative
expectations of others (normative beliefs), and beliefs about the presence of factors that may facilitate or
impede performance of the behavior (control beliefs).”

For the purposes of this study, we associate control beliefs mainly with consumer perception of the
political and economic transition, and normative beliefs mainly with subjective understanding of the s
social and cultural transition. Based on those beliefs, consumers slowly amend their value orientationg
(e.g., Welzel et al., 2003; Schwartz, 2006; Sidhu, 2010) and alter their views on the probable future
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outcomes of their present behavior.
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Lack of relevant information about environment confuses consumer beliefs, causing additional
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emotional stress. Consumers, whose life is upset by the rapid socio-economic and socio-psychological
transformation, have troubles building new construals determining their new social eid ntity and self-
definition. Depending on the dominant type of a culture, such construals may be skewed toward either
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individualist or collectivist identification. We call them “I Identity” or “We Identity,” respectively.
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In individualist cultures, the group choice is optional and individuals mary simultaneously belong to
many groups by not necessarily identify themselves with any particuPlar group (Triandis, 1989). In
collectivist cultures, people espouse highly interdependent construals of selves; thus, they determine

their relationships through perceived similarities and differences among social groups they are presently
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associated with or strive to belong to in the future (Deaux, 1996; Wong & Ahuvia, 1998).
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SELF-CONCEPT AND CULTURAL TRANSITION
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Cultural research characterizes BRICS as collecti ist cultures (e.g., Hofstede, 1983; Triandis, 2004;
Schwartz, 2004). “We Identity” dominates in the countries like China, India or Russia where social

group values frequently supersede personal vaylues (Ralstone, 2008; Rudnev, 2009). This contrasts the
ways dominant in individualist societies like the US, Netherlands or Australia where most people
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develop and put forth their individual vaalues and independence from others – “I Identity” - before
considering any group membership (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Ardichvili & Kuchinke, 2002).
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However, individualism/collectivism is an umbrella characteristic applied to so-called “national culture”
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which corresponds to the general value orientation in the society but may not fit subcultures coexisting
in the same country (Erez m& Earley, 1993; Ralstone et al., 2008). For example, within the same nation,
there might be various subcultural pockets, reflecting cultural origins of inhabitants. In addition, value
orientation is strongley affected by economic status: poor people typically exhibit stronger collectivist
trends than their wealthy compatriots (Hirshman, 1973).
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Cultural research goes more in depth characterizing different types of collectivist and individualist
societies, discerning vertical vs. horizontal collectivism, and vertical vs. horizontal individualism. Extant
literature introduces a social construct of equality to create dual characterization: an attitude towards
equality is added to a perception of self with respect to a social group (Singelis et al., 1995; Cukur et al.,
2004; Schimmack et al., 2005). When individuals put an emphasis on personal values and autonomy, but
recognize and accept inequality in the society, this value orientation is characterized as vertical
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individualism. When members emphasize individual values, but strive to achieve equality in the society,
the culture is defined as horizontal individualism. Horizontal collectivism results from the dominant
value orientation towards tradition, conformity and equality among all members. Finally, vertical
collectivism characterizes the society where group members value their belonging to a particular group,
but still recognize and accept inequality among them within this group.

TAXONOMY OF CULTURAL TRANSITION
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Extant literature suggests various classifications of national cultures presented in a form of a table org
matrix (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Singelis, 1995; Ralstone 2008) representing a static snapshot of cultural
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dimensions. To understand the cultural transition in dynamics, we suggest an integration of frameworks
provided by socio-psychological and cultural research to describe “cultural ecology” (Frake, 19i62) of a
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society.
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For this purpose, we combine conceptual consideration of the self-relevance and beehavioral stimuli
governing such relationships suggested by Marcus and Kitayama (1991) and characteristics of vertical
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and horizontal individualism/collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Cukur et al. 2004) This allows us
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to devise a socio-cultural taxonomy characterizing a relationship between self and society in different
types of cultures over time. Serving as a tool mapping a migration of culrtural values, such taxonomy
shall have both explanatory and predictive power. Furthermore, brPidging cultural research with
consumer choice, marketers shall be able to better understand current and future consumption

preferences and more effectively meet consumer needs and wants.
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In each culture, value orientation and consumption choices ofM individual members arise from a variety of
factors, including family and social group influence during the years of personality formation. For the
purpose of this research, we consider “Dependency” asW a characteristic describing the value individuals
place on their membership in social groups and its respective influence on consumer choice. We also
consider “Parity” as a degree of tolerance toward relative inequality among members within a social

group. The following definitions explain the unyderlying constructs:

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• Cultural environments with high leavel of Dependency stimulate tight intra-group integration,
indoctrinate members on group va ues, and police styles and levels of public and private
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consumption. Cultures of that type espouse “Connectedness” – most members ascribe the value of
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belonging to a social group above and beyond their personal values, aspirations and preferences,
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e.g., China and India (Triandis, 1972; Hofstede, 1980; Wong & Ahuvia, 1998).
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• In cultural environments with low level of Dependency, members afford to have only volitional and
loose affiliations ewi h social groups, completely disassociating group membership from consumption
patterns. Those cultures advocate “Detachment” – members care mostly about individual freedom
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and accomplishments, viewing groups memberships as fleeting affairs, e.g., the US, Netherlands,
France (Hofstede, 1980; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998).

• Cultural environments, where intra-group Parity is a stated goal, tolerate no distinctions among
members by either ignoring individual differences or invalidating them via group conventions to
achieve “Equality” of members within a group. Examples are a kibbutz-like environment, e.g.,
Israel, or cultures of independent individualists, e.g., Denmark, Sweden (de Mooij, 2005).
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• Cultures, where member Parity is not a concern, embrace “Hierarchy” within a group and society at
large, and adopt social ranking using attributes such as personal talents, achievements or ancestry.
Some of those cultures espouse aristocracy, e.g., UK; some - meritocracy, e.g., US; and some - cast
system, e.g., India (Verma & Triandis, 1999; de Mooij, 2005).

The suggested approach characterizes cultures by varied degrees of Dependency and Parity rather than
pegging them into a single category, e.g., horizontal collectivism. A graphic depiction of the taxonomy s
represents a circle with two horizontal focal points denoting Connectedness and Detachment and twog
vertical focal points denoting Equality and Hierarchy. A vector rotating around the center has a length
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and rotational angle depending on a degree of Dependency-Parity characteristics of a particular culture.
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The suggested Taxonomy of Cultural Ecology represents a tool, which may be used for cultural
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characterization in static and dynamics. A static application of this tool allows for snapshot-type
comparison of multiple cultures around the world or subcultural orientations within ethe same nation.
Even more important, the Taxonomy allows to assess cultural dynamics via registering the temporal
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transition of a single culture with Dependency-Parity measurements taken with reasonable regularity
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(e.g., Schwartz’s National Value Survey, GLOBE Project). Finally, this taxonomy can be used to
categorize a particular culture in terms of hierarchy of human needs and sorcial values, and compare and
contrast them with established system (e.g., Maslow, 1943; Schwartz, 200P6)

According to published research, cultures in BRICS slowly Cmigrate from horizontal to vertical
collectivism and, eventually, to vertical individualism (Verma & Triandis, 1999; Ralstone et al., 2008).
Therefore, the vector reflecting this process and denoting a paMrticular culture’s position on the chart will
slowly rotate clockwise from the lower left quadrant “Connectedness-Equality” to the upper left one
“Connectedness-Hierarchy” and subsequently to the upWper right quadrant “Detachment-Hierarchy.” At
each particular period of time, the radius and angle of this vector will denote measured cultural values.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATyIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE
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This study of BRICS cultural environmeant and ensuing concepts were validated through a preliminary
qualitative research. Qualitative research via interviewing middle and upper classes consumers with
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distinct cultural background in three BRICS countries support the outcomes of conceptual study.
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This research contributes to the body of knowledge by integration of the frameworks developed by
social psychologists and cmultura researchers, which produced a fruitful result – the Taxonomy of
Cultural Ecology. The Taxonomy shall help marketing scholars formulate clear research hypotheses
focusing of measuremeent of social Dependency and social Parity values of consumers belonging to a
particular culture. Measurement of consumer value orientation at various times during social transition
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will serve a bas s for systemic mapping of cultural changes to understand cultural dynamics in BRICS.

Greater clarity of the suggested Taxonomy of Cultural Ecology affords an easier interpretation of
disparate, and oftentimes confusing, metrics used in extant literature. This tool shall allow marketing
managers to map cultural transition of consumers, more precisely predict incoming changes, and
develop goods and services meeting future consumer demand.
References Available Upon Request