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Routledge Revivals Problems of Mind First published in 1972, Problems of Mind begins with a consideration of the view that the human mind is an immaterial thing that does not require corporeal embodiment for its operations. It takes up the conception that “inner experiences” are “strictly identical” with brain processes. The book also deals exclusively with the doctrine called “Logical Behaviourism”, which will always possess a compelling attraction for anyone who is perplexed by the psychological concepts, who has become aware of the worthlessness of an appeal to introspection as an account of how we learn those concepts, and who has no inclination to identify mind with brain. The three most plausible theories of mind-body dualism, mind-brain monism, and behaviourism are all rejected, and nothing is set forth as the true theory. Norman Malcolm states that this is ‘only a drop in the bucket. It will serve its purpose if it leads the reader into the writings of Wittgenstein, who is easily the most important ﬁgure in the philosophy of mind.’ Problems of Mind will be an essential read for scholars and researchers of philosophy of mind, ethics, logic, and philosophy in general. Problems of Mind Descartes to Wittgenstein by Norman Malcolm FirstpublishedinGreatBritainin1972 byGeorgeAllen&UnwinLtd. Thiseditionﬁrstpublishedin2021byRoutledge 2ParkSquare,MiltonPark,Abingdon,Oxon,OX144RN andbyRoutledge 605ThirdAvenue,NewYork,NY10017 RoutledgeisanimprintoftheTaylor&FrancisGroup,aninformabusiness ©1971NormanMalcolm All rightsreserved.No part ofthis bookmaybe reprintedor reproducedor utilisedin any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrievalsystem,withoutpermissioninwritingfromthepublishers. Publisher’sNote Thepublisherhasgonetogreatlengthstoensurethequalityofthisreprintbutpoints outthatsomeimperfectionsintheoriginalcopiesmaybeapparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and welcomes correspondencefromthosetheyhavebeenunabletocontact. ALibraryofCongressrecordexistsunderLCCN:73163563 ISBN13:978-1-032-10291-7(hbk) ISBN13:978-1-003-21463-2(ebk) ISBN13:978-1-032-10292-4(pbk) Problems o f Mind Descartes to Wittgenstein Norman Malcolm London GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD Ruskin House Museum Street First published in Great Britain in 1972 Second impression 1976 This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. All rights are reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, 1956, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. © 1971 Norman Malcolm ISBN 0 04 130015 7 The Essays in Philosophy series was originally published in the United States of America as the Harper Essays in Philosophy. The British edition is a photographic copy and American spelling and usage have been retained. Printed in Great Britain by Biddles Ltd, Guildford, Surrey Preface This essay was originally planned as one in a volume of essays by several authors. It was com- pleted and delivered in September 1965. During sub- sequent years, while it languished in the hands of the publisher, there appeared a number of works that treat some of the topics discussed in this essay. I regret that it contains no reference to them. Part I (Mind and Body) begins with a consideration of the view that the human mind is an immaterial thing that does not require corporeal embodiment for its operations. The assumptions that nourish this conception are studied, and some of the typical turns and twists of objection and reply are traced out. My conclusion is that the undermining, by Wittgenstein, of the notion that we obtain our psychological concepts (thinking, perception, memory, belief, will and so on) by “inward observation” (Locke’s “inner sense”), removes the main temptation to believe that a human mind could exist in separation from a living, corporeal, human being. viii Preface Part II (Materialism) takes up the conception that “inner experiences” are, or might turn out to be, “strictly identical” with brain processes. I concen- trate on the presentation of this view by J. J. C. Smart, according to whom our “immediate” or “inner” experiences take place “inside our skulls” ((Journal of Philosophy 60, 1963, p. 654) or “in our brains” (Philosophy and Scientific Realism, p. 96). Against the possibility of an empirical verification of the claimed identity of an “inner experience” with a correlated brain process, I urge what has been called “the location problem.” To a previous presentation of this criticism, it has been objected that a mind-brain materialist could contend that the putative identity holds between the event that consists in a person’s having a certain experience and the event that consists in his brain’s being in a certain state. Since neither of these events has location in any clear sense, the location disparity is removed. (See Jaegwon Kim, “On the Psycho-Physical Iden- tity Theory,” American Philosophical Quarterly 3, 1966, pp. 227-35.) It is true that someone could adopt this view; and this shows that “the psycho- physical identity theory” is not one theory, but a collection of different theories or possible theories. I have used the location argument solely against Smart’s version of identity theory, to which it re- mains a decisive objection. With regard to the different theory just mentioned, I should think two things: first, that it is more artificial than Smart’s theory, in the sense that it fails to embody the strong Preface ix temptation to think of experiences and mental phe- nomena as “inner.” This temptation is a motive force behind Smart’s theory and is, I believe, the main source of its philosophical interest. Second, as Kim points out {supra), this suggested version of identity theory, for which location is not a problem, would be faced with the equally severe difficulty of explaining how it could be verified that the property of, say, having an orange after-image, is (or is not) contingently identical (that is, not logically equiva- lent and not merely coextensive) with the property of having a certain brain-state. The notion that these two properties might turn out to be one and the same property, despite their not being logically equiva- lent, would seem to be as meaningless as is the notion, in Smart’s theory, of verifying that an experience and a brain process have the same location inside the skull. In a recent book (A Materialist Theory of the Mind, New York: Humanities Press, 1968) David Armstrong argues in support of psycho-physical identity theory by claiming (1) that the concept of a mental state is the concept of an “ inner cause ’ ’ of “outward behavior”; (2) that the inner cause of this behavior is in fact a brain state; (3) that, therefore, mental states are brain states. Unfortunately, I do not have the space in this preface to explore these contentions. If I were writing Part II again, I should fix my attention on the assumption called “The Principle of Psycho-Physical Correspondence” or “The Prin-