Problems in Historical Epistemology

194 Pages·1988·9.591 MB·English

by  Jerzy Kmita (auth.)

PROBLEMS IN HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
SYNTHESE LIBRARY
STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Managing Editor:
J AAKKO HINTI KKA, Florida State University, Tallahassee
Editors:
DON A L D D A V IDS 0 N, University of California, Berkeley
GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, University of Leyden
WESLEY C. SALMON, University of Pittsburgh
VOLUME 191
JERZY KMITA
Professor of Logic and Methodology of Science,
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan
PROBLEMS IN
HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
Translated from the Polish by Michael Turner
D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
PWN -POLISH SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHERS
WARSZAWA
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kmita, Jerzy.
[Z problem6w epistemologii historycznej. English]
Problems in historical epistemology / Jerzy Kmita ; translated from
the Polish by Michael Turner.
p. cm.-(Synthese library; v. 191)
Translation of: Z problem6w epistemologii historycznej.
Iucludes index.
lSBN-13: 978-94-010-7136-9 e-lSBN-13: 978-94-009-1421-6
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-1421-6
1. History-Philosophy. I. Title.
D16.8.K55513 1988 87-21918
901-<ic19 elP
This translation has been made from Z probZemow epistemoZogii histo
rycznej published by Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa,
1980.
English edition published by PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers, Miodo
wa 10, 00-215 Warszawa, Poland, in co-edition with D. Reidel Publishing
Company, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland.
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©
Copyright 1988 by PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers, Warszawa
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1988
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE vii
CHAPTER 1 / EPISTEMOLOGICAL COGNITION AS
HISTORICAL COGNITION 1
1.1. Factographical Versus Theoretical Historicism 2
1.2. Framework Regu1adties 10
1.3. Assumptions of Historical Epistemology 15
1.4. The Relation Born by General Statements of His-
torical Epistemology on Methodological Norms and
Directives 26
Notes 31
CHAPTER 2 / THE RELATION OF CORRESPON-
DENCE 34
2.1. Literal Reference 34
2.2. The Characteristics of Essentially Corrective
(Strict) Correspondence 39
2.3. Remarks of Traditional Understandings of Corre-
spondence 47
2.4. An Example of Essentially Corrective Correspon
dence, A Debate with the Views of P. K. Feyer-
abend 64
Notes 75
CHAPTER 3 / THE OPPOSITION OF THEORY AND
EXPERIENCE 81
3.1. 'Dogma of Empiricism' 81
3.2. Performed Action as the Essentially Corrected
Correspondence Rendering of Undertaken Action 96
[VJ
VI TABLE OF CONTENTS
3.3 TWlo Kinds of OpposiHon of Theory and Experi-
ence: The Relative and the Absolute 112
Notes 128
CHAPTER 4 I THE DUHEM-QUINE THESIS 132
4.1. The Comprehensive Instrumentalism of W. V.
Quine 132
4.2. The Comprehensive Instrumentalism of W. V.
Quine from the Viewpoint of Historical Epistemo-
logy 147
Notes 160
CHAPTER 5 I ALTHUSSER'S INSTRUMENTALISM 162
5.1. A Marxist Variant of Theoretical Historicism
Methodology 162
5.2. Althusser's Conception of Historical Materialism 167
5.3. 'Anti-EIl'lipiricism' as a Consequence of the 'Meth
odologically' Instrumentalist Interpretation of His-
torical Materialism 172
Notes 182
SUBJECT INDEX 185
PREFACE
It was only after I had finished this volume that I came across
the book by Barry Bames, Scientific Knowledge and Sociologi
cal Theory (Routledge and Kegan Paul). I am in full ag,reement
with certain ideas expounded in that book, although it also
contains others that I must object to. I have decided to make
some remarks about them at the beginning of my book, as
I believe that they may prove useful by way of int,roduction to
the English version of this volume. I hope that anyone who has
professional reasons to turn his attention to this volume will
have acquainted himself with Scientific Knowledge and Socio
logical Theory before he proceeds any further.
I fully share Barnes' view that it is possible and desirable
to undertake descrtptive-sociological investigations of scientific
research. The main subjeot of this research should be the na
tural science, and ,moreover, such findings in these sciences
whose cognitive value has never been questioned by profession
als. These investigations must avoid becoming entangled in
epistemologtical controversies, and through epi:stemo}.ogy in ,phi
losophical controversies. They must not defend any of the
contended theses and must not Hrterally ,rely on evaluative pre
mises that have been questicmed. Thus it is possible and desira
ble to treat science a,s one of the domains of culture that can
be studied by sociology (or, as the author of Scientific Know
ledge and Sociological Theory would have salid, one among the
complex of such domai:ns). I especially concur with Barnes ovoc
his claim :that Mannheim's sodology of knowledge does not
approach science from the purely sociological point of. view.
(And the same dB true f.or the phenomenological ,conception of
sociology, I would add, ,though I have not enough space herre to
elaborate on the slUbject). When Mannheim speaks about the
[VII]
VIII PREFACE
'scientific character' of research on society, he holds that the task
of the sociologist is t·o explain instances .of ideological distortion
a
of truth, as if, la Hegel, he has already learned the truth.
Marx does the same for that matter. In Mannheim's writings
the sociologist is explicitly engaged in epistemological contro
versies, and through ~pistemology he gives an absolute status
to his own truths or the truths of the fraction to which he
belongs. Again, Marx did the same when he acted in the role
of a journalist who draws his arguments from science.
I take issue with Barnes,on the .other hand, when he says
that it is unimportant for sociology .of knowledge what conclu
sions have ben reached in philosophical analysis of science
an analysis which is always engaged epistemologically. It is
possible that my defense .of these findings is motivated by the
fact that for a long time I have been personally engaged in
such investigations, and now I am determined tQ defend their
honour. I do not intend, however, t.o use epistemological argu
ments in support of my position. I will emphasize two other
reasons instead.
Firrst, I believe that ,one can effectively argue for the ex
istence of what I call social methodological consciousness of
scientific practice (a counterpart, in some degree, of Durhheim's
c.ollective consciousness). If we grant that such consciousness
exists, it is not difficult to confront various epistemological
versions of philosophy of science with corresponding historical
-social states of that consciousness and find out that the
versions of philosophy of science represent states of the con
sciousness; that they serve as 'witnesses' to the existence of
thQse states. But Piiofessor Barnes makes no provisions for per
mitting a soci.ologist of science to study this role of philosophy
of science. Neither has he made any room for functional ex
planation of historical-social states of methodological con
sciousness (or states of culture represented by historically
determined scientific disciplines, in his terminology) in terms
external to consciousness. If, however, such explanation is not
forthcoming, we will be left with the idealist formula spiritus
PREFACE IX
flat ubi vult. Where sociological research on science is at stake,
I know of no better proposal to break out of the confinement
imposed by this formula than Marx' historical materialism, as
long as it is properly interpreted. In the right interpretation, it
pemnirts us t.o pJnpoint functional reasons for the production of
:the ,relevant results of scientific research and for the emergence
,of meth,odological consciousness /Which regulates that produc
tion and is approprialtely TeJpresented by particular versions of
the iPhilosophical investigation of science.
Secondly, philosophy of ,science, as a type of philosophy, is
entitled, I believe, to undertake epistemological or even ethical
evaluation of research practice. This practice is controlled by
such evaluations, and philosophy only expresses them. If such
evaluations were to be discontinued, philosophy of science
vould serve no purpose. This would on turn obliterate cultural
motivation for engaging in scientific research, and consequent
ly science wouLd cease to exist as a social phenomenon.
To sum up : this book fully ackno'wledges that the epistemo
logical claims of the philosophical analysis of science are gr,o
undless. It has been written, however, ,in an attempt to demon
strate that philosophical analysis of science is indispensable as
an expression ,of the methodological consciousness which regula
te,s scientibc research and as an instrument of eultural-ax.iolo
gioal (,Le. epistemological or ethical) evaluation of ilts results.