Preventing violent radicalisation and terrorist recruitment in the EU

43 Pages·2008·0.52 MB·English

BRIEFING PAPER
Policy Department C
Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs

PREVENTING VIOLENT RADICALISATION
AND TERRORIST RECRUITMENT IN THE EU

THE THREAT TO EUROPE BY RADICAL
ISLAMIC TERRORIST GROUPS

CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS
JANUARY 2008
PE 393.277
EN
JANUARY 2004
i
Directorate-General Internal Policies
Policy Department C
Citizens Rights and Constitutional Affairs

PREVENTING VIOLENT RADICALISATION
AND TERRORIST RECRUITMENT IN THE EU

THE THREAT TO EUROPE BY RADICAL
ISLAMIC TERRORIST GROUPS

BRIEFING PAPER
Abstract:

The ad hoc briefing paper “Preventing violent radicalisation and terrorist recruitment in the
EU - The threat to Europe by radical Islamic terrorist groups” provides an original analysis
and evaluation of the different strategies that are meant to deal with such phenomena, as well
as their effectiveness. This perspective takes into account the dynamics of actions/reactions
between the various parts involved in violence and its repression, thus going beyond
recommendations mainly aiming at controlling the networks through which individuals enter
the radicalizing dynamics, in a “worst-case scenario” perspective. The core point of the paper
is to transgress the different forms of self-censorship that exist in the field of the
counterterrorist public policies, by insisting upon the fact that some of the measures taken can
contribute to the radicalisation, or more accurately, to the dynamics of escalation. The priority
is then to move the focus, while widening the angle of the problem, to highlight the
interactions not only between clandestine organisations and reference fields but also public
authorities, journalists and others. The question of the radicalisation must be reconsidered and
redefined as a subsidiary of the questions on escalation and de-escalation dynamics of the
conflicts.

The ad hoc briefing paper is thus structured as follows: the first part aims at understanding the
radicalisation processes; the second part deals with the questions of clandestineness,
radicalisation and recruitment; the third part deals with the dilemma faced by authorities and
their policies, that can either lead to an escalation or a de-escalation, depending on whether
they tend to mimetic rivalry or distanciation. Finally, the paper provides certain policy
recommendations, mainly based on favouring distanciation, taking into account the pernicious
effects of intensified measures of control, repression or war on violent radicalisation, and
controlling and supervising counter radicalisation.

PE 393.277
ii
This note was requested by The European Parliament's committee on Civil Liberties,
Justice and Home Affairs.

This paper is published in the following languages: EN, FR.

Authors: Didier Bigo and Laurent Bonelli, Centre d'Etudes sur les Conflits, Paris

Manuscript completed in December 2007

Copies can be obtained through:
M. Alessandro Davoli
Tel: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
E-mail: [email protected]

Informations on DG Ipol publications:
http://www.ipolnet.ep.parl.union.eu/ipolnet/cms

Brussels, European Parliament

The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and
do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

I. Understanding the radicalisation processes 8

II. Clandestinity, radicalisation and recruitment 14

1. The individuals: isolated actors or members of
an organisation? 14

2. Clandestine organisations and recruitment 16

3. Clandestinity and its various implications 24

4. Clandestine organisations and screen organisations 27

III. Mimetic rivalry or distanciation? 30

IV. Recommendations for the European Parliament 35

1. Favouring distanciation 35

2. Taking into account the pernicious effects of intensified
measures of control, repression or war on violent
radicalisation 36

3. Controlling and supervising counter radicalisation 37

AD HOC BRIEFING PAPER
Preventing violent radicalisation and terrorist recruitment in the EU.
The threat to Europe by radical Islamic terrorist groups
Didier BIGO and Laurent BONELLI, December 2007

Introduction

European institutions and Member States feel more and more concerned by the question of the
violent radicalisation in our societies and the recruitment of potential “terrorists”. The Member
States started to get organized after the 9/11 events, but wanted to reinforce the means of the fight
against terrorism at the European scale after the bomb attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004. They
asked the European Commission to initiate a reflection on what can be gained from cooperation
and on the causes of such a phenomenon. The Communication, called “Fight against terrorism:
prevention, preparedness and response” was published in October 2004 and, for the first time,
refers to the notion of “violent radicalisation”, linking it to the problem of recruitment: “Opposing
violent radicalisation within our societies and disrupting the conditions facilitating the recruitment
of terrorists must be fundamental priorities in a strategy to prevent terrorism”1. The question of
recruitment is part of any major statement on the war against terrorism, especially since the London
bomb attacks that took place on July 7 and 21, 2005: they showed that the hermetic control of the
frontiers against foreign individuals was not only impossible but also effectless when the terrorists
come from within, when they are members of the targeted society (home grown terrorists). Thus, in
2005, the Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism dedicated one of its seven objectives to
“address[ing] the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into terrorism”. These
also include (1) identifying factors which “contribute to recruitment”, (2) investigating links
between “extreme religious or political beliefs, as well as socio-economic and other factors, and
support for terrorism”, (3) addressing good governance and the rule of law, and (4) implementing a
strategy for “cross-cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and the Islamic

1 European Commission (2004) (COM(2004) 698 final). Fight against terrorism: prevention, preparedness and
response.
1
world”2. In December 2005, the Council adopted a strategy in which the concern for recruitment
and violent radicalisation holds a prominent position3. In September 2005, the Commission
adopted a Communication concerning "Terrorism recruitment: addressing the factors contributing
to violent radicalisation". An Action Plan on combating Radicalisation and Recruitment was
adopted by the European Council in December 2005. In 2006 and 2007, the European Commission
Vice-President, Franco Frattini, made multiple interventions on this subject, and a group of experts
was even set up in April 20064.
A great number of reports and studies have been written in order to define the radicalisation and
its processes, revealing the interest of the European institutions for Islamic radicalisation,
considered as the “greatest threat to Europe”, as Gilles de Kerchove, the new Counterterrorism
Coordinator, declared5. Many specific studies were proposed by the Directorate-General for
Research and the Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security, as well as by the major
research institutions in the various member states, especially the Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC) in Great-Britain. Many of these studies are of great value and add to the
knowledge on individuals that became actors, on their systems of justification and sometimes on
their motives and links to external groups. Going further than the usual experts on “terrorism”, the
researchers on Islam, migrations and minorities living in Europe produced subtle and complex
views, but most of the time, these studies have been integrated into a larger, pre-established frame,
insisting – almost exclusively – upon the motivations and mechanisms of recruitment and thus
keeping their focus on the relation between the individuals and the clandestine organisations, which
are however but one part of the phenomenon we are trying to describe. All the studies that have
been criticising “terroristology” for being partial and slanted and that have assimilated the lessons
taught by the theories on collective actions, show indeed that though this relation should not been
undermined, the public authorities are nonetheless as much as important actors: their actions,
reactions and abilities to structure the context of political opportunities contribute to develop the
various forms of radicalism. Studies on terrorism, which started to form a specific sub-field in the
1970s, wanted to get differentiated from the studies on sociology and conflict resolution,
emphasizing their particularity and the constantly renewed newness of their subject. So to speak,
they have always tried to avoid the ethical and political questions in order to better serve the

2 Council of the European Union (2004), Declaration on Combating Terrorism.
3 Council of the European Union (2005) (14469/4/05), The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
4 Commission Decision of 19 April 2006 setting up a group of experts to provide policy advice to the Commission on
fighting violent radicalisation (2006/299/CE).
5 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/019-12644-309-11-45-902-20071105IPR12636-05-11-
2007-2007-false/default_en.htm
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decision-makers. But by refusing to have a look at the dynamics of actions/reactions between the
various actors involved in the violence and its repression, they have come to a deadlock in which
their diversity is nothing but semblance when one comes to consider the questions generally raised
by the sociology of conflict. Thus, our purpose here is not to produce recommendations aiming at
controlling more or less the socialising networks through which the individuals come to the
radicalising dynamics, especially in a context of the worst-case scenario which gives de facto the
priority to the enhancement of the possibilities of intervention for the police and intelligence
services, in the name of a new balance between liberties and security, and which restrains the
presumption of innocence and favours the discourse on “prevention” (even though we will come
back on this issue in our conclusion). The core point in our note is rather to transgress the different
forms of self-censorship that exist in the field of the counterterrorist public policies, by insisting
upon the fact that some of the measures taken can contribute to the radicalisation, or more
accurately, to the dynamics of escalation. Our priority is then to move the focus, while widening
the angle of the problem, to highlight the interactions not only between clandestine organisations
and reference fields but also public authorities, journalists and others. The question of the
radicalisation must be reconsidered and redefined as a subsidiary of the questions on escalation and
de-escalation dynamics of the conflicts.
The first question to be raised must define the referent object of the radicalising process: the
radicalisation of what? Do we refer to the radicalisation of individuals, or of ideologies, or of
networked clandestine organisations developing with or without the support from some states? On
this matter, one realizes that very often the texts in the calls for tenders and the answers proposed
by the academics are ambiguous, because they deal with the violent radicalisation at a general
level. Many reports issued by Member States hence call upon a “radical era”, especially when those
have been written by British think tanks in collaboration with their American peers. This “radical
era” then turns out to be the era when one particular religion became radical: Islamism. This is
exactly what we can see in the scenarios written by the CIA when they asked all the think tanks to
describe what the world would be in 20206. For most of these texts or discourses, 9/11 is the key
turning-point from which we could distinguish an “ancient” form of terrorism from a “new” one.
But the following paradox springs up: the authors who were the most attached to the idea that
former terrorism was a sort of third world war are the very same who now assert that it was not that
important and that it could even be considered as a “moderate terrorism” comparatively to the

6 Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project
(http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html)
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present situation. This is quite obvious when we take the example of the authors who formerly
worked on the cases of Northern Ireland and Spain (ETA) and are now working on Al Qaeda. We
can even add those who worked on India and the Sikh or on the Tamils from the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam. On the contrary, experts on the Middle-East question are the less prone to adopt
this differentiation and emphasize the continuities, related to the situation in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, the Iranian revolution and its transformations, the situation in Lebanon and the relations to
Syria. The idea of a violent radicalisation in relation with a new form of terrorism must then be
balanced: if there are indeed some logics of intensified violence and capillarisation that have taken
place between the 1970s and nowadays7, we cannot say that there is a before and an after.
Another important issue is to redefine the radicalisation as a process: should we go back to the
origins and argue the radicalism of the ideas that would almost automatically radicalize the acts:
from the first speech acts, then the mobilisation, the support to the individuals who laud violence to
the final plunge into violence itself? Most of the studies that developed the terminology of violent
radicalisation seem to adopt this point of view8. Though very diverse, the thorough debates on
solutions to be provided presented by the various reports eventually adopt the same and unique
perspective: the one that analyses the deviant behaviours and the phenomenon of absolute and
relative frustration. These works have been initiated by Ted R. Gurr’s fundamental book, Why men
rebel, which he updated later on in Why minorities rebel 9 and in which he emphasized the
differences of hopes that individuals can have in a given society, their objective chances to have
their situation improve and the coercive structure of the states. Throughout the liberal periods,
offering freedom of thought and circulation, people feel less constrained by social norms in a given
society and express more easily their differences, oppositions and resentments. Several books and
articles, when studying the question of radicalisation, did apply these analyses to the post-9/11
situation, according to which deviance comes from relative frustrations and is considered as the
deviant behaviours of particular individuals10. Ted R. Gurr stays cautious when he considers the

7 On the capillarisation of violence, see Didier BIGO, “Guerres, conflits, transnational et territoire”, Cultures & Conflits
#21-22 (1996) pp. 397-418.
8 The European Commission has embraced a similar working definition, stating that radicalisation constitutes “the
phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to terrorism”; quoted from European
Commission, “Commission Programme for the Prevention of and Response to Violent Radicalisation: Call for
Proposals 2007”; available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/2004_2007/radicalisation/doc/call_2007_en.pdf.
9 Ted R. GURR, Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1970 et “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global
Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945”, International Political Science Review, #14, 1993,
pp.161-201.
10 This is for instance Marc SAGEMAN’s presupposition, in Understanding Terrorist Networks, Philadelphia,
Philadelphia University Press 2004.
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