Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy: Prudence or Peril? PDF
Preview Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy: Prudence or Peril?
Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy This page intentionally left blank Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy Prudence or Peril? By William A.Boettcher III Assistant Professor North Carolina State University PRESIDENTIALRISKBEHAVIORINFOREIGNPOLICY © William A.Boettcher III,2005. Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2005 978-1-4039-6854-8 All rights reserved.No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue,New York,N.Y.10010 and Houndmills,Basingstoke,Hampshire,England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St.Martin's Press,LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States,United Kingdom and other countries.Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-53071-7 ISBN 978-1-4039-7940-7 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781403979407 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Boettcher,William A.,1969– Presidential risk behavior in foreign policy :prudence or peril? / by William A. Boettcher III. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1.Presidents—United States—Decision making—Case studies.2.Presidents— United States—Psychology—Case studies.3.Risk-taking (Psychology)—Political aspects—United States—Case studies.4.United States—Foreign relations— 1945–1989—Decision making—Case studies.I.Title. JK516.B64 2005 327.73(cid:1)001(cid:1)9—dc22 2004058691 Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd.,Chennai,India. First edition:March 2005 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 For my wife,Becky and our children,Abigail and Andrew This page intentionally left blank C O N T E N T S Preface viii One Introduction 1 Two Clarification,Critique,Framework Construction, and Research Concerns 16 Three Truman Case Studies 47 Four Kennedy Case Studies 113 Five Conclusion 164 Notes 180 Bibliography 190 Index 202 P R E F A C E Three core questions provide the underlying structure for this book:Why did U.S.presidents frequently engage in anticommunist crusades in periph- eral areas (in terms of strategic value) during the Cold War? How can we explain individual decisions that appear to be irrational? How should we apply and test psychological theories of human decision-making based on laboratory experiments? My interest in these questions emerged in the early 1990s as articles by Robert Jervis,Jack Levy,Barbara Farnham,and Rose McDermott introduced “prospect theory”to international relations schol- ars.Borrowing from the seminal work of psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,these authors sought to develop explanations for risk- taking decisions that could not be easily explained by expected-utility theory.Prospect theory provided a relatively parsimonious,intuitively com- pelling, and descriptively accurate challenge to the reigning paradigm. Prospect theory’s emphasis on risk-taking, when faced with losses (along with research on the endowment effect, sunk costs, and escalation of commitment), seemed particularly well suited for military intervention decisions that are often fraught with danger. Unfortunately, much of the early research on prospect theory in international relations was focused on straightforward application instead of adaptation and integration. The current wave of international relations research on prospect theory takes account of the critiques leveled at the work of the early pioneers,builds on the latest research in behavioral decision theory, and self-consciously attempts to combine the insights derived from prospect theory with knowl- edge gained from years of research by international relations theorists. This book integrates research on reference dependence,personal predis- positions,and uncertainty and information accuracy in a “Risk Explanation Framework”(REF) designed to reflect the contextual nuance of the empir- ical realm of foreign policy decision making.I argue that personal predis- positions interact with the characteristics of a situation (including the number and framing of alternatives and the degree of uncertainty and time pressure) to produce choices that could not be predicted by theories of rational state interest or domestic politics. Hypotheses gleaned from the theoretical discussion and critique are tested in six case studies across two Preface ix presidential administrations (Truman and Kennedy).Throughout these case studies,I am sensitive to the problems of evaluation and testing that have plagued earlier research in this area. I find particularly strong support for the hypotheses regarding reference dependence and uncertainty and infor- mation accuracy, while the weaker results for the hypotheses regarding personal predispositions suggest areas for revision and future research. I would like to thank the people who introduced me to the study of foreign policy decision making, encouraged my interest in political psy- chology,supplied thoughtful advice and criticism of draft manuscripts,and provided emotional support in times of frustration.Throughout my years in graduate school and my time as an assistant professor,Don Sylvan (my dis- sertation advisor) pushed me to follow my heart and pursue an independent course.He has not only been a great teacher but also a true colleague and friend.I must also thank Rick Herrmann,Peg Hermann,and Tom Nygren for their patience as I struggled through the early phases of my research. Michael Fischerkeller, Tanya Charlick-Paley, Michael Young, Jack Levy, Yaacov Vertzberger,Jerel Rosati,and Nehemia Geva have provided com- ments on various chapters and conference papers that greatly improved the quality of the manuscript.Jeffrey Taliaferro has acted as a model colleague: reading multiple versions of each chapter,challenging unexamined assump- tions,forcing me to refine weak arguments,and catching both major and minor errors.I owe a great debt to the archivists at the National Archives, National Security Archive,John F.Kennedy Library,and Harry S.Truman Library.In particular,Sam Rushay of the Truman Library went out of his way to assist a young political scientist struggling through his first attempt at archival research. As I prepared the final manuscript for publication, Ekaterina Barachkova meticulously corrected flaws in citations and helped me track down incomplete bibliographic entries.David Pervin,my editor at Palgrave Macmillan,encouraged and supported me throughout the publi- cation process, and his assistant, Heather VanDusen, was instrumental in helping me deal with the minor obstacles that often frustrate authors.I also need to thank the copyediting team at Newgen Imaging Systems for clean- ing up a number of flaws in the manuscript (those that remain are the author’s responsibility alone). Finally, my wife Becky and our children Abigail Grace and Andrew William have provided love and patience in times of stress. This project was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation (DIR-9113599) to the Mershon Center Research Training Group on the Role of Cognition in Collective Political Decision Making,by a Graduate Student Alumni Research Award and a Presidential Fellowship from the Graduate School at The Ohio State University,by a research grant from the Harry S.Truman Library Institute,and by financial support from the Department of Political Science and Public Administration and the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at North Carolina State University.
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