Pragmatist Quietism: A Meta-Ethical System

240 Pages·2022·1.924 MB·English

by  Andrew Sepielli

OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,4/7/2022,SPi
Pragmatist Quietism
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,4/7/2022,SPi
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,4/7/2022,SPi
Pragmatist Quietism
A Meta-Ethical System
ANDREW SEPIELLI
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,4/7/2022,SPi
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OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,4/7/2022,SPi
Acknowledgements
Iworkedoutthemostdifficultideasinthisbookwhilewalkingthroughsomeof
Toronto’sparks,especiallyHighParkandBoydNorthPark.Thankstoallofthose
responsible for the creation and maintenance of these parks, as well as those
responsible, however indirectly, for my ability to live close to them and enjoy
them.
My work over the last decade has been facilitated by generous funding from
theSocialScienceandHumanitiesResearchCouncilofCanada,theUniversityof
Toronto, and the Connaught Fund; I thank these bodies for their assistance in
completingthisbook.
Iamluckytohavemademyacademichomeinthephilosophydepartmentat
the University of Toronto. Besides great colleagues, considered severally, about
whomI’llsaymoreinamoment,theTorontodepartmentofferedtwothingsfor
which I’m grateful: first, in keeping with University (and I believe, Canadian)
practice,thedepartmentofferstenuretoamuchhigherpercentageofapplicants
thandopeerdepartmentsintheUnitedStates.Contrarytowhatpopularopinion
might suggest, this did not affect my work ethic; rather, it enabled me to begin
work on this book back in 2012 without worrying that, by doing this instead of
writing more papers, I’d be torching my chances at tenure. Second, the Toronto
departmentproudlyendeavourstocoverallareasofphilosophy.Workinginsuch
an environment has allowed me to be comfortable forging my own path, in
accordancewithmyintellectualpassionsandscruples.
For helping me to develop the ideas in this book, I thank audiences at (in
approximately chronological order): Rutgers University, Yale University, Boston
University, The University of Melbourne, The University of Sydney, Australian
National University, The University of Notre Dame, The University of Oxford,
The University of Southampton, The University of Cambridge, King’s College
London, The Rocky Mountain Ethics Workshop at the University of Colorado,
TheUniversityofToronto,andTheUniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeley.
Thefollowingindividualsdeservespecialthanksfortheirastutecommentsand
encouragement:WilliamBredeson,RuthChang,PhilipClark,Lu-VadaDunford,
Aaron Elliott, Louis Gularte, Alex Horne, Alex Jackson, Adam Lerner, Clayton
Littlejohn, Christine Martens, Sarah McGrath, Hugh Mellor, Eliot Michaelson,
ParisaMoosavi,MilanMosse,HillePaakkunainen,CalebPerl,MarkvanRoojen,
BruceRussell,MatthewScarfone,VictorSwift,KurtSylvan,MasonWestfall,Eric
Wilkinson,andStanleyZhang.
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,4/7/2022,SPi
vi 
Thefollowingindividualsreadlargepartsofthemanuscriptandprovidedme
with extensive and insightful comments: David Barnett, Shamik Dasgupta,
Tristram McPherson, Jared Riggs, Sergio Tenenbaum, Benjamin Wald, and
DanielWodak.
Thanks to Peter Momtchiloff at Oxford University Press for shepherding this
manuscript through the publication process, and to two anonymous referees for
crafting a set of truly perceptive and challenging comments. Thanks as well to
SindhujaBaskaran,AimeeWright,PhilDines,andothersatOUPandatStraive
fortheirinvaluablehelpincompletingthebook.
ThankstoGilHarman,ShellyKagan,andespeciallyRuthChang,forservingas
myphilosophicalmentorsincollege,lawschool,andgradschool,respectively.
Tomywife:thankyouforlovingme,forinspiring mewithyourcourageand
withtheindependenceandsystematicityofyourownthought,andfortakingme
and my stuff seriously. To my children: thank you for being your marvellous,
uniqueselves.Yoursenseofwonder,yourcompassionforallcreaturesgreatand
small,andyourwisdom,areajoytobehold.
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,4/7/2022,SPi
Contents
1. Introduction 1
1. AnOutlineofMyView 4
2. AChapter-by-ChapterOverview 10
2. RawMaterials 15
1. DeepandSuperficialInquiryandDebate 15
1. ExplanationandIllustration 15
2. ACanonicalStatement 25
3. Superficial/DeepvsInternal/External 26
2. TheSpecialFeaturesofEthicalThought 27
3. WhyDoesThereSeemtoBea‘ProblemwithEthics’? 30
1. WhySeeminglySuperficialInquiryandDebateSeemNotto
BeObjective 32
1. On‘Object-Placing’ 33
2. On‘Cognition-Commanding’ 36
2. WhytheForegoingDoesn’tGenerallySuggesta‘Problem’
forNon-EthicalDomains 37
3. WhytheForegoingDoesSuggesta‘ProblemwithEthics’ 39
4. WhyDeepEthicalDebatesDon’tSeemtoSaveEthical
Objectivity 42
5. SuperficialEthicalDebates,Revisited 48
6. ConcernsaboutMyExplanation:PhilosophersandtheFolk 49
4. ObjectivistQuietismaboutEthics,PartOne:ThePositiveView 53
1. WhyI’mTalkingaboutValueRatherthanSubstantivity
andTruth 55
2. The‘Truthy’Values 58
3. WhyNoTruthyValuesAreatStakeinSuperficialEthical
Debates 61
4. The‘SpecificallyEthical’Values 71
5. HowThisSupportsQuietism 72
6. RightAnswersinEthics 79
7. InDefenceofObjectivistQuietism 87
1. IntuitionsaboutCases 88
2. SeeingOthersintheRightWay 88
3. Epistemology 89
4. EvaluativeConnections 90
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,4/7/2022,SPi
viii 
5. ObjectivistQuietismaboutEthics,PartTwo:Objectionsand
Responses 92
1. WhatIfMetaphysics,Semantics,Etc.MatterbyDefinition? 92
2. WhyAssessBeliefs...inThisWay? 94
3. EthicsinDeepContexts 102
4. DivorcingEthicalValuesfromTruthyValues 103
5. BeggingtheQuestion 104
6. Pragmatism 107
1. PragmatismWhat 108
1. PragmatismvsRepresentationalism 108
2. MakingPragmatismExplanatory 114
2. WhyBeaPragmatist? 118
3. AnAutonomousEvaluativeSphere? 127
7. DiggingDeeper 130
1. Representationality,RightAnswers,andtheImportance
ofExplanation 130
2. WhatIfI’mWrong? 136
8. MoralEpistemology 144
1. ImplicationsforEthicalInquiry 145
1. QuietismandFoundationalisminEthics 145
2. Meaning-BasedDistortion 147
3. MetaphysicalArguments 153
4. ArgumentsfromtheMarksofTruth 156
5. ArgumentsfromRationalCommitment 157
6. IndeterminateAnti-QuietistArguments 158
7. LessonsforMoralEpistemology 161
2. DealingwithDisagreement 162
3. DebunkingArguments 171
1. DebunkingArgumentsandExplanation 172
2. HowWeShouldResistThisDemandforExplanation 174
9. PragmatistQuietismvsExpressivism 183
1. ADifferenceinExplanatoryFramework 184
2. ADifferenceinOrderofInquiry 192
3. BothDifferencesTogether:Meta-Semantics 196
10. QuietismandCounter-Normativity 201
1. TheCounter-Reasons/SchmeasonsArgument 201
2. TheFirstPossibility:‘Reasons’and‘Schmeasons’AreEqually
Thin,andBothAreCompletelyThin 203
3. TheSecondPossibility:‘Reasons’IsThinnerthan‘Schmeasons’Is 211
4. TheThirdPossibility:‘Reason’and‘Schmeason’AreEquallyThin,
butNeitherIsCompletelyThin 215
References 219
Index 229
OUPCORRECTEDAUTOPAGEPROOFS–FINAL,5/7/2022,SPi
1
Introduction
Wecanbegintogetahandleonmeta-ethicalquietismbycontrastingitwithsome
morefamiliarwaysofthinkingaboutthestatusofethics.Considerafewresponses
tothesuggestionthattherearetruthsaboutwhat’srightandwrong.
Somepeoplewillbesceptical.Theymightask:
“Butcanyouproveanyoftheseallegedtruths?”
Icancertainlygiveargumentsforthem,I’dwanttoreply.Nowifyouscanthese
arguments, you’ll see that they all contain at least one other ethical premise—
although,hopefully,apremiselesscontroversialthantheconclusion.Butnoneof
themhaveanethicalconclusionwithnoethicalpremises.
“Sono,then”,theywillsay.“Youcan’treallyprovethem.”
Ortheymightaskofanypurportedmoraltruth:
“Whosays?”“Accordingtowhom?”
Fromscepticswithmorephilosophicaltraining,wemayhear:
“Propertieslikerightnessandwrongnesswouldbe‘mysterious’or‘queer’,andso
itisimplausiblethatsuchpropertiesexist.Butthey’dneedtoexistinorderfor
anythingtoberightorwrong”.
Orelse:
“Moral terms or concepts don’t refer in the way terms or concepts like ‘cat’ or
‘deciduous’ do. There’s not the right kind of semantic ‘link’ between word/
conceptandworld.Noreference,notruth.”
“Moraltermsorconceptsdon’thaveenough‘sense’or‘cognitivesignificance’;there’s
nottherightkindofsemantic‘link’betweenthemandnon-moraltermslike‘cat’or
‘leg’,andsothere’snorationalwaytomovefromclaimsinvolvingthelattertoclaims
involvingtheformer—nowaytogofroman‘is’toan‘ought’,inotherwords.”
Ofcourse,noteveryoneisasceptic.There’snoshortageofphilosopherswillingtostep
intorescuemoraltruthfromthesceptics’doubts,throughmoveslikethefollowing:
“Somesaythatmoralpropertiesaremysteriousorspooky...butthey’renotat
all. They’re identical to natural properties. Or at least reducible to them. Being
rightisnothingoverandabovethesenaturalpropertiesorclustersthereof.Ican
PragmatistQuietism:AMeta-EthicalSystem.AndrewSepielli,OxfordUniversityPress.©AndrewSepielli2022.
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192856500.003.0001