Practical Rules: When We Need Them and When We Don’t

223 Pages·2001·1.19 MB·English

by  Alan H. Goldman

CAMBRIDGE
STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY
PRACTICAL
RULES
When We need
them and when
we don(cid:213)t
Alan h. goldman
PracticalRules
Rulesproliferate;somearekeptwithabureaucraticstringencybordering
on the absurd, while others are manipulated and ignored in ways that
injure our sense of justice. Under what conditions should we make
exceptionstorules,andwhenshouldtheybefolloweddespiteparticular
circumstances that they ignore?
The two dominant models in the current literature on rules are the
particularist account, which rejects the relevance of genuine rules, and
that which sees the application of rules as standard. Taking a position
that falls between these two extremes, Alan Goldman is the first to
provideasystematicframeworktoclarifywhenweneedtofollowrules
inourmoral,legal,andprudentialdecisionsandwhenweoughtnotto
doso.Thebookdistinguishesamongvarioustypesofrules;itilluminates
concepts such as integrity, self-interest, and self-deception; and finally, it
provides an account of ordinary moral reasoning without rules.
This book will be great interest to advanced students and profes-
sionals working in philosophy, law, decision theory, and the social sci-
ences.
AlanH.GoldmanisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofMiami.
He is author of Empirical Knowledge (1988), Moral Knowledge (1988),
and Aesthetic Value (1995).
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cambridge studies in philosophy
General editor ernest sosa (Brown University)
Advisory editors:
jonathan dancy (University of Reading)
john haldane (University of St.Andrews)
gilbert harman (Princeton University)
frank jackson (Australian National University)
william g.lycan (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
sydney shoemaker (Cornell University)
judith j.thomson (Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology)
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Practical Rules
When We Need Them and When We Don’t
alan h goldman
.
University of Miami
PUBLISHED BY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (VIRTUAL PUBLISHING)
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 IRP
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

http://www.cambridge.org

© Alan H. Goldman 2002
This edition © Alan H. Goldman 2003

First published in printed format 2002

A catalogue record for the original printed book is available
from the British Library and from the Library of Congress
Original ISBN 0 521 80729 8 hardback

ISBN 0 511 01844 4 virtual (netLibrary Edition)
InmemoryofmyfatherLarryGoldman,
neveronetofollowrulesneedlessly
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Contents
Acknowledgments pagexi
Introduction 1
1 MoralRules 10
I. OutlineoftheTask 10
II. TypesofRules:DispensableandIndispensable 13
III. OrdinaryMoralConsciousness 22
IV. RulesasSecond-BestStrategies 32
V. TheJustificationofRules:StrongandWeak 42
VI. InterpretationofWeakRules 55
2 PrudentialRules 62
I. MoralandPrudentialRulesCompared 63
II. Second-OrderPrudentialRules:Optimizing 79
III. APrudentialRuletoBeMoral 91
3 LegalRules 104
I. Classification 105
II. TheDescriptiveQuestion:Hart,Dworkin,andOthers 112
III. TheDescriptiveQuestion:SourcesofLaw 119
IV. TheNormativeQuestion 137
4 MoralReasoningwithoutRules 149
I. TheInadequacyofParticularism 150
II. Coherence 155
III. TheReasoningProcessReviewed 168
IV. Objections 175
Notes 185
References 197
Index 203
ix