Practical Rules: When We Need Them and When We Don’t PDF
Preview Practical Rules: When We Need Them and When We Don’t
CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY PRACTICAL RULES When We need them and when we don(cid:213)t Alan h. goldman PracticalRules Rulesproliferate;somearekeptwithabureaucraticstringencybordering on the absurd, while others are manipulated and ignored in ways that injure our sense of justice. Under what conditions should we make exceptionstorules,andwhenshouldtheybefolloweddespiteparticular circumstances that they ignore? The two dominant models in the current literature on rules are the particularist account, which rejects the relevance of genuine rules, and that which sees the application of rules as standard. Taking a position that falls between these two extremes, Alan Goldman is the first to provideasystematicframeworktoclarifywhenweneedtofollowrules inourmoral,legal,andprudentialdecisionsandwhenweoughtnotto doso.Thebookdistinguishesamongvarioustypesofrules;itilluminates concepts such as integrity, self-interest, and self-deception; and finally, it provides an account of ordinary moral reasoning without rules. This book will be great interest to advanced students and profes- sionals working in philosophy, law, decision theory, and the social sci- ences. AlanH.GoldmanisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofMiami. He is author of Empirical Knowledge (1988), Moral Knowledge (1988), and Aesthetic Value (1995). This Page Intentionally Left Blank cambridge studies in philosophy General editor ernest sosa (Brown University) Advisory editors: jonathan dancy (University of Reading) john haldane (University of St.Andrews) gilbert harman (Princeton University) frank jackson (Australian National University) william g.lycan (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) sydney shoemaker (Cornell University) judith j.thomson (Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology) RECENTTITLES: mark lance and john o’leary hawthorne The Grammar of Meaning d.m.armstrong AWorld of States ofAffairs pierre jacob What Minds Can Do andre gallois TheWorldWithout,the MindWithin fred feldman Utilitarianism,Hedonism,and Desert laurence bonjour In Defense of Pure Reason david lewis Papers in Philosophical Logic wayne davis Implicature david cockburn OtherTimes david lewis Papers on Metaphysics and Epistemology raymond martin Self-Concern annette barnes SeeingThrough Self-Deception michael bratman Faces of Intention amie thomasson Fiction and Metaphysics david lewis Papers on Ethics and Social Philosophy fred dretske Perception,Knowledge and Belief lynne rudder baker Persons and Bodies john greco Putting Skeptics inTheir Place ruthgarrettmillikanOnClearandConfusedIdeas derekpereboomLivingwithoutFressWill brainellisScientificEssentialism This Page Intentionally Left Blank Practical Rules When We Need Them and When We Don’t alan h goldman . University of Miami PUBLISHED BY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (VIRTUAL PUBLISHING) FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 IRP 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia http://www.cambridge.org © Alan H. Goldman 2002 This edition © Alan H. Goldman 2003 First published in printed format 2002 A catalogue record for the original printed book is available from the British Library and from the Library of Congress Original ISBN 0 521 80729 8 hardback ISBN 0 511 01844 4 virtual (netLibrary Edition) InmemoryofmyfatherLarryGoldman, neveronetofollowrulesneedlessly This Page Intentionally Left Blank Contents Acknowledgments pagexi Introduction 1 1 MoralRules 10 I. OutlineoftheTask 10 II. TypesofRules:DispensableandIndispensable 13 III. OrdinaryMoralConsciousness 22 IV. RulesasSecond-BestStrategies 32 V. TheJustificationofRules:StrongandWeak 42 VI. InterpretationofWeakRules 55 2 PrudentialRules 62 I. MoralandPrudentialRulesCompared 63 II. Second-OrderPrudentialRules:Optimizing 79 III. APrudentialRuletoBeMoral 91 3 LegalRules 104 I. Classification 105 II. TheDescriptiveQuestion:Hart,Dworkin,andOthers 112 III. TheDescriptiveQuestion:SourcesofLaw 119 IV. TheNormativeQuestion 137 4 MoralReasoningwithoutRules 149 I. TheInadequacyofParticularism 150 II. Coherence 155 III. TheReasoningProcessReviewed 168 IV. Objections 175 Notes 185 References 197 Index 203 ix
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