Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places

449 Pages·2013·4.362 MB·English

by  Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O’Leary (eds.)

Power Sharing
in Deeply Divided Places
NATIONAL AND ETHNIC CONFLICT
IN THE TWENTY- FIRST CENTURY
Brendan O’Leary, Series Editor
Power Sharing
in Deeply Divided Places
Edited by
Joanne McEvoy
and Brendan O’Leary
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS
PHILADELPHIA
Copyright © 2013 University of Pennsylvania Press
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used
for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this
book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written
permission from the publisher.
Published by
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104- 4112
Printed in the United States of America
on acid- free paper
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Power sharing in deeply divided places / edited by Joanne McEvoy and
Brendan O’Leary. — 1st ed.
p. cm. — (National and ethnic confl ict in the twenty-fi rst century)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8122-4501-1 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Ethnic groups—Political activity. 2. Minorities—Political
activity. 3. Representative government and representation. 4. Ethnic
confl ict—Political aspects. 5. Cultural pluralism—Political aspects.
I. McEvoy, Joanne. II. O'Leary, Brendan.
JF1061.P68 2013
320.90089—dc23
2012041497
CONTENTS
1. Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places:
An Advocate’s Introduction
Brendan O’Leary 1
PART I. POWER SHARING AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
2. Electoral Rules and Ethnic Repre sen ta tion and
Accommodation: Combining Social Choice and Electoral
System Perspectives
. Hodgson Bernard Grofman 67
3. Th e Track Record of Centripetalism in Deeply
Divided Places
Allison McCulloch 94
4. Electoral Engineering for a Stalled Federation
Kris Deschouwer and Philippe Van Parijs 112
PART II. HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FORAYS
INTO POWER SHARING
5. A Th eory of Accommodation Versus Confl ict:
With Special Reference to the Israel- Palestine Confl ict
Ronald Wintrobe 135
6. Th e Success of Religion as a Source for Compromise
in Divided Empires: Ottoman and Safavid, Past and Present
Benjamin Braude 176
vi Contents
7. Geopolitics and the Long- Term Construction
of Democracy
Randall Collins 198
8. Courts, Constitutions, and the Limits of Majoritarianism
Samuel Issacharoff 214
PART III. CONTEMPORARY POWER SHARING QUESTIONS
9. A Revised Th eory of Federacy and a Case Study of
Civil War Termination in Aceh, Indonesia
Alfred Stepan 231
10. We Forbid! Th e Mutual Veto and Power- Sharing
Democracy
Joanne McEvoy 253
11. Northern Ireland: Power Sharing, Contact,
Identity, and Leadership
Ed Cairns 278
12. Public Opinion and Power Sharing in Deeply
Divided Places
Colin Irwin 295
13. Th e Balkans: Th e Promotion of Power Sharing
by Outsiders
Florian Bieber 312
14. Governing Polarized Cities
Scott A. Bollens 327
15. Power Sharing in Kirkuk: Th e Need for Compromise
Liam Anderson 364
16. Power Sharing: An Advocate’s Conclusion
Brendan O’Leary 386
List of Contributors 423
Index 425
Ac know ledg ments 437
CHAPTER 1
Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places:
An Advocate’s Introduction
Brendan O’Leary
Th e Mafi a makes off ers that cannot be refused. In one peace pro cess a poli-
tician was once accused of making off ers that no one could understand
( O’Leary 1990). Do these statements explain the diff erence between power
and power sharing? Is power coercive capacity, whereas power sharing is
incomprehensible?
Power sharing is not incomprehensible, but it is frequently misunder-
stood. To aid comprehension a comparison is useful. In standard En glish,
power is the ability to act, to be able to produce an intended eff ect (Russell
1992 [1938]). Th e powerless lack the capacity to do things they might want to
do. Th e powerful are in the opposite situation. Power sharing, therefore,
suggests spreading access to the capacity to get things done. Power is also a
synonym for authority, jurisdiction, control, command, sway, or dominion,
as well as the capacity to persuade, induce, constrain, oblige, or force. It fol-
lows that power sharing minimally means widening the access of persons
or groups to the same domains or attributes. In standard usage power is also
“a possession,” “held” by those with authority or infl uence over others, es-
pecially public offi cials, governments, offi cers, managements, or establish-
ments who constitute what Paul’s Letter to the Romans described as “the
powers that be.” Power sharing, therefore, broadens membership of “the
powers that be.” It also requires that the included parties have access to key
and observable “decision making.” Th ere must be no important “non– decision
making” taking place off stage, that is, no hidden possessors of power who
2 Brendan O’Leary
control the agenda or exclude some issues from being addressed. Th ere
must instead be an open and negotiable public agenda among the power-
sharers, or at least among their leaders. Any suppression of (controversial)
issues must be mutually agreed upon among those who share power.
Th eorists contrast “power to” and “power over” (see Morris 2002; Parsons
1969). “Power to” is ability, “power over” is domination. Th e contrast resem-
bles that between “positive- sum” and “zero- sum” relationships. “Positive- sum”
power is joint, collaborative, or cooperative. All gain from its exercise, even if
the benefi ts are not the same for all. “Zero- sum power,” by contrast, de-
scribes a distinct antagonism: if power could be mea sured, then A’s gain and
B’s loss would sum to zero. Positive- sum and zero- sum conceptions do not
exhaust the logical possibilities of power relations. Th e exercise of power
may generate net losses (a “negative sum”) or the mutual ruin of the con-
tending parties. It may create winners and losers; there may be disparities in
benefi ts among the winners as well as in losses among the losers; and only
one party may gain, while the others experience no net losses. Power shar-
ing, for its proponents, is defended as “power to.” It enhances collective ca-
pacity; it is “positive sum.” Th ose who share will gain from a constructive
way of making public decisions, from which all stand to gain, notably through
the preservation of order and peace. Critics, by contrast, suggest that power
sharing shapes public life at the expense of other and better kinds of politics—
more competitive, individualist, or harmonious.
Th e opposite of power sharing is power’s monopolization by a person,
faction, group, or ga ni za tion, or party. On inspection, it is usually true that
the chief power- holder has to delegate some power to or ga nize and maintain
the monopoly. But to delegate power is not to share it. Th e principal who
delegates requires the delegated agent to perform specifi ed tasks and may
withdraw the mandate.
Monopolies of power exist, at least formally, in tyrannies, despotisms,
military autocracies, monarchies, lordships, papacies, theocracies, and one-
party dictatorships. Th ey also exist, however, in democracies, a more unset-
tling idea. To say that democracy may coexist with monopolistic domination
requires no commitment to theories suggesting that behind the façade of
electoral competition lies the power of a ruling class or a power elite (see,
e.g., Miliband 1980 [1969]; Domhoff 1990; Mills 1956). For example, no
matter how competitive or free elections may be, critical po liti cal power can
be monopolized between elections by the incumbent president, prime min-
ister, cabinet, and nominated judges associated with the dominant party,
Introduction 3
ethos, or ideology. Even a temporary domination (between elections) is
nevertheless domination, and the opportunities for elected leaders to domi-
nate their societies against widespread or deeply held public preferences are
signifi cant (see, e.g., Nordlinger 1981, 92– 94, 111– 12, 130– 32).
Th at democracy might lead to domination was the theme of the “tyr-
anny of the majority,” which deeply concerned eighteenth- century republi-
cans, such as James Madison, and nineteenth- century liberals, such as Alexis
de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill. Th ey were mostly preoccupied, how-
ever, with the impact of that possible tyranny on the individual’s property
and liberty (including the individual’s religious beliefs) rather than on
national, ethnic, or linguistic minorities as such (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay
1987 [1788]; Mill 1997, 5– 6, 81– 82, 192– 94; de Tocqueville 1988 [1835, 1840],
vol. 1., chap. 7, esp. 250ff ).
Democracy is, however, also straightforwardly compatible with the (tem-
porary) tyranny of a minority, especially democracies with institutions that
encourage the “winner” to take all. For example, an ideological faction, not
supported by a majority of voters in a country, may nevertheless control a
cabinet, which in turn controls a party, and which in turn controls a legisla-
ture. In consequence, law or public policy may be dictated in the interests of
the faction as long as its control is maintained.
Defi ning Power Sharing, Deeply Divided Places, and
Well- Ordered States
Th ese considerations suggest the following broad defi nition of power sharing:
Any set of arrangements that prevent one agent, or or ga nized collective agency,
from being the “winner who holds all critical power,” whether temporarily
or permanently. Th is suggestion explains why the synonyms of power sharing
usually include the following generally positive connotations: “co ali tion” or
“cooperative” government and “consensual” and “inclusive” decision making.
Critics of power sharing just as powerfully insist upon negative connotations.
Th ey refer to power- sharing arrangements as “rudderless” or “leaderless,” and
they complain of “stalemated,” “deadlocked,” or “blocked” decision making.
Th e general defi nition of power sharing just suggested is broad if not vague.
It does not, for example, specify how power is shared among the parties. It is
capacious enough to include arrangements such as the Roman Republic’s
executive, based on the annual election of two consuls, and its tribunes, who