Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances

303 Pages·2007·1.1 MB·English

by  Jae-Jung Suh

Power, Interest, And Identity
In Military Alliances
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Power, Interest, And Identity
In Military Alliances
Jae-Jung Suh
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POWER,INTEREST,ANDIDENTITYINMILITARYALLIANCES
© Jae-Jung Suh, 2007
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced
in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the
case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.
First published in 2007 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™
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United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a
registered trademark in the European Union and other countries.
ISBN-13: 978-1-4039-7928-5
ISBN-10: 1-4039-7928-6
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from
the Library of Congress.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Design by Macmillan India Ltd.
First edition: July 2007
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Printed in the United States of America.
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Table of Contents
List of Tables viii
List of Figures ix
Acknowledgments xi
List of Abbreviations xiv
1 Power, Interest, and Identity in International Politics:
The Military Alliance between the
United States and Republic of Korea 1
Three Ways of Looking at Alliances 4
Institutional Persistence 8
Power, Interest, and Identity in Alliance Politics 12
Asset Specifi city 13
Social Identity 16
Institutionalization 21
Conclusion 23
2 Power and Alliance: Assessing Military Balance in Korea 29
Conventional Force Balance in Korea 30
Force-to-Force Ratios in the Theater 32
Force-to-Force Ratios by Sectors 37
Blitzkrieg? Dynamic Analysis 41
Movement of a Battle Front 42
Battles between Tanks 44
Airpower and C3I 45
Special Forces and Countermeasures 49
Is the Alliance Maintenance a Puzzle? 54
Power and Alliance 62
3 Interests and Alliance Persistence 63
Equipment and Alliance 64
Trend in Weapons Transfer 67
Korea’s Weapons Production 72
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vi Table of Contents
Processes and Alliance 86
Development of Institutional Integration 86
Homogeneity in Military Doctrine 91
Human Assets and Alliance 95
Team Specifi city 95
Communication Specifi city 98
Locations and Alliance 101
Assets Specifi c to Alliance 104
4 Alliance and Identity 109
Alliance and Korea ’s Identity 111
“Americans’R Us” 111
North Korea as the Other 117
Institutional Framework of Identity Preservation 122
Alliance and U.S. Identity 125
North Korea as the Other 125
Institutional Framework of Identity Preservation 130
Alliance and Identity 134
5 End of the Cold War, Beginning of
Alliance Persistence 137
Asset Specifi cities and Alliance Persistence 138
Asset Specifi cities and Alliance Constituency 138
Alliance Constituency, Security Costs, and Alliance
Persistence 144
Silent Consensus 149
The End of the Cold War and the Persistence of Identity 153
North Korea as a “Missile Threat” 153
North Korea as a “Nuclear Threat” 158
North Korea as a “Time Bomb” 161
North Korea as the “Other” 164
Alliance as Usual 165
Interest, Identity, and Alliance Persistence 171
6 The Past and Future of Alliances:
Institutionalization in World Politics 175
Power, Interest, Identity, and Alliance Persistence 177
Relationships between Institutional and
Identity Frameworks 178
Dialogue between Rationalist and Refl exivist
Approaches to IR 183
Theory of Institutional Persistence 187
Cold War Alliances and Asset Specifi city 187
Social Identity and Homogenization 190
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Table of Contents vii
Domestic Politics, Transnational Coalitions, and
International Institutions 193
The U.S.-Korea Alliance in the Twenty-First Century 196
The U.S.-Korea Alliance Crisis at the Turn
of the Century? 196
The Future of the U.S.-Korea Alliance 198
Appendices 207
Appendix A. Adaptive Dynamic Model Simulations 207
Appendix B. Hypothetical Armored Battle in a
Breakthrough Sector 211
Appendix C. Airpower’s Contribution to Ground War 221
Appendix D. Military Effectiveness of
North Korea’s Missiles 225
Notes 231
Index 279
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List of Tables
2.1 Force Balance by “Bean Count” 33
2.2 Force Balance in WEI/WUV 36
2.3 Force-to-Force Ratios 40
2.4 Air vs. Air Defense 47
3.1 Weapons Imports 70
3.2 Offset Trades with Various Countries (1983–1992) 71
3.3 Domestic Content of Korea-Produced Weapons 78
3.4 Major Defense Contractors’ Sales 80
3.5 Major Weapons Systems Korea Produces 81
3.6 Korea’s Ordnance and Ammunition Production 82
3.7 USFK Bases and Facilities 102
6.1 Major IR Theories’ Expectations versus U.S.-Korea
Alliance Behavior 178
6.2 Congruence between Theoretical Expectation
and Empirical Evidence 179
C.1 Number of Aircraft Needed to Stop North’s
Exploitation 222
C.2 South Korea’s Aircraft Available for Ground
Interdiction 223
D.1 Number of Scud-Bs Needed to Destroy a
Command Center 227
D.2 Number of Scud-Bs with Chemical Warhead
Needed to Slow Down Command Center Reaction 227
D.3 Number of Scud-Bs Needed to Cut an
Airbase Runway 228
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List of Figures
1.1 Specifi c and Nonspecifi c Security Costs in Arms
and Alliance 15
1.2 Causal Arrows of the Institutionalization Theory of
Alliance Persistence 22
2.1 North and South Korea’s Military Expenditures 34
A.1 Simulation Results with Exchange Ratio of 2:1
and Force Ratio of 1.4:1 208
A.2 Simulation Results with Exchange Ratio of 2:1
and Force Ratio of 1.6:1 208
A.3 Simulation Results with Exchange Ratio of 1.75:1
and Force Ratio of 1.4:1 209
A.4 Simulation Results with Exchange Ratio of 1.75:1
and Force Ratio of 1.6:1 209
B.1 Homogeneous Force Battle 212
B.2 South Korea’s Superior Tanks 215
B.3 North Korea Reinforces at 1 tu 215
B.4 The North Attacks the South in Defense 217
B.5 North Korea Reinforces While Attacking 218
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