Power by Design: Constitution-Making in Nationalist China PDF
Preview Power by Design: Constitution-Making in Nationalist China
Page iii Power by Design ConstitutionMaking in Nationalist China Suisheng Zhao Page iv © 1996 University of Hawai'i Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 96 97 98 99 00 01 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data Zhao, Suisheng, 1954 Power by design : constitutionmaking in Nationalist China / Suisheng Zhao. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0824817214 (alk. paper) 1. China—Politics and government—1895—1945. 2. China Constitutional history. I. Title. JQ1522.Z43 1996 320.951'09'041—dc20 95–23127 CIP University of Hawai'i Press books are printed on acidfree paper and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Council on Library Resources Book design by Kenneth Miyamoto Page v For my wife Ren Yi and for our children Lillian, Sandra, and Justin Page vii Contents Note on Romanization ix Abbreviations x Acknowledgments xi 1. Introduction: Institutional Design in Authoritarian Settings 1 2. The Rise of Constitutionalism 20 3. Power Resources and Authority Relationships 38 4. Relative Power Positions of the Major Players 57 5. Institutional Preferences of the Major Players 74 6. The Succession Struggle: From Cabinet to Presidential Government, 1925– 87 1928 7. The Grand AntiChiang Coalition: From Presidential to Cabinet Government, 106 1928–1931 8. The Destruction of Chiang's Major Rivals: From Cabinet Back to Presidential 126 Government, 1931–1937 9. Conclusion: A Comparative Perspective 143 Notes 157 Selected Bibliography 199 Index 211 Page ix Note on Romanization Pinyin is used as the primary romanization system for Chinese characters throughout this book except in the quotes, where original spelling stands unchanged. The WadeGiles romanization system is used occasionally for names and organizations long familiar in the West. Examples include Kuomintang (Guomindang in the pinyin system), Sun Yatsen (pinyin Sun Yixuan), Chiang Kaishek (Jiang Jieshi), and Chiang Chingkuo (Jiang Jingguo). Page x Abbreviations CCP Chinese Communist Party CEC Central Executive Committee CPC Central Political Council CSC Central Supervisory Committee KMT Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) Page xi Acknowledgments This book is based largely on my dissertation research. Although my primary area of interest is contemporary Chinese politics, my dissertation focused on a historical period because I think an indepth historical knowledge of Chinese politics is important for understanding contemporary Chinese politics. It was fortunate that my dissertation advisor shared my belief and helped me devise a historical topic with contemporary significance and comparative value. I would like to acknowledge those at the University of California, San Diego, who guided my graduate work and dissertation. The support, advice, and constructive criticism of Susan Shirk guided my graduate study and my intellectual growth. My scholarly role model in the Department of Political Science was Arend Lijphart, whose dedication to scholarship, passion for teaching, and profound knowledge of comparative politics greatly helped my research from its inception and have been a constant source of inspiration in my academic career ever since. I am indebted, too, to Richard Madsen, Paul Pickowicz, Mathew McCubbins, Tengjen Cheng, and Victor Magagna for their extensive suggestions concerning my research. My gratitude goes also to a number of my fellow graduate students, in particular John Carey, Kathy Underwood, Hendrik Spruyt, and Dabbi Avant, for their intellectual support for the research. This research would not have been possible without access to a number of libraries and archives. I would especially like to thank the East Asian National Resource Center at Stanford University for a travel grant that allowed me to make use of the archival collections at Page xii the Hoover Institution and the libraries at the University of California, Berkeley. A research trip sponsored by the Cultural Foundation of the United Daily News Group in Taipei made it possible for me to access the archival collections in the National History Archival Museum, the KMT Party History Commission, and the Institute of Modern History of Academia Sinica in Taiwan. In the course of revising the manuscript, I benefited greatly from the suggestions of a number of scholars. I am especially grateful for the comments of Andrew Nathan and Ramon H. Myers. The written comments of two anonymous readers were extremely helpful in sharpening the argument. I would also like to express my appreciation to the editors at the University of Hawai'i Press, in particular to Patricia Crosby for her efficient work style and personal attention to the manuscript during the usually impersonal initial stages of the publication process, and to Mr. Don Yoder who copyedited the manuscript swiftly, consistently, and with a very sharp eye. My colleagues at Colby College provided a supportive environment that made revision of the manuscript enjoyable. Valuable technical assistance from Patricia D. Kick, the Government Department secretary, Duc Bun Truc and June Chan, my research assistants, and Grace Von Tobel at Colby's Faculty Manuscript Service allowed me to put the final touches to the manuscript. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Ren Yi, and my three children, Lillian, Sandra, and Justin, for their love, tolerance, and encouragement during the prolonged process of research, writing, and revision. Their understanding and support have been beacons of light during times of flagging energy and wavering resolve in my struggle. To them, this book is dedicated. Page 1 Chapter 1— Introduction: Institutional Design in Authoritarian Settings There is a growing comparative politics literature that explores the political consequences of alternative constitutional designs and analyzes the processes of constitutionmaking. This literature evinces great interest in the institutional choice between parliamentarianism and presidentialism in democratic countries. 1 Little attention, however, is devoted to the study of different constitutional frameworks in authoritarian settings. Indeed, there is a general tendency to ignore constitutional and institutional issues in the study of authoritarian regimes. Because of the difficulties in determining the relationship between individual leaders' power positions and their institutional incentives in authoritarian countries where there are noncompetitive elections or no elections at all, scholars tend to assume that authoritarian leaders are not constrained by formal institutional procedures and rules. Hence they rarely bother to examine different incentives and strategies of the political leaders who are responsible for the formal institutional design of the presidential or the cabinet system in these countries. Conventional wisdom holds that formal institutions are of little importance in nondemocratic regimes. Nevertheless, political leaders operating in nondemocratic regimes often seem to think otherwise. Indeed, they pay quite a bit of attention to institutional design and are willing to fight for their preferred designs. A review of constitutional development in contemporary authoritarian states reveals that, after the presidential and the cabinet systems were introduced, seasoned political leaders in authoritarian states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America certainly found that it was
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