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No. 53–54 17 July 2013 Abkhazia South caucasus Ossetia analytical Adjara digest N Karaago bakhrno- resourcesecurityinstitute.org www.laender-analysen.de www.css.ethz.ch/cad www.crrccenters.org POST-ELECTIONS ARMENIA Special Editors: Gevorg Ter-Gabrielyan / Iris Kempe ■■Armenian Elections. No Room for Optimism? 2 Isabella Sargsyan, Yerevan ■■Political Parties Before, During and After the Elections of 2012–2013 7 Ara Nedolyan, Yerevan ■■Oligarchy in Armenia 11 David Petrosyan, Yerevan ■■Elections, Social Movements and Internet Penetration in Armenia 19 Gegham Vardanyan, Yerevan ■■100 Days: The Foreign Policy Dimension 23 David Hovhannisyan, Yerevan ■■Armenia and Europe: Can a Country Simultaneously Strengthen Autocracy, Deepen Its Ties with Russia, and Become European? 27 Mikhayel Hovhannisyan, Yerevan ■■Armenia’s European Choice After the 2012–13 Elections 32 Iris Kempe, Berlin ■■OPINION POLL How the Armenian Population Assesses the General Situation of the Country (Caucasus Barometer 2012) 36 ■■CHRONICLE From 25 June to 15 July 2013 40 Institute for European, Russian, Research Centre Center German Association for and Eurasian Studies for East European Studies for Security Studies Caucasus Research East European Studies The George Washington Resource Centers University of Bremen ETH Zurich University The Caucasus Analytical Digest is supported by: CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 53–54, 17 July 2013 2 Armenian Elections. No Room for Optimism? Isabella Sargsyan, Yerevan Abstract This article argues that despite the cosmetic changes that the Armenian government undertook in order to comply with international standards and meet expectations, the situation on the ground worsened after the 2012 parliamentary elections. Presidential Elections: The “Best Elections ulations from the 1990s and early 2000s, such as bal- Ever” in Practice lot-box stuffing, violence at the precincts, stealing of After the rigged and highly criticised presidential elec- ballot boxes, and tampering with protocols, were com- tions of 2008, and especially following the post-elec- plemented by a more sophisticated, state-orchestrated toral violence when ten people were killed by govern- system that infiltrates all aspects of society. ment forces and hundreds arrested, the international Following the 2008 disaster, the regime applied all community advised the Armenian government that it possible efforts to insure its systemic presence in all would apply the “more for more” principle, providing spheres of people’s lives in order to have full control international aid and cooperation in direct proportion over the situation in the future. Thus, existing mecha- with better elections.1 nisms were strengthened: the majority of school prin- Nevertheless, the 2012 parliamentary elections were cipals throughout the country became members of the marked by numerous violations, including extensive use Republican Party, as did university rectors, student gov- of “administrative” (i.e. government) resources, and an ernment leaders, and the heads of big hospitals and poly- unprecedented level of bribery—of voters, proxies, and clinics. The majority of elected mayors are members of members of the electoral commissions. A wide range the Republican Party too. District-level police officers, of educational institutions, public utilities, and health, heads of condominium councils, housing operations social, and housing services were dragged into the elec- office managers, and others who have direct access to toral process.2 The most rude, barefaced, impudent and, people at the grassroots level became “agents” of the at the same time, visible methods of electoral manip- ruling regime. They are continuously collecting various data on each family in their area of operations3, updat- ing unofficial voter lists; providing an escort to “their” 1 “The EU expects elections to be conducted according to inter- voters at the election day, and engaging in a variety of national standards. We fully support the OSCE ODIHR rec- other activities. ommendations, made after the parliamentary elections, on improving election procedures and their implementation. These Additionally, in bigger towns and cities, semi-crim- recommendations should be implemented as soon as possible. inal street authorities became deeply knitted into the Our policy is, as you know, based on the ‘more for more’ prin- regime’s system. Along with the actors mentioned above, ciple: the deeper the reform, the more the EU can and will help”. they became a major force for distributing bribes and Interview with Jose Manuel Barroso http://www.mediamax.am/en/ exerting voter intimidation and pressure. There is even news/interviews/6368/#sthash.FcgBveXO.dpuf 2 “Notwithstanding fundamental progress in the external, visible an unofficial terminology used within those groups aspects of the electoral process, it is impossible to ignore the fact (foremen, centurions, millenials) which refers to the that the distortion of the genuine will of the Armenian electorate number of people they “supervise” and “bring to the is no less than before. The most significant techniques used in polls” on election day. Naturally, this is not work per- limiting free expression of will in the election included employ- formed for free. ers pressurising staff, the use of various ‘administrative’ (i.e. gov- ernment) resources, and an unprecedented level of bribery— The 2013 presidential elections were expected to be of voters, proxies, and members of the electoral commissions. “intrigue free” since the major candidates who could A wide range of educational institutions, public utilities, and compete with incumbent Serzh Sargsyan—former Pres- health, social, and housing services were dragged into the elec- ident Levon Ter-Petrossian, leader of the oppositional toral process. Given government employees’ and civil servants’ Armenian National Congress (ANC), and Gagik Tsar- political dependence on their bosses, as well as the merging of business and government, members of the ruling coalition had ukyan, head of the large and rich Prosperous Armenia exclusive leverage in calling in favours or otherwise influencing governmental organs. These infringements could not have been possible without the engagement of state bodies at various lev- 3 The required data includes the following information: where els”. Boris Navasardyan. Parliamentary Elections in Armenia: members of the family work, what’s their income, do they have From Decorative to Genuine Democracy? http://library.fes.de/pdf- relatives working in state or public sectors, do they have chil- files/id-moe/09186.pdf dren in the army, does anyone have any health problems etc. CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 53–54, 17 July 2013 3 party, boycotted the elections. Hence, many believed nalism, many “mistakes” that could be cut from the that the elections would be marred not as much by fraud, ordinary media coverage were revealed in the Internet. as during previous elections, but rather by public apa- For instance, in an interview to Gyumri-based Gala TV thy…there would be no distribution of election bribes, (one of the traditionally free media outlets), Sargsyan since the main candidate had no formidable opponent4. arrogantly and in a vulgar manner proclaimed that he These elections also demonstrated the increasing could win as many votes in Shirak Marz as he wanted. competition inside the ruling clique: in the Republican This provoked public displeasure and became a subject Party, the “young-republican”5 group, took the oppor- of political sarcasm.9 tunity to guide the action. For them it was important Opposition candidate Raffi Hovhannisyan took to conduct “the best elections ever” as promised to the advantage of the freedoms provided. He launched an international community and, at the same time, to use extensive campaign enjoying a privileged position with this chance to take take power within their own party at least one TV channel, Yerkir Media TV, as YPC media from oligarchs, such as Ruben Hayrapetyan and Sam- monitoring suggests. In an unprecedented move, he was vel Alexanyan, who are famous for using the most vio- allowed to tour the frontlines of the Nagorny Kara- lent forms of electoral fraud. bakh defence, and the visit was covered by the media.10 With a good degree of confidence, it is possible to He also spent the largest amount of money during the state that the Republican Party relied on already estab- campaign.11 lished platforms, such as exaggerated voter lists6 and But, most importantly, the main reasons why Raffi administrative resources (including schools, polyclin- Hovhannisyan unexpectedly performed so well in the ics, local authorities etc). Most probably, according to election was the voters’ deep distrust toward the author- their calculations, these actions should have been suf- ities12 and the protest vote. People took the opportunity ficient to ensure victory to Sargsyan without violence of the regime’s relative indulgence to vote against the and unnecessary noise. In order to address the criticism ruling party and Sargsyan in particular. Toward the end that the elections were “non competitive”7 and give the of Election Day and as the ballots began to be counted, appearance of a free vote, the authorities eased control it became clear to the Republican Party leadership that over the broadcast media8 and did not obstruct the elec- Hovhannisyan was performing well and the Republican toral campaigns of non-incumbent candidates. There campaign plan did not work. Hence, the oligarchs and were fewer electoral bribes distributed and less pres- their resources were called into action, and all the avail- sure on the voters. able arsenal of violent and unlawful practices, such as Nonetheless, from the very beginning, the campaign ballot box stuffing, that artificially increased the num- did not go the way the Republicans wanted. On Jan- ber of people voting, were executed throughout much of uary 31, presidential candidate Paruyr Hayrikyan was the country. Here is a quote from Heritage party state- wounded by unknown gunman in the center of Yerevan ment that illustrates the situation “In Abovyan, Serzh and another candidate Andrias Ghukasyan declared a Sargsyan lost the vote in 21 precincts out of a total of hunger strike under the slogan “Stop the fake elections.” 25, but received 1101 votes from just one polling sta- In parallel, Sargsyan’s campaign and interaction with tion (while his average for the other 24 polling stations people proved to be rather arrogant and presumptuous. was 231 votes) which seems to have compensated for Thanks to instruments of social media and citizen jour- the loss from the other polling stations. In Etchmiadzin, Serzh Sargsyan lost in 19 out of 22 polling stations, but received more than 96% of the votes in neighbouring 4 http://www.armenianow.com/vote_2013/42853/armenian_presidential_elec Aygek village—26 to 758 to his favor. It is inexplicable tions_2013_campaign_programs how a candidate registering similar results in 90% of 5 The “young republican” is an idiom used predominantly by some members of political opposition and picked up by the media. It polling stations, suddenly receives several times more refers to younger generation of Republican Party of Armenia in the remaining 10%.13” and establishes clear linguistic connotations with Young Turks (yeni turk), the government responsible for the Genocide or Armenians in the Ottoman Turkey in 1915–1922. For example 9 https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=my-e6O see: http://www.tert.am/en/news/2013/05/05/zahrabyan/ EMmCk 6 Ambassador of the Great Britain to Armenia worries about 10 http://times.am/?l=en&p=18275 exaggerated lists of voters http://www.arminfo.info/index.cfm?objectid= 11 http://www.pastinfo.am/en/node/7052 7F616AB0-649D-11E2-A793F6327207157C 12 According to CRRC Caucasus Barometer 2012 data only 2% 7 See for example http://regional-studies.org/en/publications/analytical/1 of population trust political parties, 4% the parliament and 7% 70-310113 the president http://www.crrc.am/hosting/file/_static_content/barometer/ 8 YPC media monitoring report http://www.ypc.am/upload/YPC%20Mon di12/CB_2012_Presentation_eng.pdf itoring_RA%20Presidential%20Elections%202013_eng.pdf 13 http://www.tert.am/en/news/2013/02/22/heritage-announcement/ CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 53–54, 17 July 2013 4 By the end of the day, Sargsyan was re-elected with to Yerevan’s Council said: “Observers were under pres- 59% of the votes, Hovhannisyan received 37%14. It is sure, and numerous instances of unknown people pres- noteworthy that Sargsyan was officially defeated in a ent at polling stations were reported. The elections do number of urban areas, including Gyumri, the second not at all meet democratic standards”. Sona Ayvazyan, biggest city of Armenia. Notwithstanding the numer- Head of the Transparency International Anti-corrup- ous cases of electoral malpractices reported by local and tion Centre, noted that “disgraceful elections have once international observers and journalists15, post-electoral again been reported in Armenia.”16 street protests, Hovhannisyan’s hunger strike and appeal As a result of elections full of intimidation and vio- to the Constitutional court, the results of elections lence, which were watched by few observers representing were eventually recognised as valid. The USA, Russia, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the France and others congratulated Sargsyan with victory. Council of Europe and a few representatives of western The inauguration ceremony was conducted peacefully. embassies, the Republican Party won 56% of the votes, The protesters gathered around Hovhannisyan did not Prosperous Armenia 23% and Barev Yerevan (Heritage undertake any significant resistance under his leadership. party bloc) only 8.48%. Prominent oppositional parties such as the Armenian National Congress and Dashnk- Yerevan City Council Elections: antsutyun didn’t pass the 6% threshold. Oppositional Back to Square One parties and the majority of local observers marked the Within three months after the presidential elections, in elections “not free and unfair”. May 2013, Yerevan planned to hold city council elec- The question then arises: Why did the protest vote tions. About 40% of Armenia’s population lives in Yere- approach that worked unexpectedly well only three van and about 80% of economic activities are concen- months before fail this time, and the opposition dra- trated in the capital. Hence, the elections are important matically lost its influence. I would argue that there both for the regime and for the opposition. If the oppo- are two main reasons for this failure. The first reason sition were able to form a majority in the City Council, is rather objective. In Armenia, presidential elections which elects the mayor of the city, a de facto diarchy, an are widely perceived as the sole possibility for regime unprecedented power balance could be created between change. Usually only these elections generate the larg- the city and federal government. Prior to the May elec- est voter turnout and provoke tense post-electoral devel- tions, opposition parties including ANC, Prosperous opments. As for the rest, including parliamentary and Armenia, Heritage and ARF Dashnaktsutyun agreed local elections, there is an obvious lack of interest and to cooperate in the City Council and work together to confidence that they will have any serious impact on prevent fraud. the regime change and on peoples’ lives. The regime, however, learned its lesson from the The second reason was the enormous pressure on vot- previous round and granted no “favours” to anyone ers, which was executed on a large scale and led by the this time. The electoral fraud machine was running at state and its agents. As an illustration one can point out full power. Months before the elections, people were that some governors of regions were called up to Yerevan systematically threatened, intimidated and frightened. in order to use their levers of influence on natives from Cases of intimidation crossed society from ministries their respective regions living in Yerevan. All available to schools. In almost every building block a Repub- mechanisms of voter intimidation, bribery and pressure lican Party headquarters was established, the reason that were described above were in use during the elec- being not just electoral propaganda but first and fore- tions on May 5. most surveillance of the inhabitants. The role of semi- For instance, on May 5th MP Samvel Alexanyan (also criminal, and to a significant extent, oligarch-affiliated known as “Lfik Samo”, and introduced in US diplomatic elements in these elections is difficult to exaggerate. A channels as “A semi-criminal oligarch who maintains widespread anecdote popular in those days claims that an army of bodyguards. He boasts little formal educa- the most lucrative business project during the economic tion (maybe the least among oligarchs). Close to the downturn was setting up a Republican electoral head- President’s office”17, and the one who actually calls the quarters. Avetik Ishkhanian, Chairman of the Helsinki tune in Malatia-Sebastia district of Yerevan), appeared Committee of Armenia, which observed the elections in a polling station personally to establish “order” him- 16 From “End of the carousel. Hardly fought election for Yerevan 14 Official results http://www.elections.am/presidential/ City Council consolidates President Sargsyan’s hold on power.” 15 Check i-ditord map https://iditord.org/2013-presidential-elections/ and http://electionswatch.org/2013/05/07/end-of-the-carousel-hardly-fought-elec Armenian times newspaper newsfeed http://www.armtimes.com/ tion-for-yerevan-city-council-consolidates-president-sargsyans-hold-on-power/ tag/6077 17 http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/12/03YEREVAN2975.html CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 53–54, 17 July 2013 5 self.18 Transparency International, an election observer, ODIHR mission in Armenia sent a letter to the Arme- appealed to the National Assembly Committee of Ethics, nian Bar Association Chairman where he noted that but it declined to discuss the issue based on the opinion “I was director of the elections board at the national and that the issues raised in the application were not within local level for my party. I have never witnessed anything the competence of the Ethics Committee.19 like this. I feel that a full re-examination of this count should take place.”22 International Reaction: No Smoking Gun? Notwithstanding all the facts and concerns, at the It is widely argued that reports of foreign election final press conference OSCE/ODIHR election observa- observation missions including those of PACE, OSCE/ tion mission declared that “The 18 February presidential ODIHR, and CIS to a certain extent are always polit- election was generally well-administered and was charac- ically tailored and a product of some bargain with the terized by a respect for fundamental freedoms. Contes- authorities.20 The question of to what extent they are tants were able to campaign freely. Media fulfilled their trustworthy, impartial and really support democratic legal obligation to provide balanced coverage, and all processes in Armenia is one of the most pressing issues contestants made use of their free airtime. At the same related to the electoral processes. According to wide- time, a lack of impartiality of the public administration, spread public opinion, the international community is misuse of administrative resources, and cases of pressure not sincere and unbiased in its promises and demands. on voters were of concern. While election day was calm For instance, despite four PACE resolutions (1609, 1620, and orderly, it was marked by undue interference in the 1643, and 1677) that have been passed on Armenia since process, mainly by proxies representing the incumbent, March 2008, urging Armenian authorities to create an and some serious violations were observed 23”. independent commission and to impartially investigate As a response to that, a group of young represen- the events of March 1, 2008, the Armenian government tatives of Armenian civil society interrupted the press managed to mitigate the international pressure with- conference and read their own statement addressed to out decisive action. No serious investigation was con- OSCE/ODIHR mission. The “Stop legitimating the ducted and the people guilty of killing peaceful protes- fraudulent election” statement in particular said: “Dear tors remain unpunished. political tourists, we have had enough of your efforts Wikileaks materials related to the 2008 elections and to legitimize the fraudulent elections. The recent pres- post-electoral processes, including internal discussions idential election in Armenia, when compared to previ- over the OSCE report, provide food for thought on how ous presidential elections, has registered one step for- things are done. For instance the US Embassy Chargé ward and three steps backwards, two steps to the right d’Affaires Joseph Pennington referring to the OSCE/ and a half step to the left. In a word, they haven’t cor- ODIHR interim report states that “Characteristically, responded to the RA Constitution, to the demands of some of the most provocative findings are buried near the Election Code as well as international standards.24” the end of the nine-page document and in the footnotes” That was not the first and only protest of Arme- and ends up saying “The ODIHR report highlights an nian civil society against statements and practices that extensive array of various types of electoral violations in some institutes representing the international commu- almost every phase of the process. However, while doc- nity exercise towards Armenia. In March 2008 there umenting a number of serious problems, and present- were protests in front of the OSCE office in Yerevan, in ing other elements that suggest a distinctly malodor- 2008–2009 activities targeting the Council of Europe ous air to the overall proceeding, the ODIHR report and addressing the March 1st events and its consequences does not produce documented evidence of problems in took place in Yerevan. One can argue that also thanks to enough precincts to add up to a high enough number the new media, the voice of the Armenian civil society, of bad votes to categorically cast doubt on Serzh Sarg- which to a certain extent breaks stereotypes and taboos, sian’s 45,000 vote margin of victory… There is, however, reaches more and more people and gains more influence. no smoking gun here 21”. On March 5th 2013, Ireland’s former Minister for Conclusions: Issues To Be Addressed Justice Dermot Ahern, who served as observer in OSCE/ Prior to the 2012 elections, one of the most efficient means of fraud prevention was declared mass observa- 18 http://www.tert.am/en/news/2013/05/05/aleksanyan/ tion and media coverage. In 2012 and 2013 the num- 19 http://transparency.am/news.php?id=669&inside=1 20 For example see Judith Kelley. Election Observers and Their Biases http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/4625/ 22 http://asbarez.com/108717/osce-observer-details-voter-fraud-in-armenia/ 279967300013.pdf?sequence=1 23 Full report is available here: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/101314 21 http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08YEREVAN213.html 24 http://hetq.am/eng/news/23565/ CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 53–54, 17 July 2013 6 ber of proxies, impartial observers and representatives between elections and emigration in Armenia25, some of mass media was higher than ever. In the 2013 presi- experts suggest that there is a tendency of that kind. dential elections, according to the law, political parties After each election taking place in Armenia, there is a represented in the National Assembly could appoint new wave of emigration. Most probably the latest elec- members of local electoral commissions; hence all major tions will not be different in that sense and a new flow political parties had at least one representative in each of emigration should be expected. of the commissions. The 2012–213 elections demon- There is no doubt that international election observa- strated that those means were helpful, indeed, to pre- tion missions play huge role and do have very strong influ- vent some violations in precincts. However, it became ence on the government. At the same time and just because absolutely clear that the overwhelming volume of vio- of that, very often election observation reports along with lations is taking place not in the precincts and not on highly professional content and critical remarks, put an the election day. emphasis on a rather ambiguous and at the end of the The methods and techniques of organisation of the day satisfactory for the government final statement. This electoral fraud have been mastered by the ruling regime undermines the work of individual observers and mem- and brought to perfection. They are based on intimida- bers of local staff, disseminates seeds of distrust in the tion and terror both in rural areas and in urban districts society and discredits international organizations. through the use of administrative means and informal One of most commonly articulated opinions by rep- power. The system is fuelled by resources provided by resentatives of international structures is that elections loyal oligarchs and is a result of clear trade-offs. At this in Armenia do not correspond to the international stan- moment there are no political or civic forces that are able dards but in comparison with other neighboring OSCE/ to counteract the regime given the existing rules of the CoE member counties “they are not that bad”. However, game. It is extremely difficult to stand against the state I would argue that the way the elections are conducted that possesses unlimited power and employs all possi- should not be assessed in comparison with other elec- ble ways of electoral fraud. tions (whether it is past elections in the same country In addition to the mentioned types of electoral mal- or in neighboring one) but in accordance and congruity practices, there are two phenomena that illustrate the with OSCE 1990 Copenhagen document26 as OSCE/ essence of Armenian elections from a statistical analy- ODIHR handbook suggests27. ses point of view. The first issue is an “implausibly high There are some down-to-earth recommendations turnout,” which is in clear correlation with higher num- that the international community could take into con- bers for the ruling regime. This concern was raised both sideration. First and foremost, the amendments to the by international observers and the opposition. Second, Electoral Code suggested by the opposition and cur- the situation seems quite strange from a logical point rently rejected by the Republican majority. One of the of view since according to the official data, the socio- most important suggestions reflected in the draft is lift- economic state of affairs in Armenia are worsening and ing the ban on publication of signed voter lists, which is emigration is expanding; at the same time, votes for instrumental in counteracting electoral fraud through the Republican Party are growing over the years at the exaggerated voter lists. expense of all other parties in absolute numbers. Taking the above into consideration, it is possi- Political party and electoral campaign financing are ble to conclude that the election-free period until the also among the most pressing issues, although rarely next parliamentary elections in 2017 should be used articulated. There are almost no local businessmen both by political parties and by civil society for search- ready to fund any oppositional party openly. The case ing and finding creative ways of resistance. Political of Khachatur Sukiasyan, who publicly supported Ter- parties should reorganize and expand to the regions Petrossian in 2008, and whose business was actually of Armenia and generate long-term support. The tight smashed in response, is a vivid lesson learned by Arme- cooperation between oppositional parties should be nian business community. strengthened.28 Civil society, in its turn, should use all Despite vociferous statements articulated by the international community and the West, facts come to 25 http://www.armtimes.com/en/node/31979 (interview in Arm.) prove that issues of regional stability and predictability 26 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304 dominate the democracy discourse in the West, when 27 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/68439?download=true assessing Armenia elections. 28 A positive example of cooperation is mutually agreed changes to the Electoral code of the Republic of Armenia supported by Although Head of IOM in Armenia Ilona Ter- four oppositional parties presented at the National Assembly. Minasyan points out that there is no academically The amendments were not accepted since the Republican major- conducted research that clearly establishes correlation ity voted against the proposal. CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 53–54, 17 July 2013 7 the institutional means available, such as oppositional ing people. From that point of view, it is very important MPs in the National Assembly, to upgrade the level of that the opposition and civil society stand against any public advocacy. Definitely, rapid development of tech- web regulating laws which may possibly be advanced nologies, larger penetration of Internet and advancing by the ruling regime in preparation for the next round new media and citizen journalism will play a crucial of elections. role in spreading alternative information and mobiliz- About the Author Isabella Sargsyan is a Human Rights and Religious Studies specialist and a civic activist, she works with the Eurasia Partnership Foundation. Political Parties Before, During and After the Elections of 2012–2013 Ara Nedolyan, Yerevan Abstract The most important event during the first 100 days of Serzh Sargsyan’s second presidential term is the aboli- tion, or the radical collapse, of the organized political opposition. Immediately after the election, it seemed that the political opposition headed by Raffi Hovhannisyan (the leader of the “Heritage” party) was at the peak of its power. According to public opinion polls, as well as to his own statements, Hovhannisyan won the 2013 presidential elections. However, the election results were falsified by the government. Society revolted: meetings and protests were held every day in Liberty square. The situation seemed to be turning revolu- tionary. However, the City Council elections on May 6 were a total failure for the opposition; the Repub- lican Party of Armenia became the leading force in city hall. Thus, the deep crisis of legitimacy that Sarg- syan faced since the 2008 presidential elections, expressed in the great public support for opposition political forces, came to an end. This situation may change again, but currently no political force seriously challenges Sargsyan. This article provides an overview of Armenia’s main political parties. The Leading Party: the Republican Party of parties are mainly clubs of supporters of this or that pol- Armenia itician. They essentially support their leader’s ideologi- The government is represented by the Republican Party cal, promotional and organizational activity. of Armenia (RPA), whose leader is Serzh Sargsyan The leading party’s inner life is inevitably wider, as (Armenia’s president). There is also an affiliate party of it carries out also the tasks of state governance, partially little influence called Rule of Law that will not be fur- replacing the activity of other state institutions. This is the ther discussed. During the last five years the representa- reason why it often becomes a place of rivalry between the tives of the opposition have been the Armenian National sub-elites of the ruling elite. Such access to power adds to Congress, headed by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Heritage, the attraction of the leading party and stirs public inter- headed by Raffi Hovhannisyan, Gagik Tsarukyan’s Pros- est in it. The society still remembers the times when all perous Armenia, a relatively “passive opposition”, and the social events originated inside the leading and the the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsu- only party, the Communist Party. In this respect, now tyun) with no definite leader. the leading Republican Party also has some charm for the Armenian political parties by themselves have not Armenian society, as there have formed in it some internal played a prominent role during the years of indepen- struggles and procedures for the resolution of differences. dence. They have been inconsistent political entities The present day Republican Party was formed in lacking regulations, ideological activity, an open inner 1998 as a result of President Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s res- debate, close relations with different strata of the society, ignation. Before that it had been a minor and non-influ- a definite ideological orientation and a social base. These ential party. Two days after the resignation, several MPs CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 53–54, 17 July 2013 8 declared en masse their cooptation into the Republican The Armenian National Congress: 2008 and Party. They were followed by all those state officials who Beyond wanted to maintain their posts under the new govern- During the 2008 presidential elections, the role of leader ment. Later the RPA served as a ground for the forma- was performed by ex-President Levon Ter-Petrosyan. tion of R. Kocharyan’s social basis, i.e. the upper bour- He was able to do three important things. Firstly, he geoisie, which merged with the machine of government. characterized the present administration to be a gang, Big capital and the state merged, and this still remains pointing to their anti-constitutional, anti-social and Sargsyan’s social base. This base was strengthened by anti-state nature. Secondly, he clearly determined the nationalistic ideology (derived from the old Republican goal, which was to restore the constitutional order in Party ideology) combined together with some clerical Armenia, to provide a social lift in the political, eco- and glamour-intellectual elitist elements. As a result, a nomic and cultural spheres, and to abandon the clerical- new balanced system was created, which, still the only nationalist (elitist) ideology. Finally, Ter-Petrosyan was one in Armenia, was able to replace its leader Robert able to create a large political union, gathering around Kocharyan with Sargsyan. At the same time, it main- him almost all the opposition groups of Armenia. This tained its inner intrigue, which has become the only made a clear impression on the society. Ter-Petrosyan remarkable intrigue of Armenian political life against announced that he was the winner of the 2008 presi- the background of the opposition’s failure. dential elections which were falsified by the government. There are several competitions going on inside the Then the society started what was later called a “consti- party: between the holders of “European” and “Russian” tutional revolution”. positions, as well as between the first generation “plebe- Everyday meetings were held in Liberty square, the ian-criminal” businessmen (oligarchs) and the second government was troubled and deployed police force generation “educated” oligarchy, which also presents against the peaceful demonstrators. During the night itself as the supporter of the country’s modernization. of March 1 to March 2, 2008, the unarmed demonstra- There is also a fraction consisted of those who support tion was suppressed with the use of weapons. Ten peo- the party’s ex-leader Kocharyan. Sargsyan presents him- ple were killed and hundreds of people were arrested self as a person who balances all these interests. Thus, the on false accusations. After these events, the opposition leading party has some of the components necessary for declared the formation of the Armenian National Con- political longevity: an actual and vital (or imitational) gress, which was meant to be the union of those politi- inner debate, diversity, a certain inner collegiality deter- cal forces and citizens who supported the restoration of mined by the presence of different fractions, a conflict- the constitutional order. Ter-Petrosyan declared him- resolution procedure, and the ability to change the leader self to be the political instrument of the citizens. The in an externally legal way, without delegitimizing the main work style of the Congress was the so-called “street previous leader. The party’s main and organic defect is policy” in the form of meetings, marches and pickets. that it still remains the party of the privileged minority. The original Congress managed to become a place It fails to become a place of self-expression for the citi- for the society’s self-expression, but not a place for gain- zens of Armenia. It is not able to create a social lift for ing political power. It obtained a diverse inner ideology the society and cannot exist without the monopolistic with the cooperation of, for example, the conservatives, possession of all the power levers (administrative, eco- the socialists and the liberals. Open professional com- nomic and cultural). In order to maintain this monop- missions operated there and formed policies of politi- oly, the leading party has to apply force, commit crimes cal and economic transformations. A new independent and violate Armenia’s democratic constitution and laws. media was formed in Armenia around the various issues This arouses the society’s rightful anger and stirs its inner put forth by the Congress. At that time the social move- willingness to change the situation, which becomes the ments for ecology, law enforcement and social self-orga- potential for the development of opposition parties. nization became active. The crowded square served as a The 2013 presidential elections were Armenian soci- link for all these processes: it provided a common infor- ety’s only hope of getting rid of the grouping that has mation area and resulted in the unity of public mind pocketed political, economic and cultural power. Why with public activity. Life can be changed—this time not not the parliamentary or the local government elec- through a revolution with a negligible result, but con- tions? Because the society still relies on a leader that will sciously, by creating a modern field of democratic val- act in favor of the nation: social self-organization is not ues and starting a free social debate—this was the main regarded as a means of fighting the evil. The leader, in his idea of the process. turn, is expected to co-opt the whole society in the pro- This productive social situation lasted for four years, cess of governance and in this way modernize the country. until the autumn of 2011. There is no clear benchmark CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 53–54, 17 July 2013 9 to which the decrease of this activism can be related. The National Congress and two other political forces (Pros- main reason for this might be the fact that the Congress perous Armenia and the Armenian Revolutionary Feder- was not institutionalized. Its original structure and the ation) decided not to take part in the elections. During official staff did not change, moreover, the existing struc- his campaign the leader of the Heritage, Raffi Hovhan- tures degraded instead of developing. New social groups nisyan, applied a new style, which he called “BAREV did not become members of the Congress, and the expe- revolution” (BAREVolution—a “Hello Revolution”). rience of cooperation of the different existing groups He walked in the streets of Yerevan, travelled to the was not given a normative formulation. No platform regions and greeted everyone, talked with them, thus was created to unite the ordinary members of the Con- creating an image of a sociable and modest political fig- gress on a daily basis, the speechmakers at the podium ure. Hovhannisyan was born and educated in the USA. remained the same, and there was no party media devel- In 1992 he was appointed the first Minister of Foreign oped. All the new and existing enterprises that were not Affairs of independent Armenia. During the year in this part of the Congress administration, were not regarded post, he led a moderately nationalistic, mostly anti-Tur- as expressions of the Greater Congress: on the contrary, key policy. Because of this policy he had to resign from they were considered to be unwelcome competitors. This the post. Together with this moderate nationalism, the led to the paradoxical break of the Congress with pub- Heritage, which also has a parliamentary group, during lic movements, independent media, artistic circles and, the past years had gained the reputation of a party that finally, with society. Here we can also see the society’s helps people in need. Its campaign was based on this fault expressed by its tendency to become easily fas- idea. The Heritage had always been liked by the soci- cinated and easily disappointed, by its suspiciousness ety, for being constantly oppositional but in a soft way, and too critical attitude toward Ter-Petrosyan or the unlike the rough style of the Congress. At the same time, Congress, and finally, by its lack of understanding. As the Heritage displayed the same soft opposition against a result of this, the Congress was rapidly gaining an the Congress itself. During the 2013 presidential elec- undesirable “brick-stone identity” and predictability. tions, these factors worked in favor of Hovhannisyan, The inner debate was fading, and the chances of self- and the latter won the elections, according to public expression via the Congress were growing smaller and opinion. Again, like five years before, demonstrations smaller. Then a conflict occurred between the found- and meetings started in Yerevan’s Liberty square. Hov- ers of the movement. The Congress lost its main qual- hannisyan paid active visits to the regions, which was ity of uniting people, and the spheres of expression were highly appreciated by the population. He declared that blocked because of the absence of normative means of he was no longer the representative of the Heritage, but manifestation, because of the hierarchy and roughness the representative of the whole society. He promised to of the inner debate forms. In the end, the Congress unite the oppositional part of society and claimed that turned into an ordinary party in the Armenian percep- he didn’t regard the government as his enemy either, but tion of the concept (devoid of real substructures, reg- wanted it to fulfill the people’s wishes. However, in con- ulation, debate, creativity and social base). This led to trast to the Congress, the public activism of Raffi lasted the failure of the Congress to participate in the coun- only three months. At the end of this period, the pub- try’s political processes. The Congress did not partici- lic disappointment was obvious. pate in the 2013 presidential elections, and at the 2013 The reasons are manifold. Firstly, unlike Ter-Petro- City Council elections did not receive even the mini- syan, Hovhannisyan did not bring with himself a new mum of 5% of the votes. and independent political text. Of course, his non-elitist, However, during the four years of its active existence, non-hierarchic attitude was a fresh and effective factor. the Congress created a valuable example of democratic But the basis of values brought by him was too eclectic, policy, gained experience and intellectual achievements somewhat contradictory, and highly populist. Secondly, that, together with the mistakes, still remain actual and despite the fact that different political groups partici- exemplary. pated in Hovhannisyan’s meetings, namely the ARF- Dashnaktsutyun and one of the former leaders of the Heritage and the Problem of Inheriting a Congress, Raffi failed to create a structure capable of a Democratic Movement long struggle, like the Congress. Although Hovhanni- Thus, we saw how the Armenian society, though per- syan did not refuse the idea of creating an openly work- haps not very wisely, ceased to trust the establishment of ing alternative government, it was not fulfilled because democracy in Armenia to the Armenian National Con- of the lack of a decision-making system. There was also gress. But the problem remained unsolved, whilst the a lack of ideological discussion and strategy elaboration presidential elections were about to start. The Armenian in the square and among the society. It was disappoint- CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 53–54, 17 July 2013 10 ing that Hovhannisyan, who named his party “Heritage”, leader Ter-Petrosyan had hoped that Prosperous Arme- refused to inherit the legitimacy of the past five years’ nia would join the oppositional movement and become struggle, not considering his movement as the contin- a party that protects the interests of the majority. This, uation of the previous one. By his contemptuous atti- in its turn, would break the vicious link between busi- tude towards the past struggle of the Congress, Hov- ness and the government, and would serve as an example hannisyan hurt the people who had been in the same for the other businessmen, stirring their wish to estab- square five years already. He did not understand that lish a constitutional order or, in Ter-Petrosyan’s words, these were the same people, the same society. to make a bourgeois-democratic revolution. However, Hovhannisyan’s movement seemed to correct many Tsarukyan did not accept that co-operation, though in of the deficiencies of the Congress, but at the same time separate matters his party co-operates with the parlia- he refused to accept its fundamental achievements in mentary fractions of the opposition. It is not clear why organizing a social struggle, its rules and values, its expe- the big bourgeoisie should go for that revolution. They rience and text. At the City Council elections in May have already made such a revolution, uniting with the 2013, the Heritage received an offensive 8% of the votes government, becoming its social basis. The democratic and gave up its public activism for the time being. We revolution and the establishment of a constitutional can say that the Heritage manifested itself as an alterna- order can endanger their monopolistic-oligarchic posi- tive not to the government, but to the previous opposi- tions, turning them into ordinary businessmen. tion. In many respects it was really a positive opposition, In any case, the uncertainty of principles, adopted which corrected the mistakes of the previous one. How- by Prosperous Armenia and considered by some to be ever, in core matters, i.e. how to unite the society, how the party’s advantage (since the party, as an instrument, to make the oppositional movement a free and respon- could be used to promote any principles that it adopts), sible place for the self-expression of people, it did less seems to become its deficiency. If Tsarukyan used to than its predecessor, both from the conceptual and the play the role of a powerful “joker” in the political field, practical points of view. whose support was needed by both the government and the opposition, now he will probably start playing the Prosperous Armenia: A Continuously role of an unnecessary factor, unreliable for both the gov- Failing Alternative? ernment and the opposition, as well as for the society. Prosperous Armenia is the party of Gagik Tsarukyan, Anyway, the failures of the opposition at the latest elec- a businessman and an oligarch. In fact, it is based on tions worked not in favor of Tsarukyan, but in favor of the same values as the ruling RPA, on the idea of the the government. Tsarukyan just maintained his previ- unity of big business with the government. For a long ous rating, which, probably, is a failure for him. time it was RPA’s coalitional partner. However, in 2010 this party left the governing coalition and announced ARF-Dashnaktsutyun1: itself not an opposition, but an “alternative” to the rul- With Whom and For What? ing party. Tsarukyan made the impression on some part The ARF-Dashnaktsutyun is probably the only party of the society that he was going to help everybody to in Armenia not focused on the cult of personality. It prosper like him, and activate a social lift that will not has an inner structure, operating regulations, and com- require the change of the present political-economic paratively decentralized and localized institutions. The system (oligarchy). In this system only the minority is party has a 100 year history and a great reputation in able to prosper politically, economically and culturally, the Diaspora; being a member of the Dashnaktsutyun through repressing the majority’s rights. So, it is not is in some sense a way of living, an identity. However, clear what plan Tsarukyan suggests to overcome this in the last 10 years, the Dashnaktsutyun has failed to circumstance. We don’t know any serious concept or obtain a reasonable, programmed and ideological form, program either that would express Tsarukyan’s vision text and position. During Kocharyan’s rule it was part of of Armenia’s future and the reforms the party intends the governing coalition, but then it left the government to make. In spite of, or due to that, Prosperous Arme- and declared itself an opposition. The party refused to nia arouses romantic hopes among quite a great part of join the Congress. However, it joined Hovhannisyan’s the voters, and it has a big, though not very influential movement, but here too failed to display a stable politi- (about 20%), factions in the Parliament, City Coun- cal position. It did not even try to modernize its social- cil, as well as in the regional local government bodies. ist origins, while there is probably public demand for Probably, Tsarukyan manages to maintain some inner such a position in Armenia. The party’s nationalistic life, inner interest inside his party. This interest is pos- sibly based merely on his personal career. The Congress 1 In Armenian “Dashnaktsutyun” means “coalition.”

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36. □□ CHRONICLE. From 25 June to 15 July 2013. 40 digest caucasus. Research Centre in Armenia: From Decorative to Genuine Democracy? http://library.fes.de/pdf- be allowed to privatize the struggle as it doesn't belong.
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