Post-Communist Economies and Western Trade Discrimination: Are NMEs Our Enemies?

265 Pages·2006·1.133 MB·English

by  Cynthia M. Horne (auth.)

Post-Communist Economies and
Western Trade Discrimination
Political Evolution and Institutional Change
Bo Rothstein and Sven Steinmo, editors
Exploring the dynamic relationships among political institutions, attitudes, behaviors,
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It will explore social dilemmas, such as collective action problems, and enhance
understanding of how political outcomes result from the interaction among political
ideas—including values, beliefs or social norms-institutions, and interests. It will pro-
mote cutting-edge work in historical institutionalism, rational choice and game theory,
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The Politics of Pact-Making: Hungary’s Negotiated Transition to
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Post-Communist Economies and Western Trade Discrimination:
Are NMEs Our Enemies?
By Cynthia M. Horne
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By Matthew J. Hirschland
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of Political and Economic Transformation
Edited by Rudra Sil and Dennis C. Galvan
Post-Communist Economies
and Western Trade
Discrimination: Are NMEs
Our Enemies?
Cynthia M. Horne
POST-COMMUNISTECONOMIESANDWESTERNTRADEDISCRIMINATION
© Cynthia M. Horne, 2006.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2006 978-1-4039-7451-8
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DOI 10.1057/9780230601673
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First edition: November 2006
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CONTENTS
List of Tables vi
List of Figures viii
Acknowledgments ix
Chapter One Introduction: Transitions and Trade 1
Chapter Two A Logic of Belief Stasis and Belief Change 19
Chapter Three Crawfish, Sparklers, and Rebar: Testing
Theories of Trade Protection 41
Chapter Four The Nuts and Bolts of Anti-dumping
Laws: Actors and Institutions in the
United States and the European Union 66
Chapter Five The Institutionalization of Beliefs 85
Chapter Six Rule Change but Outcome Stasis 115
Chapter Seven Belief Stickiness and Belief Change 149
Chapter Eight Integrating Non-Market Economies
into the International Trading System 180
Appendix I 194
Appendix II 197
Appendix III 202
Notes 211
Bibliography 220
Index 250
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Traditional List of Non-Market Economies 3
2.1 Belief Certainly: Matrix of Interests
and Incentives 32
2.2 Predicting Levels of Belief Certainty 37
3.1 Matrix of Theories Explaining Patterns
of Trade Protection 42
3.2 Comparative Groups 44
3.3 Sample of High, Medium, and
Low Value-Added Sectors 47
3.4 Summary of Independent Variables 51
3.5 Sample of U.S. Anti-dumping Cases
(1985–1999) 52
3.6 Which Factors Explain Industry Level
Incidence of Trade Protection?
Analysis 1—Parameter Values for
Logit Model 54
3.7 Which Factors Explain the Size of the
Trade Protection Awarded? Analysis II—OLS
Regression Model Dependent Variable:
Amount of Trade Protection Received 57
3.8 Comparison of Dumping Margins in
Same U.S. Cases 60
3.9 Which Factors Explain Incidence of
Trade Protection against Certain Countries?
Analysis III: Parameter Values for Logit Model of
Anti-dumping Decisions Dependent Variable:
Anti-dumping Determinations 62
4.1 European Council Voting Patterns on
Anti-dumping Measures 77
List of Tables vii
5.1 Recent Surrogates Proposed By ITA
for Non-Market Economies 88
5.2 Surrogates in Selected Recent U.S.
Anti-dumping Cases 90
5.3 Comparison of Anti-dumping Margins:
BIA versus NME Information 96
5.4 Sample of Affirmative Anti-dumping
Cases against Non-Market Economies with
Developing Countries as Analogues (1990–2003) 99
5.5 Sample of Affirmative Anti-dumping Cases
against Non-Market Economies with
OECD Countries as Analogues (1990–2003) 102
5.6 Countries in Logit Analyses (Baseline Year 1997) 108
5.7 Summary of Variables 109
5.8 Are NMEs Institutionally Different from
Other Developing Countries? Parameter
Values for Logit Model (US Data, 1997) 110
5.9 Are NMEs Institutionally Different from
Other Developing Countries? Parameter
Values for Logit Model (EU Data, 1997) 112
6.1 Country Wide Rates versus
Individual Treatment 132
7.1 Summary of US Status Reclassification
Requests 151
7.2 Waves of EU Country Reclassifications 152
7.3 Index of Economic Freedom 153
7.4 Index of Political and Economic
Freedoms Combined 155
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 U.S. Imports Compared to Anti-dumping Cases,
Non-Market Economies, 1981–2003 11
1.2 EU Imports Compared to Anti-dumping Cases,
Non-Market Economies, 1980–2002 11
1.3 Ratio of Imports to AD Cases—Cross
Regional Comparison, U.S. Trade Data, 1980–2002 13
1.4 Ratio of Imports to AD Cases—Cross
Regional Comparison, EU Trade Data 1980–2002 13
1.5 Cross Group Comparison of U.S.
Anti-dumping Cases, 1981–2003 14
1.6 Cross Group Comparison of EU
Anti-dumping Cases, 1980–2002 14
1.7 EU Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy
Cases Initiated by Sector 15
1.8 EU Anti-dumping Cases against
NMEs by Sector 15
2.1 Continuum of Certainty Levels by Group:
Predicting Belief Change 33
4.1 U.S. Anti-dumping Decision Tree 69
4.2 EU Anti-dumping Decision Tree 74
7.1 Belief Certainty as Predictor of Belief Change 159
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The idea for this book started more than ten years ago. At that time the
entire world was transfixed by the start of the political and economic
transitions in the former Soviet bloc, and I was no exception. I was
intrigued by trade as a vehicle for international development, and
perplexed about any impediments that the former Soviet bloc faced
achieving this goal. As such, I was captured by the urge to participate in
the international policy community’s efforts to facilitate the economic
transformations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. So
I put this project on a shelf, and returned to it only several years later.
After dusting off the initial idea and presenting it in an incredibly pas-
sionate yet completely undisciplined form, I was encouraged to take my
puzzle—about the cause of continuing Western trade protection against
post-Communist economies—and systematically investigate it. I owe a
tremendous intellectual debt to Margaret Levi not only for helping me
to develop the analytical and theoretical tools to investigate my puzzle,
but for also ensuring that I actually used those tools in an intellectually
rigorous way. Both her encouragement as well as her corrections chal-
lenged me to work harder. I have not figured out a way to thank her
appropriately for all her untold personal and intellectual support.
I am especially grateful to James Caporaso for his skepticism at critical
stages in the drafting of the initial manuscript. Jim’s simple but precise
questions—“but what is the puzzle?” and “how can you measure
that?”—sent me back to the drawing board more than once. The project
is much better as a result. Anthony Gill walked me through countless
permutations of variable conceptualization and operationalization. His
tutelage, advice, and patience were invaluable in the initial project design
and implementation. Bryan Jones unlocked a new theoretical door for me.
For introducing me to the beauty and frustration of evolutionary psychol-
ogy and the behavioral theory of organizations, I am quite indebted.