Possible Experience: Understanding Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

216 Pages·1999·12.48 MB·English

by  Arthur Collins

,
!
Possible
Experience
Understanding Kant's
Critique ofPure Reason
Arthur W. Collins
UNIVERSITY OF CALIF
Berkeley Los Ange
UniversityofCalifornia Press
Berkeleyand LosAngeles,California
UniversityofCalifornia Press,Ltd.
London, England
©1999by
TheRegentsoftheUniversityofCalifornia
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Collins,Arthur W.
Possibleexperience:understandingKant's Cri
tiqueofpurereasonIbyArthurW.Collins.
p, em,
Includesbibliographical referencesand index.
ISBN0-52.0-21498-6(alk.paper).-
ISBN0-520-21499-4 (pbk.:alk.paper)
1.Kant,Immanuel, 1724-1804.
Kritikdel'reinenVernunft.
2.Knowledge, of. 3. Causation.
4. Reason. LTitle.
B2779·C54 1999
121-dc21 98-33670
CIP
Printed intheUnitedStatesofAmerica
9 87 6 5 4 3 2 I
Thepaper usedinthispublicationmeetsthemini
mumrequirements ofAmericanNationalStandards
forInformationSciences-PermanenceofPaperfor
PrintedLibrary Materials, ANSIZ39.48-1984.
for Rufus andJacob
Contents
Preface
IX
Note on Texts and Abbreviations xix
Kant and the CartesianPhilosophy ofMind
1. I
2. Subjectivismversus Idealism 8
3· Idealism and TranscendentalIdealism 20
4· AreThings-in-Themselves Noumena? 26
k 5. The Conceptof Representation 31
,qI ~ 6. "Space Isin Us" 60
7· Outer Causes ofPerception 73
'I 8. Kant Nota Foundationalist 82
,I 9· The "How-Possible" Questions 91
iI 10. The "Clue" for Finding the Categories 101
q The Parallelism ofInner and Outer Sense 1
I >tIL °7
12. The SubjectofExperience 121
'I
13· How Representations Make Objects Possible 14°
II 14· Objects and Empirical Realism 143
15· The IdealisticUnderstanding ofKant's
11 TheoreticalPhilosophy 153
II
11
Notes 183
Index 199
!
11 vii
Preface
This bookidentifies and triesto remove thegreatestsingleobstaclefaced
I bystudents andteachers intheirattempts to understand Kant's theoret-
I
icalphilosophy.Wecan approachthis obstaclethroughthe phrase tran-
i scendentalidealism, whichisone of the titles Kant giveshis philosophy
I as a whole. These words naturally suggest that Kant ispresentingsome
+
,i \~.I"\~~ Jill..-j~fl.~~ i~
form ofidealism, but infact heisnot. QhilosQJ2.b.J;: an,Y.£2.!l:
I. ¥i'<\1")~' \:§ption"_Q..Lcon§.Sioll§Q~ss knowl<:,4.g~..e£s;or5!illgJ5l ~hish.c!.h.~~!h!.~
and ..
iln~~iaj~.!.Y.~P.l2r~b-"c:.!24jrL~J?£tk!!f~_~~!s..ali!ie§..Jh~1~2fl~ljl.1~Q..ru;
I'",}< we
I
i ~u1l!if!i:.Ifthere are nonmental realities at all, they are positedreal-
1\
: itiesor,ifwe can knowthingsoutside ourminds, they are known medi-
I
i atelyandbyinference from ourunmediatedexperienceofmentalthings.
II
ii' Apartfrom afewvoicesto the contrary,most readersofKant, from well
~, before the appearance ofthe Critique ofPure Reasonup to the present,
il
II have assumed that transcendental idealism is, first of all, idealism, and
!1 that the relevant problem of interpretation isthat of finding the differ-
ii ence, ifany,.between Kant's idealism and that of other idealistphiloso-
;i phers. I say that this view is incorrect and that its dominance has been
1!I1
extremely harmful to thinking about Kant. Although I approach Kant
Ii throughonly one issue,the discussioninvolvesthe maincontentionsand
I-I features of Kant's theoretical philosophy. I am convinced that a sound
II
understanding of this issue is crucial to comprehension of the Critique
11 ofPure Reason as a whole.
II
H
Ix
Preface
x
Readers frequently find some version of phenomenalism in Kant's
account of experience and knowledge. For our purposes, we can treat
phenomenalism as a form of idealism becausepheno~ne1!.a..l~§.!Q...!~..!!_4Y£:
tiye; and it is!!..Q!1!'1)el"!!gLilii!lg§!h<l!..fl!:~..r_~_slllS~c!· Byincluding phenom
enalism as a variety of idealist interpretation, I am willing to disregard
distinctions some philosophers want to respect." A putative contrast
between phenomenalism and idealism issupported by the thought that
.12.hf.l}om~lla1.~QLc!Q~not.g.~D.Y.._!h.e..~2Cj§!~pceof.fl.2!nnental..2.£j~~s
~~.!<;:~~.1?~e.~e.~!~_~1];..~~pJa}~at!o.n9-f..Lll.§.t1Yh?,:!,1~!£h.£QI~ts ~. Forexam
ple, theyare "logicalconstructsoutof sense data." Acommonobjective
of the reduction attempted by a phenomenalist logical construction is
ontological parsimony. The same parsimony is intended by any phe
nomenalist translation of statements about physical objects into a lan
guage the referring terms of which are confinedto sense data and other
mental existents. While we ordinarily allow for the existence of mental
realities suchas thoughts and perceptualexperiences and also allowfor
the existence of outer nonmental objects as entities in addition to and
otherthanmentalthings,the logicalconstruction,or the translationpro
gram, proposes the deletion of the nonmental objects from our ontol
ogy.fujygca!~§_.Qf-2h~!1.9m~!l~Jj§Q1.sp.~'!!~.()fo..l.!!~Ll'h.~i<,:aLo!?i.~~!~.QllLgg
~Q.Lt:b~r~Qy.gQJ~.e.YQPSL<l!}.5m!Ql()gygnfle,J;l!a.:I.tl1ings,c1ll.cJ..tl1.LlSC1Q.i~e.C1J:
i~£12!£logy.
Ihavealso includedunderthe broadumbrellaofidealismviewssome
timesascribedto Kantthatare notreductiveandthatmerelyconfinethe
evidencefor the existenceofnonmentalthingsto mentalrepresentations.
Such theories are not phenomenalist, butthey do belong to the classof
views that Kant brings together under the heading "problematic ideal
ism." They do notclose the door to skepticism but virtually invite the
skeptical thought, "Any amount of such 'evidence' is compatible with
the nonexistence of outer objects," and the skeptical question, "With
what right do we regard mental states as evidence for nonrnental reali
ties at all?"
Again, manyreaders thinkthat, in the face of criticalreactions to the
obviouslyidealistictenetsofthe first editionofthe CritiqueofPureRea
son, Kantcontradictedthosetenetsinthe secondedition,or exacerbated
contradictions thatwere already present in the first edition.
The understandable thought that Kant's transcendental idealism is a
genuine form of idealism is conveyed, for example, by the definition of
the termidealisminSimonBlackburn's 1994 OxfordDictionaryofPhi-
Preface xi
losophy: "Any doctrine holding that reality isfundamentally mental in
nature ..." and "major forms of idealism include subjective idealism,
or the position better called immaterialism and associated with Berke
ley,according to which to exist isto beperceived, transcendentalideal
ism, and absolute idealism" [emphasis addedj.?Ifwe judge in the light
of two hundred years of idealist interpretation of Kant, this dictionary
entry seems to be in good order. If, on the other hand, that interpreta
tion is fundamentally wrong, as I mean to argue, the explanation for
such awidespread misunderstandingmust lienotmerely withthis army
of readers but just as much with Kant himself. Indeed, the supposition
thatKant'sphilosophyisaform ofidealismisbyno means asimple prej
udice read out of the words "transcendentalidealism." The Critique of
Pure Reason abounds in apparent confirmations of that supposition.
Manyconfirmations take the form ofwhatsoundlikeflat statements of
an idealisticthesis. There are also fundamental and large-scale develop
ments inKant'ssystem thatseem to requireidealismifthey are to make
any sense at all. For illustration of the flat statements, consider Kant's
repeated contention that we can apprehend only appearances and that
appearances are "representations" and can exist only in our faculty of
representation. Surely all the things that exist in our faculty of repre
sentationare mentalthings. Asan illustrationofthe fundamental devel
opments,considerKant's grandeffortto showthatobjectsofexperience
are products of a synthesis we perform, that is, of a mental combinato
rial activity operating on mental representations.
In light of these Kantian assertions and doctrines, it would be sur
prising if most students of Kant did not find an idealism in his work,
since the appearance of idealism could not be much more prominent
than it is. In the last chapter of this book, I discuss a number of inter
pretations of Kant byfirst-rate philosophers, past and present, in order
to convey something of the history, the persistence, and the variety of
idealisticreadings,andIalsotake note oftheworkofseveral recent non
idealistic commentators. For the main body of this book, I do not talk
about the interpretations of other writers on Kant. In order to under
stand the widespread incorrect interpretation, Iuse only Kant's writing
as the source for the seeming idealism of his work. One olJ.1}e feat..!1r~
t;;hflct.mgl<e.t.4~J?.!'.~.s.~n,t".§tlJ4y'...gJ~Jig£t~I~j§_t1}5:.~~!!!;;Q!J2!LiLgiY~,§ ..!9~.th~
llj;Q.Ql.~.m.QLr~.<:(?}1c:iling" the,l11o,s,t..p.~()miQ~ll.La.!.1:4.l.11~~k~.s!i!.1:K.lfl$_a.listic:.:
§.olll1clil1gassertionsa119thf:l11esin.I\a.£lt~itl1 a'Yh<?J!Y}1.o.!},i4~.~E§.ti£",2.,\1t­
JQ2!~:J will also locatethe interpretationofKantthatIdefendhere with
xii Preface
respect to the small minority of recent commentators who do not pre
sent Kant asan idealist.
This book isneither a briefgeneralcommentaryonthe Critique ofPure
Reason nor an introductory text. Iaddress only one topic, albeit a per
vasivetopic, and Itry to make only one point, albeit a point of funda
mental importance.The book discussesprominentthemesinKant's the
oretical philosophy,withthe singleobjective ofmakingitpossibleto see
apparentlyidealistic passageswithoutthe idealism.Itisacommonplace
that Descartes's introduction of the egocentric skeptical perspective in
philosophy has had and continues to have a decisive role in modern
thinking. Inwhatfollows, Itty to sho~how t~broadll: Cartesian0l.l;.t-
k' I~an!_en~E.lC?~th~ w":!.!.~g§a~~~!tj.ons
lookofreade!:sof t9seeinhis that
are qu~~~l~.~~imLc.?D.~~s~~hLtakes him~~!fto_
J2~m<t~1f!.g.Ofcourse, his vocabulary and rhetoric are partly to blame
for misunderstandings. The term transcendental idealism is only the
most obvious example. In spite of such difficultiesin Kant's texts, the
great preponderance of the misreading of Kant arises from Cartesian
presuppositions on the part ofthe reader that make it hard or impossi
bleto recognize the verymany clear indications ofKant's oppositionto
idealism, root and branch.
The presentwork concentrates on Kant's conception of "representa
tions," on hisconception of space and time, on the nonfoundationalist
stance ofhisfamous "How-possible?" questions,and on hisdeepargu
ment against the verypossibility of a Cartesiansubject enduringintime
while surveying the contents of its own consciousness. I do not find a
singlediscussion in the Critique or in any other of Kant's works where
he presentsthis last argumentinfull.Idrawon diversematerialson this
point, most prominently on the Paralogisms and the Refutation of Ide
alismbutalsoonKant's repeateddiscussionsoftheneedtorepresentthe
unity of time spatially. Where the precise wording of the text seems
important for my single objective, I have not hesitated to present very
detailed analyses of it. In these explications, I believethat the structure
ofKant's argumentscan beusedto more or lessprove hisentirely anti
idealist intentions.
Thesections ofthe Critique towhichIhavedevotedthemost detailed
examination are the Transcendental Aesthetic and parts of the Tran-
r
Preface xiii
'I
scendentalDeduction ofthe Categories, aswellasthe above-mentioned
Refutation and Paralogisms. In orderto profitfrom the reflections that
are presented here, it seemsto me that a reader must have made, or be
intheprocessofmaking, asubstantialeffortto understandKantthrough
hardstudyofthe Critique.Undergraduateandgraduatestudentsarecer
tainly to befound among such readers of Kant, and I intend this work
to beof interestand ofuseto students at all levels,aswellasto profes
sional philosophers and Kant scholars. Icame to most of the ideas pre
sented here inthe contextofefforts to help students in numerous semi
nars on the Critique. I hope that their understanding was helped, and
since I am sure that mine was, I am grateful to those students. I have
translated all ofthe quoted passages myselfwith consultationand help
from othertranslations. Atthe same time, Ihavebeencareful not to let
an appearanceofsupportfor myunderstanding ofapassage reston my
translation. Where Ifind that options available to a translator impinge
significantly on the issue of idealism, I discuss the translation explicitly
and Iinclude the Germantextin the notes.
:1
I
i My interests inthis topic are not merelyhistorical.The skepticalmoves
I that lead to one or another form of idealism in metaphysics are part of
'j awidelysharedphilosophicalinheritance. AbroadlyCartesianoutlook
,I
~; stilldominates the preliminary "set" from whichphilosophicaltheoriz
,1
il ingtakes it start. The tenacity ofthis preliminary outlook derives from
:1
I! its apparentfitwith obvious facts about experience. For the most part,
Ii
ifnotinallcases,we knowwhat our beliefsare evenifthey turn outto
:1
befalse beliefs.Weknow howthings appear to us, even ifappearances
II
prove to be radically misleading. What is the subject matter of the
knowledge that survives erroneous beliefs and illusory appearances?
II Most philosophers accept the idea that the subject matter belongs, in
Il somesense,tothecontentsofourconsciousness. ThismuchoftheCarte
~l sian method of doubt and its idealist resolution is retained, even by
philosopherswho repudiateDescartes's dualism and conceptionofmen
r tal substance. Our states of beliefand other "mental representations,"
together with our perceptual experiences, are inner realities of some
kind, although there is no consensus whatever ahout the kind of reali
ties these mental things are. Debates flourish about the nature of these
inner mental representations, while the idea that immediate experience