Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy. Studies in Foreign Policy 1873–1917

368 Pages·1966·15.925 MB·English

by  John A. S. Grenville, George B. Young

POLITICS, STRATEGY, AND
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917
by John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young
,.
NEW HAVEN AND LONDON, YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1966
Copyright© 1966 by Yale University.
Designed by Wayne D. Peterson,
set in Caledonia type,
and printed in the United States of America by
Colonial Press.
Distributed in Canada by McGill University Press.
All rights reserved. This book may not be
reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form
( except by reviewers for the public press),
tcithout written permission from the publishers.
Library of Congress catalog card number: 66-12498
/,EP
GiFT
PUBUS;-ia
FOR BETIY ANr."'E AND MARY
Priface
THESE STUDIES WERE WRITI'EN in the belief that a con
tribution to the better understanding of the history of
American diplomacy might be made by examining foreign
policy in its political as well as strategic context·; Both authors
were members of Samuel Flagg Bemis' postgraduate sem
inar on American foreign policy held at Yale University. Al
though two decades separated their respective attendance,
they share a common approach to the subject. The collabora
tion which led to this book was undertaken at the suggestion
of Mr. Bemis, who has taken a lively interest in the progress
of the work~:.We have benefited greatly from his deep under
standing of the period and his instinctive grasp of the issues
involved. Any merit this book may possess is but a small re
turn for his interest and devotion. Of course the authors alone
are responsible for the views expressed.
It is pleasant to record our debt to the many friends who
have helped us: to E. K. Wickman, Lansing V. Hammond,
and Martha English of the Commonwealth Fund of New York,
and to Yale University. Admiral E. M. Eller of the Division of
Naval History, Department of the Navy, permitted the exam
ination of the records in his care, and Dean Allard ensured
that this research proved fruitful and pleasant. We are also
grateful to George Cabot Lodge for permitting us to quote
from the correspondence of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
and to the Massachusetts Historical Society for their hospi
tality. Walter M. Robinson of Nashville, Tennessee, allowed
us to look at the papers of William L. Scruggs at considerable
[vii]
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l;
l
Preface
trouble to himself. James E. Hewes, of the division of Army
Historical Research, discussed the whole subject with the au
thors. His criticisms, especially of the last two chapters, have
led to significant improvements. W. D. Mcintyre and H. C.
Allen read parts of the manuscript and gave us the benent of
their learning. Richard Webb, J.P., Reader in the Department
of Law at the University of Nottingham, read the whole of
the manuscript in its nrst draft and drew the attention of the
authors to mistakes in fact and style with exemplary zeal and
unfailing courtesy.
In common with many authors we owe a tremendous debt
to the staffs of the National Archives and the Library of Con
gress who spent many hours on our behalf searching for the
documents we required.
The Yale University Press lavished valuable and specialized
care on the manuscript, and we are particularly grateful to
' Marian Neal Ash and Jane lsay for ensuring that what had
''
remained obscure in the manuscript would be clear in the
book.
To our friends and colleagues too numerous to mention
who have aided us in many ways, we can only express the
general hope that they will consider the results worthwhile.
J. A. S. G.
G. B. Y.
Leeds, Yorkshire
Chicago, Illinois
October 1965
[viii]
;----::.
·my
au
ave Contents
c.
:of
ent
of
vii
PREFACE
the
.nd INTRODUCTION xi
ONE
~bt The Admiral in Politics: Stephen B. Luce and the Foundation --....
m of the Modern American Navy 1
:he
TWO
Party Politics and Foreign Policy: Grover Cleveland's First
ed
Administration, 1885-1889 39
to
ad TlffiEE
The Challenge of Latin America: Harrison and Blaine,
he
1889-1892 74
:m FOUR
b.e An Administration in Search of a Policy: Hawaii and Latin
le. America, 1893-1895 102
FIVE
The Diplomat as Propagandist: William Lindsay Scruggs,
Agent for Venezuela 125
SIX
Grover Cleveland, Richard Olney, and the Venezuelan
Crisis 158
SEVEN
The Dangers of Cuban Independence: 1895-1897 179
EIGHT
The Expansionists: The Education of Henry Cabot Lodge 201
[ixJ
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Contents
NINE
The Breakdown of Neutrality: McKinley Goes to War with
Spain 239
TEN
The Influence of Strategy upon History: The Acquisition
of the Philippines 261
ELEVEN
The Quest for Security: Admiral Dewey and the General
Board,l900-1917 297
337
MANUSCRIPT SOURCES
INDEX 339
[x]
I
)
SF srs
Introduction
THE ERA BEGINNING AT the close of the Civil War and
ending with American participation in World War I
witnessed startling and revolutionary changes, among them
the transformation of the United States from a predominantly
rural society to an industrial one. During the early decades of
this period, the problems of international relations troubled
few Americans; absorption with domestic problems was almost
complete. By 1917, America was drawn into the mainstream
of world politics. The interrelated studies here presented are
concerned with the men who perceived this change and in
fluenced the American response to it.
The structure of this book is biographical rather than purely
narrative. Such a presentation imposes certain limitations, but
at the same time it may serve as a useful reminder that the
conduct of diplomacy is not determined in the abstract, but
influenced by personal prejudices and idiosyncracies. Histori
ans, in their endeavor to trace the principles and doctrines
that govern diplomacy, are perhaps inclined to impose order
on what is frequently an irrational pattern of events. Often
the interplay of personal assessments and the resolution of
rival pressures are determining factors. Politicians are not al
ways conscious of the personal motivations for their conduct;
they may even persuade themselves .t hat they are acting ac
cording to some hallowed tradition. They certainly neglect
few opportunities to invoke principle and tradition to lend
dignity to the policies they decide on. For many years after
the Civil War George Washington's advice to hold aloof from
[xi]
Introduction
entangling alliances was cited more frequently than the Mon
roe Doctrine. A reference to the Founding Fathers could serve
as an excuse for inaction. On the other hand, the Monroe
Doctrine imposed a responsibility for action whenever a Euro
pean power endangered its principles.
The purely diplomatic approach cannot offer a complete
analysis of American foreign policy; on occasion, party politics
played a predominant role in its formation, as did the con
siderations of strategy. The influence of strategy on the course
of American policy during the years under consideration can
not be equated simply with the influence of Alfred Thayer
Mahan. Fortunately, the discovery of new archival sources and
the rediscovery of old material now enable the historian to re
veal aspects of American foreign policy too long neglected.
The first chapter of this book is devoted to a naval officer
who, with his supporters, challenged the traditional views of
the majority in the 187os and 188os. These men recognized
that the conditions of American safety that Jefferson had de
scribed more than half a century earlier were passing away:
'We especially ought to pray that the powers of Europe may
be so poised and counterpoised among themselves, that their
own safety may require the presence of all their forces at
home, leaving the other quarters of the globe in undisturbed
tranquility." 1 But the European balance of power during the
last quarter of the nineteenth century led to consequences
Jefferson had not foreseen. Bismarck's masterful diplomacy in
Europe had created a temporary stalemate. The great Euro
pean powers fought out their rivalries in Africa and Asia. It
seemed possible, even probable to some, that an attempt to
partition parts of South and Central America would follow
the partition of Africa. The United States herself might fall
1. Saul K. Padover, ed., Thomas Jefferson on Democracy (New York
New American Library, 1946), p. 145. '
[xii]
/
Introduction
prey to European aggression. The expansion of American
commercial and strategic interests in the East were also en
dangered by the growth of European power in Asia and the
Pacific. These changing conditions led a small group of Amer
icans to ignore the pressures of domestic politics and to re
examine the traditional tenets of military and foreign policy.
Among these farsighted men was Rear Admiral Stephen
Bleecker Luce.
Only a few years after the close of the Civil War, the
United States Navy practically ceased to exist as a fighting ~,
fleet. In these, the darkest years in the history of the Navy, """
the service produced an officer of rare talent, a leader of men,
and a great reformer. Unknown today, his stature and success
entitle him to occupy at least an equal place with Mahan, his
most brilliant pupil, whose fame obscured the contribution of
his teacher. Unlike Mahan, Luce worked behind the scenes,
manipulating with dexterity the political forces that alone
might ensure the success of his mission. Although he left no
self-adulatory account of his work, his published articles, pri-
vate papers, and the papers of others clearly evidence the
towering influence, generous personality, and remarkable polit-
ical skill of this great naval officer. Luce did not seek to fur-
ther the cause of any particular party. He was as ready to
work with the Democrats as with the Republicans to bring
about the regeneration of the American Navy. Grover Cleve-
land's attitude to party politics was very different.
The influence of party politics on the course of American
•
foreign policy has been the subject of much comment. The
study of Cleveland's first Administration ( 1885-89) shows a
President utilizing diplomacy as a weapon of domestic politics.
The diplomatic maneuvers to which Cleveland was willing to
resort in order to assure his reelection, secure domestic reform,
and keep himself and his party in power are examined in the
[xiii]