ebook img

Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy. Studies in Foreign Policy 1873–1917 PDF

368 Pages·1966·15.925 MB·English
Save to my drive
Quick download
Download
Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.

Preview Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy. Studies in Foreign Policy 1873–1917

POLITICS, STRATEGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917 by John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young ,. NEW HAVEN AND LONDON, YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1966 Copyright© 1966 by Yale University. Designed by Wayne D. Peterson, set in Caledonia type, and printed in the United States of America by Colonial Press. Distributed in Canada by McGill University Press. All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form ( except by reviewers for the public press), tcithout written permission from the publishers. Library of Congress catalog card number: 66-12498 /,EP GiFT PUBUS;-ia FOR BETIY ANr."'E AND MARY Priface THESE STUDIES WERE WRITI'EN in the belief that a con tribution to the better understanding of the history of American diplomacy might be made by examining foreign policy in its political as well as strategic context·; Both authors were members of Samuel Flagg Bemis' postgraduate sem inar on American foreign policy held at Yale University. Al though two decades separated their respective attendance, they share a common approach to the subject. The collabora tion which led to this book was undertaken at the suggestion of Mr. Bemis, who has taken a lively interest in the progress of the work~:.We have benefited greatly from his deep under standing of the period and his instinctive grasp of the issues involved. Any merit this book may possess is but a small re turn for his interest and devotion. Of course the authors alone are responsible for the views expressed. It is pleasant to record our debt to the many friends who have helped us: to E. K. Wickman, Lansing V. Hammond, and Martha English of the Commonwealth Fund of New York, and to Yale University. Admiral E. M. Eller of the Division of Naval History, Department of the Navy, permitted the exam ination of the records in his care, and Dean Allard ensured that this research proved fruitful and pleasant. We are also grateful to George Cabot Lodge for permitting us to quote from the correspondence of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and to the Massachusetts Historical Society for their hospi tality. Walter M. Robinson of Nashville, Tennessee, allowed us to look at the papers of William L. Scruggs at considerable [vii] - · l; l Preface trouble to himself. James E. Hewes, of the division of Army Historical Research, discussed the whole subject with the au thors. His criticisms, especially of the last two chapters, have led to significant improvements. W. D. Mcintyre and H. C. Allen read parts of the manuscript and gave us the benent of their learning. Richard Webb, J.P., Reader in the Department of Law at the University of Nottingham, read the whole of the manuscript in its nrst draft and drew the attention of the authors to mistakes in fact and style with exemplary zeal and unfailing courtesy. In common with many authors we owe a tremendous debt to the staffs of the National Archives and the Library of Con gress who spent many hours on our behalf searching for the documents we required. The Yale University Press lavished valuable and specialized care on the manuscript, and we are particularly grateful to ' Marian Neal Ash and Jane lsay for ensuring that what had '' remained obscure in the manuscript would be clear in the book. To our friends and colleagues too numerous to mention who have aided us in many ways, we can only express the general hope that they will consider the results worthwhile. J. A. S. G. G. B. Y. Leeds, Yorkshire Chicago, Illinois October 1965 [viii] ;----::. ·my au ave Contents c. :of ent of vii PREFACE the .nd INTRODUCTION xi ONE ~bt The Admiral in Politics: Stephen B. Luce and the Foundation --.... m of the Modern American Navy 1 :he TWO Party Politics and Foreign Policy: Grover Cleveland's First ed Administration, 1885-1889 39 to ad TlffiEE The Challenge of Latin America: Harrison and Blaine, he 1889-1892 74 :m FOUR b.e An Administration in Search of a Policy: Hawaii and Latin le. America, 1893-1895 102 FIVE The Diplomat as Propagandist: William Lindsay Scruggs, Agent for Venezuela 125 SIX Grover Cleveland, Richard Olney, and the Venezuelan Crisis 158 SEVEN The Dangers of Cuban Independence: 1895-1897 179 EIGHT The Expansionists: The Education of Henry Cabot Lodge 201 [ixJ ,_ J -===~-----~u,.., Contents NINE The Breakdown of Neutrality: McKinley Goes to War with Spain 239 TEN The Influence of Strategy upon History: The Acquisition of the Philippines 261 ELEVEN The Quest for Security: Admiral Dewey and the General Board,l900-1917 297 337 MANUSCRIPT SOURCES INDEX 339 [x] I ) SF srs Introduction THE ERA BEGINNING AT the close of the Civil War and ending with American participation in World War I witnessed startling and revolutionary changes, among them the transformation of the United States from a predominantly rural society to an industrial one. During the early decades of this period, the problems of international relations troubled few Americans; absorption with domestic problems was almost complete. By 1917, America was drawn into the mainstream of world politics. The interrelated studies here presented are concerned with the men who perceived this change and in fluenced the American response to it. The structure of this book is biographical rather than purely narrative. Such a presentation imposes certain limitations, but at the same time it may serve as a useful reminder that the conduct of diplomacy is not determined in the abstract, but influenced by personal prejudices and idiosyncracies. Histori ans, in their endeavor to trace the principles and doctrines that govern diplomacy, are perhaps inclined to impose order on what is frequently an irrational pattern of events. Often the interplay of personal assessments and the resolution of rival pressures are determining factors. Politicians are not al ways conscious of the personal motivations for their conduct; they may even persuade themselves .t hat they are acting ac cording to some hallowed tradition. They certainly neglect few opportunities to invoke principle and tradition to lend dignity to the policies they decide on. For many years after the Civil War George Washington's advice to hold aloof from [xi] Introduction entangling alliances was cited more frequently than the Mon roe Doctrine. A reference to the Founding Fathers could serve as an excuse for inaction. On the other hand, the Monroe Doctrine imposed a responsibility for action whenever a Euro pean power endangered its principles. The purely diplomatic approach cannot offer a complete analysis of American foreign policy; on occasion, party politics played a predominant role in its formation, as did the con siderations of strategy. The influence of strategy on the course of American policy during the years under consideration can not be equated simply with the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Fortunately, the discovery of new archival sources and the rediscovery of old material now enable the historian to re veal aspects of American foreign policy too long neglected. The first chapter of this book is devoted to a naval officer who, with his supporters, challenged the traditional views of the majority in the 187os and 188os. These men recognized that the conditions of American safety that Jefferson had de scribed more than half a century earlier were passing away: 'We especially ought to pray that the powers of Europe may be so poised and counterpoised among themselves, that their own safety may require the presence of all their forces at home, leaving the other quarters of the globe in undisturbed tranquility." 1 But the European balance of power during the last quarter of the nineteenth century led to consequences Jefferson had not foreseen. Bismarck's masterful diplomacy in Europe had created a temporary stalemate. The great Euro pean powers fought out their rivalries in Africa and Asia. It seemed possible, even probable to some, that an attempt to partition parts of South and Central America would follow the partition of Africa. The United States herself might fall 1. Saul K. Padover, ed., Thomas Jefferson on Democracy (New York New American Library, 1946), p. 145. ' [xii] / Introduction prey to European aggression. The expansion of American commercial and strategic interests in the East were also en dangered by the growth of European power in Asia and the Pacific. These changing conditions led a small group of Amer icans to ignore the pressures of domestic politics and to re examine the traditional tenets of military and foreign policy. Among these farsighted men was Rear Admiral Stephen Bleecker Luce. Only a few years after the close of the Civil War, the United States Navy practically ceased to exist as a fighting ~, fleet. In these, the darkest years in the history of the Navy, """ the service produced an officer of rare talent, a leader of men, and a great reformer. Unknown today, his stature and success entitle him to occupy at least an equal place with Mahan, his most brilliant pupil, whose fame obscured the contribution of his teacher. Unlike Mahan, Luce worked behind the scenes, manipulating with dexterity the political forces that alone might ensure the success of his mission. Although he left no self-adulatory account of his work, his published articles, pri- vate papers, and the papers of others clearly evidence the towering influence, generous personality, and remarkable polit- ical skill of this great naval officer. Luce did not seek to fur- ther the cause of any particular party. He was as ready to work with the Democrats as with the Republicans to bring about the regeneration of the American Navy. Grover Cleve- land's attitude to party politics was very different. The influence of party politics on the course of American • foreign policy has been the subject of much comment. The study of Cleveland's first Administration ( 1885-89) shows a President utilizing diplomacy as a weapon of domestic politics. The diplomatic maneuvers to which Cleveland was willing to resort in order to assure his reelection, secure domestic reform, and keep himself and his party in power are examined in the [xiii]

See more

The list of books you might like

Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.