Political Stratification and Democracy

328 Pages·1972·31.45 MB·English

by  Ian Budge, J. A. Brand, Michael Margolis, A. L. M. Smith (auth.)

Political Stratification and Democracy
Political Stratification
and Democracy
IAN BUDGE, J. A. BRAND,
MICHAEL MARGOLIS and A. L. M. SMITH
Palgrave Macmillan
©Ian Budge,]. A. Brand, Michael Margolis and A. L. M. Smith 1972
So ftc over reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1972
All rights reserved. No part of this publication
may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form
or by any means, without permission.
First published 1972 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke
Associated companies in New York Toronto
Dublin Melbourne Johannesburg and Madras
SBN 333 12348 4
ISBN 978-1-349-01141-4 ISBN 978-1-349-01139-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-01139-1
Contents
Acknowledgements Vll
Introduction I
I A Predictive Model of Political Stratification m a Mass
l)emocracy 7
2 Support for Established Procedures 43
3 Representation So
4 Communication I24
5 l)ifferentiated Agreement I65
6 The Politicians: Autonomy and Competition 200
7 Conclusion 246
Appendix A- Study l)esign 272
Appendix B - l)etailed Statement of the Predictive Model
discussed in Chapter I 28I
Index 307
Acknowledgements
In the preparation of this book we have received essential help from
many people. For the essential computer programmes on which analysis
was based we owe a great debt to Eric Roughley, Brian O'Mahoney
and A. J. S. Skinner. Much data-processing was performed by M. J.
Fryatt and M. Marsh. M. J. Taylor suggested and largely performed the
analysis of integrative behaviour carried through in Chapter 6. We
received advice and criticism of the MS. itself from F. I. Greenstein,
Anthony King, Brian Barry and Jean Blonde!. The project was
initiated with the help of A. M. Potter and the University of Strath-
clyde: analysis was subsequently supported by the Universities of
Strathclyde, Essex and Pittsburgh.
The essential materials of the analysis were the responses of the Glas-
gow councillors, p:myworkers and electors reported below. To all
those who gave us time for interviews we extend our deepest appreci-
ation. We hope they will find some recompense in the resulting insight
obtained into the patterns of Glasgow politics.
Ofc ourse none of the individuals mentioned above has final responsi-
bility for the reports and interpretations appearing in the book: that
rests solely with us.
LB.
J.A.B.
M.M.
A.L.M.S.
Introduction
AIMS
Most of the immediately noticeable phenomena of democratic politics
can be explained in terms of the obvious divisions which exist between
different social classes, religious or ethnic groups, and political parties.
These pervasive divisions influence electoral strategies, voting choices,
issue-stands, governmental policies and pressure-group activities. Im-
portant though such decision-making processes are, it is apparent on
deeper consideration that they form only one aspect of democratic
politics. Of central relevance also are the toleration of one party for
another, the submission of the Government to periodic elections, the
existence of a broad cross-party consensus on some policies - phenom-
ena which all relate to the maintenance and stability of democratic
procedures. It is less easy to explain stability in terms of class or party
cleavage than competition, although one ingenious argument based
on the effects of cross-cutting cleavages emphasises the tendency to
conciliation and compromise set up in an individual who finds himself
grouped with different associates on one cleavage from those with
whom he is grouped on another. 1 But cross-cutting theories do not
explain why compromise rather than widespread withdrawal and
alienation should result from individual cross-pressures, nor why at
group level cross-cutting on cleavages of equal importance should not
result in absolute intransigence and total inability to act (immobilisme}.
The failure of cross-cutting theories to discriminate satisfactorily be-
tween stable and immobilistes polities has led to speculation about influ-
ences on democratic stability which are less obvious than the familiar
cleavages. One distinction common to these alternative speculations is
drawn between persons of higher and lower political activity. The
theory of differentiated consensus, for example, holds that democracies
can operate in the face of considerable popular opposition and
1 A useful summary of cross-cutting arguments is given in M. Taylor and
D. Rae, 'Analysing Crosscutting Between Cleavages', Comparative Politics,
Mar 1969.
2 POLITICAL STRATIFICATION AND DEMOCRACY
confusion, provided that the politically active elements support their
procedures.2 Other theories stress the political apathy of potentially
anti-democratic sections and the energy and effectiveness of the sup-
porters of democracy.3 Indeed it can be argued that cross-cutting cleav-
ages likely to affect the behaviour of activists will differ from those
which impinge on ordinary citizens,4 so that cross-cutting theories too
should take activity into account. It is precisely this differentiation of
the democratic population by their varying levels of activity and
involvement that we mean by political stratification.
Immediately political stratification is introduced as an explanation
for democratic stability, its ability to account for other features of
democratic politics becomes apparent. Some such features, such as the
distribution of political information, and associated patterns of political
communication, are linked very closely with the electoral and decision-
making processes mentioned in the first paragraph. New questions are
also raised. If persons at the same level of activity have many politically
relevant characteristics in common, how do these interact with the
party loyalties that otherwise divide them? And if communication
between strata presents difficulties, do representatives - who by defi-
nition must belong to the upper strata - get enough information even
to know what their constituents' views are?
The explanatory potential of political stratification in the areas of
stability, representation, communication and party competition has
never been systematically utilised.s The purpose of the present study is
to devise and test a comprehensive framework which draws to-
gether the results of previous findings and theory, within which the
effects of political stratification can be investigated. The remainder
of this introduction gives a general description of the way we pro-
pose to conduct our investigation and of the data upon which it is
based.
z R. A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, I963) pp. 311-25; V. 0. Key,
Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York, I963) pp. 536-43; Ian Budge,
Agreement and The Stability of Democracy (Chicago, I970) chaps I, 2, I2.
J Budge, ibid., chap. I; H. McClosky, 'Consensus and Ideology in American
Politics', APSR Lvm (I964) 36I-82.
4 R. A. Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, I966)
pp. 37o-I.
s In Chapter I we shall note the varied contexts within which the concept has
been employed, but usually as an ad hoc interpretative device rather than in a
systematic framework.
INTRODUCTION 3
DATA
The data which resources and opportunity enabled us to collect consist
of the responses of: 563 electors systematically selected from all persons
on the electoral registers of the city of Glasgow; 64 ward chairmen and
secretaries of the Glasgow City Labour Party; 52 of the most active
Glasgow Progressive Party workers; 82 Glasgow City councillors;
6 municipal correspondents of Glasgow newspapers. All were inter-
viewed between February and October 1966. The measure of political
stratification obviously inheres in the basic survey design. Measures of
the cleavages whose effects may cut across those of stratification were
provided by reports of occupation, education, feelings about class and
perceptions of the class structure, religious and party identifications.
Dependent phenomena which might be affected by these political
differences were ascertained through questions asked of all respondents
on issues and problems facing Glasgow, reading and listening habits,
ideas about councillors' tasks, and voting behaviour. Questions put only
to partyworkers and councillors included queries as to how they first
became politically involved. Questions put only to reporters included
queries about their criteria for selecting and presenting news.
Appendix A gives a full account of the sampling design, question-
naire construction, interviewing and coding procedures employed in
the survey, together with a comparison between various census statistics
and comparable statistics resulting from the analysis of replies. In
general we do not concern ourselves with developments in Glasgow
after the interviewing period: that is to say, after 15 October 1966.
ORIENTATIONS
Whatever we do with these survey responses in the way of exploring
the consequences of political stratification, they also have an inherent
interest in describing aspects of the local political situation in Glasgow
in 1966. This situation deserves investigation, for as a large and import-
ant city Glasgow has not only a unique political interest of its own but
experiences which bear upon urban problems in general. Feeling both a
deep fascination with Glasgow politics and a considerable interest in
general urban problems, we have used our data to investigate Glasgow
society and politics6 as well as political stratification. Apart from the
inherent interest of this other analysis it helps us in the present study to
6 Ian Budge, J. A. Brand, M. Margolis, A. L. M. Smith, Class, Religion,
Politics: Glasgow, forthcoming.
4 POLITICAL STRATIFICATION AND DEMOCRACY
distinguish general from Glasgow-specific phenomena, and to inter-
pret some of the effects of parties in light of their historical develop-
ment in Glasgow. At some points in the discussion we shall introduce
fmdings from this other research and assess their bearings on general
phenomena of cleavage and stratification.
One problem immediately posed by the concern of the present dis-
cussion with more abstract and general phenomena is the extent to
which we can extrapolate to other political systems from data collected
in Glasgow in 1966- from one particular place at one particular time
to democracies in general.
It is of course obvious that our data are severely bounded by time and
place in a way in which experimental data of the physical sciences are
not. Political events cannot be re-run in the laboratory with the same
ease that physical scientists can re-run most experiments. We have
recognised this limitation to a particular time and place in speaking of
the opportunity it gives to illuminate unique features of Glasgow
politics- an opportunity which we welcome. But this does not prevent
the Glasgow data from offering one check on a general explanation:
especially when we face it with the intention of abstracting common
features from analogous events, wherever and whenever they occur.
In actual fact our analogies need not be forced, for it is easy to discern
important resemblances, not only between Glasgow and other large
Western cities, but between its political system and that of any modern
democracy. In common they have a party system, elections with virtu-
ally universal adult suffrage, representatives responsible to those who
elected them, citizens of varying degrees of political interest and activity,
mass media which devote a portion of their time and space to relaying
information about politics.
Unlike some democracies, which constitute independent nation-
states or autonomous provinces, the corporation elected locally in
Glasgow is formally subordinate to the central Parliament. However,
nation-states and provinces are not so autonomous as their formal
sovereignty would indicate, nor is the corporation of Glasgow strictly
confined to its legal powers. Many far-reaching decisions are debated
and made locally, and the central authorities are only the most import-
ant of the numerous bodies whose compliance the corporation has to
get on other matters. Nation-state, province and city are thus not
entities which are non-comparable because they are different in kind:
simply political bodies which lie at different points on a continuum
between complete autonomy and complete subordination in decision