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Political Equality: An Essay In Democratic Theory PDF

136 Pages·1989·9.035 MB·English
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R. CHARLES BEITZ Political Equality An Essay in Dernocratic Theory PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS Pt:l.INCETON NEW JERSEY 1 L . . Copyright© 1989 by Prineeton University Press FOR Published by Princeton University Prcss, 41 William Strcct, Jean H. Beitz Princeton Ne\.,r Jersey 08540 1 ln the United Kingdom: Prineeton University Press, Oxford AND IN MEMORY OF Richard C. Beitz All Rights Rcscrvcd tibrary of Congress Cataloging·in-Publieation Data Beitz, Charles R Poltieal cquality: an essay in democratic thcory /Charles R Bcitz p cm Bibliography: p Includes index ISBN 0-691 ·0779 l ·6 lalk papcr) ISBN 0-691-02271-2, papcrback l Equality 2 Democracy I Title JC575 B45 1989 321 8-dcl9 88·29276 First Princeton Papcrback printing, 1989 This book has been composcd in Linotron Trump Clothbound editions of Princeton Univcrsity Prcss books are printed on aeid-free paper, and binding materiais are chosen for strength and durability. Paperbaeks, although satisfactory for personal eollections, are not usually suitable for library rebinding Printcd in the United Statcs of Ameriea by Prinecton University Prcss, Prineeton, Ne\v Jersey Dcsigned by Laury A Egan L Contents Preface ix Acknow ledgments xvii Introduction ONE The Subject of Political Equality 3 Part One: Theory TWO Rcsults 31 THREE Prefercnccs 49 FOUR Procedures 75 FIVE A Theory of Political Fairness 97 Part Two: Applications SIX Proportional Representation 123 SEVEN Fair Representation and Lcgislative Districting 141 EIGHT The Formation of the Political Agenda 164 NINE Political Financc 192 Conclusion TEN Substancc and Mcthod 217 Works Cited 231 ln d ex 245 Preface Political theories can be "democratic" in two different, although related, senses. Democratic theories in the narrower land more tra ditionalj sense speak to the question, what is the best form of gov ernment1 Those in the broader sense ask, instead, what is the best society? ln recent years, philosophcrs and political theorists have concen trated their attention on democratic theory in the broader sense, with particular emphasis on the sub1ect of social 1ustice This de parture from tradition has been enormously fruitful: philosophical thought about the basis and character of a democratic society has attained a richness and texture it has not known for decades. So it is not a criticism of recent writing in democratic theory to observe that, with a few significant exceptions, it has given more narrowly political and institutional problems less than their due Nevertheless, these problems need attention. Without a clear grasp of the foundations of democracy as a political form, we have no ba sis in political morality for resolving important issues concerning the structure and processes of the institutions of self-government. Moreover, there is a risk that the public character of democratic po litical life will be misunderstood. For the subject of political equality, the need for closer theoretical attention is especially acutc. ln the last twenty-five years, a set of ostensibly egalitarian institutional reforms has taken place in the United States whose historie dimensions have pcrhaps not yet been fully appreciated 1 Thc reform era dates from the Supreme Court's early reapportionment decisions,2 but subsequent efforts have gone lar beyond implementation of "one person, one vote." They also in· cluded reapportionment of the lowcr house of the Congress and of 1 For a discussíon that placcs thc rccent reforms in historical perspective, scc J R Polc, The Pursuit of Equality in American History (Berkeley: Univcrsity of Califor· nía Prcss, 1978) 2 Particularly the landn1ark "one person, one vote" decisions of Wesberry v San ders, 376 U S l (1964), and Reynolds v. S1ms, 377 U S 533 (1964) X l'HEFACE PREFACE xi state and local legislatures to eliminate or restrict partisan and ra is part of the definition of democracy, any philosophical theory of cial gerrymandering; legislation requiring affirmative action in the democracy that failed to take up the grounds and content of politi reapportionment process to correct racial and othcr forms of "vote cal equality would be seriously deficient. To be sure, no account of dilution'';' revision of the processes oi candidate selection within political equality, no matter how comprehensive, can hope to en the major political parties to provi de for greater participation by the compass ali of the reasons why democratic institutions might be rank and file; alleviation of long-standing hmitations on the access valued or ali of the desiderata that their procedures should satisfy. of indepcndent and minor-party candidates to the general election But no theory of democracy that failed to give the egalitarian idea a ballot; and enactment of a system of pubhc subsidies for presiden central place could possibly yield a faithful representation of the tial election campaigns and of restrictions on private financial con extraordinary grip of democracy on the modem political imagina tributions and expenditures in campaigns for ali federal offices:' tion. Ali of these reforms were defended by their proponents as require Contemporary controversy about how political equality bears on ments of political equality. Yet, as continuing controversy in the institutional reform points toward a second and more practical aim. courts, the legislatures, and the political parties attests, there is no Justas an adequate democratic theory should give a central place to consensus about the meaning of this principie Even the most ar the ideal of equality, so too it should be framed in a way that illu dent supporter of the reforms is bound to be troubled by this ques minates matters about which people actually argue, revealing the tioning: while we feel confident that political equality means some extent to which disagreement turns on philosophical dispute about thing, it is surprisingly difficult to give it a clear explanation and first principies and that to which it involves conílict about histori defense. The legislators and judges who designed and carried out thc cal or casuistical questions instead Although it would be naive to reforms are not much help, since they themselves were seldom ar expect a philosophical theory, by i tself, to resolve controverted ticulate about their principies Nor can much guidance be found in questions of institutional design, an adequate theory should at least the recent work of political theorists Owing to the concentration identify the central values at issue and provide a structure that in on issues of democratic theory in its larger sense, there is little in forms their application. Accordingly, I shall try to show how dis the way of coherent political doctrine to fali back on when, as now, pute about the meaning and grounds of poli ti cal equality is reflected procedural reforms come under political challenge; we are forced to in contemporary disagreement about how the institutions of dem rely on unexamined inttutions anda crude balancing of interests in ocratic politics should be arranged and to illustrate how the theory assessing the merits of contending positions of political equality that 1 shall set forth would influence our judg· This book is a contribution to democratic theory in the narrower ments about these questions. sense It has two main aims. The first and more philosophical is to arrive at a systematic theory of political equality that will clarify the meaning of the egalitarian ideal in light of the reasons we have SYNOPSIS for accepting it. This would be an important task for democratic theorists even if the subject were not the focus of political contro Political equality refers to a set of requirements that apply to the versy. For although nothing is to be gained by claiming that equality institutions that enable citizens to participate in political decision making in a constitutional democracy. The basic idea of this book •1 Most importantly, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 \Vith subsequcnt an1cndmcnts; is that these requirements are best understood in the perspective of 42 U.S Code, secs 1971-1973cc a substantive ideal of democratic citizenship that explains how we 4 Thc main lcgislation is the Federal Elcction Campaign Act ( 197 l) as amcndcd in should construe them and why they should matter to us 1974; 2 U S Code, sccs, 431-55; 26 U.S Code, sccs 9001-42 Severa! in1portant ele· ments of the 1974 amendn1ents wcre held to be unconstitutional in Buc/dey v Va. The presentation is divided into two parts, the first concerned pri leo, 424 U S 1119761 marily with theoretical considerations and the second with their L xii PREfACE PRErACE xiii application to institutions. 1 begin in chapter 1 with the question of briefly, the foundations of majority rule, mainly to argue that this the subject of political equality, or what a theory of political equal principie is wrongly conceived as expressing a foundational require ity can be about. According to what 1 shall cal! "the simple view," ment of political equality. lts significance is far more rnodest. the main problem is merely to say in what respects the terms of ln chapter 4, 1 examine simple versions of proceduralism that participation in democratic institutions should apply equally to all conceive of fairness as an intrinsic property of political proeedures. citizens-that is, how equality of political right should be con These views are unexpeetedly problematic. For one thing, it is sur ceived. ln contrast, 1 shall argue that considerations of equality op prisingly difficult to give an account of procedural fairness that erate at a greater remove from institutional 1udgments, which are avoids the twin dangers of misrepresenting its requirements as the more accurately seen as 1udgments about fair participation than outcomes of self-interested strategic bargaining or of collapsing it about equal participation. Fair institutions should treat people as into a result-oriented conception in which the characteristics of equals, but whether this implies that any particular political rights procedures have instrumental rather than intrinsic significance. should be distributed equally to all citizens is part of the problema Moreover, the comrnon forms of proceduralisrn lack sufficient the theory should resolve rather than a premise to be taken for granted. oretical richness to illuminate problems of institutional structure Once the sub1ect oi political equality is understood in this way, that are not best understood as involving the distribution of abstract it is possible to identify severa! prominent theories. The leading al procedural opportunities to influence outcomes ternatives 1 shall consider are best result, popular will, and proce These criticisms of received views prepare the way for the alter dural theories The examination of these alternatives in chapters 2- native conception of political fairness presented in chapter 5 It is 4 is not comprehensive; in each case 1 concentrate on instances of based on the idea of a social contract: fair terms of participation are the view in qucstion that seem particularly interesting or problem those that no citizen has a sufficient reason to refuse to accept, atic and simply speculate about the extent to which my criticisms given that everyonc shares a desire to come to agreement on sorne can be generalized For example, thc discussion of best result theo niechanism for participation. The main difficulty in working out ries, in chapter 2, takes up what is perhaps the most striking cx this idea is to explain what should count as a sufficient reason for ample of inegalitarianism in modem democratic theory-the de refusal To answer this question, 1 provide an account of certain fense of plural voting set forth by John Stuart Mil!. 1 try to show higher-order political interests (the regulative interests of citizen that an accurate understanding of Mill's errar casts doubt as well on ship) that we may presume to be among the ehief normative con any theory of political equality that holds that the conditions of fair cerns of dernocratic citizens. These inelude interests in publie ac participation derive from a conception of the overall results that the knowledgment of one's status as an equal rnember of the polity political system should promotc lrecognition), protection against political outcomes that would The discussion of popular will theorics, in chapter 3, is devoted plaee one's prospects in serious 1eopardy (equitable treatment), and to certain aspects of the theory of social choice, where scholarly conditions of public deliberation conducive to responsible 1udgment thought about political equality has found its most technically so about public affairs (deliberative responsibility) phisticated analytical expression. 1 believe that technical sophisti 1 call this theory complex proceduralism The term is awkward cation has exacted too high a price: modem popular will theories but, 1 think, aecurate: the view is a hybrid form of proceduralism, bring a spurious unity to the sub1ect of political equality by adopt its complexity deriving from the irreducible plurality of substantive ing an artificially narrow conception oi the democratic process and interests associated with the idea of political fairness. The two parts by attributing a primacy to the popular will that cannot be sus of the view-the contractualist framework and the account of the tained Once this is recognized, thc most important result of social regulative interests-are an attempt to represent a familiar ideal of choice theory-the impossibility theorem due to Arrow-comes to democratic citizenship in a theoretically fruitful way. Although 1 seem much less troubling. ln this connection 1 consider, if only shall not provide a systematic defense of the theory, 1 shall make L1 xiv PREFACE PREFACE XV three kinds of claims on its behalf: the ideal it articulates is an at tance that 1 must leave for another occasion. First, there is no sys tractive one that is presem in the modem democratic tradition and tcmatic discussion of some basic questions in the theory of value. implicit in many of our intuitive judgments about the faimess of For example, foundational issucs regarding the structure and plau democratic institutions, it is philosophically preferable to various sibility of rival moral conccptions are left aside, as, for the most more conventional altematives, and it illuminates and helps re part, are disputes about the standards of value that such concep solve severa! practical problems of contemporary dispute tions should employ. These questions are obviously importam, but ln part 2 we examine how complex proceduralism applies to some 1 can do no more than acknowledge the need for more systematic of these problems, including proportional representation, the repre analysis elsewhere and rely in what follows on less systematic, in sentation of groups in systems employing territorial constituencies, tuitive judgments. thc structuring of the political agenda lprimarily through mies gov Second, the consideration of institutional issues is highly selec erning acccss to the ballot and the candidate selection procedurcs tive. For example, 1 discuss only in passing what many will regard of political partiesj, and regulation of the system of political fi as the central institutional question of political equality-the issue nance. I shall not try to summarize the substantive conclusions of voting weights, ar the foundations of "one person, one vote." reached about these issues, which seem straightforward enough. This is not an unimportant matter, but it is hard to discern much The main reasons to examine them herc are to shed light on the contemporary disagreement about it Another institutional issue theory and to illustrate how considerations of principie and of his left aside involves the choice of voting systems, a problem that has torical and political experience should be brought together in re engaged theoretical attention at least since the pioneering efforts of solving practical dispute. 1 believe that theorists have tended to un Borda and Condorcet.5 Although some of my remarks bear on this derestimate the importance of historical considerations and to subject, 1 cannot pretend to have given it the attention it would re misunderstand their place in practical reasoning about political fair quire in a more comprehensive study. I have tried to confine the ness. Although a doctrine of political equality imposcs constraints discussion to issues that have arisen in the wake of recent reform on the design of democratic institutions, one must take care not to efforts in the United States and that have gained attention beyond conceive these theoretical constraints too concretely or to assume the fairly narrow confines of specialized circles of scholarly interest. that they operate in a similar fashion insocial contexts with vary IThe discussion of proportional representation may seem to be an ing historical and social characteristics exception; but, as I hope will be clear, a grasp of the theoretical Both the content of the theory and the claims 1 shall advance on problems associated with it is required to frame the examination of its behalf will raise methodological questions in the minds of many issues considered !ater J readers. I have resisted the temptation to pursue these matters in Finally, 1 do not take up what might be called the structural pre the central parts of the book, where they would distract attention requisites of fair political choice. By this I mean how institutions from more pressing normative concems. However, some of these should regulate the distribution of wealth and the bases of social questions cannot be ignorcd altogether, and 1 consider them very status that influence both thc salience of the formal democratic pro briefly in the Conclusion cess within the overall system of social decision making and the relative capacities of different persons and groups to advancc their PATHs Nor TAKEN .~ The seminal discussíon ís due to Ouncan Black, The Theory o/ Co1nn1ittees and Electíons {Cambridge: Can1bridge University Prcss, 1958); there is a convenient his· torical survey in chap 18, pp 156-84 Recently there has been rene\ved ínterest in This is a large agenda for a book of this length, but cvcn so it these matters; see, for example, Steven J Brams and Peter C. Fishburn Approval hardly exhausts the range of problems that arise under the heading 1 Voting (Boston: Birkhauser, 1983), and Michael Dummett, Voting Procedures (Ox· of political equality. 1 note here three topics of particular impor- ford: Clarcndon Press, 1984) j L xvi PR E FACE interests within the formal process. Some rclated conccrns are taken up in connection with ballot access (in chapter 8) and politi· Acknowledgments cal finance (in chapter 9), but it is unrcalistic to maintain that pro· cedural arrangements in these areas, by themselves, can effectively regulate the political influence of background inequalities. l stop short of the larger subject mainly because broader issues involving distributive justice are more familiar in reccnt political theory than This book has becn a long time in the making and would have the more narrowly procedural issues discussed hcrc; therc is less bcen evcn longer wcrc it not for thc gcnerous advice and encourage need to address them and probably less to say about them that has ment of many friends and colleagues. Thomas Scanlon stimulated not already been said.6 ln addition, thcrc is the tcmptation, once the my interest in thc subject of political fairness in a series of conver· larger subject has been broached, to believe that no more nceds to sations beginning severa! years ago; the influence of his idcas, par· be said about narrower issues of procedural design This would be a ticularly in the first part, has becn fundamental Amy Gutmann, mistake: not only because these issues are pressing today, but also William Nelson, and Dennis Thompson rcad carlier versions of the because they (ar close analogs) would be likely to arise evcn in a entire manuscript and supplied criticisms and suggestions that af· society in which thc background distribution was fully just fected virtually every part of it. Brian Barry, Douglas Bcnnett, Owen Beyond this, we must keep in mind that historically a main goal Fiss, Charles Gilbert, Russell Hardin, David Hoekema, thc late of democratic movcments has been to seek redress in the political Richard Krousc, Diana Meyers, J. Roland Pennock, Nancy Rosen· sphcre for the effects of incqualitics in the economy and socicty bium, lan Shapiro, Kenncth Sharpc, Judith Shklar, Henry Shue, and Political equality, in particular, has more oftcn functioned as a Huntington Terrell contributed valuable comments at various "protest ideal" than as a constructivc one: it does not describc a stages Sanford Thatchcr went well beyond the call of duty in help· goal to bc realized so much as it expresses grounds for criticism of ing me to distinguish the forest Iram thc trees the status quo 7 It is natural to cxpect to find some reflection of this I am grateful for the financial support of the American Council of faet in a philosophical thcory of political equality. For this to be so, Learned Societies and of Swarthmore Collcge's unusually generous thc possibility of these background inequalities must bc taken for program of faculty research assistancc Final revisions were com· granted. Moreover, we must resist as lar as possible philosophical pleted during thc tenure of a MacArthur Foundation Fellowship pressure toward idealization that would obscure issues that distinc· when I was associated with the Center for Science and lnternational tively arise in the prcsence of background injustice ln setting aside Affairs of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 1 must larger issues involving thc justice of the social and economic struc thank both the MacArthur Foundation and the Center for allowing ture, thercfore, l do not suggest that they are unimportant. My aim, me to take time away from other pursuits so that 1 could finish the instead, is to set forth the outline of a normativc theory of political work on this book equality that will shed light on the main issues of practical contro Passages from articles that appeared elsewhere are included here versy that confront us today by arrangement with the original publishers: New York University 6 Among recent \Vorks that explore thc influcnce of thc social and ccononlic back· Press, for "Procedural Equality in Democratic Theory: A Prelimi· ground on thc functioning of democratic political dcviccs, sce particularly Charles nary Examination," Iram Nomos XXV: Liberal Democracy, ed ). E Lindblorn, Politics and Marl<ets (Ne\V York: Basic Books, 1977); and Joshua Cohen Roland Pennock and John W Chapman (1983); the University of and Joel Rogcrs, On Democracy (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Pcnguin Books, 1983) 7 Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracv Revisited (Chatham, N J: Chatharn Chicago Press, for "Political Finance in the United States: A Survey Housc, 1987), vol 2; pp. 337-38 of Research," from Ethics 95 (1984); and Westview Press, for "Equal xviii ACKNO\Vl E DG M ENTS Opportunity in Political Representation," from Equal Opporttmit)', ed. Norman Bowie (1988). Introduction 1 owe a different order of thanks to Ann and Caroline Cyl kowski-to Ann, for encouraging my work even when it dragged on considerably longer than either of us expected; and to Caroline, for reminding me with such wonderful exuberance that there are more important things than writing books CHAPTER ONE The Subject of Political Equality "IRJeally I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live as the greatest he." Thomas Rainsborough, member of Par liament and eolonel in Cromwell's New Model Army, spoke these words in the course of arguing that parliamentary constitueneies "ought to be more indifferently proportioned "1 But they also ex press-most famously, perhaps, if not for the first time2-an endur ing and powerful ideal. We eall it politieal equality, and, like Rains borough, we appeal to it in defense of proposals for political reform. Yet, though we are sure the ideal means something, it is difficult to say what; and though we are sure we accept it, it is difficult to say why These abstract diffieulties have practical consequences. Being uncertain what politieal equality means, we are unable to explain 1 Thc Rainsborough passagc is from thc Putncy debates of thc General Council of thc Army, thc session of 29 Octobcr 1647. The subjcct of debate \Vasa radical pro· posal for política! rcform-thc first "Agrccmcnt of thc Pcoplc," advanccd by a dissi· dcnt movcmcnt of officcrs but probably draftcd by civilian Lcvcllcr lcadcrs-that íncluded thc provision for reapportionmcnt of parliamcntary constituencics in its first clausc G E Aylmcr, cd, Tbe L.evellers in the English Revolution (Ithaca: Cor nell Univcrsity Prcss, 1975), pp 90 !clausc l of thc "Agrcemcnt"J, 100 (Rainsbor ough) The best account of the debates is Austín Woolryeh, Soldiers and Statesmen: The General Council of the Army and Its Debates, 1647-1648 !Oxford: Clarendon Prcss, 1987), chap 9 2 When was the first time? lt is impossible to say but surcly it \Vas at Jeast as early 1 as the speech of Otanes, rcported in Herodotus's account of the Persían díalog ("thc rulc of the many has the faircst of namcs, to wit, cquality"). The ffistory of f/erodotus, trans George Rawlinson (New York: Tudor Publishing, 1928), bk 3, p 177. Sec Gregory Vlastos, "Isonomia," American fournal of Philology 74 (1953), pp 337-66; and Martin Ostwald, Non1os and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democ· racy !Oxford: Clarcndon Press, 1969), pp 111-13

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