i Political Economy and Policy Analysis Mostofeconomicstakespoliticsforgranted.Throughsome(oftenimplausible) assumptions,itseekstoexplainawaypoliticalstructuresbycharacterizingthem asstableandpredictableorasinconsequentialinunderstandingwhatgoesonin an economy. Such attempts are misguided, and this book shows how governments and political institutions are composed of people who respond to incentives and whose behavior and choices can be studied through the lens of economics. This book aims to bridge the gap between economics and politics, and in doing so hopes to instill in the reader a deeper appreciation for social scientific thinking. Opening with a refresher on microeconomics and an introduction to the toolkit of political economy, it ensures that the necessary building blocks are in place before building up from the level of the individual and the firm to show how a political–economic equilibrium can be achieved. The text explores how to separate primitives—the external parts of a model that we cannot affect—from outcomes—the internal parts of a model that we can. Moreover, it demonstrates that economic and political issues alike can be studied within the same general framework of analysis. Political Economy and Policy Analysis offers readers the chance to gain a more sophisticated understanding of political processes, economic processes, and the interplay among them. Adopting an applied microeconomics approach, it will be ideal for upper-level undergraduate or postgraduate courses on political economy, public choice, or policy analysis. AntonioMerlo istheDeanoftheSchoolofSocialSciencesandtheGeorgeA. Peterkin Professor of Economics at Rice University, USA. He is also the founding and current director of the Rice Initiative for the Study of Economics (RISE). In 2012, he was elected a Fellow of the Econometric Society. His areas of expertise are political economy, policy analysis, public economics, bargaining theory and applications, and empirical microeconomics. iii Political Economy and Policy Analysis ANTONIO MERLO Firstpublished2019 byRoutledge 2ParkSquare,MiltonPark,Abingdon,OxonOX144RN andbyRoutledge 52VanderbiltAvenue,NewYork,NY10017 RoutledgeisanimprintoftheTaylor&FrancisGroup,aninformabusiness ©2019AntonioMerlo TherightofAntonioMerlotobeidentifiedasauthorofthisworkhasbeen assertedbyhiminaccordancewithsections77and78oftheCopyright, DesignsandPatentsAct1988. Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereprintedorreproducedor utilisedinanyformorbyanyelectronic,mechanical,orothermeans,now knownorhereafterinvented,includingphotocopyingandrecording,orin anyinformationstorageorretrievalsystem,withoutpermissioninwriting fromthepublishers. Trademarknotice:Productorcorporatenamesmaybetrademarksor registeredtrademarks,andareusedonlyforidentificationandexplanation withoutintenttoinfringe. BritishLibraryCataloguing-in-PublicationData AcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Names:Merlo,Antonio(Economist),author. Title:Politicaleconomyandpolicyanalysis/AntonioMerlo. Description:Abingdon,Oxon;NewYork,NY:Routledge,2019.|Includes bibliographicalreferencesandindex. Identifiers:LCCN2018037493(print)|LCCN2018039635(ebook)| ISBN9780429490309(Ebook)|ISBN9781138591776(hardback:alk.paper)| ISBN9781138591783(pbk.:alk.paper) Subjects:LCSH:Economics—Politicalaspects.|Economicpolicy.| Policysciences. Classification:LCCHB74.P65(ebook)|LCCHB74.P65M472019(print)| DDC330—dc23 LCrecordavailableathttps://lccn.loc.gov/2018037493 ISBN:978-1-138-59177-6(hbk) ISBN:978-1-138-59178-3(pbk) ISBN:978-0-429-49030-9(ebk) TypesetinDanteandAvenir byApexCoVantage,LLC v To my father, who taught me by example the meaning of work ethic. To the memory of my mother, who taught me by example the meaning of resilience and perseverance. To my wife, who teaches me every day by example the meaning of empathy and unconditional love. Contents Preface ix Acknowledgments xi 1 Overview and introduction 1 2 Basic tools of microeconomics 5 2.1 A simple economy 7 2.2 Efficiency 8 2.3 Competitive equilibrium 10 2.4 Equity 13 2.5 The Social Planner Problem 17 2.6 Game theory 20 2.6.1 A simple game 20 2.6.2 Games with more than two actions 24 2.6.3 Games with a continuum of actions 27 2.7 Discussion 30 3 Basic tools of political economics 32 3.1 The Voting Problem 33 3.2 Median voter theorems 43 3.3 Discussion 50 4 Voters 52 4.1 Voter turnout 52 4.1.1 The calculus of voting 53 4.2 Sincere voting and strategic voting 62 4.2.1 Split-ticket voting 65 4.3 Discussion 68 vii Contents vii 5 Electoral competition 71 5.1 The Downsian model 71 5.2 The citizen-candidate model 76 5.2.1 A simple model with three types of voters 77 5.2.2 A general model with a continuum of voter types 80 5.3 Discussion 87 6 Parties 88 6.1 Voter mobilization 88 6.2 Policy platforms 91 6.3 Candidate recruitment 96 6.4 Discussion 100 7 Lobbies 102 7.1 Exogenous lobbies 103 7.1.1 Ex ante lobbying 104 7.1.2 Ex post lobbying 108 7.2 Endogenous lobbies 111 7.3 Discussion 113 8 Political careers 117 8.1 The political labor market 117 8.2 A model of politicians’ careers 118 8.3 Discussion 124 9 Public goods 125 9.1 A simple economy with public goods 127 9.2 Private provision 129 9.2.1 Competitive markets 129 9.2.2 Voluntary contribution games 131 9.3 Political provision 135 9.3.1 Heterogeneous preferences and homogeneous income 136 9.3.2 Heterogeneous income and homogeneous preferences 140 9.3.3 Heterogeneous preferences and heterogeneous income 142 9.4 Discussion 143 10 Public schools 145 10.1 Political provision of primary education 145 10.1.1 Elected superintendent 148 10.1.2 Appointed superintendent 148 10.1.3 Elected politicians or appointed bureaucrats? 151 viii Contents viii 10.2 Taking the model to data 152 10.3 Discussion 154 11 Higher education 157 11.1 Pure private system 158 11.2 Pure public system 160 11.3 Mixed system 164 11.4 Discussion 167 12 Redistribution 169 12.1 Efficiency and redistribution 170 12.2 Political economy of redistribution 171 12.2.1 A different type of heterogeneity 181 12.3 Discussion 184 13 Health care 187 13.1 Health insurance 187 13.1.1 Private health insurance 188 13.1.2 Publicly provided health care 192 13.2 Electoral competition and health care 195 13.3 Discussion 198 14 Mobility 199 14.1 Local public goods 200 14.2 Local redistribution 203 14.3 Federalism 208 14.4 Discussion 212 Bibliography 214 Index 218 ix Preface I have written this book to bridge the gap between economics and politics, which has become an unfortunate norm across much of the social sciences. In so doing, I also hope to instill in the reader a deeper appreciation for social scientific thinking. To understand what we are talking about you will need to be able to think critically and abstractly, taking out bits and pieces of information from a larger picture and using them to build up to a political– economic equilibrium. You will need to separate primitives—the exogenous parts of a model that we cannot affect—from outcomes—the endogenous parts of a model that we can. You will also need to understand that economic and political issues alike can be studied within the same general framework of analysis, where a theory is a combination of models and equilibrium concepts that starts from primitives to ultimately explain outcomes. And of course, you will gain a more sophisticated understanding of political processes, economic processes, and the interplay among them. Thisbookisideallysuitedtoserveasatextbookforasemester-longcourse, though it could be easily used in combination with other texts to cover any portion of a course devoted to topics in political economy and/or policy anal- ysis. The book is aimed at students with an understanding of basic economic principles and a working knowledge of calculus. If you have taken a calculus- based microeconomics foundations course you will be able to hit the ground running. As you go through the various chapters, you will encounter some formal mathematics, which can often seem intimidating to some people. In fact, some would even go as far as claiming that economics really is just a bunch of esoteric formulas scribbled on a board. Well, this is not true. It turns out