POLITICAL BARGAINING AND THE PUNJAB THE PUNJAB ACCORD OF 1985 CRISIS: By

101 Pages·2010·4.56 MB·English

POLITICAL BARGAINING AND THE PUNJAB CRISIS:
THE PUNJAB ACCORD OF 1985
By
ALVARO JOSEPH RODRIGUEZ
B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1987
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of P o l i t i c al Science)
We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
September 1988
® Alvaro Joseph Rodriguez 1988
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced
degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it
freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive
copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my
department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or
publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written
permission.
Department
The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada
DE-6 (2/88)
those who dared
ABSTRACT
Since the early 1980's, the Punjab state of India has been in
turmoil as a result of a separatist movement that developed among
elements of the Sikh community. P o l i t i c al tensions not only
characterized the relationship between the Punjab and New Delhi/
but also between Sikhs and Hindus and among different segments
within the Sikh community itself. The most important attempt to
end the conflict in the state has been the Rajiv Gandhi-Sant
Longowal Accord signed on July 24, 1985. However, the Accord
failed and by mid-1987 the Punjab was once again racked by
p o l i t i c al violence. This thesis focuses on the events that led
to the signing of the Accord and the forces that caused i ts
demise. Bargaining theory provides the general theoretical
framework against which the data are analyzed.
This thesis highlights the fact that political bargains in
Third World weakly-institutionalized states are often the result
of particular configurations of political power which are short
lived. The corollary of this is that once the configuration of
p o l i t i c al forces changes, the chances of success for the
previously reached p o l i t i c al bargain are weakened. In the
particular case of the Punjab Accord, there was a change,
beginning in late 1985, in the relative political power of the
participants in. the bargain. Also, the terms of the bargained
Accord unleashed forces on both sides which undermined i ts
implementation. Third World leaders should draw two major
lessons from this. First, they should be careful not to have
exaggerated perceptions of their power since this may be
counterproductive in the future if they cannot deliver what they
have promised. Second, these leaders should attempt to consult
all interests with a stake in the bargained settlement as a way
to prevent opposition to i t.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract ii
Table of Contents • iv
List of Maps v
Acknowledgements vi
Chapter I: Anatomy of an Accord 1
The Accord 2
The Sikhs 6
Genesis of Sikh Separatism 11
Bargaining Theory 15
Information Interpretation 20
Decision-Making 22
Strategy Search 26
Chapter I Notes 31
Chapter I I: The Accord to End Discord 33
Separatism and Communal Violence in Punjab 33
An Accord at Last 37
Final Remarks 55
Chapter II Notes ... 57
Chapter I I I: The Resurgence of Discord 58
From Accord to Discord 59
Final Remarks 78
Chapter I II Notes 81
Chapter IV: Conclusion 82
Bibliography 89
iv
LIST OP MAPS
Page
Map 1 India. P o l i t i c al Divisions 8
Map 2 Linguistic Divisions of Punjab in 1966 9
Map 3 Punjab and Haryana Today 10
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This thesis is the culmination of five years of study at the
University of British Columbia that would not have been possible
without the help of numerous individuals. I am grateful to my
parents who supported me in my decision to leave Chile close to
six years ago, knowing that I would, or could, never go back. In
addition, I owe many thanks to a ll my friends. My achievements
owe much to their acceptance and tolerance.
My gratitude also goes to Professor John R. Wood for his
encouragement in the last few years. For his patience and
dedication I am much indebted. As well, I would like to thank
Professor Diane K. Mauzy for her help and support when I seemed
to lack direction. To Professor Harjot S. Oberoi I am grateful
for an uncanny ability to open new fields of interest for me in
the realm of Sikhism. A ll three I must also thank for their help
in the quick completion of this thesis.
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CHAPTER I: ANATOMY OP AN ACCORD
August and September 1985. Punjab, India. The a ir is f u ll
of hope; the cities peaceful; the fields coloured by different
crops symbolizing a new beginning. It was in this optimistic
setting that a Memorandum of Settlement was signed by Harchand S.
Longowal, leader of the Akali Dal party, and Rajiv Gandhi, prime
minister of India, on July 24, 1985. Their Accord was an attempt
to end the terrorism and political conflict which had beset the
Punjab for several years.
The Punjab had been in turmoil as a result of a separatist
movement that had developed in the early 1980*s among elements of
the Sikh community, the biggest ethnic group of the state. Their
desire for separatism was strengthened as a result of New Delhi's
apparent intransigence regarding a number of p o l i t i c a l, economic,
and religious grievances of the Sikhs. The movement had also
been made increasingly violent as a result of the preachings of
Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a Sikh religious leader who
imbued the movement with fundamentalist overtones. Moreover, it
was exacerbated by the factional disputes and electoral
machinations of Punjab's major p o l i t i c al parties. However,
during August and September, a ll this seemed forgotten and the
two major ethnic groups of the state, the Hindus and the Sikhs,
appeared to be developing a common Punjabi outlook. The feeling
of harmony was reflected in the electioneering f or the State
Assembly and national Parliament. The restoration of the
democratic process was significant as Punjab had been under New
Delhi's administration since late 1983.
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April and May 1987. The hope is gone, the cities are havens
for terrorism, and the parched soil due to the failure of the
monsoon symbolizes the s t e r i l i ty of the recent political
initiatives. The Accord has not been fully implemented and the
future looks bleak. The document promising "peace in our time"
is but one more failed attempt to solve the Punjab c r i s i s, a
crisis that has reached new heights in the last few months.
Hostility and suspicion are the norm now. Even the democratic
process in the Punjab has been halted due to i ts "inefficiency"
in handling the "law and order" situation in the state.
Why? Why the hope in 1985? Why the despair in 1987? Why
was the Punjab Accord viewed so promisingly? Was it doomed to
f a il right from the start? If so, what were the forces that
shaped i ts drafting and i ts implementation? These are some of
the questions this thesis w i ll attempt to answer. In doing so,
the analysis w i ll take us to the roots of a conflict which has
led to communal violence unparalleled since India's partition in
1947.
THE ACCORD
This thesis focuses on the Memorandum of Settlement signed
between Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, and Sant Harchand
Singh Longowal, president of the Shiromani Akali Dal (L), a
preponderantly Sikh party, on July 24, 1985. It examines the
events and forces that led to i t; the shape the Accord took; and
the developments that led to i ts demise. Of c r i t i c al importance
is to determine why the bargain that took place between these two
politicians was possible then and not at any other time. The
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