Policing gangs in America PDF
Preview Policing gangs in America
P1:JZZ 0521851106pre CB982B/Katz 0521851106 December1,2005 4:47 PolicingGangsinAmerica PolicingGangsinAmericadescribestheassumptions,issues,problems, and events that characterize, shape, and define the police response to gangsinAmericatoday.Theprimaryfocusofthebookisonthegang unit officers and the environment in which they work. A discussion of research, statistical facts, theory, and policy with regard to gangs, gang members, and gang activity is used as a backdrop. The book is broadly focused on describing how gang units respond to community gangproblemsandanswerssuchquestionsas:Whydopoliceagencies organizetheirresponsestogangsincertainways?Whoarethepeople who choose to police gangs? How do they make sense of gang mem- bers–individualswhosparkfearinmostcitizens?Whataretheirjobs really like? What characterizes their working environment? How do their responses to the gang problem fit with other policing strategies, suchascommunitypolicing? Dr.CharlesM.KatzreceivedhisPh.D.inCriminalJusticefromtheUni- versityofNebraskaatOmaha.HeiscurrentlyanAssociateProfessorof CriminalJusticeandCriminologyatArizonaStateUniversity.Dr.Katz hascoauthoredorcoeditedtwopreviousbooksandhasbeenpublished inseveralscholarlyjournals,includingCriminology,JusticeQuarterly, andCrimeandDelinquency.Dr.Katzhasconductedresearchinmore thantwentypoliceagenciesacrosstheUnitedStatesaswellasinseveral stateandfederalagencies. Dr. Vincent J. Webb received his Ph.D. in sociology from Iowa State University. He served as chair of the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Nebraska at Omaha for more than twenty years andaschairoftheDepartmentofCriminalJusticeandCriminologyat ArizonaStateUniversityforsevenyears.In2005hejoinedthefaculty atSouthernIllinoisUniversityatCarbondaleasDirectoroftheCenter for the Study of Crime, Delinquency and Corrections. Dr. Webb has publishedinavarietyofcriminologyandcriminaljusticejournals,and heisthecoauthorandcoeditorofthreeotherbooksoncriminaljustice topics. He is a former President of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. i P1:JZZ 0521851106pre CB982B/Katz 0521851106 December1,2005 4:47 CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY Editedby AlfredBlumstein,H.JohnHeinzSchoolofPublicPolicyandManagement,Carnegie MellonUniversity DavidFarrington,InstituteofCriminology,UniversityofCambridge Otherbooksintheseries: LifeintheGang:Family,Friends,andViolence,byScottH.DeckerandBarrikVan Winkle DelinquencyandCrime:CurrentTheories,editedbyJ.DavidHawkins RecriminalizingDelinquency:ViolentJuvenileCrimeandJuvenileJusticeReform, bySimonI.Singer MeanStreets:YouthCrimeandHomelessness,byJohnHaganandBillMcCarthy TheFrameworkofJudicialSentencing:AStudyinLegalDecisionMaking,byAustin Lovegrove TheCriminalRecidivismProcess,byEdwardZambleandVernonL.Quinsey ViolenceandChildhoodintheInnerCity,byJoanMcCord JudicialPolicyMakingandtheModernState:HowtheCourtsReformedAmerica’s Prisons,byMalcolmM.FreeleyandEdwardL.Rubin SchoolsandDelinquency,byDeniseC.Gottfredson TheCrimeDropinAmerica,editedbyAlfredBlumsteinandJoelWallman Delinquent-ProneCommunities,byDonWeatherburnandBronwynLind White-CollarCrimeandCriminalCareers,byDavidWeisburdandElinWaring,with EllenF.Chayet SexDifferencesinAntisocialBehavior:ConductDisorder,Delinquency,andViolence intheDunedinLongitudinalStudy,byTerrieMoffitt,AvshalomCaspi,Michael Rutter,andPhilA.Silva DelinquentNetworks:YouthCo-OffendinginStockholm,byJerzySarnecki CriminalityandViolenceamongtheMentallyDisordered,bySheilaghHodginsand Carl-GunnarJanson CorporateCrime,Law,andSocialControl,bySallyS.Simpson CompanionsinCrime:TheSocialAspectsofCriminalConduct,byMarkWarr TheCriminalCareer:TheDanishLongitudinalStudy,byBrittaKyvsgaard ViolentCrime:AssessingRaceandEthnicDifferences,editedbyDarnellHawkins GangsandDelinquencyinDevelopmentalPerspective,byTerenceP.Thornberry, MarvinD.Krohn,AlanJ.Lizotte,CarolynA.Smith,andKimberlyTobin EarlyPreventionofAdultAnti-SocialBehavior,byDavidFarringtonandJeremy Coide ErrorsofJustice,byBrianForst RethinkingHomicide:ExploringtheStructureandProcessUnderlyingDeadly Situations,byTeranceD.MietheandWendyC.Regoeczi SituationalPrisonControl:CrimePreventioninCorrectionalInstitutions,by RichardWortley EconomicEspionageandIndustrialSpying,byHediehNasheri ChoosingWhite-CollarCrime,byNealShoverandAndyHochstetler PrisonerReentryandCrimeinAmerica,byJeremyTravisandChristyVisher iii P1:JZZ 0521851106pre CB982B/Katz 0521851106 December1,2005 4:47 Policing Gangs in America CHARLES M. KATZ ArizonaStateUniversity,Phoenix VINCENT J. WEBB SouthernIllinoisUniversity,Carbondale v P1:JZZ 0521851106pre CB982B/Katz 0521851106 December1,2005 4:47 Contents Acknowledgments page ix 1 StudyingthePoliceResponsetoGangs 1 2 SettingandMethods 23 3 HistoricalAnalysisofGangsandGangControl 42 4 ScopeandNatureoftheCurrentGangProblem 91 5 Form,Function,andManagementofthePoliceGangUnit 125 6 TheGangUnitOfficer 165 7 OntheJob 198 8 PolicingGangsinaTimeofCommunityPolicing 241 9 ConclusionandImplications 267 References 291 Index 303 vii P1:JZZ 0521851106pre CB982B/Katz 0521851106 December1,2005 4:47 Acknowledgments Throughout the research project we received help and assistance from numerouspeoplealongtheway.Wewouldbothliketothankthemen and women of the Albuquerque, Inglewood, Las Vegas, and Phoenix police departments. They provided us with an invaluable glimpse into their world, and they were always helpful with accommodating our many requests. We would also like to thank Scott Decker and Cheryl Maxson, who provided advice along the way with regard to research methodologyandinterpretationoffindingsandwhoprovidedvaluable feedback after reading various versions of the manuscript. We express gratitudetoRobinHaarrforherassistancewithdatacollectioninboth InglewoodandLasVegasandtoKenKarpinski,whomanagedallofthe processes associated with the production, copyediting, and typesetting for this book. Additionally, we would like to thank Ed Parsons, our editor,whoguidedusthroughthepublicationprocessflawlessly. ThisresearchwasfundedbytheNationalInstituteofJustice(grantno. 98-IJ-CX-0078). The opinions expressed in this book are those of the authors alone and are not those of the National Institute of Justice. However,wewouldliketothankWinnieReed,ourprogrammanager, who provided us with access to technical advisors and to federal task forces that we otherwise would not have had the opportunity to learn from. Charles Katz would like to thank his colleagues at Arizona State Universityforcreatingasupportiveworkenvironment.Hewouldespe- cially like to thank Ed Maguire at George Mason University, who first ix P1:JZZ 0521851106pre CB982B/Katz 0521851106 December1,2005 4:47 x Acknowledgments introduced him to organizational theory and who has also generated muchenthusiasmtowardthefieldofpolicing.Likewise,MalcolmKlein, whonotonlyprovidedmuchvaluablefeedbackonearlierdraftsofthe manuscriptbutwhoseworkhasinspiredmuchofwhatcanbefoundin thisbook.Additionally,CharleswouldliketothankSamWalker,who imprinted the importance of judging the fairness of modern policing strategiesandtactics,andVinceWebb,whoinfluencedhimonmatters related to the understanding of crime control policy. As usual, Charles thankshisparents,DuaneandJanet,andhiswife,Keri,foralloftheir loveandsupportovertheyears. VincentWebbwouldliketothankhisformercolleaguesatArizonaState UniversityaswellasthoseattheUniversityofNebraska,Omaha,who havemadeitpossiblethroughtheirsupportandinspirationtocarryout anumberofprojectsassessingcrimecontrolpoliciesandpractices.Sam WalkerandInekeMarshall,withtheirpenchantforcritiquingcriminal justicepolicy,wereespeciallyinfluentialinthisregard.Heisalsodeeply gratefultoCharlesKatzforhispatienceandsteadfastnessinkeepingthis research project on track and for sharing his many theoretical insights into the behavior of police organizations. Most importantly, he would liketothankaveryspecialperson,hiswifeBetsy,forallofherloveand support. P1:PJU 0521851106c01 CB982B/Katz 0521851106 September11,2005 1:21 1 Studying the Police Response to Gangs That’swhattheywanted–andthat’swhattheygot. –FormerLosAngelesCRASHUnitofficer By the mid-to-late 1980s, Los Angeles, California, had become widely recognized as the epicenter of the nation’s growing gang problem. The city had about 280 gangs with 26,000 members who were becoming increasinglyinvolvedinviolenceandnarcoticstrafficking(Spergeland Curry1990).Between1984and1992,thenumberofganghomicidesin Los Angeles County skyrocketed from 200 to 800 homicides per year (Maxson 1999). The seriousness of the phenomenon was highlighted in media reporting, both locally and nationally. Local news programs frequently led with gang-related stories in which innocent bystanders hadbeenshotandkilledindrive-byshootings.Themovieindustrywas producing popular films such as Colors and American Me, portraying L.A.gangmembersasbloodthirsty,minoritymaleswhowereinvolved inhigh-leveldrugsales(Hagedorn1998). Asaconsequence,adeepfearofgangsgrippedpartsofthecity.The LosAngelesTimesreportedthatresidentsingangneighborhoodswere barring their windows and chaining their doors, sleeping in bathtubs or on the floor, to protect themselves from nighttime drive-by shoot- ings. People avoided wearing clothing in colors associated with gangs topreventbeingmisidentifiedbyrivalgangs(J.Katz1990).Therewas talk from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that the Crips in Los Angeles were well on their way to bringing together all Crip sects across the nation into “one major organization with a chief executive 1 P1:PJU 0521851106c01 CB982B/Katz 0521851106 September11,2005 1:21 2 PolicingGangsinAmerica officer-styleleadershipstructure”toenhancethegang’sabilitytotraffic drugs (Brantley and DiRosa 1994, 3). In fact, the problem in the city became so bad that some FBI officials publicly announced that gangs representedaseriousthreattothenationalsenseofsecurity. Inresponse,then–PoliceChiefDarylGatesdeclaredawarongangs, claiming that he would “obliterate” violent gangs and “take the lit- tle terrorists off the street” (Burrell 1990); he urged President Ronald Reagantodothesame(LosAngelesCityNewsService1988).Aspartof hiswar,ChiefGatesallocatedadditionalofficersandstafftothepolice department’s antigang unit, the Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums(CRASH).Withinfiveyears,theLosAngelesPoliceDepart- ment(LAPD)hadabout200swornofficersassignedtotheCRASHunit (Spergel1995). Once in full swing, the unit reacted decisively and aggressively, sweeping through gang neighborhoods. Take, for example, Operation Hammer, a series of gang sweeps carried out in the worst neighbor- hoodsinLosAngeles.Thesweepswerecharacterizedbytheunitmov- ing through neighborhoods, arresting gang members for the slightest infractions, including wearing colors, flashing signs, jaywalking, and curfew violations. In fact, the unit was making so many arrests that year – close to 25,000 – that during one weekend LAPD had to cre- ateamobilebookingfacilityattheLosAngelesMemorialColiseumto processallofthearrestees(Burrell1990). By the late 1990s, LAPD’s response to gangs appeared to be work- ing. For example, in the Rampart Area, one of the regions hardest hit, gang crimes dropped from 1,171 in 1991 to 464 in 1999 – areduc- tion that exceeded the citywide decline for all other violent crime over the same period (Chemerinsky 2000a). As a consequence, Chief Gates and the police department rapidly developed a reputation for being toughongangs,andtheCRASHunitbecameanationalmodel.Police departments across the country were contacting LAPD for advice on respondingtotheirowngangproblems.LAPDbeganformallytraining officersfromotherpolicedepartmentsonLAPD’soperationalstrategies andtacticsforpolicinggangs,gangmembers,andgangcrime. With the CRASH unit’s success, however, came problems. CRASH unitofficersinsomeprecinctsdevelopedasubculturethatembodiedthe war-on-gangs mentality advocated by their chief. The subculture was characterized by a mindset in which officers saw all young Hispanic and African American males as gang members, believing that any and all efforts to remove them from the community could and should be P1:PJU 0521851106c01 CB982B/Katz 0521851106 September11,2005 1:21 StudyingthePoliceResponsetoGangs 3 used. Under the guise of protecting the community, CRASH officers beganresistingsupervision,flagrantlyignoringpoliciesandprocedures that they believed were inhibiting their ability to respond to the gang problem(Chemerinsky2000b,1). ThissubcultureeventuallygaverisetotheRampartCorruptionScan- dal,inwhichRampartCRASHunitofficersinLosAngeleswerefound tobeengaginginhard-corecriminalactivity.Officersadmittedtoattack- ingknowngangmembersandfalselyaccusingthemofcrimestheyhad not committed. The officers argued that “if the suspect didn’t commit thiscrime,hedidanotherforwhichhedidn’tgetcaught”(Chemerinsky 2000b,27). Theensuinginvestigationrevealedthatofficerswereroutinelychok- ing and punching gang members for the sole purpose of intimidation. Inonecase,officershadusedagangmemberasahumanbatteringram, forcefully thrusting his face repeatedly against a wall. In several other instances,officershadplanteddrugsongangmemberstomakearrests. Corrupt sergeants and lieutenants in the division had promoted these activities,givingawardsformisdeeds.Oneofficerhadevenreceivedan awardforwhatemergedastheshootingofanunarmed,innocentperson (CNN.com2000a).Asaconsequence,approximatelytenyearsafterit had been fully staffed and promoted as the ideal in antigang enforce- ment,LAPD’sgangunitwasshutdownbecauseofcorruption,theuse ofexcessiveforce,andcivilrightsviolations;andthecityhadpaidout about $70 million to settle lawsuits related to the scandal (Associated Press2005). Such happenings were not unique to Los Angeles. Police gang units acrossthecountrywerecomingunderclosescrutinyforoverlyaggres- sivetacticsandotherpolicemisconduct. (cid:1) InLasVegas,gangunitofficerswerefoundguiltyofparticipatingin a drive-by shooting. Two officers, one driving and the other hang- ing outside a van, had driven around a well-known gang neigh- borhood until they found a group of gang members loitering on a streetcorner.Theofficerhangingoutsidethevanshotsixtimesinto thecrowd,killingatwenty-one-year-oldmale.Theincidentsparked an FBI investigation into all unsolved drive-by shootings and gang killingsdatingbackfiveyears,inthebeliefthatsomemayhavebeen theworkofroguegangunitofficers(Hynes1997). (cid:1) In Chicago, gang unit officers were found by federal prosecutors to beworkinghand-in-handwithfourChicagostreetgangstotransport
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