planning for off-site response to radiation accidents in nuclear facilities

125 Pages·2001·2.64 MB·English

IAEA-TECDOC-225
PLANNING FOR
OFF-SITE RESPONSE TO
RADIATION ACCIDENTS IN
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
A PRE-PUBLICATION WORKING DOCUMENT
A DOCUMENT DERIVING FROM
ADVISORY GROUP MEETINGSNO
PE PLHARTNO RNTOIENFCGT IFOON
THE PUBLIC IN THE EVENT OF
AN ACCIDENT IN A NUCLEAR FACILITY,
ORGANIZED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
AND HELD IN
ANKARA, TURKEY, 15-19 NOVEMBER 1976
NIAN D
LISBON, PORTUGAL, 24-28 OCTOBER 1977
A TECHNICAL DOCUMENT ISSUED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, VIENNA, 1979
PLANNR OIONFFGF -SITE RESPONO RSTEA DIATION ACCIDENf TfIBS TJCLEAR FACILITIES
IAEA, VIEfflJA, 1979
e In hAAiEtPAu rsyintrbtiead
December 1979
PLEASE BE AWARE THAT
E MHTAI SFLOSL ING PAGEN TSI HIS DOCUMENT
WERE ORIGINALLY BLANK
e IhATEA dt omoneas intain stocf kores pon rttihs is series. However,
microfiche copies of these reports can be obtained from
INIS Microfiche Clearinghouse
International Atomic Energy Agency
Wagramerstrasse 5
P.O. Box 100
A-1400 Vienna, Austria
on prepayment of US $1.00 or against one IAEA microfiche service coupon.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pag.oeN
FOREWORD
SECTION I - INTRODUCTION l
PURPOSE l
SCOPE l
General
2
Siting Considerations
SE- A CCTICIIIOD NENT ANALYSIS, PREDICT FICOOO NNSEQUE3NCE S
3 Gen eral
Types of Accidents 3
3 Magnitudf oAe ccidents
Acc4ident Analysis
5 Exposure Pathway s
Time Factors Associated with Releases7
Radiological Characteristics of Releases 8
SECTION III - PROTECTIVE MEASURES AND ASSOCIATED 11
RISKS, DIFFICULTIES AND COSTS
11
General
TYPES OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES 11
TIME SCALE CONSIDERATI21ONN ISS ELECTING
PROTECTIVE MEASURES
SELECTIONF O APPROPRIATE PROTECTIVE MEASUR41ES
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES
RISKS, DIFFICULTIESD NA COST61 S
Sheltering 16
á1 Shielding
Ventilation Control ^
i ft
Risks, difficulties and costs °
Kadioprotective prophylaxis °
Basic Principles '
21
Dosage and Administration
12 Risks, Difficuld tCnioaes tss
Controlf o Accessd na Egress
« pp
General
32Risks, Difficuld tCnioaes sts
Evacuation 23
General 3
Risks, Diffi4cultied nCsa osts
.oN egJ P
Personal Protective Methods 25
General 25
S5i2mple respiratory protectio n
Other forms of respiratory protection 26
Protective clothing 26
62 Risks, difficultd icneaos sts
82 Std omrnaaaig netenanc e
Decontamination of Persons 28
82 Gener al
8R2isks, difficultd inceaos sts
82 Medical care
82 Genera l
Risks, difficulties and costs 30
Diver0s3if ofod n ownoaad ter supplies
General 30
Risk1s3, difficulti dencaso sts
Decontamination in Affected Areas 32
General 32
Risks, difficu23ltied nsac osts
SEC- T FIVLOIAN MR IRONETSG PONO SATNE ACCIDENT/
ASSESSMENT/PREDICTION/OPERATIONAL RESPONSE 32
General 34
CONCEPTP O EMERGENCY PLANNING53 ZONES
Relevant Offsite Data 35
ASSESSMENT OP THE ACCIIENT 41
The Role of the Nuclear Facility Operator 41
The Role of Offsite Authorities 43
Instrumenta44tior onAf ssessment
Huclear Facility Operational Instrumentation 44
Nuclear Facility Emergency Instrumentation 44
Offsite Emergency5 4Instrumentation
Radiological 45
Fixed 45
Mobile 46
Meteorological 47
PREDICTION OF CONSEQUENCES 48
The Role of the Nuclear Facility Operator 48
P.aîgÍe
The Role of Offsite Authorities 50
Data Acquisition and Processing 50
Information concerning the radioactive 50
source term
Me0t5eorological information
Offsite radiological information 51
25 E OHPPTLE ARNARTNOIIFON NGAL RESPONS E
Emergency Response Resources 52
Implementation of Appropriate Protective 52
Measures
General 5?
Sheltering 52
Administration of radioprotective prophylactic
drugs 54
Control of access and egress 55
75 Evacuation
Personal protective equipment/emergency workers/
85 Decontaminatio n
Medical care §9
06 Diversif oofnd ownoaad ter
Decontaminatiof ona1 6red aneas quipment
PROCED RUIROMEFP SLEMENE TPHILTNA GNNED
OPERATIONAL RESPONSE 62
General g 2
Organization and responsibility 62
Derived intervention levels 62
Actions Úó support groups 62
Procedure format 63
REMEDIAL AND RESTORATIVE MEASURES 66
66 Genera l
66 Measure s
Controlf o acces66sd na egress
Diversiof nof ood nwda ate6r6 supplies
Decontaminatiof noa re66a dnmsa aterials
Fixation of remaining radioactivity 67
76 Contf rCooo nltamind aDtnoiaso en
Intervention Levels 68
Organizational Aspects 68
96 PUBLIC INFORMATION ASPECT S
UPDATINGE HT EMERGENCY RESPONSE PL17AN
TRAINING AND EXERCISES 72
SECTI- O IVNN TERVENTION LEVED LCNASO 4N7SIDERATIONS
INFLUENCING THEIR CHOICE
General 74
CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE DETRIMENT 77
CAUSED BY THE PROTECTIVE MEASURE
RISK/BENEFIT CONS8I7DERATIONØ S SETTING
INTERVENTION LEVELS
INTERVENTION LEVELS 78
DERIVED INTERVENTION LEVELS 79
GUIDANCE FOR THE SELECTION OF INTERVENTION
LEVELS 83
48 Appendi x
EXAMPLES OF INTERVENTION LEVELS ADOPTED BY SOME COUNTRIES 84
F5E8DERAL REPUBLIF OCG ERMANY
FRANCE 88
UNITED KINGDOM 89
29 UNITED STATF EAOSM ERICA
SECT- OIIROVGN ANIZA5T9D IRNOEAN SPONSIBILITIES
General 95
69 ONSITE ORGANIZATION
The Role of the Nuclear Facility Operator 96
69 Genera l
OFFSITE ORGANIZATION 98
89 General
89 Emergency Response Organizatio n
99 Local Organization
National Authori101ties
ORGANIZATION AT LEVEL OF REGIONALLY ASSOCIATED COUNTRIES
OR STATES 102
ORGANIZATION AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 104
REFERENCES 107
FOREWORD
e hpt ansI5 2ty earse hn,t uclear energy industs ramhy aintaine ndae xcellent
safety record, second to none with regard to public safety. Nuclear facilities are
designed, construd cotnpeae drated with exceptional considerar tsioaoff nety. Their
sophisticated safety syste erdmaes signo eptd rott esooct ennit phl tldy annat
personnet lua,b lse hpot ue bhetl nidnvca ironme ehetn vntIea . n bftor eakdown
or failure within a facility, one or more of these systems will be activated,
each of which is designed to ensure the ultimate integrity of the plant.
Nonethele aa spss eo,rtrieonoutsifa alccident does arise, evens thtoiug h
proba sbtiih slem iiritetn yfiIomrale . neceso n spaatlidr ra ve yonamnefcr geency
action ot protect bothe ht plant staffe ht dna public.
In such cases, emergency action could be initiated by :
e rhetpe e rpohehslpsttaeae nr n taft-taootf ripolv aent management,
- public authorities f tphe roadtoe athtps neukhhtcbaatlv tii en cg
the environment.
The plant operator will be concerned mainly with on-site action to control any
emergency situation to protect on-site personnel and to collect data concerning the
accident. The public authorities - principally public health authorities - will
usually be concerned with protection of off-site population and also ihe collecting
of environmental data.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a Nuclear Safety
Standards programme to prepare and publish a series of Codes of Practice and Safety
Guides concerned with all aspects of Nuclear Power Plant Safety. One of the guides
under preparation, IAEA Safety Se. r5oi0eN- sSG-G6, entitled "Preparednfeos s
Public Authorities for Emergencies at Nuclear Power Plants" will consider some
aspects of emergency planning to be used by groups outside the plant area; however,
this wille b primarily directede ht rof groups undere ht managemente ht fo plant
operator,
The Agency bas also recognized that a manual of guidance is needed for public
health authorities, environmental specialists,f eome rglenlcay addvinsoars ,
other persr ognor soups that e htahf avtoso er kganizr iin<m gplementing off-site
emergency procedures. This guidance must also fit needs of developing countries,
in which locally-available expertise b veyame sted onlyn i those persons already
entrusted with safety tasks in the nuclear facility. This differs from the
situationn i industrialized countries, wherea larged na independent bodyfo
eabve axiypr lecaaorobmftnl ss eultation.
To this ene dAhg,t ency convenn Aeadd visory Group comprising
experts nominaó tÌÚeå dòÚåã Std arnteaep sresentatif vioen sterested
international organizations to draft such a document. Meetings were
held in Ankara, 1976 and in Lisbon, 1977» under the chairmanship of
Mr.H.E.Collins of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The revised text that resulted from the latter meeting was reviewed
t iuanpnt do fin. aColrl Mld n irJyinau bsfn te 1979»
The text, incorporating a few additional comments received sub-
sequentlyw on i,si ssuee ht fdni ora mfwo orking document,o t enable
interested parties ot benefit froe mhtd ocument exped tiouslyot d,na
obtain critical comments from users of the document before proceeding
to formal publication in the Safety Series.
In particular difficulty in drafting such a manual lies in the fact
that there is little experience with nuclear facilities that have had
an uncontrolled releaf sroe adioactivity having major environmental
impact. However, some insight into the problems can be gained from
large-scale accidents in non-nuclear industries. As examples of radio-
active accidents, the Windscale incident provided experience in
monitoring dna controlling contaminationo t pasture landd sna milkt,ub
the Three Mile Island incident did not lead to any substantial contamination
eenhvitro ofnment. However, there were many lessons concerning emergency
planning and response to be learned from such cases, and these are incor-
poraten dit his document.
Readef rtos his document shoue lbad wares nit ehtiaitt he ar collection
f a rl of iuraoslop etnps roved std eanpcat sions.a Rastih etri,
discusse hivto afnor ious philosophied npsa roblems invole hvot efnidf site
response to an accident in a nuclear facility. The readers who are respon-
sible for setting up off-site emergency procedures for a given facility
will have to decide on a philosophy and mode of action that suits the
situation pertaining to their specific site. For instance, actions will
depend not only upon the nature of the facility and its environs, but
also on the resources available to cope with an accident. The Agency
believee shi tm tplholaart tant facto dnrtaso pics have been considered.
Comments from interested parties would be welcome and should be
addresse:do,t
. _. Ñ-225)
(Ref 1ÀÅÀ ÒÂÑ1Þ
Divisiof noN uclear Safetd nyEa nvironmental Protection
International Atomic Energy Agency
P.O.Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria