Pitfalls of participatory programs : evidence from a randomized evaluation in education in India

2008·1.6 MB·English

by  Banerjee, Abhijit

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Working Paper Series
Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a
Randomized Evaluation in Education in India
Abhijit V. Banerjee
—
Rukmini BeftCfji \3^/\€r\c
Esther Duflo
Rachel Glennerster
.:
Stuti Khemani
Working Paper 08-1
Septembers, 2008
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E52-251
50 Memorial Drive
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Cambridge, 02142
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Paper Collection at
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1
Pitfalls ofParticipatory Programs: Evidence From a Randomized Evaluation in Education '
in India ^~-
Abhijit Banerjee, Rukmini Banerji, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Stuti Khemani
NBER Workmg Paper No. 43
1 1
September 2008
JEL No. 121,012
ABSTRACT
Participation ofbeneficiaries in the monitoring ofpublic services is increasingly seen as a key to improving
their efficiency. In India, the current government flagship program on universal primary education
organizes both locally elected leaders and parents ofchildren enrolled in public schools into committees
and gives these groups powers over resource allocation, and monitoring and management ofschool
performance. However, in a baseline survey we found that people were not aware ofthe existence
ofthese committees and their potential for improving education. This paper evaluates three different
interventions to encourage beneficiaries' participation through these committees: providing infonnation,
training community members in a new testing tool, and training and organizing volunteers to hold
remedial reading camps for illiterate children. We find that these interventions had no impact on community
involvement in public schools, and no impact on teacher effort or learning outcomes in those schools.
However, we do find that the intervention that trained volunteers to teach children to read had a large
impact on activity outside public schools - local youths volunteered to be trained to teach, and children
who attended these camps substantially improved theirreading skills. These results suggest that citizens
face substantial constraints in participating to improve the public education system, even when they
care about education and are willing to do something to improve it.
Abhijit Banerjee Rachel Glennerster
MIT Department ofEconomics Abdul LatifJameel Poverty Action Lab
E52-252d MIT Department ofEconomics
50 Memorial Drive E60-275
Cambridge, MA 02142-1347 CambndgeMA 02139
and NBER [email protected]
[email protected]
Stuti KJiemani
Rukmini Banerji The World Bank
Pratham Mumbai Education Initiative 1818 H Street N.W.
MIT Department ofEconomics Washington, DC 20433
50 Memorial Drive [email protected]
MA
Cambridge, 02142-1347
[email protected]
- -
Esther Duflo
MIT Department ofEconomics
E52-252G
50 Memorial Drive
CambndgeMA 02142
and NBER
[email protected]
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
Boston Library Consortium IVIember Libraries
http://www.archive.org/details/pitfallsofparticOObane
1. Introduction
The deplorablestate ofpubliclyprovidedsocial services in manydeveloping countrieshas attractedconsiderable
attention in recentyears,from academics andpolicymakers alike. The 2004WorldDevelopment Report "Making Services
Workfor Poor People"detailsthe dismal qualityofeducation and healthservices offeredtothe poorin developing
countries, andconcludesthat "social services failthepoor" (World Bank, 2004). Both sectors are plaguedbyhighprovider
absenteeism, little on-the-job effortfromthosewhodocometowork, andoverall poorperformance. Forexample,
teachers inprimaryschools and medical staffat primary healthcenters in India have absence rates of25percent and40
percent, respectively (Chaudhuryet al., 2006). > InIndia's publiceducationsystem, theseproblems are manifest inthe
failure ofthepublicschoolstoimpart eventhe mostelementaryskills.A2005nationwide ruralsurveyon educational
attainmentof7-14yearoldsfoundthat, eventhoughmostchildrenare enrolledin school, 35percentofprimaryschool
age children couldnotread asimple paragraph and41percentcouldnot dosimple subtraction, competenciesthat
,
should, accordingtogovernment guidelines, be achievedbygrade 2 (Pratham, 2005).
,
Inadequatefunding does notappeartobethe onlyreasonforthe systems'poorperformance. Infact, inthe case of
education, rigorous, randomizedevaluations havefoundlittle evidencethat more resources ontheirown, withnochanges
tothewayeducationis delivered, can improvetestscores.= Incontrast, studies havefoundimprovementsinoutcomes
when modestincentives havebeengiventoteachers (see e.g., Duflo, Hannaand Ryan, 2007, and Murahdharanand
Sundararaman, 20073). However, inboththese casesthe incentives were implementedbythe non-governmental
organization (NGO)thatranthe program. Whengovernmentbureaucrats havetoimplementthem, the incentiveswere
ineffectual. In Kenya, forexample, headteacherswere given grantstorewardteachers who attend regularly. Eventhough
the headteacher could usethe moneyto get otherthings forthe school iftheydid notuse ittorewardtheteachers, they
almostuniversallychosetogivethe moneytotheteachers, irrespective ofwhethertheteacherhad done anythingto
deserve it, withthe resultthat the incentive had noimpact (KremerandChen, 2002). In India areformthatwas meantto
linkgovernment nurses' paytotheirattendancewas initiallyveryeffective,butfailedto haveanyimpactafterthelocal
bureaucracystartedproviding official excusesformost ofthenurses' absences (Banerjee, Duflo, and Glennerster, 2008).
The poorincentives ofbureaucrats andpublicproviderstodeliverqualityservices contrastswithevidence of
strong incentives ofgovernmentsto deliverquantity, especiallyineducation, bybuildingschools andrecruitingteachers
(Glewwe and Kremer, 2006, Keeferand Khemani, 2004, and Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007). Keeferand Khemani
(2005), building on alarge political economyliterature-*, argue thatthis canbe explainedbypoliticalincentivesof
governmentsthat are skewedtowardtheprovisionofprivate andverifiablebenefitstosome citizens, atthe expense of
qualityimprovementsthat are more diffuse and hardertoverify. Providing (secure)jobsthroughteacherrecruitment, or
scholarships and othertransfers, is more effective inwinning electionsthangettingteachers toteach.
' Forhealth, Dasand Hammer(2005) showthattheaveragetimespentbya publicdoctortoexaminea patientsis2 minutes,and that
theaverage\isitdoes not includeanyphysicalexam. In education, Chaudhur}',etal. (2006)findthat halfoftheteacherspresentin
school in Indiawere notteachingat thetimeoftheinvestigator'svisit.
- Forexample, Glewwe, Kremer,and Moulin (2002) find no impactfromtextbooks, Glewwe, Kremer, MoulinandZitzewitz(2004)find no
impactfromflipcharts, and Banerjee, KremerandJacob, (2004) find no impactfrom additional teachers in India. Fordiscussion and more
references,seeGlewweand Kremer(2006).
3See, on theotherhand,Glewwe, Uias, and Kremer(2003) fora cautionar)'taleon multitaskingbyteachersevenwhen incentivesare
properly implemented.
See,e.g.Acemoglu and Robinson..(2001); Banerjee and I>er(2005), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006); Rajan (2007); Hoffand Stiglitz
(forthcoming).
2
5
Such political economyarguments suggestthat governmentbureaucracies maybeill equippedtoimprovethe
qualityofpublicservices. This hasled developmentpractitionerstobelievethattheinvolvement ofbeneficiaries is
essentialto makeservicesworkforpoorpeople. Developmentprojectsfundedbyinternationalorganizations are
increasinglyrequiredtoinclude"beneficiaryparticipation" components, suchasthe constitutionofusers'committees,
parents-teachers associations, etc. or, wheresuchinstitutions alreadyexists,interventions aimedat mobilizingpeopleto
makethemmore effective. TheWorld Bank'sWorld Development Report"MakingServicesworkforPoorPeople"
describes arangeofalternative institutional designsthatenablebeneficiaries toexercisebettercontrol overthe qualityof
servicesthattheyare receiving (World Bank, 2004).
Despitethis enthusiasm, andsome encouraging experimentswe describebelow, whetherexternal interventions
actuallyaffectthebeneficiaries, andwhetherthis participationcan inturnimprovepublicservices, remainlargelyopen
empirical questions. It is challengingtoanswerthese questions definitivelybecausethere isnosingle leadingcandidate
forwhat encouragesbeneficiaryparticipation and/ormakes it more effective and a wide range ofpossible models.
Afavery minimum, there are atleasttwodimensionsalongwhichinterventions designedtopromote
participation can (anddo)vary. /• ;,,;,,.;.;: ,1 '.-., . '• , '
—
o First, communitymembers mighteitherbe able to: .,,;"- , c, ;
o intervene directlytoimprove servicedelivery(bycontributing additionalinputs,bypunishingor
rewardingthe agents, etc.)or
o theymayonlybeabletointerveneindirectly(saybycontributingto afundthatis administeredby
somebureaucrat orcomplainingtothe agentorthe agent's supervisor).
o Second, communitymembers mightbe ableto exercise control (directorotherwise)
o individuallyoras apart ofasmall group (forexampletheymayasktobepaidfortheworkthey
' . .. ' didonthe local roadproject), or ; ,,
o it mayrequirejoint actionbysomelargergroup.6 ,
Boththedirectandindirect dimensions allowforcontinuousvariation, creating acontinuous planeofpossible models of
popularparticipation.
The different modelshavetheiradvantages and disadvantages: forexample, direct control obviouslymakesit
easierto exercise controlbut opensthedoorforcapture ofthe entireprocessbyalocallydominantgroup. This iswhat
happenedinthe sugarcooperatives in Maharasthra, India (Banerjee et al., 2001). Indirect controls, such as complaint
systems, havethe advantage that it is possibletobypassthelocal elites, but at the cost ofpotential slippage (the complaint
maygetlost orignored).^ Small groups requireless coordinationtoexercise control (andhence are less subjectto
coordinationfailures),butlarge groups make sensewhenthe goodis notexcludable, andcomplaints arelesslikelytobe
ignoredwhentheycomefrom alarge enoughgroup.
This raisesthepossibilitythatpromotingsomeforms ofbeneficiarycontrol mightbe more rewardingthan
focusingonothers. Atthe sametime, given aspecificmodel ofbeneficiarycontrol, there are manydifferentwaysto
5TheWorld DevelopmentReport (2004)callsthese respectivelythe"short route"and the"longroute"tocontrol.
'Thereisactuallya natural third dimension: there maybespecific, pre-specified mechanismsfortheexerciseofcontrol, orthe precise
mechanicsmaybelefttothecommunitytodetermine.This ispotentiallyveryimportant,butimpingeslesson the issuesemphasized in
this paper.
7SeeBardhanand Mookheijee(2006) foran illuminatingdiscussionofthetrade-offshere.
3
encouragethebeneficiariestoget more involvedinexercising control. At one extreme are interventionswherepeople are
simplytoldtheirrightswithinthesystem andthenleftalonetofigure out howtheywanttoclaimthoserights.Atthe other
extreme,beneficiaries maybeorganizedandtrainedtoparticipate indemonstrations, orotherforms ofpublicaction,
including communityinterventionsthatsubstituteforthe publiclyprovided services.
This paperreports ona randomizedexperimentinthe state ofUttarPradesh (UP)in Indiathatcomparesthe
effects ofthree differentinterventions intendedto promotethe greaterexercise ofbeneficiarycontrolontwoverydifferent
forms ofbeneficiarycontrolwithinthesame setting. One oftheforms ofbeneficiarycontrolthatwe studyinvolvesthe
exercise ofindirect controlbyalargegroup; the otheris all aboutdirect control byindividuals. Thetreatmentsvary
betweenthe relativelyhands-off(tellpeoplewhattheirrights arewithrespecttotheirchildren's educationandalertthem
to theirresponsibilities) andthe highlyinterventionist (trainingvillagevolunteersin howto identifythe childreninthe
villagewhoarelaggingbehind, aswell as intechniquesforteachingthese childrenmore effectively).
'
Thepossibilityofaffectinglargegroupindirectcontrol comesfromthestructure ofthe Indianfederal
government's flagship current programon elementaryeducation,the Sarva ShikshaAbhiyan (SSA). This program, under
whichthefederal governmentwill contribute 65percentofthe educationalbudgetin UPin 2007-08 (22,374 million
rupees or559 milliondollars), gives aprominentroletotheVillageEducationCommittees (VECs),thoughVECs had
existed priortothe SSA. In UttarPradesh, theVECis abody consisting ofthree parents, the head-teacherofthevillage
school andthe headofthevillagegovernment, which is supposedtobethekeyintermediarybetweenthevillage andthe
district educational authorities and is supposedto exerciseboth indirect control (by monitoringthe performance ofthe
schools, reportingproblemsto higherauthorities, and requesting additional resources), aswell as some direct control (by
decidingwhetherthe contracts ofthe existing community-based teachers shouldbe renewed, recruiting newhires, and
allocatingtheadditional resourcesfor improvementthatthe schoolreceives underthe SSA). swhiletheVECitselfis a
small group, wearguethatthethree parent members oftheVEC could not have real control withoutthe activebacking of
alarge numberofotherparents andthatthislargergroup ofparents also havethe abilityto exercise controlwithoutgoing
throughthe VEC. Inthis sensethe model ofbeneficiarycontrol in education in UPis one ofdirect andindirect control
exercisedbyalargegroup.
The opportunityto dothese experimentsarosebecauseby2005, morethanfouryears after SSAwaslaunched,the
primafacieevidence suggestedthat atleastinJaunpurdistrict ofthestate ofUP, beneficiarycontrolwas notbeing
exercisedparticularlyeffectively.Asurveyofchildren, parents, andteachers in 280 villages inthat districtfoundthat
while mostvillages didhaveaVEC, veryfewparents knewofits existence, sometimes evenwhentheyweresupposedtobe
members ofit. VEC memberswere also unaware ofeventhe mostimportantresponsibilitiesthattheyhavebeen assigned
underthe SSA: hiring ofadditionalteachers, allocationofschool resources, and monitoring ofperformance. Atthe same
timethe state ofeducationinthesevillagesbordered onthe disastrous: 15 percent ofchildren age 7to 14 could not
recognize aletter; only39 percent could readandunderstand asimple story (ofgrade 1level); 38 percent could not
recognize numbers.Yet parents, teachers, andVEC memberswereoftenunaware ofthescaleoftheproblem andtended
to overestimate what children inthevillage reallyknew (Baneijee et al. 2006).
^ Itis importantto emphasizethateven though SSAisnational program, its implementation, aswell asthestructureand roleofthe
VECsvariesalotacrossstatesin IndiaandUP isnotnecessarilyrepresentative.
4
Giventhattheinstitutionalframeforlargegroup control (theVEC etc.) were extanteverywhere,butalmost
entirelynon-functional, one goaloftheinterventionswasto makelargegroup controlworkbetterbymobilizingpublic
sentiments andprovidingbetterinformation.Asecondgoal wastosensitizepeople abouttheimportance ofeducationfor
theirchildren andthe state ofeducationinthevillage, withthe expectationthatthiswouldencouragethemtotrytodo
something about it, eitherintheirprivate capacityoras apartofa small group—inotherwords asmall-groupdirect
control strategy. Sometrainingthatwould makethem more effectiveinthis capacitywaspart ofthe intervention.
Thethree interventionswere designedandimplementedbyPratham, India's mostprominent educationalNGO.
The interventionsthat Pratham implementedwere designedafterseveral months ofpilotinginthe area. Therewas a
conscious attempttobe sensitivetothespecificities ofthe local environment (inparticularthe constraints and
opportunities resultingfromtheexistingpolicies ofthe stategovernment), tofollowthe availablebest practiceguidelines
forcommunityengagement (World Bank, 1996, 2001), andtostreamline the designforreplicabilityandexternalvalidity.
One ofthe assumptions underlyingthe design ofthe interventionwasthatlackofrelevantknowledgewas afactor
holdingbackparticipatoryaction. Itwas clearfromthebaselinesurveythat communitymembers didnotknowwhatthey
were entitledto, whattheywere actuallygetting, and howtheycouldputpressure ontheproviders—all ofwhich are
criticalforparticipationtobe effective (Jenkins andGoetz, 1999; Goetz andJenkins, 2001; Paul, 1987).Asecondelement
inthe Pratham'sprogram designwasthe need(ifparticipationwastobe areality)toinvolvemorepeoplewiththe state of
educationinthevillage, particularlyonlearning outcomes, andtoturnthatinterestintosomeform ofcoordinatedaction.
Allthree interventions sharedabasicstructure: Pratham activists spentseveral daysin avillagefacilitatingsmall
group discussions ineach ofthevillage's neighborhoods orhamlets aroundissues ofelementaryeducation. In each of
these small group meetings, peoplewere invitedtoa largevillage-wide meeting. Theselargevillage-wide meetingswere
the culmination ofthe wholeprocess andwere attendedbyteachers,parents, communitymembers andmembers ofthe
village administration. ".
, ,
Inthesimplest ofthe threeinterventions usingthis format,the Prathamteamfacilitatedthesmall andbiggroup
meetings inthevillage. Inthe meetings, school staffandvillagelocal governmentrepresentativeswere encouragedto
share information aboutthestructure and organization oflocal service delivery, includingtherole andactivities ofthe
VECs. Inthedesignofthis intervention,thefocuswas on ensuringthatthe relevant informationabout norms and
provisions (usuallyoninputs)forschoolswere sharedinthevillage. The meetingswerefollowedbythedistribution of
pamphlets that describedthevarious roles andresponsibilities ofVEC members. The pamphletwas also explainedto as
manyindividualVECmembers as possible. Inthis intervention, therewere nodirect discussions onthelearninglevels of
children, unlessthetopicwasbroughtupbycommunitymembers. , 1 ;,
The secondtreatmentincludedtheactivities describedinthe firstintervention. In addition, inthe small
neighborhoodorhamletlevel meetings, Prathamteam members demonstratedthe process ofcreating "learning report
cards"byconductingsimple assessments ofreading andarithmeticwiththelocal children. Inthis process, Prathamteam
members activelyinvitedandimmediatelyorientedlocal communitymembers to participateinthe makingofthe report
cards. The mostvillages ofUttarPradesh, parentsarenotveryliterate andthus unabletoreallyunderstandtheissues
relatedtolearninglevels oftheirchildren. Oneoftheobjectivesbehindthe designofthe secondinterventionwasthat
communitymembers andparentsbecome sensitizedtothestatus oftheirchildren's learning. Byparticipating or
observinghowchildrenwerebeingassessedinreading orarithmetic, communitymembers andparentswouldget afirst
handviewofwhatwas meantbybasiclearning andhowtheirchildrenwere performingon simpletasks. Thevarious
neighborhoodreportcardswerethen also discussedatthevillage-wide meeting. The aggregation ofthe hamletor
neighbourhoodreportcardsled to thevillagereport card whichwas discussedatthebig meetingatthevillagelevel. .'
Thefirsttwo interventionsweretherefore aimed atstrengtheningthe SSAmodel ofcommunityparticipationbya
combinationofinformingvillage members oftheprovisions and norms andgivingthem a good idea ofwhatprocesses had
been envisaged in SSAforfacilitatingcollective action. : . ' ;
Thethird intervention added a "direct-control smallgroup" component ora componentthat demonstratedthat
local "solutions" are possible. In additionto allthe activities undertakenunderthefirst andsecond interventions, inthe
third case a "demonstration" classwasstartedinthevillage. This demonstrationclass showedhowsimpleactivities with
childrenhelpedto improvetheirreadingskills. The demonstrationclass ran inthevillageforaperiodof3-4days. Local
communitymembers usuallyyouthattendedandwatchedtheactivities. Those who hadshownkeeninterestwerethen
givenseveraldaystrainingandmaterialstoworkwithchildren oftheirvillage. Thiswas anentirelyvoluntaryeffort. No
moneywas paidtovolunteersfortheirworkv^dthchildren. The pedagogicaltechnique,training andmaterialsthatwere
used inJaunpurweretheonethat Pratham haddevelopedandusedthroughout Indiaforteachingbasicreading skills.
Aftertraining,volunteersthenheld readingclassesinthevillages. Thetypical "reading course"lastedtwotothree months,
with classes heldeverydayoutside ofschool. This interventionthus offered committedindividuals the opportunityand
the competence neededtodirectlyimprovelearningamongchildren.
The results fromthe evaluation showthat none ofthethree intervention methods managedto effectlarge group
indirect or direct control overpublic schools, intermsofparticipationbyanyoftheplayers (theparents,theVEC, the
teacher), nordidtheyimprove school performance. This is notbecausethe mobilization entirelyfailed: the meetings
organizedbyPrathamwerewell attended (onaverage morethan 100 people attended inavillageof360 households). Nor
is itbecausevillagers areunwillingto getinvolved ordonotcareabout education, orbecausetheyarepessimistic about
the possibilityofimprovement. Thisbecomes evidentwhenwe lookattheimpact ofthe smallgroup component ofthe
thirdintervention, which was a clearsuccess. Itsucceededin mobilizingalarge numberofvolunteersfromthe villages,
who signedup forthe Prathamtrainingandthensetup reading classes in theirvillage: Morethan400 reading camps
were heldacross55 villages. Almost 7,500 childrenenrolled (morethan 130 childrenpervillage) suggestingthatthere
were enoughparents andchildrenwhowerekeento improvetheirchildren's education.
The results also demonstrate thatteachingthese childrenhowto readis not animpossiblydifficulttask. In
contrasttothefailure ofthe firsttwo interventions, the reading camps hadverylarge effects onlearning: afterayear, we
6
see evidence ofverysubstantialprogressforthechildrenwhoattendedthecamps. Ourinstrumentalvariablesestimate
suggestthatthe averagechildwho couldnotreadanythingatbaselineandwhoattendedthecampwas 60 percentage
points morelikelytodecipherletters afterayearthanacomparablechildina controlvillage.The average childwho
attendedthe camp andwhocoulddecipherletters, butnotwords, inthebasehnewas 26percentagepoints morelikelyto
be able to readandunderstand a storythan acomparablechildinthe controlvillages. Combinedwiththe natural progress
ofchildren overthe course ofayear, these results implythat, afterayear, allthe childrenwho couldnot readatall and
attendedthe campwereabletodecipherletters, and35percentofthe childrenwhocouldreadletters and attendeda
camp where abletoreadandunderstanda story.
Howeverit is alsonoteworthythatneitherofthefirsttwointerventions generatedthe kindofeducational
volunteeringthatthethirdinterventionsosuccessfullygenerated. Villagers gotthe same informationaboutthestate of
education inthevillage intreatmentstwo andthree. Whatthethirdinterventiondid differentlywastotrainthe
volunteers, whichpresumablymadevolunteering more salient andgavethevolunteers some confidence inwhattheywere
doing. But inprinciple, therewas nothingto stopeducatedvillagers inintervention 2villages (orforthat matter, in
intervention 1villages)from reactingtothe campaignsbystartingsome classes on theirown. Indeedtheycould have
askedthe Prathamfacilitatorsforhelpwithstartingthe classes. This did not happen: there was no increase inthe
availabilityoftutoringclassesinintervention 1 and2villages.
Thus,none oftheinterventionhadanyeffectonlarge-group strategiesfrom anyofthethreeinterventions, and
thefirsttwointerventionsfailedtogeneratesmallgroupinterventions.The contrastbetweenthesefive negativeresults
andthe enormous impactofthelastinterventiononcoachingandchildoutcomes, is striking. The differencebetween
what happenedtothelarge groupandsmallgroupbehaviors maylieinthefactthatlargegroup mechanisms makevery
different demands onthe communitythansmall group mechanisms. Thefactthatthethirdintervention got so many
peopletovolunteerforread camps but almost entirelyfailedto influence involvementwiththeVECs, mightthen reflect
the community's expectations aboutthe efficacyofthelarge group mechanisms—ifyou do notbelievethatthese
mechanismswork,thereis no reasontoinvestinthem. We goonto arguethatthinking aboutthe different models of
participatoryaction can also helpus understandthe relationbetweenthese results andthe (insome instances, much more
encouraging) results fromthe otherrecentevaluations ofparticipatoryprograms (KremerandVermeersch, 2002; Olken,
2005; Banerjee and Duflo, 2006; Bjorkman-Svensson, 2006; and Duflo, Dupas, Kremer, 2007).
The contrastbetweenthe impact ofthefirstandparticularlythe secondinterventiononvolunteeringandthe
impact ofthethirdisperhapsless surprising,butitreinforcesthe evidencepresentedin Banerjee andDuflo (2006)
showingthatmerelygivingvillagersinformation aboutthe state ofpubhcgoodsinthevillage,withoutfacilitatingtheuse
ofthatinformation, maynot alwaysbeveryuseful. Whilepeopleinthevillagewere clearlypreparedtovolunteer,theydid
notfeel comfortable comingforwardto dosowithoutthetrainingandencouragementfromthefacilitators (althoughwe
do notknowwhetheritwastheencouragementorthetrainingthatdidit).
Inthe remaining sections ofthis paperwe describethe institutional context ofparticipatoryaction, emphasizing
the nature ofthe SSAmodel (section2); comparetheinterventionsthatare evaluated (section3); anddiscussthe dataand