Piercing the fog : intelligence and Army Air Forces operations in World War II PDF
Preview Piercing the fog : intelligence and Army Air Forces operations in World War II
Piercing the Fog Intelligence and Army Air Forces Operations in World War I1 John F. Kreis General Editor with contributions by Alexander S. Cochran, Jr. Robert C. Ehrhart Thomas A. Fabyanic Robert F. Futrell John F. Kreis Williamson Murray Air Force History and Museums Program Bolling Air Force Base Washington, D.C., 1996 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Piercing the fog: intelligence and Army Air Forces operations in World War I1 I John F. Kreis, general editor; with contributions by Alexander S. Cochran . . . [et al.]. p. cm. - (Special studies I AF History and Museums Program) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. World War, 1939-1945-Military intelligence-United States. 2. United States. Army Air Forces-History-World War, 1939-1945. 3. World War, 1939-1945-Aerial operations, American. I. Kreis, John F., 1940- . 11. Series: Special studies (Air Force History and Museums Program (U.S.)) D810.S7P49 1995 940.54'49734~20 95-1 1550 CIP ~~ ~~ ~ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 ii FOREWORD WHENJ APAN ATTACKED PEARL, HARBOR on December 7,1941, and Germany and Italy joined Japan four days later in declaring war against the United States, intelligence essential for the Army Air Forces to conduct effective warfare in the European and Pacific theaters did not exist. Piercing the Fog tells the intriguing story of how airmen built intelligence organizations to collect and process information about the enemy and to produce and dissemi- nate intelligence to decisionmakers and warfighters in the bloody, horrific crucible of war. Because the problems confronting and confounding air intelligence officers, planners, and operators fifty years ago still resonate, Piercing the Fog is particularly valuable for intelligence officers, planners, and operators today and for anyone concerned with acquiring and exploiting intelligence for successful air warfare. More than organizational history, this book reveals the indispensable and necessarily secret role intelligence plays in effectively waging war. It examines how World War I1 was a watershed period for Air Force Intelligence and for the acquisition and use of signals intelligence, photo reconnaissance intelligence, human resources intelligence, and scientific and technical intelligence. Piercing the Fog discusses the development of new sources and methods of intelligence collection; requirements for intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare; intelligence to support missions for air superiority, interdiction, strategic bombardment, and air defense; the sharing of intelligence in a coalition and joint service environment; the acquisition of intelligence to assess bomb damage on a target-by-target basis and to measure progress in achieving campaign and war objectives; and the ability of military leaders to understand the intentions and capabilities of the enemy and to appreciate the pressures on intelligence officers to sometimes tell commanders what they think the commanders want to hear instead of what the intelligence discloses. The complex problems associated with intelligence to support strategic bombardment in the 1940s will strike some readers as uncannily prescient to global Air Force operations in the 1990s. A half century ago, accurate, timely intelligence contributed significantly to victory and hastened the end of World War 11. Such a legacy is worth reading and thinking about by all those responsible for building, maintaining, and employing air power. How well intelligence is integrated with air operations is ... 111 Foreword even more important today than it was in the past. It will continue to prove as critical in the next century as it has been in this one. RICHARD P. HALLION Air Force Historian iv PREFACE THE MILITARY CALAMITY IN EUROPE in mid- 1940 called into serious question the ability of Great Britain to survive before the Geman onslaught. The near collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1941 after Germany’s invasion prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt to conclude he would eventually have no choice but to take up active, declared participation in the conflict. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, followed by Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States, decided the how and when. The Japanese attack not only plunged America into the war; the surprise of that attack underscored the woeful state of American military intelligence. Unable to meet the demands of field commanders and planners, military intelligence deficiencies imperiled efforts of the Army and Navy to defeat the enemies ranged against them worldwide. The Army Air Forces (AAF) were particularly deficient in information about enemy air forces and targets, a situation prompted by the AAF’s subsidiary position within the Army and by the limited understanding of the new art of air warfare. Improvements in that understanding and in the relationships between intelligence analysis and the use of its product in preparing first-rate offensive and defensive air and joint air-land-sea operations are the subject of this history. This volume treats the wartime period between 1941 and 1945, although preliminary discussion explores the interwar era, a time when the U.S. Army Air Corps developed an air doctrine that would place such strenuous demands on air intelligence during World War 11. For the wartime period, the study weighs the impact of air intelligence on doctrine, planning, strategy, tactics, resources, and joint and combined operations. This history addresses the various tools of intelligence including ULTRA,M AGIC, photointelligence, and Y intelligence. Human intelligence, the information from agents knowledgeable about enemy areas, is addressed in those geographical regions where it influenced air operations. In recounting events of the Pacific war, place names are spelled as they were at the time, and Japanese personal names are presented with the family name preceding the given name. Works of this nature and magnitude are possible only with the generous assistance of a variety of institutions and individuals. The authors are indebted to the Yale University Library for permission to cite and quote from the Henry L. Stimson Diaries and to the helpful staffs at the Library of Congress, V Preface Manuscript Division; the National Archives, Military Reference Branch, and the Washington National Records Center; The U.S. Army Military History Institute; the Air Force Historical Research Center; Air University Library; and the Reference Branch at the Air Force History Support Office. A special thanks is offered to those historians at the Air Force History Support Office who diligently read and critiqued the numerous early drafts and the publication division for turning draft work into final form. Eagle Aviation Services and Technology, Inc. (EAST, Inc.), of Chantilly, Virginia, researched and wrote this book while under contract to the U.S. Air Force. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF, provided the funding, while the Air Force History and Museums Pro- gram served as executive agent for project oversight. Special thanks are owed Maj. Gen. James C. Pfautz (USAF, Ret.), who sponsored and fully supported this project while serving as Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, and to Richard H. Kohn, former Air Force Historian, who saw the work undertaken. It fell to the members of the final review panel to read the manuscript in its entirety, and to these people the authors owe special appreciation for their insights and advice. Richard G. Davis, Diane T. Putney, Herman Wolk, R. Cargill Hall, Eduard Mark, and Col. David Tretler represented the Office of Air Force History on the panel, while Richard Wolf participated from the Air Force Intelligence Agency. The panel’s outside scholars included General Pfautz, who long believed that a historical analysis of this nature would be of interest to the informed public, B. Franklin Cooling of the Department of Energy, Ray Cline, formerly of the Office of Strategic Serviczs and the Central Intelligence Agency, Capt. Roger Pineau (USN, Ret.), who served as an intelligence officer in the Pacific during World War 11, Kenneth McDonald of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Edward J. Drea of the U.S. Army Center for Military History. The suggestions and perspective offered by the outside scholars were especially helpful. The authors are indebted to Frank W. Anderson, former NASA deputy historian and an Air Force intelligence officer during World War 11, for the substantive editorial support he brought to this project and to Barbara Wittig, project editor for this volume. vi AUTHORS ALEXANDER S. COCHRAN, Jr., teaches military history and strategy as a Professor of Military History at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He received a B.A. in history from Yale University and a Ph.D. in history from the University of Kansas. His publications include The MAGIC Diplomatic Summaries and Lemnitzer: His Life and Times, as well as numerous book chapters and articles on World War I1 strategy and intelligence. Professor ROBERT C. EHRHART is editor and principal author of Modern Warfare and Society, coeditor of Air Power and Warfare, and author of several articles on military history and airpower doctrine. A twenty-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force, he holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Texas at Austin and an M.S. in ForestryIRange Management from the University of Montana. He serves as a Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Montana’s School of Forestry. THOMAS A. FABYANIC is President of Eagle Aviation Services and Technology (EAST), Inc. He is the author of Strategic Air Attack in the United States Air Force: A Case Study and of various chapters and articles on war, air doctrine, and military professionalism. He earned an M.A. and a Ph.D. in history at St. Louis University. ROBERT FRANK FUTRELL holds a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of Mississippi and a Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University. During World War 11, he served as a historian with the U.S. Army Air Forces at the AAF Tactical School and with the Far East Air Forces in the Philippines. He is the author of The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953; The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, The Advisory Years to 1965; and Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force. He is also the author of numerous articles related to air power history. Before retirement, Futrell served for many years as aprofessor of military history at the Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. JOHN F. KREIS, a retired U.S. Air Force officer, is a historian and military and defense analyst as well as a Senior Fellow of the Air Force Historical Foundation. He holds a B.A. in economics from Willamette University, Salem, Oregon, and an M.A. in medieval history from the University of Delaware. He is the author of Air Warjiare and Air Base Air Defense, 1914-1973, as well as numerous articles on air power history and operations. vii Authors WILLIAMSON MURRAY is Professor of History at The Ohio State University and an Intelligence Officer in the U.S. Air Force Reserve. Among his publications are Military Effectiveness (which he coauthored in three volumes); Strategy for Defeat: The Lufhyaffe, 1933-1945, and the previous edition, Lufhyaffe; and The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin. He holds a B.A., an M.A., and a Ph.D. in history from Yale University. ... Vlll TABLE OF CONTENTS Page FOREWORD ................................................ iii PREFACE ................................................... v AUTHORS .................................................. vii Introduction John F . Kreis ................................ 1 Chapter 1 Early Intelligence Organization in the Army Air Corps Thomas A. Fabyanic and Robert F . Futrell ....... 11 American Air Intelligence in World War I ........... 12 Air Intelligence in the 1920s ...................... 17 Air Intelligence in the Early 1930s .................2 0 The Air Corps Tactical School and Air Intelligence ....2 4 Acquisition and Evaluation of Air Intelligence: Developments in Europe and Asia ..............2 8 The Approach of War ............................ 39 AWPD- 1: Planning an Air War .................... 46 Air Intelligence on the Eve of Pearl Harbor ...........5 1 A Tentative Assessment .......................... 54 Chapter 2 The Tools of Air Intelligence: ULTRA.M AGIC. Photographic Assessment. and the Y -Service Alexander S . Cochran. Jr., Robert C. Ehrhart. and John F . Kreis ............................. 57 ULTRA. ....................................... 59 The Importance of ULTRAi n the European Theater .....7 4 Photointelligence ............................... 80 Y Intelligence .................................. 94 ULTRAa nd MAGICin the Pacific and CBI ............9 9 B Section .................................... 105 Operational SIGINT and the Far East ..............1 06 ix
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