Physical layer security in wireless communications

308 Pages·2014·9.001 MB·English

by  Zhang, Yan, Song, Lingyang, Zhou, Xiangyun Sean

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Physical Layer
Security in Wireless
Communications
© 2014 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
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WIRELESS NETWORKS AND MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS
Dr. Yan Zhang, Series Editor
Simula Research Laboratory, Norway
E-mail: [email protected]
Broadband Mobile Multimedia: Physical Layer Security in Wireless
Techniques and Applications Communications
Yan Zhang, Shiwen Mao, Laurence T. Yang, Xiangyun Zhou, Lingyang Song, and Yan Zhang
and Thomas M. Chen ISBN: 978-1-4665-6700-9
ISBN: 978-1-4200-5184-1
Resource, Mobility, and Security
Cognitive Radio Networks: Architectures, Management in Wireless Networks and
Protocols, and Standards Mobile Communications
Yan Zhang, Jun Zheng, and Hsiao-Hwa Chen Yan Zhang, Honglin Hu, and Masayuki Fujise
ISBN: 978-1-4200-7775-9 ISBN: 978-0-8493-8036-5
Cooperative Wireless Communications RFID and Sensor Networks:
Yan Zhang, Hsiao-Hwa Chen, Architectures, Protocols, Security and
and Mohsen Guizani Integrations
ISBN: 978-1-4200-6469-8 Yan Zhang, Laurence T. Yang, and JimIng Chen
ISBN: 978-1-4200-7777-3
Delay Tolerant Networks: Protocols and
Applications Security in RFID and Sensor Networks
Athanasios V. Vasilakos, Yan Zhang, and Yan Zhang and Paris Kitsos
Thrasyvoulos Spyropoulos ISBN: 978-1-4200-6839-9
ISBN: 978-1-4200-1108-5
Security in Wireless Mesh Networks
Distributed Antenna Systems: Open Yan Zhang, Jun Zheng, and Honglin Hu
Architecture for Future Wireless ISBN: 978-0-8493-8250-5
Communications
Unlicensed Mobile Access Technology:
Honglin Hu, Yan Zhang, and Jijun Luo
Protocols, Architectures, Security,
ISBN: 978-1-4200-4288-7
Standards, and Applications
Game Theory for Wireless Yan Zhang, Laurence T. Yang, and Jianhua Ma
Communications and Networking ISBN: 978-1-4200-5537-5
Yan Zhang
WiMAX Network Planning and
ISBN: 978-1-4398-0889-4
Optimization
The Internet of Things: From RFID to the Yan Zhang
Next-Generation Pervasive Networked ISBN: 978-1-4200-6662-3
Systems
Wireless Ad Hoc Networking:Personal-
Lu Yan, Yan Zhang, Laurence T. Yang,
Area, Local-Area, and the Sensory-Area
and Huansheng Ning 
Networks
ISBN: 978-1-4200-5281-7
Shih-Lin Wu, Yu-Chee Tseng, and Hsin-Chu
Millimeter Wave Technology in Wireless ISBN: 978-0-8493-9254-2
PAN, LAN and MAN
Wireless Mesh Networking: Architectures,
Shao-Qiu Xiao, Ming-Tuo Zhou,
Protocols, and Standards
and Yan Zhang
Yan Zhang, Jijun Luo, and Honglin Hu
ISBN: 978-0-8493-8227-7
ISBN: 978-0-8493-7399-2
Mobile WiMAX: Toward Broadband
Wireless Quality-of-Service: Techniques,
Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks
Standards, and Applications
Yan Zhang and Hsiao-Hwa Chen
Maode Ma, Mieso K. Denko, and Yan Zhang 
ISBN: 978-0-8493-2624-0
ISBN: 978-1-4200-5130-8
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple
Access Fundamentals and Applications
Tao Jiang, Lingyang Song, and Yan Zhang
ISBN: 978-1-4200-8824-3
© 2014 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
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Physical Layer
Security in Wireless
Communications
Edited by
Xiangyun Zhou • Lingyang Song • Yan Zhang
© 2014 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
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CRC Press
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© 2014 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
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Version Date: 20131004
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Contents
Preface xi
Authors xiii
Contributors xv
1 Fundamentals of Physical Layer Security 1
1.1 Information-theoretic Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Shannon’s Cipher System and Perfect Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 Information-theoretic Secrecy Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Secret Communication over Noisy Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 Wiretap Channel Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.2 Coding Mechanisms for Secret Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Secret-key Generation from Noisy Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 Channel Model for Secret-key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 Coding Mechanisms for Secret-key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Coding for Wiretap Channels 17
2.1 Coding for the Wiretap Channel II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.1 Basics of Error-CorrectingCodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.2 Wiretap II Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Wiretap Coding with Polar Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2.1 Polar Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2.2 Polar Wiretap Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Coding for Gaussian Wiretap Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.1 Error Probability and Secrecy Gain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.2 Unimodular Lattice Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 LDPC Codes for the Gaussian Wiretap Channel 33
3.1 Channel Model and Basic Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Coding for Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.1 Asymptotic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.2 Optimized Puncturing Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.3 Reducing SNR Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.4 Finite Block Lengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
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3.3 System Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4 Key Generation from Wireless Channels 47
4.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2 Information-theoretic Models for Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.1 Key Generation via Unlimited Public Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.2 Key Generation with Rate Constraint in Public Discussion . . . . . 51
4.2.3 Key Generation with Side-information at Eve . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3 Basic Approaches for Key Generation via Wireless Networks . . . . . . . . 52
4.4 A Joint Source-Channel Key Agreement Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.1 Key Agreement with a Public Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4.2 Key Agreement without a Public Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5 Relay-assistedKey Generation with a Public Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.5.1 Relay-assistedKey Generation with One Relay . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.5.2 Relay-assistedKey Generation with Multiple Relays . . . . . . . . . 61
4.5.3 Relay-oblivious Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.6 Key Agreement with the Presence of an Active Attacker . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.6.1 Training Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.6.2 Key Generation Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.8 Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5 Secrecy with Feedback 69
5.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.2 The Gaussian Two-way Wiretap Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.3 Achieving Secrecy Using Public Discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.4 Achieving Secrecy Using Cooperative Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.4.1 Full-duplex Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4.2 Half-duplex Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.5 Achieving Secrecy through Discussion and Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.5.1 Jamming with Codewords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.5.2 Secrecy through Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.5.3 Block Markov Coding Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.6 When the Eavesdropper Channel States Are Not Known . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.7 Converse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.7.1 Outer Bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.7.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.9 Proof of Theorem 5.7.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.10 Proof of Theorem 5.7.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6 MIMO Signal Processing Algorithms for Enhanced Physical
Layer Security 93
6.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.2 Physical Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.2.1 Signal Processing Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.2.2 Secrecy Performance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
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6.2.3 The Role of CSI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.3 MIMO Wiretap Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.3.1 Complete CSI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.3.2 Partial CSI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.4 MIMO Wiretap Channel with an External Helper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.5 MIMO BroadcastChannel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.6 MIMO Interference Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.7 MIMO Relay Wiretap Networks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.7.1 Relay-aided Cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.7.2 Untrusted Relaying. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
7 Discriminatory Channel Estimation for Secure Wireless
Communication 115
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.2 Discriminatory Channel Estimation—Basic Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.3 DCE via Feedback and Retraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.3.1 Two-Stage Feedback-and-Retraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.3.2 Multiple-stage Feedback and Retraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.3.3 Simulation Results and Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.4 Discriminatory Channel Estimation via Two-way Training . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.4.1 Two-way DCE Design for Reciprocal Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.4.2 Two-way DCE Design for Nonreciprocal Channels . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.4.3 Simulation Results and Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.5 Conclusions and Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
8 Physical Layer Security in OFDMA Networks 137
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
8.2 Related Works on Secure OFDM/OFDM Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
8.2.1 Secure OFDM Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
8.2.2 Secure OFDMA Cellular Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
8.2.3 Secure OFDMA Relay Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
8.2.4 Secure OFDM with Implementation Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
8.3 Basics of Resource Allocation for Secret Communications . . . . . . . . . . 141
8.3.1 Power Allocation Law for Secrecy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8.3.2 Multiple Eavesdroppers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8.4 Resource Allocation for Physical Layer Security in OFDMA Networks . . . 142
8.4.1 Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
8.4.2 Optimal Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
8.4.3 Suboptimal Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
8.4.4 Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
8.4.5 Numerical Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
8.4.6 Discussion on False CSI Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
8.5 Conclusions and Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
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viii Contents
9 The Application of Cooperative Transmissions to Secrecy
Communications 153
9.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
9.2 When All Nodes Are Equipped with a Single Antenna . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
9.2.1 Cooperative Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
9.2.2 Relay Chatting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
9.3 MIMO Relay Secrecy Communication Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
9.3.1 When CSI of EavesdroppersIs Known . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
9.3.2 When CSI of EavesdroppersIs Unknown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
9.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
10 Game Theory for Physical Layer Security on Interference Channels 179
10.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
10.2 System Models and Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
10.2.1 Standard MISO Interference Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
10.2.2 MISO Interference Channel with Private Messages . . . . . . . . . . 183
10.2.3 MISO Interference Channel with Public Feedback and Private
Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
10.2.4 Discussion and Comparison of Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
10.3 Noncooperative Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
10.3.1 Noncooperative Games in Strategic Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
10.3.2 Solution for the MISO Interference Channel Scenarios . . . . . . . . 191
10.4 Cooperative Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
10.4.1 Bargaining Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
10.4.2 Nash Bargaining Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
10.4.3 Bargaining Algorithm in the Edgeworth Box . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
10.4.4 Walras Equilibrium Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
10.5 Illustrations and Discussions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
10.5.1 Comparisonof Utility Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
10.5.2 Noncooperative and Cooperative Operating Points . . . . . . . . . . 200
10.5.3 Bargaining Algorithm Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
10.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
10.7 Appendix: Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
10.7.1 Proof of Theorem 10.3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
10.7.2 Proof of Theorem 10.4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
10.7.3 Proof of Theorem 10.4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
10.7.4 Proof of Theorem 10.4.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
11 Ascending Clock Auction for Physical Layer Security 209
11.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
11.1.1 Cooperative Jamming for Physical Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . 210
11.1.2 Game Theory-based Jamming Power Allocation. . . . . . . . . . . . 211
11.1.3 Ascending Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
11.1.4 Chapter Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
11.2 System Model and Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
11.2.1 System Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
11.2.2 Source’s Utility Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
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Contents ix
11.2.3 Jammer’s Utility Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
11.3 Auction-based Jamming Power Allocation Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
11.3.1 Power Allocation Scheme based on Single Object Pay-as-Bid
Ascending Clock Auction (P-ACA-S). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
11.3.2 Power Allocation Scheme based on Traditional Ascending Clock
Auction (P-ACA-T) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
11.3.3 Power Allocation Scheme based on Alternative Ascending Clock
Auction (P-ACA-A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
11.4 Properties of the Proposed Auction-based Power Allocation Schemes . . . . 219
11.4.1 Optimal Jamming Power for Each Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
11.4.2 Convergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
11.4.3 Cheat-proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
11.4.4 Social Welfare Maximization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
11.4.5 Complexity and Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
11.5 Conclusions and Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
12 Relay and Jammer Cooperation as a Coalitional Game 237
12.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
12.1.1 Cooperative Relaying and Cooperative Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . 237
12.1.2 Relay and Jammer Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
12.1.3 Coalitional Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
12.1.4 Chapter Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
12.2 System Model and Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
12.3 Relay and Jammer Cooperation as a Coalitional Game . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
12.3.1 Coalitional Game Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
12.3.2 Properties of the Proposed Coalitional Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
12.4 Coalition Formation Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
12.4.1 Coalition Formation Concepts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
12.4.2 Merge-and-Split Coalition Formation Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . 246
12.5 Conclusions and Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
13 Stochastic Geometry Approaches to Secrecy in Large Wireless
Networks 253
13.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
13.1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
13.1.2 Stochastic Geometry Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
13.2 Secrecy Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
13.2.1 Network and Graph Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
13.2.2 Local Connectivity Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
13.2.3 Global Connectivity Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
13.2.4 Connectivity Enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
13.3 Secrecy Transmission Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
13.3.1 Network Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
13.3.2 Capacity Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
13.3.3 Illustrative Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
13.4 Current Limitations and Future Directions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
© 2014 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
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