Photography as the Aesthetic Determination of Difference

284 Pages·2014·13.99 MB·English

Photography as the
Aesthetic Determination of Difference
Daniel Rubinstein
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of Birmingham
City University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
January,2013
Supervisory committee
Professor Johnny Golding
Dr. Steve Kennedy
Birmingham City University, Birmingham Institute of Art and Design
'I certify that this work has not been accepted in substance for any degree other than
that of Doctorate of Philosophy being studied at The Birmingham Institute for Art &
Design (BIAD), Birmingham City University. I also declare that this work is the result
of my own investigations except where otherwise identified by references and that I
have not plagiarised another's work.'
Signed: __
2
I),lIli,:1 Rubinstein I'lmtlll.:'rapily as the Aesthetic Determination 01'l)ill,'Il'lh'C
Acknowledgments
This thesis would never have happened without the support of my
supervisor Professor Johnny Golding who not only taught me how to think but
also how to seek the 'thought of the outside'. Her confidence in the achievability
of this project provided me with a continuous source of intellectual and personal
encouragement. I am also grateful to Dr. Steve Kennedy, my second supervisor,
for his insightful comments and suggestions, I would also like to thank Brenda,
Barnaby, Hannah, Lauren, Mark, Mattia, Sheena and other members of the
Philosophers 'Salon for creating a space where one can become what one is.
I would like to express my gratitude to London South Bank University for
sponsoring my PhD studies and to thank my colleagues Andrew Dewdney and
Katrina Sluis for their support.
I would like to thank my family: Natalia Rubinstein and Ruth Amir who in
their different ways helped me to bring this work to completion. My late father
Boris Rubinstein introduced me to photography when I was a child. The memory
of this ontological moment of difference was at the back of my mind throughout
this work.
Finally, my greatest thanks go to Riikka Laulainen for her love, humour
and friendship, and to Freddie and Ludo for teaching me the wisdom of non-
human intelligence.
This thesis is dedicated to Riikka.
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1 INTRODUCTION 7
1.1 BECOMING INVISIBLE 11
1.2 METHOD: PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES • • •26
1.3 TECHNOLOGY FORMERLY KNOWN ASLIFE 30
2 THE THICKNESS OF THE IMAGE 3Jl
2.1 TECHNOLOGY AND THICKNESS 44
2.2' DOUBLE ARTICULATION 56
2.3 DYNAMISM, DIFFERENCE, CHAOS 62
2.4 TECHNOLOGY, HISTORY, REPRESENTATION 66
2.5 POLITICS INTHE FIELD OF VISION 68
3 THE IMPASSE OF REPRESENTATION ,'-'-'=.!.=,,~'-,,_... 73
3.1 REPRESENTATION: SETTING THEPROBLEM 73
3.2 ONTOLOGY OF REPRODUCTION 83
3.3 ARISTOTLE: ESTABLISHING REPRESENTATION ASTHE BASIS OF RATIONALITY 88
3.4 HEGEL: REFLECTION, SUBLATION, SPECULATION 100
3.5 WHAT DOES NOT WORK IN HEGEL AND HOW IT IMPACTS PHOTOGRAPHY 112
3.6 HEIDEGGER: REPRESENTATION AND IDENTITY 116
3.7 PERDURANCE: HEIDEGGER'S MOVE BEYOND DIALECTICS 126
3.8 LATENT IMAGE ASTHE EVENT OFTRANSLATION 134
4 ARCHIVE, APPARATUS, EVENT ,.._"'-'~.!.d4J._
4.1 INTRODUCTION 141
4.2 THE ARCHIVE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 146
4.3 FRACTALITY AND IMMANENCE 158
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4.4 EVENT-IMAGE AND THE SUBLIME 164
5 TIME: ECSTATIC TEMPORALITY OF THE 'IS' 174
5.1 INTRODUCTION 174
5.2 THE SUBLIME AND THE INTERVAL 177
5.3 HEIDEGGER:AUGENBLICK. TIME OFTHE EVENT 183
5.4 HEIDEGGER AND 'PHOTOGRAPHY' 192
6 SIMULACRA AND THE LATENT IMAGE 205
6.1 POSITIONING SIMULACRA WITHIN PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 205
6.2 BETWEEN REPRESENTATION AND SIMULACRA (OR HOW TO MAKE YOURSELF AQUASI-
REPRESENTATION) 211
6.3 THE LATENT IMAGE 233
6.4 LATENT IMAGE AND SUBJECTIVITY (THE TRUTH IN PHOTOGRAPHY) 239
6.5 PHOTOGRAPHY: DIFFERENCE AT ASTANDSTILL 250
7 (ONCLUSION 2(14
7.1 IMMANENCE: APHOTOGRAPH 264
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Abstract
The original contribution of this thesis is the insight that photography is
better served through the philosophy of difference than through the metaphysics
of identity. This thesis takes seriously the mechanically produced image in order
to claim that its technologies can be considered as the method that allows access
to the SUbjective modes within difference and develops them in relation to the
specifically photographic conditions of production: repetition, simulacra and the
latent image. This thesis proposes that considering photography from the point of
view of the content of the image is a false move as it necessarily brings in the
question of the subject (a key concern for philosophy), narrowly understood as
the immobile centre for which the world is represented as meaning. Rather than
pursuing photography as text, which brings in the problem of language, this
thesis suggests that visuality - understood as fragmentary and recursive self-
replication - is nothing other than photography's pull away from representation
and pointing to the way difference, as multiplicity of open-ended possibilities,
could be approached as the sine-qua-non for photography.
This thesis not only shows that visuality can never be fully understood as
representation and requires the untamed environment of difference, but that in so
doing one realises that philosophy of visuality is nothing other than photography.
This has the additional outcome inasmuch as it also begins to pull away at the
whole edifice of metaphysics itself, which opens up another avenue of research
that leads not only out of thinking metaphysically, but also out of thinking
humanly. These are wildly creative paths, and this thesis is pointing in the
direction that can be taken without however solving these questions.
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1 Introduction
Everything straight deceives. J
This thesis began from an observation that there is something
noncomunicable about photography that escapes all attempts to theorise it from
the converging perspectives of visuality and the content of the image.' That
which escapes because it cannot be subsumed under the aspect of identity is not
an accident or aberration but constitutes the key to photographic expressivity that
both exceeds and dissolves representation as the stencilling of pre-existing
reality.' There is, in other words something about photography that cannot be
IMartin Heidegger, Nietzsche; The Eternal Recurrence of the Same. Trans. by David Farrell
Krell (San Francisco: Harper, 1991), 41.
See Walter Benjamin's suggestion that "language is in every case not only communication of
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the communicable but also, at the same time, asymbol of the noncomunicable." W. Benjamin,
"On Language as Such". Trans. Edmund Jephcott, in Selected Writings Vol. 2. Pt. 2. 1931 - 193./.
(Cambridge, Mass; London, England: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 74. As
will be discussed later in this section, visuality and content converge around the problem of
subjectivity as the implied ground of signification.
This thesis takes issue with the long tradition that considers the photographic image as
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mechanical and accurate imprint ofa pre-existing reality, not because this tradition is wrong but
because it is immune to the paradoxes of subjectivity and representation. Before the invention of
photography, itwas considered that the camera obscura produces an exact and automatic copy of
the real. Itisevident for instance inthe notes for the Confessions by Jean Jacques Rousseau: 'It is
aquestion of my portrait and not of a book. Iam going to work, so to speak, in a camera
obscura, and will need no other art but that of exactly tracing what Isee'. Quoted in: Tracy B.
Strong, Jean Jacques Rousseau: The Politics of the Ordinary. (Oxford UK: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2002),16. While exploring the role of camera obscura as a philosophical metaphor is
beyond the scope of thisthesis, it isworthy to note that Rousseau was alert to the paradox of
representation in his critique of the bourgeoisie, as he saw that representative power tends
necessarily to dominate and distort the civil society that itclaims to represent. Pierre Mancnt, An
Intellectual History of Liberalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).63-67. And
yet, as evident from the above quotation, Rousseau did not extend this understanding to
representation by means of amechanical apparatus. One of the key concerns of this research isto
argue that visual representation and political representation are not disconnected entities but
belong to one conceptual consistency that isgrounded in the enlightenment project of rationality.
See Infra Chapter 3, The Impasse of Representation for an in-depth analysis of representation. On
captured through the discourses of verisimilitude and indexicality precisely
because these two approaches are ultimately anthropological, which is to say
they begin by placing the (human) subject and subjectivity at the centre of their
investigations. Theoretical investigations that consider photography to be 'a type
of icon or a form of visual likeness, which bear an indexical relationship to its
object' take it as a given that the photographic image is a description of a pre-
existing reality, independent from the image and unaffected by it.4 In contrast,
this thesis will propose that photography is not only a description of an object,
but is itself an object which, as the product of specific technological processes,
erases and creates subjectivity: Iterases a static, anthropocentric subjectivity and
replaces it with multiple and divergent notion of the subject which emerges not
out of representation but out of repetition, reproduction and difference.'
camera obscura as an ideological metaphor see: Sarah Kofman, Camera Obscura: Of Ideology.
Translated by Will Straw. (London: Athlone Press, 1998).
4 Rosalind E. Krauss, The Originality of the Avent-garde and Other Modernist Myths
(Cambridge, Mass, London: MIT Press, 1985),203. She continues: 'Every photograph isthe
result of a physical imprint transferred by light reflections onto a sensitive surface.' Ibid.
This understanding of technology is drawing on Heidegger: 'Technology is a mode of
S
revealing. Technology comes to presence [West] inthe realm where revealing and unconcealment
take place, where aletheia, truth happens.' Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning
Technology, and Other Essays. Trans. by William Lovitt. (New York: Harper and Row, 1977),
13. Accordingly the technology of photography isnot considered here as processes with a
predetermined outcome but as a way by which 'truth happens' i.e. certain knowledge isbeing
revealed. However, this knowledge is not about the objects represented in a photograph but about
the very process by which representation happens. This understanding of technology as a site
where subjectivity is formed (and deformed) isessential for the thought of the key thinkers
engaged inthis thesis. See for instance Deleuze's books on cinema. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema I:
The Movement-image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjarn (London: Athlone, 1992).
And Gilles Deleuze. Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galcta
(London: Athlone Press, 1989). Trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: Athlone
Press, 1989). See also: 'Here lies the vanity of the well-meaning discourse on technology, which
asserts that the problem with apparatuses can be reduced to the question of their correct usc.
Those who make such claims seem to ignore a simple fact: ifa certain process of subjectification
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Difference here means nothing more to begin with than that there is always
an excess to the visual that is expressive, singular, dynamic, a-radical and non-
identica1.6 This excess cannot be accounted for from within those theories that
begin from the notion that photographs are meaningful surfaces and proceed by
situating them within linear space and chronological time. Itis the original
contribution of this thesis to suggest that all theories that consider photographs as
visible pictures begin from taking something for granted: namely their starting
point is an implicit acceptance of the logic of representation as the founding
framework within which photographs acquire meaning as images of pre-existing
reality; that is of things and events that happened in the past. For this reason, one
of the central arguments of this thesis is that there is something else present in
photography that transcends and exceeds visibility and representation. On the
pages of this research photography is put forward not as a regime of
representation, but as the specific interlacing of technology of repetition and
[oo.] corresponds to every apparatus, then itis impossible for the subject of an apparatus to use it
"in the right way." Giorgio Agarnben, What Is An Apparatus? And Other Essays, trans. David
Kishik and Stephan Pedatella (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2009), 21.
The notion of a-radicality isdeveloped by Golding as a shift away from 'base-superstructure
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picture of power' towards a singular multiplicity that she names as 'electro-digital-acoustic-
curved-space-repetitive projection-screen-metonymy-of-our-wired-times'. Sue Golding,
"Singular Multiplicity: The A-radicality Lecture - Second Meditation on Identity, Ethics, and
Aesthetics [or What Does ItMean to 'inhabit' Technology"]," Issues ill Contemporary Culture
and Aesthetics. no. 10/11 (2000): 291. The concept of 'difference' is key for this thesis and it is
taken up in detail infra Chapter 4, Archive, Apparatus, Event and Chapter 6, Simulacra and the
Latent Image.
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visuality which produces an image of difference that is central to an ontological
account of the way thought comes into being.'
The way of getting to difference is twofold: first it is necessary to establish
the dyad of the philosophical and the photographic discourse through the
question of representation (this is the task of the Chapters 2 and 3). While the
starting point of this undertaking is within the traditional opposition between
iconoclastic/iconophiliac approaches to the image, the intention is to demonstrate
that there is, in fact, ontological connection between visual representation and the
concept of representation in philosophy in which the visual is the foundation of
the philosophical and not, as it is usually thought, the other way around'
However, the reversal of this relationship is not sufficient and will amount to
nothing more than a simple reversal of metaphysical values in which iconophilia
triumphs over iconoclasm but leaving the opposition itself intact." Therefore, a
second step is necessary in which the notion of the visual - reconstructed as a
multiplicity of expressive, dynamic and singular fragments - is expanded and
diversified to become the constellation I pattern I diagram for a fragmentary and
dis-jointed philosophy or at least for a glimpse of what philosophy could become
This point isdeveloped inthe following section, and infra Chapter 6.
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For Marie-Jose Mondzain the 'humanizing necessity of image-producing operations' places the
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possibility of image making as the origin of the possibility of thought: 'seeing an image is a
condition for vision in the constitution of the speaking subject. [oo.] [I]mage producing operations
[are] a way of discovering the conditions of possibility for a relation between our gaze and the
visible world.' Marie-Jose Mondzain, "What Does Seeing An Image Mean?" Journal of Visual
Culture 9, no. 3 (2010): 308.
9 For a discussion of iconoclasm in in French theory see Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The
Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-century French Thought. (Berkeley USA: Univ. of California
Press, 2004). Also see infra Chapter 3.1, Representation: Setting the Problem.
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