Philosophy in an African Place

141 Pages·2011·6.09 MB·English

by  Bruce B. Janz

For Lisa, and in memory of Emmanuel Eze
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Janz, Bruce B., 1960-
Philosophy in an African place I Bruce B. Janz.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-7391-3668-3 (cloth: alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-7391-3670-6 (electronic)
1. Philosophy, African. I. Title.
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Contents
Acknowledgments ix
I: Introduction: Philosophy-in-Place
2: Tradition in the Periphery 37
3: Questioning Reason 63
4: "Wisdom Is Actually Thought" 99
5: Culture and the Problem of Universality 121
6: Listening to Language 155
7: Practicality: African Philosophy's Debts and Duties 185
8: Locating African Philosophy 213
Bibliography 253
Index 265
vii
Acknowledgments
CHAPTERS 1 AND 2
Small excerpts from both of these chapters were published as "Philosophy as
I f Place Mattered: The Situation of African Philosophy," Havi Carel and Da
vid Gomez, eds. What Philosophy Is (London: Continuum Publishers, 2004):
[03-115. These excerpts are reprinted by the kind permission of the editors
and of Continuum International Publishing Group.
CHAPTER 4
Chapter 4 has been published in slightly altered form as: "Thinking Wisdom:
The Hermeneutical Basis of Sage Philosophy." African Philosophy 11, no.
[ (June 1998): 57-71. Reprinted by the kind permission of Katherine Faull,
e"ecutor of the estate of Emmanuel Eze.
CHAPTERS
A few paragraphs in chapter 8 came from "Alterity, Dialogue, and African
Philosophy," Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, Emmanuel
Cflukwudi Eze, ed. (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1997): 221-238.
Several institutions supported research on this book or gave me office and
library resources during the writing of the book. They include.; Augustana
ix
x Acknowledgments
University College (now the Augustana Faculty of the University of ~Ibe~a),
University of Central Florida, University of Nairobi, Fordham Umverslty,
Chapter One
and Rhodes University, South Africa. . .
This would not have been possible without the input, support, and cntlque
of several people. These include: Emmanuel Eze, Kai Kress~, Gail Presbe~, Introduction: Philosophy-in-Place
Pedro Tabensky, Ward Jones, John Pittman, Lisa Roney, Keith Harder, Phil
Merklinger, Ross Emmett, Shaun Gallagher, Jay van Hook, !ennifer ~isa
Vest, Kurt Young, Claudia Schippert, Shelley Park, Joseph Situma, Onare
Nyarwath, and Bertold Bemreuter.
WHERE IS PHILOSOPHY'S APPROPRIATE PLACE?
lJe:rrida, as he often does, asks the probing and incisive question:
1 will begin with the question "where?" Not directly with the question "where
are we?" or "where have we come to?" but "where does the question of the
right to philosophy take placeT' which can be immediately translated by "where
ought it take placeT Where does it find today its most appropriate place?1
Where, he asks, does the question of the right to philosophy take place?
Not "who has the right," but "where is the right?" One might be inclined
to say, without much thought, that it can take place anywhere, that we are
ull philosophers in our own ways, that philosophy is about abstractions and
universals, which are available wherever there is someone to think them. Or,
someone else might be inclined to say, again without much thought, that it
cun only take place in the prescribed places, the departments sanctioned by
the university and the discipline. Either anywhere or somewhere (but not
nowhere). But from where does the conviction arise, that it can happen any
where, and where do those stand who define that prescribed place? "Where"
iii not so easily answered.
Why should "where" matter to African philosophers? The history of Afri
clln philosophy has been the history of struggle to find a place, or to claim
u place, or to assert the entitlement to a place, in the face of those who have
muintained that it has no place. It is not everywhere, nor is it in any particular,
privileged place, according to those we have grown accustomed to listen to.
11 iN nowhere. Not the nowhere of transcendence, nor the nowhere of primor
dlulity, or memory, or promise, but rather the nowhere of obliviqn, or at best
2 Chapter I Introduction: Philosophy-in-Place 3
derivativeness. Even the traditions of African philosophy that are most likely lIized over time, whose work has sustained philosophical debate, and who
to simply assert their entitlement to a place and willfully ignore the history of currently engage the set of recognized questions and thinkers. The recogni
exclusion, must always have one eye on that which is being ignored. These lion afforded philosophy by other disciplines is such that philosophy has
traditions too come from a place, an intellectual place as well as a geographi been given a territory in relation to other territories, with disputed border
cal and cultural one. lands to be sure, but with a kind of integrity.
That there might be a "where" of philosophy suggests that there can be What is not often noticed, though, is that the question "what is philoso
a geography of philosophy (as opposed to a philosophy of geography, or phy?" does not easily lend itself to the work it has to do in legitimating the
some other Hegelian inheritance). The idea that philosophy itself might be field of philosophy. "What is (or what should count as) philosophy?" is es
the subject of the inquiry of some other discipline is not new; there is, after sentially a metaphysical question (with, of course, moral and epistemological
all, the sociology of philosophy,2 an anthropology of philosophy,3 and one undertones), implying we can tind an essence, and it assumes a celtain kind
might see the discussions concerning the end of philosophy as disciplinary or answer. It assumes that the question can be answered in the abstract before
attempts to break apart the hegemony of philosophy and its presumption to il is answered in the concrete, that any potential candidate might approach the
universality.4 Philosophy has always relied on texts; thus, it can be reduced bench and plead for inclusion, and the case will be judged against existing
to textual studies. It has predominantly been done by white males of a cer siandards. But there is a circularity-how can we ask "what is philosophy"
tain class; thus, it can be seen as products of desire or power. In each case, a apart from that which has been regarded as philosophy to this point? We tell
hermeneutic of suspicion breaks apart philosophy's pretensions to uniquely our students that there is something intrinsic to philosophical questions that
access the universal, and if it has no more access to universals, its raison makes them philosophical rather than, say, psychological, political, or his
d' etre dissipates. torical, but how could we tell the difference between our abstract image of
Is this what is behind imagining a geography of philosophy, a breakdown philosophy and the one we have inherited from others in the West who have
or dissipation of philosophy? I do not think so. Asking "where does the ques "Iso identified themselves as part of this enterprise?
tion of the right to philosophy take place?" does not suggest that philosophy That metaphysical, abstract question, meant to establish a standard that all
is reducible to the local beliefs of a group of people, nor that philosophy can applicants must meet, seems to undermine itself, for it cannot be asked in the
be subsumed under other disciplinary interests. The geography of philosophy abstract anymore. Those who might be able to ask it are already immersed in
does not lead to ethnophilosophy. Placing philosophy in a geography suggests a tradition. And, there are other problems: who are these judges, who would
that it has contingent but not arbitrary interests, that it responds to and shapes determine the legitimacy of "questionable" areas? Who appointed them? Are
a particular set of conditions of reflection. It is the contention of this book they able to stand beyond any tradition, and judge fairly? Of course not.
that philosophy must attend to the conditions in which its questions arise, and
For most philosophers, these questions are moot and uninteresting. Either
that this attention does not diminish philosophy's traditional (although never we think we already know philosophy when we see it, or we have intemal
completely fulfilled) striving for universals. l:led the critical debates of the past decades, and the question of place reduces
Imagining a geography of philosophy means asking a different question
11Ir us to the question of contextualizing conditions for the production of
than philosophers are used to asking. The identity question "what is phi
philosophy. In either case, we inherit an existing acknowledged tradition.
losophy?" has long been a focus of philosophical activity. Certainly when Yel, for African philosophers, these questions are central. Africa has always
it comes to judging whether a "marginal" area of inquiry should count as
lubored under the accusation of the West that it is incapable of generating a
philosophy, that question has been central. But even in mainstream work,
philosophy. Even now, African philosophy is as likely to be seen as a species
philosophers have always presumed that they have an identifiable domain, of cultural or postcolonial studies, or of "self-studies" areas such as African
governed in part by the nature of the questions asked, in part by the identity American studies.
of the citizens, both historical and current, and in part by the recognition 'The concern with philosophical identity and legitimacy is really a concern
afforded the field by those who are not philosophers. The questions asked, for one's place in a discipline, and in the academy. The "nowhere-ness" of
which count as philosophical, are those which fit into the broad categories AI'ricun philosophy, from the point of view of the discipline as a whole, must
that every first year student learns -ontology, epistemology, axiology, he countered by those who believe that African philosophy has or deserves
methodology. The citizens of the domain are those who have been recog- u pluce on the philosophical map. But how? The options to thi~ point have
4 Chapter J Introduction: Philosophy-in-Place 5
been clear-either show how one's work really does meet the standards of THINKING IN PLACE
the discipline and always has ("we are really part of your country after all"),
or show that one's work describes a new facet of philosophy, previously ig One sense of being "in place" suggests a lack of motion. "Running in place"
nored ("your country's boundaries must extend to encompass us"), or assert suggests expending energy but not really getting anywhere; "treading water"
that one's work predates and forms the basis of the discipline at large ("your (swimming in place) is what a person does while waiting to be rescued. It is
country is really our country"), or finally argue that one's work has its own no wonder that we have thought of place as a static idea, as one which con
integrity, judged by its own standards, which nevertheless can be translated notes lack of imagination, lack of "direction," or worst, impending morbid
to the discipline at large ("we have our own country-now let's negotiate ity. For philosophical travelers, this simply will not do. And yet, this book
trade relations"). is about the importance of place, the idea that thinking in place is not only
All these strategies are good spatial thinking. In each case, the metaphysi something to be desired, but which is ultimately unavoidable.
cal question, "Is there an African philosophy'?" guides the kind of research What does "thinking in place" mean" In part, it means paying attention
that is done. The research flows along one of the lines mentioned, and the to where we are and who is around us. Philosophers have not been particu
ultimate goal is to establish that, in some way, African philosophy can carve larly good at listening, to our "informants" (to the extent that we even think
out or claim a space on the academic map. Many African philosophers have we have informants), to our peers, to our audiences, to other disciplines,
felt uneasy about this; it is common to hear and read pleas to stop arguing to other cultures. When philosophers think about interdisciplinarity, it usu
about whether African philosophy exists, and start doing it. Some have gone lilly takes the form of providing the "theory" for other disciplines. In other
further, and simply regarded the question of the existence and nature of Af words, we think that our contribution is to help clarify the first principles
rican philosophy as alreadY answered, or as pointless, and have moved on or theoretical foundations of other disciplines. Science, for example, can
to consider specific problems. The frustration is understandable, and points use its tools to investigate the world, but it cannot scientifically inquire
to the effort wasted on justifying one's existence, and the insult implied in ubout science. That is a philosophical task, and the same goes for other
answering someone else's challenge. disciplines. So, we have tended to think of other disciplines as the fodder
And yet, can a philosopher ever stop asking what it is to philosophize? for philosophical discussion.
This is the fundamental question of the discipline. It is thought thinking Notice the assumption here-philosophers clarify the methods or assump
itself. This is, finally, all that we do-ask fundamental questions, including lions of other disciplines. Who clarifies philosophical methods or assump
questions about the nature of our questions and those doing the question liuns? Well, philosophers do. Philosophy, we think proudly, is the only truly
ing. And it is no different for African philosophy, but therein lies the central He If-reflexive discipline. While philosophers may be willing to admit that
problem. How can one ask the central question of philosophy, while not philosophy happens in social contexts, it is still about ideas; while it may
appearing to ask it as a response to a challenge from an otherwise indiffer hllppen predominantly through texts, it is not reducible to literary theory;
ent discipline? while ideas may have been used to justify the power of some over others, it
The spatial, "mapping" strategies mentioned earlier left something out. IN not simply politics. Most philosophers paid little attention to the possibility
Not another strategy for mapping African philosophy in the academic world, thul philosophy might have ended, either as a result of a Hegelian comple
but rather the question of why anyone, most of all Africans, cares about tion of history or as the result of a postmodern fragmentation of disciplinary
philosophy at alL One might say that, like science, philosophy has a luster knowledge to the extent that philosophy's pretensions to universality were
in Western society, that it represents reason at its most rigorous, and that any 110 longer relevant. For philosophers, by and large, these pronouncements of
society that cannot say it has a philosophy is somehow not quite civilized. philosophy's demise went by unnoticed.
This is the progressivist inheritance of Hegel, and it is hard to shake. But And perhaps that is as it should be. Self-reflexive or not, a philosopher
there is another possible answer. One might ask what it is, from any given needs faith that his or her area of expertise still exists in order to carryon. But
culture, that a person feels the need to use philosophical reason to analyze II' philosophers are the only ones who reflect on themselves, they are in the
or reflect. How does philosophical reasoning emerge'? Where does it come prCHumptuous and uncomfortable position of believing themselves to be, in
from? As Derrida has already asked, "where does the question of the right to M pl'Uctical sense, above method and disciplinarity, the self-thinking thought,
philosophy take place'?" the view from nowhere.
6 Chapter 1 Introduction: Philosophy-In-Place 7
But the fact is, philosophy is not from nowhere, Philosophy always comes The traditional question put before African philosophers concerning their
from a place, and that place is never completely covered over by abstraction. I1cld is this: What is the identity of African philosophy? Almost all thinkers
It is never irrelevant, even if it has been ignored. Not that there is some neces Mart from this point, if only to express frustration that the question cannot be
sary causal connection or geographical determinism, as if by figuring out the II voided. Variations on statements such as the following are common at the
place from which philosophy comes, we can encapsulate it, know it, and need hcginning of work on African philosophy:
not attend to its actual content Place is a far more complex notion than what
can be contained in geography. Philosophy is not reducible to place; there is no Thus in almost all the institutions of higher learning in Africa, COUl1ies in African
genetic fallacy or geographical determinism here. Philosophy remains a reflec philosophy are designed, but topped with questions such as: What is African
tion on its place, geographically, culturally, disciplinarily, and intellectually. philosophy? Does African philosophy exist? Who is an Mrican philosopher?6
If this is true, reflecting on the place(s) that philosophy finds itself in might
tell us something crucial about its possibilities. African philosophy is a par Questions such as these already assume an essentialist stance. They assume
ticularly good context in which to take on this task, as I will argue shortly, that an identity will be found, or at least posited, SO that the task of reflection
since (whether its practitioners put it in explicit terms or not) it is consumed ..:un take place. The task of this book is to survey the ways in which such
with its place in the world of philosophy in general, its place in relation to its essentialism has caused problems for African philosophy. The impulse to
cultural origins and present milieu, its place in the formation of the identi find an essential foundation, to map terrain, to carve out a bit of intellectual
ties of its practitioners. At the same time, 1 believe it has tried to contain the tcrritory from an otherwise recalcitrant discipline, has led to the continuing
troublesome and mUltiplying questions about place by appealing to space and nced for self-justification. This ultimately casts the conversation between
the onto-theological guarantees that such a move affords. Africa and the rest of the philosophical world as one in which self and other
Philosophy resides primarily in the questions that make particular concepts ure in an opposition whose only resolution can be found in the diminution of
viable, not in its dogmas, proponents, or history. Because of this, it is possible the other. So, African philosophy ties its hopes to finding a niche that has not
to regard philosophy as taking place seriously. Philosophy has usually been heen explored, or has been abandoned, or has been forcibly co-opted at some
seen as a set of practices which abstract from place. To the extent that place is puint in the past. The reaction by the philosophical establishment has either
taken seriously, one is not doing philosophy, but rather something else-po been bemused tolerance or active resistance. Either way, the strategy of using
litical studies, literature, anthropology, or some other discipline. Philosophy metaphysics to establish the credentials of this area only serves to further the
is not reducible to place in some determinist fashion, nor is philosophy-in essentialist malaise, and continues to render the area as a marginal pursuit.
place against abstraction. All abstraction is itself derivative on the conditions This is violent philosophy, and it only breeds more violence.
in which ideas form. Philosophical questions are necessarily questions that Is there another way? I believe there is. The question of African philosophy
have some element of abstraction in them, and that includes both analytic needs to be re-asked, not from an essentialist but from a phenomenological
philosophy as well as interpretive thought as it appears in various traditions. lind hermeneutical point of view. Instead of carving territory, there should
So what might place mean, when it comes to philosophy? Jeffrey Mal be Ii way to rethink this nascent field through its own theoretical structures,
pas, in Place and Experience,S argues that our sense of self. space and time, ruther than through a metaphysical attitude inherited from elsewhere. If this
agency, objectivity are all tied to our sense of place. These central aspects cun be done, then the conversations that African philosophy has with other
of human experience, then, the ones which have been of intense interest to IJhilosophical pursuits, other disciplines, and other sets of commitments, can
philosophers, must take place seriously. Malpas is not the first to see place as yield It positive result. Rather than asking "What is the identity of African phi
integrally and fundamentally related to the human condition. The later Hei IU!lophy?" one might instead ask "What is it to do philosophy in this (African)
degger, in shifting his emphasis from time to place, came to regard dwelling plu..:e?" The concept of place has received comparatively little philosophical
as a central feature of being human in the world, and wrote about the ways in auention until this century, possibly because the problem of how to reconcile
which technology can serve to cover over dwelling. Since Heidegger, a steady the particular and the universal in philosophy tended to be solved by opting
stream of philosophers have addressed various aspects of the relationship fur the universal. Space was, of course, much discussed. But place was left to
between subjectivity and place, but the question of philosophy's own place is Ihe ilrtist to represent, to the literary figure to describe, and to the colonist to
lIubHume under a universalizing structure of reason. And yet, the question of
still largely unexplored.
8 Chapter I lmroduction: PJlilosophy-in-Place 9
"how it is done here" continues to be the operative epistemology for the vast If philosophical reflection is not as easy as identifying a traditional/modem
majority of the world. dichotomy, where can we find it? The milieu will not be investigated simply
Heidegger, perhaps, gives the first systematic glimpse into place, but it hy considering the various forms of opposition that are possible within it.
falls to Merleau-Ponty to make the concept the centerpiece of a philosophi This at best is an attempt to catalogue modalities, or expressions, of the mi
cal system. One might take his notion of embodied knowledge as requiring a lieu, without attempting to enter into it and understand the possibilities. But
sense of place for fulfillment. The two together, along with any mediating de this does not mean that we cannot ask the central question of this chapter.
vices (such as technology) that make the connection between body and place What is it to do philosophy in this place? The "place" alluded to here does not
possible, we will call the "milieu." When we ask about place, therefore, we suggest a limit to the modalities. The place is not traditional; nor is it modem.
ask about the type of knowledge that is made possible in a particular milieu. These are attempts to fix the place by referring to another place that serves
To a certain extent, the knowledge itself will be a function of the milieu, and liS an opposition.
both the place and the body that knows the place will tind their identity in the Where is this place? Put another way, more colloquially, where am 11 At
kind of relationships possible in the milieu. one level, one might limit the discussion of place to immediate geographical
How does philosophy fit into the milieu? If it is true that everyone re location. 1 am wherever my body is. I am here. But where is here? How do
flects on a world of meaning, and at the same time the place and subject are I define "hereness"? Usually it has something to do with geography. Most
defined reciprocally, where does philosophical retlection fit? The critique people would answer that question referring to physical placement. But how
of ethnophilosophy, that reflection must be in some way different from the do we do that? We sometimes give names-University of Nairobi, Nairobi,
day-to-day practice of life, is surely correct. Philosophy becomes a particular Kenya, Africa. "Where" indicates familiarity with these political structures.
kind of reflection in the milieu. It is not abstracted reflection, which severs Someone 1000 years ago could be standing in exactly this spot, and if asked
the ties between meaning and structure; it is universal reflection, in which the "where are you" would not understand the answers we give now.
goal is not day-to-day coping but rather the larger project of self-conscious This suggests a couple of things-our sense of place is time-dependent
reflection on and maintenance of the milieu itself. It is the reflection that al (we label it using temporally indexed indicators). Our sense of place is also
lows the thinker to transcend cultural boundaries while at the same time being dependent on some sort of common knowledge. If you go half way around
forever tied to them. the world, and someone asks you where you are from, saying "Nairobi" may
If philosophy becomes a unique sort of reflection on the milieu, we might not mean much to them.
ask just where this can be found. I have already alluded to the possibility There is something else-my answer to the question "where am I?" also
that the sages might point toward this, but 1 would not want to set this up as depends on a sense of purpose. Who wants to know, and why? This seems
another example of a traditional/modem split. in which the "traditional" has to suggest that there are many places, and I choose my answer depending on
some access to some sort of pure identity that can be articulated only through the occasion.
the auspices of the professional (modem) philosopher. Serequeberhan advo Where am I? I am beside X, either another person, or another thing. Some
cates something like this in theory. and current sage philosophy practices it. . tlllles we give location not as a label, but as a relation. Of course, someone
Roles, however, cannot so easily be defined. There is no purity in African might wonder where X is then, but the chain of relations could continue on.
philosophy. But this dialectic serves not only to lionize the traditional as some We give relational locations in other ways as well. If we want to know iden
sort of well-spring of true African thought (which may in fact not be the case), tity, you might say "I am the sisterlbrother of X, the child of Y." This locates
but also is a kind of false humility on the part of the modern philosopher Y')U, not physically, but in terms of some other principle of place. In fact, in
(who is usually the one advocating this position). It is humility because the this sense, you are placed, and therefore understood, due to your relation to
locus of knowledge seems to be placed outside of the training of the modem your relatives.
philosopher; it is false because in fact the knowledge of the traditional is vin 'This suggests that place has something to do with identity. Where you are
dicated and constructed in the institutions of philosophy that only the modem defines who you are. For some people and cultures, your place in the family
philosopher has access to. This dichotomy is an attempt to reify a dialectic, trec is (werwhelmingly your identity. People from specific backgrounds often
and in doing so the conversation moves from hermeneutic to metaphysical. nnd themselves determining placement when they meet others from the same
In this move, the access to the universal is lost. ethnic or national group. Who are you related to, who did your ~other's aunt
10 Chapter I Introduction: Philosophy-in-Place 11
Inurry, did your family name's spelling change over time? This is placement, some sort of foundational structure that asserts the legitimacy of a claim and
and a sort of identity. This is seen in more places than just genealogy. Your obscures the inherent oppositions in that legitimacy. Being present, on the
place in the world of work may be important to you and others. "Student," lither hand, suggests a set of commitments and meanings not derived from
for many people, carries certain implications. A student is placed in the world. some abstract structure. It precedes them.
This is a label, like giving a place name, but also a relation. Place, then, brings a great deal with it. In various ways, to address place we
Where am I? I am at a specific set of coordinates. We could give our place must also address identity, history, memory, aspiration, family and social con
in the world via a mathematical grid. This is what you would get if you used nection. Places stand in for all of these things-disparaging someone's place
the global positioning system (GPS), for example. This assigns place in terms is often tantamount to disparaging all these others as well. But it is not only
of space, and might be seen as a form of place by relation. But one might point II matter of subjectivity. Place is important also because it is the site for the
out that, while the relations spoken of earlier are relations to (as Heidegger meeting between incommensurables-materiality and idea, part and whole,
might put it) what we care about, defining place in terms of space gives re sdf and other. Place cannot be understood without these tensions. Therefore,
lations that we do not care about, except in an indirect manner. If I fix my if we are to understand any philosophy, particularly African philosophy, we
place on the ocean using a GPS, what matters to me is my point of origin, my would do well to pay attention to the site on which the fundamental tensions
destination, and perhaps the nearest safe haven if my craft is in trouble. The of life and thought are played out.
careless information is converted into careful wisdom. In itself, this is a useful
activity-a GPS is a bit of technology that enables the milieu to function. But
like any technology, it only makes sense out of a prior sense of place. THE PLACE OF PLACE
Where am I? I am where I am from. In some way, we carry a sense of place
with us. There are many writers, from Wallace Stegner and Wendell Berry in The literature on place, in both philosophy and many other disciplines, is
the West to Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Okot p'Bitek in East Africa who evoke enormous, diverse, and for the most part fragmented. Put more positively,
in their writings a sense of place. They usually write about places that are discourse about place has followed disciplinary trajectories and conversa
not "exciting" in any ordinary sense. They write about rural places, about lions, often driven by resistance to dominant modes of thought and informed
prairies and lonely mountains, about places that are not known as vacation hy a need to recover the particularity (and in some cases, the integrity) of
spots or centers of commerce, government, or learning. In short, they are not the subject in the face of disciplinary ways of knowing that would obscure
the places that tend to show up on the news as the places where "important" or obliterate it. These disciplinary conversations have not necessarily been
things happen. And yet, these writers speak eloquently about the way that myopic, for they have drawn on work outside of their own immediate frames
of reference; nevertheless, the set of connections has been limited, given the
place affects how we understand the world.
We are necessarily rooted in place, in the sense that we necessarily come runge of work that has been done on place.7
at the world from an understanding, from a set of commitments. We come The person who embarks on a study of the concept of place across the
caring about something, no matter how dispassionate we try to be. We come disciplines might expect that some disciplines would be more "naturally"
from a place. It is no accident that one of the great virtues of the Enlighten relevant than others. Geography,S for instance, and architecture9 have always
ment was cosmopolitanism. People thought that knowledge meant that you had to face up to the question of how particular places relate to those who
could draw back from any particular commitments, and be a citizen of the dwell in them, or have dwelt, or in some cases (such as in the discussion of
world. Hume, Ben Franklin. and Voltaire alI thought of themselves this way. wildernessJO) do not dwell in them. These disciplines have built up a vocabu
And yet, they could not escape their place. These commitments may not be Jury and set of texts that deal with place, perhaps not always by that name,
completely realizable-it may be that we cannot articulate them. Our place hut always recognizing that the human cannot be extricated from the spatial,
is something larger than we can put our fingers on. Or smalIer. We may have thut it is precisely the human that transforms the spatial into the platial (or,
a sense of place connected to the house in which we grew up. It represents perhaps, it is the removal of the human that transforms the platial into the
things, and its physical structure resonates. IIIputial). What is "the human," in this context? In a classic case of the herme
Where am I? I am where I am present. One need not buy into a "metaphys neutical circle, that cannot be answered apart from the platial. To be human
ics of presence" to talk about being present. Metaphysics of presence assumes III to be in a place.