Philosophy And Its Epistemic Neuroses

227 Pages·1999·32.95 MB·English

by  Michael Hymers

Allrightsreserved.PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica.Nopartofthispublicationmaybere
producedortransmittedinanyform orbyanymeans,electronicornlechanical,includingphoto
copy,recording,oranyinformationstorageandretrievalsystem,withoutpermissioninwritingfrom
thepublisher.
Copyright©2000byWestviewPress,AMemberofthePerseusBooksGroup
Publishedin2000intheUnitedStatesofAmericabyWestviewPress,5500CentralAvenue,Boulder,
Colorado80301-2877,andintheUnitedKingdombyWestviewPress,12Hid'sCopseRoad,Cumnor
Hill,OxfordOX29JJ
FindusontheWorldWideWebatwww.westviewpress.com
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Hymers,Michael.
Philosophyanditsepistemicneuroses/MichaelHymers.
p. em.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0-8133-9137-7
1.Skepticism. 2.Knowledge,Theoryof. 1.Title.
BD201.H95 1999
149'.73--dc21 99-37918
CIP
Thepaperusedinthis publicationmeetstherequirementsoftheAmericanNationalStandardfor
PermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibraryMaterialsZ39.48-1984.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Introduction:
Philosophy and Neurosis
Thephilosopher,JohnWisdom oncewrote, islike the obsessionalneuroticwho
cannotleave his apartmentwithout checkingagain and againto seewhether he
has turned offthelights orlocked the door. These doubts ofthe neurotic seem
peculiarin muchthewaythatthe"doubts"ofthe philosopher seempeculiarto
the nonphilosopher. Ispeakhere ofskepticaldoubts: Do we have knowledge of
the"external"world?Canwehaveknowledgeofothercultures?CanIevenknow
myownmind?
Butthephilosopher's"doubts"areofnotquitethesamesortastheneurotic's.
The philosopher"entertains" doubts as iftheywere occasional dinner guests:
Thoughtheyseemrealenoughforthedurationofthemeal,theyarenotallowed
tolingeroncethepartyisover. HekeepsthelTIfrom interferinginhisnonphilo
sophicallife.Bycontrast,the neurotic,saysWisdom,is movedto act.Aslittleas
hebelievesthathehasleftthelightson,hestillfeels theneedgobackandcheck.
"The philosopher doesn't;' saysWisdom. "His acts and feelings are even less in
accordancewith hiswordsthan are the acts and feelings ofthe neurotic" (1957,
174).Thephilosopher,unliketheneurotic,often"doubts"and"worries"inaway
thatdoesnotdirectlytouchhislife-orhisphilosophy.
Isthisdiagnosisof"thephilosopher"correct?Ifso,whatistheetiologyofsuch
psycho-philosophical disorder? And is there some course oftherapyJhat might
alleviateorresolveit?
The"philosopher"-andImean this term neitherto includeallphilosophers
nortoexemptmyself,necessarily-Ishallargue,suffersfromformsof"epistemic
neurosis":Sheistemptedbyphilosophicalviewsthat,iftheyaretobeexpressed,
must "entertain" skeptical «doubts." But the philosopher cannot take those
doubts seriously, since so honoring the skeptic would undermine all available
justification for the very positions that mandate the validity ofthose doubts.
With such doubts always about, philosophycan get no peace-it is«tormented
byquestions which bring itselfin question;'questions that may«leave no room
for the rational activity ofphilosophy" (Putnam 1981, 113). The philosopher's
2 Introduction:PhilosophyandNeurosis
difficultyis notsimplythat,like Hume,hecannottake hisviews seriouslywhen
he leaves the study,butthathe cannot quitetake them seriouslywhile he is still
inthestudyeither.
An important source ofthe philosopher's temptation in such matters, I shall
maintain,isacommitmenttotheideathatphilosophymustprovideexplanatory
theoriesaboutitsobjectsofinquiry-theoriesoftruth,theoriesofreference,the
ories ofknowledge, and so on. Epistemic neurosis is a predictable malady of
those who succumb to this assumption, for it induces acon1pulsion to think of
the objectivityofthe worldas somethingthat is to be defined in relation to the
scenarios ofthe external-world skeptic, and it encourages the application ofa
similarconceptionofobjectivitytonormativenotionsliketruthandreference.
Thetherapyappropriatetosuchadisorderconsistspartlyinpaintingapicture
ofan alternative, uncoloredbythehue ofobjectivitythatcharacterizesthe neu
rosis'andpartlyinbringingthephilosopher'ssubstantiveassumptionsaboutthe
perceived explanatorytasks ofphilosophyto consciousness wherever an epis
ten1icneurosisshowsitsinfluence.Thisphilosophicalcompulsionmustface the
«slowcure"(Wittgenstein 1981,§382) ofcritique.
Inacompellingcritiqueoftraditionalepistemology(bothfoundationalistand
coherentistvarieties),MichaelWilliamshas arguedthatwemustdistinguishbe
tween two different kinds ofdiagnostic critique in philosophy: therapeutic and
theoretical(1996c,31-40).Atherapeuticdiagnosisofskepticaldoubts,heargues,
tries to sil,ence those doubts byshowing that«the skeptic doesn't or can't mean
whathe seemsto n1ean,perhaps eventhathedoes notsucceedinmeaningany
thing atall" (32). Suchtherapy,he objects,canneverbeconvincingto the skep
tic, orto thosewho haveno doubts aboutthe intelligibilityofthe skeptic's con
cerns, because it rests on «intuitions about n1eaningfulness" that are «highly
controversial,hencefarn10reopentoquestion...thanourpre-theoreticalsense
thatwe understandtheskepticverywell"(36f.).Atheoreticaldiagnosis,bycon
trast'triestoredistributetheburdenofproofontotheshouldersoftheskepticby
showingthat skeptical doubts are «unnatural doubts"-thatis,byshowingthat
these doubts restoncontroversialtheoreticalassun1ptionsaboutknowledgeand
arenottheinevitableoutcomeofphilosophicalreflectiononourquotidianepis
temicpractices.Thereisnothingunintelligibleaboutskepticaldoubt,butitmat
tersonlyiftheskeptic'stheoreticalbaggageneedbecarriedinordertoarriveata
clearunderstandingofourprereflectiveattitudestowardknowledge.
Williams'sdistinctionshouldnotbethoughtofasafirn1one.Foronething,as
IshallargueinChapter1,thetherapeuticphilosophercanconcedethattheskep
tic'sdoubtsareintelligibleinthesensethattheyviolatenolawsoflogic.Whatare
contentious are the claims that the skeptic's scenarios would be explanatory of
our experience as ofaworldbeyond oursenses and that, ifwewere deluded in
the way that the skeptic suggests, we could saythat we were so deluded. Ifthe
philosophicaltherapistis right in sayingthatmeaningandtruth are notappro
priateobjectsofanytheory,thenitdoesfollow(asweshallseeinChapter1)that
Introduction:PhilosophyandNeurosis 3
whattheskepticistryingto sayreallycannotbe said,unless itisfalse. Themis
takeliesinconstruingthisasanattemptto refutetheskeptic,whichitcannotbe,
giventhatitreliesonempiricalpremisesthattheskepticwillcallintodoubt.
I also think that proponents oftraditional epistemologyare no less likely to
findWilliams's~lternativethesesaboutknowledgecontroversialthantheyarethe
therapist's"intuitionsaboutmeaningfulness."OneofWilliams'scentralclaimsis
thatour"knowledgeoftheexternalworld"(1996c,xii) isnotaproperobjectfor
theoreticalexplanation.Thecategory"knowledge:'wecouldsay,ismorelikethe
category"chair"or"letteropener"thanitislikethecategories('acid"or"betara
diation"-itisnotthenameofanaturalkind,butofanartifact.! Butthisispre
ciselythe kind ofclaim that the therapist wants to make about categories like
"truth"and"reference"aswell.Anditisthevalidityofthisclaim-thattruthand
referencedonotpickoutnaturalkinds-thatsupportsmytherapeuticdiagnosis
ofphilosophicalviews that"entertain"skeptical doubts. So, unlessWilliams can
find away ofshowing that knowledge requires no explanatorytheory and yet
truth does, I doubtthat he can sustain the firm independence ofhis theoretical
critiquefromthekindoftherapeuticcritiqueaboutwhichhehasreservations.2
The view I present here draws significantly on the later work of Ludwig
Wittgenstein. This is·most true ofthe attitudes toward objectivityandmeaning
centraltomyarguments.Butitalsoholdsofthemetaphorsofneurosisandther
apy,whichgivethematicunitytotheissuesIconfront.InhisPhilosophicalInves
tigationsWittgensteinmakessomedifficultremarksaboutthepropernatureand
taskofphilosophy.Amongthemisthefollowingpassage,whichIquoteatlength:
Itisnotouraimtorefineorcompletethesystemofrulesfortheuseofourwordsin
unheard-ofways.
Forthe claritythatwe are aiming at is indeed completeclarity. Butthis simply
meansthatthephilosophicalproblemsshouldcompletelydisappear.
Therealdiscoveryistheonethatmakesmecapableofstoppingdoingphilosophy
when Iwantto.-The one that gives philosophypeace,so that itis no longertor
mentedbyquestionswhichbringitselfinquestion.-Instead,wenowdemonstratea
method,byexamples;andtheseriesofexamplescanbebrokenoff.-Problems are
solved(difficultieseliminated),notasingleproblem.
Thereisnotaphilosophicalmethod,thoughthereareindeedmethods;likedif
ferenttherapies.(1968,§133)
"Thephilosopher'streatmentofaquestion:'hesayslater,"islikethetreatn1entof
anillness" (§255),andelsewherehestressesthe importanceofprovidinga"slow
cure"for"adiseaseofthought" (1981,§382).
In some ways my efforts fall short ofthe philosophical therapyWittgenstein
recommends. I lack his clarity and simplicityofstyle (not to mention his in
sight),anditisnoteasyformyargumenttobe"brokenoff:'sinceitrelieslesson
examplesandmoreonengagen1entwithotherphilosophicaltexts. (Butthis,too,
4 Introduction:PhilosophyandNeurosis
aswriterslikeRichardRortyandStanleyCavellhaveshown,canbetherapeutic.)
Moreover, there is asense in which Itake myselfto be pursuing a"single prob
lem"thatmanifestsitselfindifferentcontexts.Butwhatneedsto be emphasized
about my approach, as it needs to be emphasized aboutWittgenstein's, is that
thinking ofphilosophyas akind oftherapydoes not comprisewhat some have
termed atherapeutic"farewell to philosophy" (Habermas 1987b, 306). Nothing
in the idea oftherapy need imply the desirability ofabandoning philosophy.
Philosophicalproblems,liketherealneurosestowhichIcomparesomeofthem,
have seldombeen, andneed neverbe, in short supply,though theymaychange
withhistoricalandculturalcircumstances.Thephilosophicaltherapistneednot
claim to have "attained nirvana," as Michael Dummett has disparagingly sug
gested (1996, 16),3 though, like most philosophers, he or she does claim to be
right,howeverfallible.
ExactlywhatIfind importantaboutthe problemsItakeup hereisthepersis
tentattractionoftheviewsIcriticize,thescientisticattraction-whichIfeelmy
self-inthinkingthattruthandknowledge,arefitobjectsofexplanatorytheories.
The"real discovery:'the discovery"thatgives philosophypeace:'is the one that
lets us approach philosophical questionswithoutbeingledinto the philosophi
callyneurotic, self-defeatingways thatspring, for example,from ametaphysical
picture ofobjectivityor from trying to give"theories" ofmeaning and truth as
thoughtheywere the objects ofsomescience. Onlywhenthinking does notrely
on"doubts" that undermine philosophy itselfcan we deal properlywith the
philosophicalquestionsthatremain,andonlythencanwe"breakoff"ourlistof
exanlples,sothatphilosophicaldisputedoesnot"goontoolong"(Wisdon11957,
178), without worrying that an ultimate ground ofwarrant might have been
found, ifonlywehadworldenoughandtime.
WhenWittgensteintellsusthattherapeuticphilosophy"leaveseverythingasit
is"(1968,§124),heisnotproposinganuncriticalquietisnl,asJurgenHabermas
seems to suggest (1987b, 306), or worse, as Herbert Marcuse complained, an
"academicsado-masochism,self-humiliation,andself-denunciationoftheintel
lectualwhose labor does not issue in scientific, technical or like achievements"
(1964,173).4 He is simply denying that there is a hidden essence oflanguage
awaitingdiscoverybythescientificallymindedphilosopher,andthatthereisany
need or possibility ofreplacing our actual words and expressions with a pure,
logicallanguagethatcouldsustainmeaningapartfronlourpossibleinterestsand
practices.Suchcomplaintsdo notdojusticeto thecritiquesofscientismandes
sentialisminWittgenstein'slaterwritings.Indeed,Ithinkitwouldnotbeutterly
amisstoviewthatworkasacontributiontocriticaltheoryinmuchthesenseup
held by thinkers like Marcuse and Max Horkheimer, though it does not wear
suchcredentialsonitssleeve.5
Itisnotmychieftaskto interpretWittgenstein'sphilosophy,buttothe extent
that I drawon his work Iwant to insist on likeprovisos for myinterests in the
therapeuticaspect ofphilosophy.Andalthoughthe presentworkis notprimar-
Introduction:PhilosophyandNeurosis 5
ily a work ofradical theory either, its undertones will be clear enough. Like
Horkheimer's"criticaltheorist:'Idoubtthat"socialrealityand its products"are
"extrinsic" to philosophical work and that such matters belong solely to the
sphere of"politicalarticles, membership in politicalparties or socialservice or
ganizations, and participation in elections" (1982, 209). As Alasdair MacIntyre
says,"All philosophy, one way or another, is political philosophy" (1987, 398).
Part ofwhat I want to achieve, even as I focus on the work of mainstream
philosophers influencedbythe analyticaltradition ofthe twentieth century, is a
clarificationofconceptsandproblemsthathaveanimportantroletoplayinrad
icaltheory. ThisaspectofmypositionismostevidentinChapters6and8.
Myinvestigationwillfall roughlyinto three parts, in whichknowledge ofthe
"external"world, knowledge ofother cultures, and knowledge ofourselveswill,
respectively, provide the foci of discussion. Each ofthese aspects of human
knowledge is a site ofskeptical"doubt" and, so, a likelylocus at which to en
countersomeform ofepistemicneurosis.
In Chapter I, I examine Hilary Putnam's ostensibly antiskeptical argument
againstthepossibilitythatweare nowandalways havebeenbrainsinavat.The
argumentisbestunderstoodnot,asmostcommentatorshaveassumed,asanat
tempttorefutetheskeptic,butas ameansofillustratingthedifferencesbetween
two kinds ofrealism that are often conflated: metaphysical realisnl and modest
realism.Theformervarietytreatstheskeptic'sscenariosnotmerelyasconsistent
logical possibilities,but as real possibilities-possibilities whose actualitywould
explainourexperienceasofaworldbeyondoursenses.Themodestrealistrejects
thisthesis,butsheconcedeshappilythattheworldisindependentofourknowl
edge ofit in the sense that our knowledge clainls are sometinles mistaken and
thattheworldcouldhaveexistedmuchasitdoeswithoutthereeverhavingbeen
any epistemic agents to be right or wrong about it. The metaphysical realist's
viewsarepronetoepistemicneurosis,becausehispositionisdefinedbyreference
toskepticaldoubt,butheisepistemicallyjustifiedinadvancingnoneoftheother
philosophicaltheses thathe typicallywants to advance, unless he can refute the
skeptic. Consequently,he is often tempted to dismiss external-world skepticism
as a mere logical possibility,even though it is centralto his own viewthat such
skepticism be treated as a real possibility. This concurrent need to admit and
denyathesis,especiallyaskepticalone,ischaracteristicofwhatIcall"episten1ic
. "
neurOSIS.
Putnam's argument also implicitlyrelies on an inlportant claim about refer
ence-namely, that reference is paradigmaticallyan internal relation between
word and object, in the sense that a competent speaker cannot understand the
standarduse ofareferringtermwithoutalso understandingwhatits referentis.
Afailure to recognize that Putnam depends on this "interactive conception" of
reference("interactive"becauseitplacesthespeakersquarelyintheworldofspa
tio-temporal objects and persons) has led many critics to object that Putnam
shows onlythat ifwehad alwaysbeenbrains in avat,thenwecould notknow-
6 Introduction:PhilosophyandNeurosis
inglysayso. Butsuch acriticismitselfturns onasubstantive assumption about
reference-namely, that it is an externalrelationbetweenword and object such
thatI mightunderstandtheuseofareferringterm,butnotunderstandwhatits
referentis.Apopularversionofthisassumptionistheclaimthatreferencecanbe
reducedtocausalrelationsofsomesort.However,themetaphysicalrealistisnot
entitledto anysuch empiricaltheoryofreference until the skeptichasbeen re
futed. So this atten1pted criticism ofPutnam is an additional symptom ofepis
temicneurosis.
Putnam'srelianceonan"interactive"conceptionofreference-onethattreats
reference as an internalrelationbetweenword and object-draws ourattention
to a crucial distinction for the philosophical therapist: the distinction between
conceptsthat are appropriate objectsfor explanatorytheories and conceptsthat
are not. But the notion ofan internal relation may itselfsound suspect to the
pragmaticallyinclinedearthathastakeninW.V.Quine'scritiqueoftheanalytic
synthetic distinction. Thus,in Chapter2,I considerthe ideaofan internalrela
tioningreaterdetail,examiningthedevelopmentofthenotioninWittgenstein's
workfromthe Tractatustohislaterwritings.6I arguethatinWittgenstein'stran
sitionalandlaterworkthereemergesapictureofinternalrelationsthatpossesses
fourinterestingfeatures: (1) ittreatssuchrelationsasobtainingbetween"instru
mnts oflanguage:' including words, but also, for example, gestures, facial ex
pressions, and spatio-temporalobjects used as paradigms; (2) it does not entail
that allpropositions expressinginternal relations mustbe analytic; (3) it allows
some distinction to be drawn between the analytic and the synthetic; and (4) it
does so in awaythat is largely compatible with Quine's critique, except where
that critique is led offthe rails by Quine's scientistic outlook. That scientistic
viewpoint,asweshallsee,expressesitselfpreciselyinafailure to distinguishbe
tween concepts that are appropriate objects for explanatorytheories and con
ceptsthatarenot.
Chapter3holdsupcausaltheoriesofreferenceandthecorrespondencetheory
oftruth,whichtheyareinvokedto support,for closerexamination.Causaltheo
ries derive much oftheir attraction, I argue, from their apparent abilityto deal
withanumberoftraditionalproblemsthatplaguedclassicalversions ofthe cor
respondence theory oftruth, especiallythe latter's inabilityto provide any clear
means ofindividuatingthe"facts"or"states ofaffairs" that are alleged to make
true statementstrue. However,causaltheories proveto be epistemicallyneurotic
inthemselves,preciselybecause (1) theytreatreference asanexternalrelation,in
thesenseclarifiedinChapter2,and (2) theytreatthatexternalrelationasanex
planatoryrelation-explanatoryoftruth.This,Iargue,istherealpointofanother
ofPutnam's arguments, his"model-theoretic"argument against the correspon
dencetheoryoftruth.Whatthisargumentshowsisjustthatbytreatingreference
as an explanatorynotion, the causal theorist paves the wayfor skeptical doubts
about our knowledge ofthe reference ofour terms. The veryactivityoftheory
buildingunderminesitselfwhenaninternalrelationistreatedasanexternalone.
Introduction:PhilosophyandNeurosis 7
In supposing that reference and truth are fit objects ofexplanatory theories,
thephilosopherisautomaticallycommittedtodrawingadistinctionbetweenthe
phenomena to be explained by such a theory-phenomena that are taken for
granted-andthehypothesesthatwouldservetoexplainthosephenomena. (Or,
in the language ofthe inductivist, he or she must distinguish between the evi
dence,whichistakenfor granted,andthe conclusions thatsuch evidencemight
be taken to support inductively.) Treating reference as an external relation
thinkingthatIcanunderstandtheuseofareferringtermwithoutknowingwhat
itrefers to-isthus an unavoidable methodologicalcommitmentofallexplana
torytheoriesofreference,andofcontemporarycorrespondencetheoriesoftruth
thathopetoexplaintruthbyrecourseto atheoryofreference.Totreatreference
asaninternalrelationisthustoeschewallexplanatorytheoriesoftruthandref
erenceandalsoto abandonthe skepticaldoubtsthattheyincur.
InChapter4,Igeneralizethis principleto includethe doubts ofthe external
world skeptic. To treat some phenomenon as an appropriate object ofan ex
planatorytheoryistoplacethatphenomenoninanexternalrelationofepistemic
priorityoverthe realpossibilitieswhose actualitywould explain it.When inter
nal relations are misconstrued as such external, explanatory relations, skeptical
problems quickly ensue. The root ofthe metaphysical realist's overgrown con
ception ofobjectivity, then, is a commitment to the view that the philosopher
shouldbeinthebusinessofprovidingexplanatorytheories. Inparticular,byre
gardingthescenariosoftheexternal-worldskepticasrealpossibilities,the meta
physicalrealistexpressesacommitmentto traditionalepistemology'stheoretical
explanations ofknowledge and ofexperience ofthe so-called externalworld in
general.Andthis is to treatmindandworld,knowerandknown,as related only
externally. If, on the contrary, we suppose that we are internally related to the
worldinourexperienceofit,thenwemustconcludethatwecanhavenoknowl
edgeofourownexperiencewithoutknowingsomethingoftheworldaroundus.
This is to join Michael Williams in holding that «knowledge of the external
world"isaninappropriateobjectfortheoreticalexplanation.
In this chapter I also consider why philosophers are so tempted to give ex
planatorytheories oftruth and knowledge, taking Putnam's erstwhile obsession
witha((substantive"notionoftruthasmyexample.Thoughsuchtheoriescanbe
eithermetaphysicalornaturalistic,inthese scientisticdays itis the lattervariety
thatbearsthemarkofrespectability.Animportantsourceofourdesireforsuch
theories is oursense thattruth andknowledge are phenomenawith hidden na
tures.Butourinitialdifficultyinansweringquestionslike((Whatistruth?"arises
fromthefact,whichWittgensteinemphasized,thatwelearntousesuchconcepts
in extren1elycomplicatedcontexts thatwe do not, however,learn to describe in
any satisfying way. This suggests that the proper way ofalleviating our puzzle
mentinthefaceofsuchquestionsistotrytogetabettergrasponthecontextsin
whichwordslike truth and knowledge andthe concepts ofexperiencearetaught
andlearned.
8 Introduction:PhilosophyandNeurosis
Havingdiagnosedarecurrentcauseofepistemicneurosisinthedesireforthe
oreticalexplanationsofnontheoreticalnotions,IturninChapter5toourknowl
edge ofother cultures. Here I focus on critics ofmetaphysical realism who are
oftenattractedtovariousforms ofrelativisnl.Would-berelativists,suchasBarry
Barnes,DavidBloor,BarbaraHerrnsteinSmith,andPaulFeyerabend,I argue,are
frequentlylessdeeplycommittedtorelativismthantheirownrhetoricmightlead
ustobelieve.Manyoftheirarguments andclarificationssuggestapositionakin
to the modest realism thatI counsel. Butthinkers canbe temptedbyrelativism
for three main reasons: (1) the perceived failure ofthe strongobjectivist's theo-
.riesoftruthandknowledgecanbereadilytakenasasignthatsomeothertheory
oftruthandknowledgeisneeded,ifonehasnotjoinedthephilosophicalthera
pist in eschewing traditional epistemology and truth theory; (2) the apparent
plausibilityofconceptualrelativism,theideaofalternative((conceptualschemes;'
seemsto offerawayofmakingsenseoftheepistenlicrelativist'sclaimthattruth
is relative to cultures or communities; and (3) a perceived association ofobjec
tivist epistemologies andscientismwith inter- andintraculturalintolerance can
maketalkoftruth,knowledge,andobjectivityappearasthoughitwereunavoid
ablylinkedwithpowerandoppression.
Considering the second ofthese motivations, I argue that conceptual rela
tivism,farfrombeingawayofovercomingthedisordersofmetaphysicalrealism,
itselfsuffersfrom muchthe sameproblems.The conceptualrelativistholdsthat
differentcultures possess different,incommensurable«conceptualschemes"that
carveuptheworldintodifferentontologiesandacconlpanyingsetsofontology
relativetruths,suchthattheholdersofoneschemenlaybeunableinprincipleto
conlprehendtheholders ofanother. OfferinganovelreinterpretationofDonald
Davidson's arguments against conceptualrelativism,I showthatthe doctrine of
conceptual schemes recapitulates the assumptions ofstrong objectivism and
causal theories ofreference. First, this doctrine turns on the premise that con
ceptsareonlyexternallyrelatedtotheirempirical«content"sothatthesamecon
tent-whetheritbecalled«experience"or«theworld"or«reality"-canbeorga
nizedbydifferentsetsofconceptsandidentifiedindependentlyofhavingapplied
anyparticularsetofconceptsto it. However,ifitisthe same contentthatisdif
ferentlyorganized,thenholdersofdifferentconceptswouldseemtohaveabasis
for mutual interpretation and understanding. Second,the assertion that the
holders ofone scheme might be incomprehensible to the holders ofanother
turns on the premisethatthe reference ofa referringterm is onlyexternallyre
latedto its use.Wemight,thatis,be ableto tracethelinguisticbehaviorofoth
erswellenoughtodeterminethattheyexpresstheirbeliefsbymakingstatements
that possess truth-values without ever being able to saywhat things they refer
to-what ontology they possess. The conceptual relativist thus proves to be a
strongobjectivistatheart,for herpositionsinlplyappliesthe metaphysicalreal
ist'sskepticalconceptionofobjectivitytoconceptualschemes.
Introduction:PhilosophyandNeurosis 9
In Chapter 6, I return to the would-be relativist's third source oftemptation,
the"ethical-politicalargument."Accordingtothislineofreasoning,oftenrecog
nized by critics ofrelativism but seldom examined in any detail, realism and
terms like knowledge:, truth, and objectivity are bound up with the discourse of
powerandoppression,andmorallyorpoliticallyprogressivethoughtshouldes
chew such concepts. Although the relativist who endorses this argument may
have laudable goals, her reasoning, I argue, conflates metaphysical realism with
modest realism, and both ofthese, in turn, with scientism. These conflations, I
suggest,areanunderstandablereactiontothescientismthatisoftenpresentboth
in analytical philosophyand in varieties ofMarxist theory. In both cases, how
ever, the links between realism and scientism must be regarded as historically
contingent. Indeed, one mightbe an epistemic relativist and still endorse scien
tism.Sothebestresponsetoscientismistoforegothesearchforexplanatory,sci
entific theories ofnonexplanatory, nonscientific concepts like truth and knowl
edge.
Thetherapeuticphilosopher'sclaimthatmindandworldareinternallyrelated,
so that I cannot understand myown mindwithoutunderstandingsomethingof
the world around me, is aversion ofwhat Tyler Burge has called psychological
"anti-individualism:'theviewthatthenatureandclassificationofanindividual's
intentionalphenomenadependoncertainaspectsofherenvironment.However,
inChapter7,Ishowthatmyanti-individualismisnotliketheanti-individualism
advocatedbyBurge.Burge'sviewispremisedonconstruingtherelationbetween
nlind and world as an external one. He is not only an anti-individualist, but a
nletaphysicalrealist,andthismakesitdifficultforhimtoaccountfor"first-person
authority": the specialjustificationthat a person has when making claims about
her own intentional attitudes. IfI can be completelymistaken about the world
thatdeternlines the contents ofmyintentionalattitudes,then itseemsthatIcan
be completelymistaken about those attitudes too.According to Burge, the diffi
cultyistobesolvedbyweakeningthe"Cartesian"accountoffirst-person author
ity.TheCartesian,heclaims,iscorrectto maintainthatIam authoritativeabout
myactualintentionalphenomenaandthatincounterfactualsituationsIwouldbe
authoritative about myintentionalphenomenain those situations,butwrongto
thinkthatIam actuallyauthoritative aboutmyintentionalphenomenaincoun
terfactual situations. Relinquishing this third requirement,he argues, lets us rec
oncilefirst-person authoritywithanti-individualism.
I show, on the contrary, that an adequate understanding ofexternal-world
skepticism and metaphysical realism presupposes the Cartesian's third require
ment.Burgecannotavoidposingathreattothespecialjustificationthatattaches
to paradigmaticclaimsofself-knowledge.Makingsenseofbothfirst-person au
thorityandanti-individualismrequiresthatwebemodestrealists,eschewingthe
realpossibilityofexternal-worldskepticismandtreatingmindandworld as re
latedinternally.