Philosophy and Education: Accepting Wittgenstein’s Challenge

238 Pages·1995·4.98 MB·English

by  Paul Smeyers

PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION:
ACCEPTING WITTGENSTEIN'S CHALLENGE
Philosophy and Education
VOLUME 6
Series Editors:
c. J. B. Macmillan
College ofE ducation, The Florida State University, Tallahassee
D. C. Phillips
School of Education, Stanford University
Editorial Board:
Richard J. Bernstein, New Schoolfor Social Research, New York
David W. Hamlyn, University ofL ondon
Richard J. Shavelson, University of California, Santa Barbara
Harvey Siegel, University of Miami
Patrick Suppes, Stanford University
PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION:
ACCEPTING WITTGENSTEIN'S CHALLENGE
Edited by
Paul Smeyers and James D. Marshall
Reprinted from Studies in Philosophy and Education,
Volume 14, Nos. 2-3,1995
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress
ISBN 978-90-481-4613-0 ISBN 978-94-017-2616-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-2616-0
Printed on acid-free paper
AH Rights Reserved
© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1995
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
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retrieval system, without written permis sion from the copyright owner.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAUL SMEYERS and JAMES D. MARSHALL / Preface 1
PAUL SMEYERS and JAMES D. MARSHALL / The Wittgen-
steinian Frame of Reference and Philosophy of Education at
the End of the Twentieth Century 3
C.J.B. MACMILLAN / How Not To Learn: Reflections on Wittgen-
stein and Learning 37
WOUTER VA N HAAFTEN / Wittgenstein and the Significance of
Private Meaning 47
LUISE PRIOR McCARTY and DAVID CHARLES McCARTY /
Wittgenstein on the Unreasonableness of Education: Connect-
ing Teaching and Meaning 63
AL YEN NEIMAN / Wittgenstein, Liberal Education, Philosophy 77
EDWIN P. BRANDON / The Unj ustifiability of Education 93
PAUL SMEYERS / Initiation and Newness in Education and Child-
rearing 105
STEFAAN E. CUYPERS / What Wittgenstein Would Have Said
about Personal Autonomy 127
PAUL STANDISH / Why We Should Not Speak of an Educational
Science 143
NICK McADOO / Wittgenstein and Aesthetic Education 159
TERENCE H. McLAUGHLIN / Wittgenstein, Education and
Religion 171
MICHAEL PETERS / Philosophy and Education: 'After' Wittgen-
stein 189
JAMES D. MARSHALL / Wittgenstein and Foucault: Resolving
Philosophical Puzzles 205
PAUL SMEYERS and JAMES D. MARSHALL / Epilogue 221
References 225
Notes on Contributors 237
Author Index 241
Subject Index 243
Preface
We met in London at the second INPE conference in 1990. One of us com
mented on the other's paper and as a result and of later correspondence Paul
suggested to Jim that there was a need for a collection on Wittgenstein and edu
cation. It has taken three years, with many faxes, E-mails and telephone calls.
There were also discussions in Varna in 1992 and major work in Leuven in 1992
and 1993. We spent some time thinking about potential contributors and what
we would have hoped for in such a collection. We are certain about the quality
of the contributions, but the reader can judge about the structure.
Jim would wish to thank Paul and KU Leuven for their generous hospitality
during the production of the collection. In return Paul would wish to thank Jim
for his long distanced patience.
The result we hope has been worth the effort.
We would especially like to thank Betty Vanden Baviere for her production of
the manuscripts.
We would also wish to thank C.J.B. Macmillan and D.C. Phillips, Kluwer's
external reviewers, for their helpful advice. Finally we thank Kluwer in the
person of their Editor, Peter de Liefde, for his patience and guidance.
James D. Marshall
Paul Smeyers
Studies in Philosophy and Education 14: 125, 1995.
© 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
The Wittgensteinian Frame of Reference and Philosophy
of Education at the End of the Twentieth Century
An Introduction to Philosophy and Education: Accepting Wittgenstein's
Challenge
PAUL SMEYERS AND JAMES D. MARSHALL
University of Leuven, Belgium and University of Auckland, New Zealand
If the ability to inspire a wealth of exciting philosophy in others is the mark of a
great philosopher, then Wittgenstein is one. His 'deep thoughts' as well as his
abstruse (cryptical) style, have inspired scholars not only within the different
fields of 'pure' philosophy, but from disciplines as diverse as theology and math
ematics and including disciplines such as psychology, sociology and education.
Our concern is mainly with education. Regrettably understanding of Wittgenstein
within philosophy of education has been until very recently, rather superficial.
Notwithstanding references to the early work and to the later position in a
handful of books and articles, it is clear that education has not grasped the full
potential of Wittgenstein's philosophy. The themes that were developed by
Wittgenstein challenge our understanding of education, and of philosophy of
education. To take up the challenge posed by Wittgenstein is the focus of the
present volume.
After a brief introduction to Wittgenstein's philosophy and a general outline
of the state of the art of philosophy of education, the rationale of the structure of
the volume is elaborated and brief introductions to the different chapters are
given.
Readers familiar with Wittgenstein and/or the state of the art of philosophy of
education can start with either of these parts or directly with the introduction to
the chapters. Notes are given at the end of each chapter, but all the references are
compiled together at the end of the volume. The list of references starts with a
set of abbreviations that is used for referring to Wittgenstein's works. Square
brackets are used for additions for clarifications in quotations by the author of
the chapter.
WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY
Yet another introduction to Wittgenstein's work can only be justified if a lack of
knowledge of his position, can arguably be defended amongst the envisaged
readership. Such is undoubtedly the case for the discipline of education, and for
philosophy of education. But there is another reason why it is necessary to go
into some basic Wittgensteinian ideas. His philosophy is not only very rich, but
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Studies in Philosophy and Education 14: 127-159, 1995.
© 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
128 PAUL SMEYERS AND JAMES MARSHALL
it also generates different perspectives, some of which are mutually exclusive.
Though it cannot be the intention of the editors to pin down either for the con
tributors or for the readers of this volume, the one and only interpretation, it is
nevertheless necessary to make clear in which way we understand and have been
impressed by this philosophy, in so far as it is relevant for education and philos
ophy of education. In doing that, a concept of education must intrude and per
meate the account. But as Wittgenstein himself argued, we have to start from the
concepts we use, we need 'friction' (PI, I, # 107). Obviously, only a limited
number of issues can be dealt with, others can be touched upon and some cannot
even be mentioned.
Below we will discuss consecutively the 'theory' of meaning, the importance
of basic propositions, and the 'form of life' and understanding of human action.
Finally, some of his ideas concerning ethics and philosophy itself will be elabo
rated. The relevance of the elaborated basic insights to education will only be
mentioned in passing, but these will, we trust, become clear. At the end of this
part, some implications for education are proposed.
One final remark may suffice to characterise the general frame-work that has
been used. It is customary to differentiate between the earlier and the later phi
losophy of Wittgenstein. No attempt will be made in this introduction to do
justice to the numerous differences nor to the similarities between the two
periods. While the main inspiration will be sought in the posthumously pub
lished Philosophical Investigations (1953), the ideas can be traced back to the
decade following the 1922 publication of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.!
'MEANING' AND 'ACTING'
In the determination of the meaning of a word, the context fulfils, according to
Wittgenstein, a crucial role. The idea of a 'language-game' is used to express
this. The meaning of a sentence, like that of a word or phrase, is internally
related to the criteria of our understanding. These are of two main types:
explaining the sentence, word or phrase, and using it correctly. The form of
explanation typical for sentences is that of paraphrase: the sentence to be
explained is replaced by another sentence that disposes with a problematic
expression, an opaque construction, or an uncertain use. The use of sentences
has two major characteristics which can be understood as subdivisions of our
understanding. The focus in one is the ability to produce a sentence in appropri
ate circumstances; in the second that we react to a sentence in a way appropriate
to the circumstances. Both indicate that a 'language-game' is part of an activity
or of a 'form of life'. This latter concept was crucial to overcoming the difficul
ties of the earlier calculus model of language. This suggests that it is possible to
interpret the rules of the language in such a way that an interpretation cannot be
wrong and, moreover, that a rule determines independently of its use whether an
expression has been used correctly. Section 242 of the Philosophical Investiga
tions reads therefore:
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THE WITTGENSTEINIAN FRAME OF REFERENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 129
"If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions
but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements" (PI, I, # 242).
and in section 241 this agreement is called an agreement not in opinions but in
'fonns oflife'.
The paradigm example of a 'language-game' given by Wittgenstein is the
game of chess. Chess shows that rules are not' grounded', and that rules cannot
be justified by any reference to reality. Furthennore, the rules are autonomous
and 'arbitrary', in the sense that they could have been different. In a 'language
game' the following can belong: certain words, expressions, gestures, a particu
lar context and a constitutive activity. Only within a 'language-game' will we be
able to justify a certain inference, a certain behaviour; within a 'language-game'
we can speak of justification and lack of justification, of evidence and proof, of
mistakes and groundless opinions, of good and bad reasoning, of correct and
incorrect measurements.
"What counts as an adequate test of a statement belongs to logic. It belongs to the description of
the language-game" (C, # 82).
Within a system of thinking and acting there occur, up to a point, investigations
and criticisms of the reasons and justifications that are employed in that system.
We bring this inquiry to an end when we come upon something that we regard as
a satisfactory reason, and that we do so shows itself in our actions. The end,
Wittgenstein says,
" ... is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on
our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game" (C, # 204).
It is by our actions that we fix a boundary of the 'language-game'.
We are initiated into 'language-games'. Wittgenstein insists upon the impor
tance of the way this initiation proceeds, and on its relevance to establishing
meaning. In section 77 of the Philosophical Investigations he writes:
"In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word ("good" for
instance)? From what sort of examples? in what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to
see that the word must have a family of meanings" (PI, I, # 77).
Not only does the meaning of a word tum on the context in which it is learned,
but, obviously, there are different contexts in which the word is used, or to put
this more technically, there are different 'language-games'. The meaning of a
word will be different according to the context. More precisely, there is no such
thing as the meaning of a word, there is only a (and this realised in this pre
sent context) meaning of the word, and usually in that particular context the
meaning of a word is clear to the participants. As was indicated (cf. PI, I, # 77)
Wittgenstein therefore suggests that in order to understand the meaning of a
word we look at the particular situations in which the word is learned. Not sur
prisingly such a way of thinking has raised questions about relativism, as differ
ent contexts provide different meanings for a word. If we think from the
opposite direction it seems to a certain extent true. At the same time, one could
argue that whatever words we use to realise are themselves in tum context-
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130 PAUL SMEYERS AND JAMES MARSHALL
dependent. And as different contexts are at least in principle not inconceivable,
it might be possible to think of a number of them. But can we really imagine
them, one can and should ask? Furthermore, the meaning of an expression
seems constantly to slip away, so that it is difficult to decide, it is argued, what
exactly has been said. In these interpretations - for which the dense nature
of Wittgenstein's writings must to some degree be held responsible - the
'language-game' is understood more as a game with words instead of being
inherently connected with reality.
Wittgenstein's 'theory' of meaning advocates neither a position of pure sub
jectivity nor of pure objectivity. From the beginning, what one could call an
element of risk, is present in the way communication is conceived. However, the
consistency of meaning Wittgenstein argues for is free of essentialism. Though
every situation is in some sense new, the different meanings of a concept are
linked with each other through family-resemblances. In order to be understood,
the present use may not be radically different from the former ones. It is within
the normal context that the meaning of a concept is determined. The others and I
proceed in this way. There is no absolute point of reference (neither internal nor
external) for them, or for me. The community of language speakers forms the
warrant for the consistency of meaning. Analogously the meaning of an action
can be decided from the 'third person perspective'. And in tum 'intention' finds
its proper place in the context of action.
Wittgenstein also conceives action as in the main part being non-reflective.
Human behaviour is conceived as a constant stream of reactions which only very
rarely, and in such cases only for a moment, are stopped by deliberate reflection.
To answer a question, as to follow a command, does not contain usually an ante
rior step in which the situation is analyzed. To act is not first to think and con
sequently to do something. It is to do something in a certain manner (which
doesn't mean that one cannot reflect upon it afterwards).
In what I do it will become clear what I stand for, the things that I value, and
the way that I go on and 'follow a rule'. To say that what I do is voluntary in this
sense, does not mean that I have reflected upon it, nor does it imply that if I
reflect upon it, I can take a stance outside of reality. It only means that the things
I do cannot be considered as random activities which are just 'done' by me with
out being conscious of them or engaging with them. It goes without saying that
different meanings can be ascribed to my actions, that my action can have more
than one meaning, and also that I can deceive myself. But in normal circum
stances, I take it for granted that the intention of what one does, has not been
searched for by the actor.
Crucial, as has been indicated already, is the social determination of meaning
and understanding. The meaning of a concept is not the result of what I intend,
but is determined and carried, by the community to which I belong. To under
stand a concept means to be able to paraphrase it and to act accordingly. In both
the 'third person perspective' is predominant. But language is first the language
of the others. It determines the way that I can speak: otherwise I risk being unin
telligible. 'Concepts' and 'actions' are necessarily and inseparably interwoven
6