Philosophy

676 Pages·2007·4.71 MB·English

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2 n d e d i t i o n
Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL ARTICLES
THEMATIC OUTLINE
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
10
INDEX
e
m
u
l
o
v
2 n d e d i t i o n
Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
DONALD M. BORCHERT
Editor in Chief
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Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Second Edition
Donald M. Borchert, Editor in Chief
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c o n t e n t s
volume 1
PREFACE TO 2ND EDITION
INTRODUCTION TO 1ST EDITION
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
LIST OF ARTICLES
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY
2nd edition
Abbagnano–Byzantine Philosophy
volume 2
Cabanis–Destutt de Tracy
volume 3
Determinables–Fuzzy Logic
volume 4
Gadamer–Just War Theory
volume 5
Kabbalah–Marxist Philosophy
volume 6
Masaryk–Nussbaum
volume 7
Oakeshott–Presupposition
volume 8
Price–Sextus Empiricus
volume 9
Shaftesbury–Zubiri
volume 10
APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL ARTICLES
THEMATIC OUTLINE
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
INDEX
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
2nd edition
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a p p e n d i x
albert the great appointed him bishop of Regensburg,but he served less
than two years before submitting his resignation, after
(before 1200–1280)
instituting many reforms in his diocese. Although
According to the near-contemporary testimony of retired, he was directed by Pope Urban IV, in 1263, to
Tolomeo of Lucca (Historia Ecclesiastica [1317], 22.19) preach to the Germans a crusade to the Holy Land,and
and confirmed by other, later sources,Albert the Great this he did,until Urban’s death in 1264.
(Albertus Magnus) was more than 80 years old when he
It is said that after the death of Thomas Aquinas,
died on November 15,1280,establishing the turn of the
Albert traveled to Paris one last time to defend the views
thirteenth century as the terminus ante quemofhis birth.
of his former student,but this story,related at the can-
He was born in the town ofLauingen in Schwaben in the
onization proceedings for Aquinas in 1319, is not fully
diocese ofAugsburg,at the time a part ofBavaria,the son
consistent with other known facts about Albert’s final
ofa knight in the service ofthe counts ofBollestadt.He
years and,indeed,appears to interpret the events in Paris
was already a student in the studium litterarumat Padua
in 1277 in a manner that places far too much importance
when, in 1223, Jordan of Saxony came in search of
on the connection,ifany,between Aquinas and the doc-
recruits to the Dominican Order among the young men
trines that were being formally condemned. The com-
in residence at the new university. Albert received the
plete absence ofany official correspondence after August
habit from Jordan sometime around Easter of 1223 and
18,1279,in the face of a full and active participation in
was sent to Cologne for his novitiate. By 1228 he had
the life of the Church and his order right up until that
become a lecturer (lector),and he served in that office in
date, has suggested to some that Albert’s memory, and
Dominican communities at Heldesheim, Freiberg,
perhaps other aspects ofhis mental life,had begun to fail
Regensburg,and Strassburg.In 1243 or 1244 he was sent
him at that time,but there is no good reason to suppose,
to Paris by John of Wildeshausen, where he became a
as some have done, that this decline began as early as
master of theology in 1245 and lectured on Peter Lom-
1277.Whether he was already in decline or not,he and
bard’s Sententiarum(Sentences).
his Dominican brothers were apparently not unprepared
In the fall of1245 Thomas Aquinas was sent to Paris, when death finally took him away on November 15,
also at the direction of John of Wildeshausen, and in 1280.
1248 he and probably other Dominicans accompanied
Albert to Cologne,where Albert was to establish the first writings
studium generale(or liberal-arts college) in Germany.He
Albert was committed to the preservation and propaga-
served as Provincial ofTeutonia from 1254 to 1257,dur-
tion ofthe philosophical ideas ofantiquity,in particular
ing which time he was summoned before the papal curia
the philosophy of Aristotle, which he saw himself as
to defend the Dominican Order against the attacks of
introducing to the Latin west.Like Aristotle,he produced
William of Saint-Amour. He was well received by the
a body ofphilosophical work that spanned the discipline
curia, and his lectures and debating were found to be
in both breadth and depth. As in the case of Aristotle,
extraordinary. In January of 1260 Pope Alexander IV
some of the works attributed to Albert in his corpus are
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not actually from his hand, and other works known to Neoplatonism.The complaint is that the two systems are
have been written by him have yet to be found.Little is philosophically and philologically incompatible,and any
known with any certainty about the chronology of the attempt to reconcile them is not only doomed to failure
corpus,but there are good reasons for thinking that the but is also methodologically misguided.It is worth not-
bulk ofhis philosophical writings,in particular,his Aris- ing,however,that this view is itselfgrounded in historical
totelian paraphrases, were completed between the years research based upon certain a priori assumptions about
1250 and 1270. the relation between Plato’s philosophical system and
Aristotle’s. Albert’s Neoplatonism was essentially the
His corpus can be divided into three main categories:
Neoplatonism of the Greek commentators on Aristotle,
philosophy (nine treatises in logic, five in metaphysics,
which was itself an attempt to syncretize Plato and Aris-
and three in ethics),theology (thirty treatises),and what
totle,and it is fair to say that in antiquity the disparities
we would call natural science but what throughout the
between the two systems were not viewed as they have
medieval period was known as natural philosophy
been by modern commentators.In fact,Albert,in offer-
(twenty-two treatises). His method in most of his writ-
ing a Neoplatonic harmonization of the two systems, is
ings is the paraphrastic style employed by Avicenna (ibn
simply following the example, not only of his Arabic
Sina),as opposed to the line-by-line commentary charac-
sources,but of a tradition that extends back to the Hel-
teristic ofthe works ofAverroes (ibn Rushd),and his log-
lenistic period.The view that the systems are beyond har-
ical works in particular are deeply influenced by the work
monizing is of rather recent vintage and is subject to
not only ofAvicenna but also ofal-Farabiand Robert Kil-
modification.
wardby.Although Aristotle’s scientific writings had been
condemned in 1210 by Innocent III and the University of
Paris established a commission to purge the Aristotelian metaphysics
corpus of heretical ideas in 1231,Albert encountered no
Albert’s metaphysics focused primarily on a theory of
difficulty in making use of Aristotelian ideas when he
causation that can be traced to such sources as Aristotle,
began to work on his Summa de creaturis (Treatise on
Avicenna,Pseudo-Dionysius,and the Liber de causis(The
creatures),before 1246,and his commentary on the Sen-
Book of Causes). He adapted the Neoplatonic notion of
tentiarum of Peter Lombard, completed in 1249. It was
emanation of form,but in his system the causation is by
probably not until the condemnation of 1277 that Aris-
attraction rather than by pure emanation from the One.
totelianism as such encountered any serious resistance at
He preferred attraction to pure emanation because he
the universities.
identified the One with the Good, and the Good, by its
very nature,is diffusive of itself and of being (diffusivum
philosophy sui et esse),that is,it causes other things to be by means of
a kind of“calling to resemblance.”(Albert here treats the
Part of what was at issue in the condemnation of 1277
word for good,“bonum,”as cognate with the verb “boare”
was the relation between philosophy and theology,which
[to call]. This appeal to homespun etymology was also
the so-called Latin Averroists argued were separate disci-
common in antiquity, particularly in Plato but also in
plines corresponding to entirely distinct objects of
Aristotle.) By virtue of this “calling to resemblance,”the
knowledge,and hence governing different sorts oftruths.
The truths of theology were grounded in divine revela- Good is not merely the first mover, as Aristotle’s
tion and prophecy, while those of philosophy were unmoved mover is,but is also the first producer,that is,
grounded in human reason, and the mendicant orders the Creator—a role for the First Cause that is not found
were concerned to keep the two disciplines separate,on in Aristotle’s Metaphysics(bk.?),but rather is drawn from
the grounds that philosophy,an inherently skeptical dis- the Liber de causis,which Albert regarded as Aristotelian
cipline, might intrude itself into theology in an unwar- in provenance.
ranted way,calling into question conclusions drawn in a
domain in which it had no authority. In this context, logic
Albert’s insistence on the importance of knowing and
Albert’s logical works consist,for the most part,of para-
understanding the philosophy of the ancient Greeks is
phrases of the treatises of the Organon (from Gr.
striking and serves to illustrate his intellectual integrity.
“organon,” instrument, tool), so-called in the medieval
Albert’s approach to ancient philosophy has been period because logic was viewed not as a part ofphiloso-
criticized by late-twentieth-century historians ofphiloso- phy but rather as an implement that is necessary for the
phy as an unrealistic syncretism of Aristotelianism and advancement of philosophy. The Organon consisted of
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Aristotle’s Categories, De interpretatione (On interpreta- entific “experiment”consisted in the gathering of obser-
tion), Topics (including the De sophisticis elenchis [On vational data only, not the comparative analysis of data
sophistical refutations]), Prior Analytics, and Posterior against hypotheses with controlled variables (The Latin
Analytics.Yet Albert moved beyond Aristotle in a number word “experimentum” is cognate with the Greek word
of areas, most notably in his treatment of universals, “empeiria”[experience], from which we get the English
which was grounded on the notion of form found in word “empiricism.”) As in Aristotle’s treatises on nature,
Plato and Aristotle.Aristotle had objected to the separa- observational data served only to illustrate or confirm a
bility of the Platonic form and argued that forms are priori hypotheses,never as a means ofhypothesis forma-
immanent in particulars.Drawing again upon Aristotle’s tion.But Albert is not a strict Aristotelian in this matter.
Greek commentators, Albert argued that the universal For natural philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition,
must be analyzed into three modi essendi, or modes of such as Aquinas,experience must be understood in terms
being.Although a universal is a metaphysical unity,it may of an inductive process leading from sense perception of
be considered under three aspects:as an entity in its own particulars to the formation of general concepts in the
right,really existing separately from a particular,as in the soul,as described in Aristotle’s Metaphysics(A.1) and Pos-
mind ofGod (ante rem);as an entity that informs a par- terior Analytics(B.19).
ticular, causing it to be the thing it is (in re); or as an In this account,the specific features ofparticulars are
entity in human thought (post rem). The distinction the proper objects ofsense perception,but memory func-
between the universal in re and the universal post rem is tions to gather together the perceptual information from
grounded in the Aristotelian notion ofabstraction,which similar particulars into what Aristotle calls an empeiria
is discussed in more detail below under the heading of (experience) of the natural kind involved, and the
“Natural Science.”Although Albert achieves here another rational faculty called nousin Greek (variously translated
notable syncretism, it is worth noting that he does not into English as either intellect or understanding)
treat universals as substantial forms,as Plato and Aristo- abstracts from empeiriaan intelligible object,which then
tle both do. resides in nousand is a likeness (homoioma) ofthe imma-
nent form present in the particulars.Since these intelligi-
natural science ble objects are different in kind from the perceptual
objects that are the proper objects of the perceptual fac-
Albert’s interest in the natural world was driven by his
ulties,Aristotle is properly regarded not as an empiricist
belief that all knowledge is interconnected, and he pur-
but as a rationalist.Nonetheless,experience clearly plays
sued scientific questions with such intensity that critics,
an essential role in the acquisition of knowledge of uni-
such as Henry ofGhent (De scriptoribus ecclesiasticis2.10)
versals.
suggested that he neglected theology and philosophy.Of
For Albert, although scientific knowledge is of the
particular interest with regard to his scientific writings is
universal, the mechanism by which the universal comes
his attitude toward the distinction between rationalism
to reside in the soul is by the “calling to resemblance”of
and empiricism, a distinction that had been of great
the emanation of the intelligences. Intelligences illumi-
interest in antiquity but that had faded during the early
nate the human rational faculty in accord with the doc-
medieval period as a consequence ofboth the ascendancy
trine of causation by attraction, and universal concepts
of rationalism under the influence of Neoplatonism and
form in the soul not because of the capacity of human
the decline in scientific investigations during periods of
intellect to abstract them but because the First Cause uses
social and political upheaval.Working against the grain of
the intellect in its causal process.In Albert’s and Bacon’s
the prevailing rationalism,Albert’s attitude towards work
reliance on experience, though different in kind from
in the natural sciences was decidedly empiricist: experi-
later notions of experience,we see the beginnings of the
mentum solum certificat in talibus (“Experience alone
movement that would, by the time of the Renaissance,
gives certainty in such matters”(De vegetabilibus et plan-
establish empiricism as the dominant scientific attitude,
tis, VI, 2.1). Although “experimentum” (here translated
an attitude that, in time, would drive a wedge between
“experience”) is reminiscent of our word “experiment,”
natural philosophy and first philosophy and separate the
the modern concept of scientific experiment,in which a
natural sciences from philosophy.
hypothesis is tested against observational data for confir-
mation or falsification,was unknown at this time.
See also al-Farabi; Aristotelianism; Aristotle; Avicenna;
For Albert,as for his contemporary Roger Bacon,the Bacon, Roger; Liber de Causis; Neoplatonism; Peter
other great experimentalist ofthe thirteenth century,sci- Lombard;Pseudo-Dionysius;Thomas Aquinas,St.
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Bibliography Ifit had been the case that X,then it would have been the
case that Y (if X had happened,then Y would have hap-
WORKS BY ALBERT
pened)
Alberti Magni opera omnia,edited by the Institutum Alberti
Magni Coloniense.Münster,Germany:Monasterium
Subjunctive conditionals of the form “If she be gone,he
Westfalorum,1951–.
Alberti Magni opera omnia.21 vols.,edited by Petri Jammy. is in despair”are not at issue.
Lyon,France:1651.
It is because the antecedents ofsuch subjunctive con-
Alberti Magni opera omnia.38 vols.,edited by Auguste Borgnet
ditionals usually state something that is not in fact the
and E.Borgnet.Paris:L.Vivès,1890–1899.
case or “contrary-to-fact,”or is at least assumed not to be
WORKS ON ALBERT the case by the thinker or utterer of the conditional,that
Bianchi,Luca.Il vescovo e i filosofi: La condanna pariginia del
they have come to be known as counterfactuals.
1277 e l’evoluzione dell’aristotelismo scolastico.Bergamo,
Italy:1990. It is not clear that there is any interesting difference
Craemer-Ruegenberg,Ingrid.Albertus Magnus.Munich, between present and future tense indicative and subjunc-
Germany:Beck,1980. tive conditionals.It is not clear,for example,that there is
D’Ancona Costa,Cristina.Recherches sur le “Liber de causis.”
any important semantic difference between one saying “If
Paris:J.Vrin,1995.
it were raining they would not be playing” and “If it’s
Hoenen,Maarten,and Alain de Libera.Albertus Magnus und
der Albertismus: Deutsche philosophische Kultur des raining,then they’re not playing.”Nor is it clear that there
Mittelalters.Leiden,Germany:Brill,1995. is any important semantic difference between one saying
Kovach,Francis J.,and Robert W.Shahan,eds.Albert the Great: “If she goes to the party,he will not go”and “If she were
Commemorative Essays.Norman:University ofOklahoma to go,he would not go,”or between one saying “If salt is
Press,1980.
mixed with water it dissolves (will dissolve)”and “If salt
Libera,Alain de.Albert le Grand et la Philosophie.Paris:J.Vrin,
were to be mixed with water it would dissolve.”The idea
1990.
that there is an important difference here is perhaps an
Pegis,Anton.“St.Albert the Great and the Problem ofSoul as
Substance.”In his St.Thomas and the Problem ofthe Soul in artifact of the empiricist outlook dominant in analytic
the Thirteenth Century,chap.3.Toronto:St.Michael’s philosophy in the last century,which endorsed the “regu-
College,1934.
larity theory of causation” and the associated idea that
Weisheipl,James,ed.Albertus Magnus and the Sciences:
laws of nature could be adequately expressed by the
Commemorative Essays,1980.Toronto:Pontifical Institute of
“material conditional”ofstandard first-order logic.
Mediaeval Studies,1980.
Zimmermann,Albert.Albert der Große: Seine Zeit,sein Werk, However that may be,the difference between indica-
seine Wirkung.Berlin:de Gruyter,1981.
tive and subjunctive conditionals seems clearer in the case
Scott Carson (2005) ofpast-tense conditionals.Consider
IfGeorges Agniel and his friends did not discover the Las-
caux caves,then someone else did
counterfactuals
and
A conditional is a sentence, statement, proposition, or
If Georges Agniel and his friends had not discovered the
thought ofthe form
Lascaux caves,then someone else would have
IfA then C
The difference ofmeaning is immediately apparent and is
“A”is called the antecedentofthe conditional and “C”the sufficiently shown by the fact that although one takes the
consequent.Philosophers have traditionally divided con- first to be true,one has no reason to believe the second.
ditionals into two main groups,indicative,which can be
The commonly used labels (“indicative,”“subjunc-
symbolized as [ArC], and subjunctive ([A~rC]). The
tive,” and “counterfactual”) do not, however, perspicu-
so-called counterfactual conditionals that have been the
ously mark out the set of conditionals that concern
subject of so much discussion in analytic philosophy are
philosophers when they discuss counterfactuals. The
subjunctive conditionals ofthe form
indicative/subjunctive distinction is purely syntactical
and simply fails to pick out the right set of conditionals.
If it were to be the case that X then it would be the case
On the one hand,“If the Palestinians declared statehood
that Y (ifX were to happen,then Y would happen)
now,the Israelis would retaliate”is a counterfactual that
and is not grammatically subjunctive.On the other hand,one
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can utter a subjunctive conditional ofthe form “IfX had A central issue for any theory of conditionals is
happened,then Y would have happened”without having whether indicatives and counterfactuals should receive a
any intention to assert or imply the falsity of the uniform treatment,that is,one that uses the same theo-
antecedent.Suppose I am a detective who suspects that a retical apparatus across the board.David K.Lewis (1973,
criminal did A although none of my colleagues believe 1976) and Frank Jackson (1977, 1979) both reject this
me.I note that the criminal did something peculiar,that idea,offering nonuniform theories that fix the truth-con-
is,B,and remark truly that ifshe had done A,she would ditions of indicatives and counterfactuals in different
have had to have done B in support of my case,without ways. Mackie (1973), by contrast, offers a uniform
in any way implying that the state of affairs specified in account of all conditionals in terms of the single basic
the antecedent is not the case (alternatively,I may say this notion of suppositions,and Robert C.Stalnaker (1968),
before dispatching someone to find out whether she did having given an account of all conditionals in terms of
B).Again,I may set you a puzzle,asking you to work out possible worlds, accounts for the intuitive difference
what I have done,and give you clues,pointing out that if between indicatives and counterfactuals by appeal to
I had done X then this would have happened,that ifI had pragmatic considerations.
done Y then this other thing would have happened,with-
Central to this debate is the question whether one
out ever asserting or implying that I did not do X or Y.
bases one’s account of indicative conditionals on the
Again,I may truthfully assert both “If I had come to the
material conditional of standard first-order logic, often
party I would have got drunk”and “IfI had not come to symbolized as “A(cid:1)C,” which is true just in case its
the party I would have got drunk”without for a moment
antecedent is false or its consequent is true (the truth-
thinking or implying, inconsistently, that both these
value of the whole is determined in a purely truth-
antecedents are false.
functional way by the truth-values of the parts). Lewis
The purely syntactical criterion is no good,then,and and Jackson are among those who think that the mate-
blanket use of the term “counterfactual”to cover all the rial-conditional approach can give an adequate account
subjunctive conditionals that concern philosophers is no ofall indicative conditionals (others think that it can only
better.It remains true,nevertheless,that when one asserts provide a necessary and not a sufficient condition),but a
a subjunctive conditional one almost invariably suggests unified material-conditional account of both indicatives
that the state of affairs specified in the antecedent is not and counterfactuals seems a nonstarter. The material-
in fact the case. This entry will therefore use the tradi- conditional account,for example,classifies
tional term “counterfactual”in this discussion,and con-
trast counterfactuals generally with indicatives in spite of If the moon had been made of cheese, I would be
the difficulties just noted. immortal
as just as surely true as
theories of conditionals
Ifthis apple had been made ofcopper,it would have con-
Any theory of counterfactuals will be part of a general
ducted electricity
theory ofconditionals,and the question arises as to what
form a general theory of conditionals should take.Many
simply on the ground that the antecedent is false.But one
favor a truth-conditional approach,that is,one that ana-
is much more discriminating about the truth-values of
lyzes conditionals by offering an account of the condi-
counterfactual conditionals than this account allows.
tions under which statements of the form “If A then C”
That is why Lewis and Jackson,having accepted the mate-
are true or false (possible-worlds and metalinguistic
rial-conditional theory for indicatives, adopt a nonuni-
accounts of conditionals are examples of truth-
form general theory of conditionals, Lewis (1973)
conditional approaches). Others seek to analyze condi-
offering a possible-worlds account ofcounterfactuals and
tionals by reference to the conditions under which they
Jackson (1977) a causal account.
can be justifiably asserted or accepted as true (e.g., see
A further issue concerns whether one can give a uni-
Edgington 1986). An attractive alternative is John L.
form account of the logic of indicatives and counterfac-
Mackie’s (1973) condensed argument/supposition
tuals.The following inference patterns
account,according to which conditionals are condensed
arguments or suppositions and so not strictly true or false (I1) IfA then C,therefore,ifnot-C then not-A (con-
at all. traposition)
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(I2) If A then B,if B then C,therefore,if A then C THE METALINGUISTIC APPROACH. According to
(hypothetical syllogism) Goodman’s (1947) metalinguistic approach a counterfac-
tual asserts a certain connection or consequential relation
(I3) If A then B, therefore, if A and C then B
between the antecedent and the consequent.Since in the
(strengthening the antecedent)
case of the counterfactuals that concern this discussion
the antecedent does not entail the consequent as a matter
are valid for the material conditional, but are widely
of logic or a priori necessity, certain other statements,
agreed not to hold for counterfactual conditionals (e.g.,
including statements oflaws and existing particular con-
consider the failure of (I3), in the move from the true
ditions,must be combined with the antecedent to entail
claim “Ifhe had walked on the ice,it would have broken”
the consequent. These counterfactuals, then, are true, if
to the false claim “If he had walked on the ice and had
true at all,only if(and if) the antecedent combined with
been holding a large bunch of helium balloons, the ice
a set of statements S that meets a certain condition f
would have broken”).While a nonuniform account can
entails the consequent as a matter of law. The theory is
allow that these inference patterns hold for indicatives
metalinguistic because counterfactuals are treated as
but fail for counterfactuals (see Lewis [1973] and Jackson
equivalent to metalinguistic statements of the relevant
[1979],who attempts to explain away apparently invalid
entailments.
indicative cases like “if he has made a mistake,then it is
not a big mistake,therefore,ifhe has made a big mistake, A notorious difficulty for this theory has been to give
he has not made a mistake”in terms of failure of assert- an adequate specification of condition f. Consider
ibility),a uniform account must hold that if they fail for [A~rC]. Given that the assumption, in the case of a
counterfactuals then they also fail for indicatives (see counterfactual, is that A is false, one may reasonably
Stalnaker 1968). assert ~A. However, if ~A were admissible into S, then
with A one would get the contradiction [A&~A], and
since it is generally accepted that anything can be inferred
theories of counterfactuals
from a contradiction, anything could be inferred from
Turning now to counterfactuals, one finds three main the conjunction ofA and S,including C.All counterfac-
approaches.The metalinguistic account initiated by Nel- tuals would therefore turn out to be true (a priori false
son Goodman in 1947 (see also Chisholm 1955,Mackie counterfactuals have been excluded).To prevent this triv-
1973,Tichy 1984) analyses counterfactuals in terms ofan ialization,the statements that constitute S must be (logi-
entailment relationship between the antecedent plus an cally) compatible with A. This excludes ~A. A further
additional set ofstatements or propositions,and the con- requirement noted by Goodman is that the statements
sequent.The causal approach offered by Jackson in 1977 that constitute S must be compatible with ~C;for ifthey
(see also Kvart 1986) is closely related but deserves a sep- were not,C would follow from S itself,and A and the laws
arate category because it appeals essentially to causal con- would play no role in the inference to C.
cepts in its analysis ofcounterfactuals,thereby ruling out
With this in hand Goodman offers the following
the popular strategy ofusing counterfactuals in an analy-
analysis:“A counterfactual is true ifand only if(iff) there
sis of causation (one of the first to do this was Hume
is some set S of true sentences such that S is compatible
1748/1975, p. 76; see also Lewis 1986b). Finally, there is
with C and with ~C, and such that [A&S] is self-
the possible-worlds approach initiated by William Todd compatible and leads by law to C;while there is no set S'
(1964),Stalnaker (1968),and Lewis (1973),which analy- compatible with C and with ~C and such that [A&S] is
ses counterfactuals in terms of similarity relations self-compatible and leads by law to ~C”(Goodman 1947,
between worlds. This entry will consider them in turn, p.120;for a discussion ofthis last condition,see Bennett
after hereby putting aside,as unimportant to the present 2003;Parry 1957).Restricting S with the notion of com-
concerns,all counterfactuals that are true (or false) as a patibility does not seem to be enough,however,for coun-
matter oflogic or a priorinecessity,such as terfactuals that clearly seem false still threaten to turn out
true.Consider
IfQ had been P it would have entailed P (Q)
(1) Ifmatch m had been struck,it would have flared
If this number had been 2 it would have been even
(odd) and
Ifthis circle had been square it would have had fewer (2) If match m had been struck, it would not have
than (more than) seven sides been dry
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
6 •
2nd edition