Philosophical Historicism and the Betrayal of First Philosophy

241 Pages·1990·31.32 MB·English

by  Carl Page

LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Page,Carl, 1957-
Philosophicalhistoricismandthe betrayaloffirst philosophy/
CarlPage.
p. em.
Includes bibliographical referencesandindex.
ISBN0-271-01330-3(alk. paper)
1. Philosophy. 2. Historicism. 3. Methodology. I.Title.
B61.P34 1995
101--dc20 93-41574
eIP
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What is thefirst andlastthingthataphilosopherdemands 0/himself?
To overcomehis agein himself, to becometimeless.
- Friedrich Nietzsche
PREFACE
Overemphasizing the historical character of human existence ends by
betrayingphilosophy, for the necessary timeliness ofdeeds all too easily
overshadowsthefragile possibilityofuntimelyspeeches. Dogmaticasser
tion ofreason's transcendencebetraysphilosophynoless, foritencourages,
first, a disconnection of insight from the caring it takes to cultivate
virtueand, subsequently,anallbutirreparablesplitbetweenthetandem
moments oftheory and practice, endeavor and insight.
In this matter of reason's self-knowledge, the collective mood of
contemporary philosophy is swinging toward the former, historicist
extre~. What is defined and explicated in this book as philosophical
historicism claims that the activity of human reason is totally and
necessarilydetermined bythefinite actuality ofhistorical circumstance,
that despite the intelligibility ofuniversal, primary, and synoptic cogni-
xii Preface
tive ideals, in reality human reason is necessarily dominated by the
purely contingent. I do not oppose this view with the supposition that
history is irrelevant to philosophy or that philosophy does not need to
take history seriously. I contend, rather, that contemporary philosophy
is becomingso infatuatedwith historicalcontingency thatitthreatensto
make nonsense ofthe natural desire to see things whole and clear. With
all the good intentions of saving reason from dogmatic pretension and
self-delusion, philosophical historicism nonetheless betrays theoretical
eros by its insistence that thedesire toget to the bottomofthings, to the
bottom of anything, cannot in principle be consummated and must
therefore be wholly retrained. Getting to the bottom of things, seeing
things whole and clear-these aspirations helpdefine the spirit of"First
Philosophy," Aristotle's descriptive designation for the knowledge of
things through their ultimate causes and principles, the knowledge
whose perfection but not intelligibility philosophical historicism denies.
For the sake of paying due respect to the historical situatedness of
reason's exercise, historicism thus alienates us from the given form of
our yearning to understand.
Iam convincedthat this betrayalistoo high apricetopay, despitethe
value ofhistoricism's central lesson that the soul, and more particularly
the theorizing mind, may not reasonably be indifferent to its historical
embodiment. My aim in this book is to show how the meaning of
historicity may be preserved without forsaking the natural integrity of
theoretical desire and without, therefore, abandoningeitherthe spirit or
the tradition ofFirst Philosophy.
The readershouldbe warned that IoffernosystematicdefenseofFirst
Philosophy's alternative to philosophical historicism. It appears here
chiefly as the shadow progenitor against which the latter defines itself.
Myimmanentcriticismsaredirectedat thecurrenthistoricistorthodoxy
in its own terms. They are grounded in historicism's own explicit aims
and self-understanding as well as in tacit constraints common to all
modes ofphilosophizing. I have spoken ofthose common constraints in
terms ofboth metaphysical and logical (or account-giving) responsibility,
phrases whose meanings are explained and whose relevance is justified
in the appropriate places. My own commitmentto First Philosophy may,
from time to time, distract the historicistically inclined reader, but that
commitment alone cannot be held to invalidate arguments I have made
every efforttokeepcommensurablewith historicism's ownphilosophical
spirit, stated and implied.
Preface xiii
What follows is a theoretical critique. It addresses philosophical
historicism as a teaching about the true situation ofhuman reason. But
historicism's growing philosophical popularity represents as much a
practical commitment as it does a theoretical one, namely the moral
conviction that we have, at last, found the right way to discipline
philosophy's hubristic tendency to place itselfabove politics, above the
city, above its fellow citizens. From this zeal comes all the contemporary
emphasison solidarity. The topicisdeepandcomplex,made particularly
difficult by the natural passion for justice. Importance notwithstanding,
I havedeliberatelyavoidedalldiscussion ofthis wider, politicallyramify
ingcontext. It requires a bookin its own right. Instead I have chosento
focus on philosophical historicism's purely doctrinal weaknesses as an
interpretation ofhuman reason. The priorityisjustifiedsince, ifhistori
cism is theoretically inadequate in the ways I maintain, it cannot possi
bly beasuitablebasisfor practical responsibility to the politicaldomain.
ABBREVIATIONS
BOR Richard Bernstein, BeyondObjectivism andRelativism:Science,
Hermeneutics, andPraxis (Philadelphia: University ofPennsyl
vania Press, 1983).
BT Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John M'acquarrie and
Edward Robinson (Ne·w York: Harper and Row, 1962 [1926]).
CIS Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, andSolidarity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989).
CP RichardRorty, ConsequencesofPragmatism:Essays, 1972-1980
(Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1982).
CR Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth ofScien
tificKnowledge, 2d ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1965).
xviii Abbreviations
"CWM" "CorrespondenceConcerning WahrheitundMethode: Leo Strauss
and Hans-Georg Gadamer," Independent Journal ofPhilosophy
2(1978): 5-12.
EH Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus (Munich:
Oldenbourg, 1959 [1936]), translated by J. E. Anderson as
Historism (London: Herderand Herder, 1972). Page references
are to the English translation.
EHO Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical
Papers, Volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991).
EN Sections referto G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopadiederphilosophischen
Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1969
[1830]), withEnglishtranslationsfromHegel'sLogic, tr.William
Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) and Hegel's Philoso
phyofMind, tr. A. V. Miller (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1971).
"GS" Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Gadamer on Strauss: An Interview,"
Interpretation 12 (1984): 1-13.
HCE Martin Heidegger, Hegel's Concept ofExperience (New York:
Harperand Row, 1970).
HK Robert D'Amico,Historicism andKnowledge (New York: Rout
ledge, Chapman, and Hall, 1989).
"HM" Karl Mannheim, "Historicism," in Essays on the Sociology of
Knowledge, ed. Paul Kecskemeti (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1952).
HP G. W. F. Hegel,Hegel's Introduction totheLecturesontheHistory
ofPhilosophy, tr. I M. KnoxandA. V. Miller(Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1985).
IRH Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction totheReadingofHegel: Lectures
onthePhenomenologyofSpirit, tr. JamesH. NicholsJr. (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969).
IU Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, tr. Louis Wirth and
Edward Shils (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1936).
"KH" Ernst Troeltsch, "Die Krisis des Historismus," Die Neue
Rundschau 33 (1922): 572-90.
Abbreviations xix
KPM MartinHeidegger,KantandtheProblemofMetaphysics, 4thed.
(en!.), tr. Richard Taft (Bloomington: University of Indiana
Press, 1990[1929]).
ORT Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophi
calPapers, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991).
OSE Karl Popper, The Open SocietyandIts Enemies, 2vols., 5th ed.
(London:'Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966).
"PCR" Jack Meiland, "On the Paradox of Cognitive Relativism,"
Metaphilosophy 11 (1980): 115-26.
PHM Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, tr. David
Linge (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1976).
PMN Richard Rorty, PhilosophyandtheMirrorofNature (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979).
PPH DavidCarr, PhenomenologyandtheProblemofHistory:A Study
ofEdmundHusserl's Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston,
Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1974).
PR G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy ofRight, tr. T. M. Knox
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1952).
PS G. W. F. Hegel,Hegel's PhenomenologyofSpirit, tr. A. V. Miller
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).
PVH Karl Popper, The Poverty ofHistoricism, 3d ed. (New York:
Harper and Row, 1964).
PWF Joseph Margolis, Pragmatism Without Foundations: Recon
ciling Realism and Relativism (New York: Basil Blackwell,
1986).
RF Erich Streissler, ed., Roads to Freedom (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1969).
SL G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic, tr. A. V. Miller
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanitie's Press, 1969).
SWU Joseph Margolis, Science Without Unity: ReconcilingtheHuman
andNatural Sciences (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
xx Abbreviations
TM Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2d rev. ed., transla
tion revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall
(New York: Crossroad, 1989).
TWR Joseph Margolis, Texts Without Referents: Reconciling Science
andNarrative (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
WH G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History:
Introduction-Reason in History, tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975).
INTRODUCTION
HISTORICISM: THE NEW COMMONPLACE
Since the middle of the nineteenth century Historismus has been a
familiar item in the lexicon ofGerman scholarship. In contrast, only in
the latter half of the twentieth century has the kindred (though not
equivalent) term historicism appeared as a category in the working
vocabulary ofEnglish-speaking academics. Despite this apparently late
start on their part, it is now fair to say that historicism is a well-worn, if
less than well-understood, pieceoftaxonomic coin. Withinthe lastdecade
itsincreasedcirculationintheconversationsofphilosophersinparticular
has been especiallymarked. Thesignificance ofthis recent philosophical
appropriation ofhistoricism is the subject ofthe present book.
Although the upsurge in philosophical use is recent, it has not taken
long for the currency to become debased. As a label, historicism may
now be found attributed to almost any philosophicalpositionthat makes
some approving reference to history, regardless of the specific form
in which it should happen to do so. When used in this indefinite
way, historicism becomes equally applicable to the views ofHegel and
to those of Richard Rorty.Nonetheless, the widespread willingness to