Philosophers in Exile: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, 1939-1959

379 Pages·1989·29.98 MB·English

by  Richard Grathoff (Ed.)

Philosophers in Exile
Studies in Phenomenology and
Existential Philosophy
GENERAL EDITOR
JAMES M. EDIE
CONSULTING EDITORS
_David Carr William L. McBride
EdwardS. Casey J. N. Mohanty
Stanley Cavell Maurice Natanson
Roderick M. Chisholm Frederick Olafson
Hubert L. Dreyfus Paul Ricoeur
William Earle John Sallis
J. N. Findlay George Schrader
Dagfinn F0llesdal Calvin 0. Schrag
Marjorie Grene Robert Sokolowski
Dieter Henrich Herbert Spiegelberg
Don Ihde Charles Taylor
Emmanuel Levinas Samuel J. Todes
Alphonso Lingis Bruce W. Wilshire
Philosophers in Exile
of
The Correspondence Alfred Schutz and
Aron Gurwitsch) 1939-1959
Edited by Richard Grathoff
Translated by J. Claude Evans
Foreword by Maurice Natanson
INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS <• BLOOMINGTON AND INDIANAPOLIS
© 1989 by Indiana University Press
The German edition of .this correspondence was published as Alfred Schutz, Aron
Gurwitsch:
Briefwechsel, 1939-1959, © 1985 Wilhelm Fink Verlag
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and
recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publisher. The Association of American
University Presses' Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only
exception to this prohibition.
Manufactured in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Schutz, Alfred, 1899-1959.
[Alfred Schutz, Aron Gurwitsch. English]
Philosophers in exile : the correspondence of Alfred Schutz and
Aron Gurwitsch, 1939-1959 I edited by Richard Grathoff ; translated
by J. Claude Evans ; foreword by Maurice Natanson.
p. cm.-(Studies in phenomenology and existential
philosophy)
Translation of: Alfred Schutz, Aron Gurwitsch.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-253-32627-3
1. Schutz, Alfred, 1899-195~orrespondence. 2. Gurwitsch, Aron
Correspondence. 3. Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938.4. Phenomenology.
5. Philosophers-United States-Biography. I. Gurwitsch, Aron.
II. Grathoff, Richard. Ill. Title. IV. Series.
B945.S354A4 1989
193-dc19
[B] 88-46037
CIP
1 2 3 4 5 93 92 91 90 89
CONTENTS
vii FOREWORD BY MAURICE NATANSON
xiii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
xv INTRODUCTION BY RICHARD GRATHOFF
1 2
The Riders of the Apocalypse The Strange and the Stranger
(August 5, 1939-0ctober 9, 1941) (November 8, 1941-July 16, 1944)
2 42
3 4
Context as a Problem of Order Oh, Holy Mannheim!
(June 11, 1945-July 17, 1949) (January 26, 1950-March 16, 1951)
73 113
5 6
The Field of Consciousness From the Theory of Action to the
(June 24, 1951-March 17, 1952) Theory of Science
134 (April4, 1952-September 5, 1953)
171
7 8
Concepts of the Life-World lnve$tigation of the Life-World vs.
(October 2, 1953-January 1, 1956) Transcendental Constitutional
215 Analysis
(February 22, 1956-April25, 1957)
248
VI CONTENTS
9
Parting
(June 6, 1957-May 16, 1959)
267
321 AFTERWORD BY J. CLAUDE EVANS
327 BIBLIOGRAPHY
334 INDEX
Foreword
MAURICE NATANSON
This book presents the remarkable correspondence between Alfred Schutz and Aron
Gurwitsch, both European Jews born at the tum of the century, both philosophers
deeply influenced by Edmund Husserl, both exiled more than once (the two first met in
Paris in the mid-thirties, at the suggestion ofHusserl), both ultimately seminal figures in
the establishment of phenomenology in the Uni.ted States. The dates of the Schutz
Gurwitsch correspondence-1939-1959-provide a focus for but not an explanation of
the scope of this exchange.
The correspondents were strongly entrenched in the history of their times, but their
intellectual and cultural roots were defined humanistically by the classical gymnasia that
they attended, by the Continental universities at which they studied, by their immersion
in philosophy (Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, in particular), and by their compre
hension of the grounding of the social as well as the natural sciences in a logic whose
terms relate profoundly to the world ofd aily life-the ambience of human experience as it
is lived in immediacy by all of us.
But more than being intellectual products of a certain European tradition, Schutz and
Gurwitsch were historically located at a savage juncture of world events: they were
Europeans compelled to leave their cultural homes to become exiles not only from their
lands but also from the European tradition itself-a tradition which, far from ridding
itself of what it deemed undesirable "elements," splintered into the shards of irratio
nalism, genocide, and historical disgrace. A central part of what makes this correspon
dence remarkable is that Schutz and Gurwitsch understood the chaos of the events of
their times and yet in the midst of their own personal losses comprehended the loss of
that European humanism which wounded itself beyond recovery. Tliese refugees did not
escape the Europe that made them possible; that Europe no longer existed.
What remained was the world that Schutz and Gurwitsch constituted in their corre
spondence and personal meetings-perhaps above all through the philosophical papers
which they wrote, sent to each other faithfully, and discussed with the deepest critical care
and philosophical urgency-as well as in the no less important personal concern that they
showed for each other, for their families, and for their friends. Paradoxically, theirs was
not a private but a universal world. What, then, makes this correspondence "remarkable"?
To the reasonable question: What, essentially, is the Schutz-Gurwitsch correspon
dence about? no simple response is possible. It is correct to say that the entire correspon
dence is, au fond, a reflection of the relationship between two extraordinary individuals
that the correspondence is essentially a human document. But being correct is not always
enough. In this instance, it must also be said that though the correspondence is a mirror
of a transcendent friendship and of a world shared by exceptional relations and friends, it
is at the same time a philosophical venture by Schutz and Gurwitsch to work out their
ideas through and with each other, to determine whether their fundamentally resonant
but more than occasionally divergent views could achieve clarity and resolution. The
image used by the correspondents is that of a "tunnel" that they are digging from
different ends and which may or may not ''meet." The tunnel is being dug "together'';
whether the diggers finally "meet" is of vital importance to them; but the image has its
Vll
Vlll FOREWORD
limits. The phenomenological theme of the correspondence is the practice of philosophy:
the nature of that practice, its implications for the practitioners, and the transformation of
both self and world in the course of what might be called a genuine philosophical
existence. In a way, the correspondence is about itself, for both partners are self
consciously and overtly aware of the activity of philosophy which is engendered by their
reports to each other, their exchanges, their arguments, and their reliance on each other
for the expert understanding and unqualified honesty in theoretical as well as practical
matters which are so rarely found in combination.
From a different vantage point, one may say with confidence that, depending on
where one samples these letters, a variety of themes provides legitimate (if partial) an
swers to the question of what this correspondence is about. A strong part of the book is
concerned with problems of what has come to be known as the subject of "refugee
scholars" in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s. What is different about the
Schutz-Gurwitsch exchange when viewed under the rubric of "refugee scholars" is the
internal-or better, interior--character of a sustained discussion between such scholars
themselves rather than by their observers in the literature devoted to what is now a
"research" subject. Ironically, perhaps, Max Weber's notion of the actor's interpretation
of the meaning of his own act-the "subjective interpretation of meaning"-so well
known to Schutz and Gurwitsch, became particularized in the actuality of the lives of the
correspondents. They were refugee scholars who not only knew their sociological place
ment but who were also concerned with its philosophical implications. We have a dou
bling effect: refugee scholars who were professionally concerned with some of the most
fundamental aspects of the situation of which they are prime examples. But the meaning
of the "refugee scholar'' would be lost in its deepest aspect with regard to Schutz and
Gurwitsch if it were not recognized that for them the "refugee" problem had its own
history, its own "sedimentation of meaning" (to use Husserl's language), for the "prob
lem" is closer to Socrates than to Hider. The force of events in 1939 cannot be wished
away by invoking the ancient history of the "refugee"; neither can the historical scene of
1939 be comprehended fully without access to what lies so anciendy behind it-not in a
causal but in a humanistic sense. What identifies the essence of humanism in this context
is the recognition that "history'' is primarily not what happened but what keeps happen
ing. The last historical event looks back to its origins not out of nostalgia but by virtue of
an integral philosophic effort which human beings may make to grasp the meaning they
bear in a "preinterpreted" world.
Still another feature of the correspondence is the intensive discussion of
phenomenology-of a considerable number of phenomenological problems, to be more
precise-which for the two men was a fire fed by the exchange of their writings. This
discussion will be precious to the reader acquainted with philosophy in general and
phenomenology in particular; approached in the wrong way, it may very well lead the
reader who is not especially interested in phenomenology to conclude that whatever the
problems at issue are, they are intended only for readers ofHusserl. What possible change
in approach can alter this circumstance? What would an approach "in the right way"
mean? What is at issue in the discussions of phenomenological problems in the correspon
dence between Schutz and Gurwitsch is not textual in character; that is, neither correspon
dent is primarily concerned with what Husserl meant by a particular point made in a
particular passage. The task of the correspondence is not the ¢:plication or the exegesis of
the writings of Edmund Husserl. ·
Early in the exchange, Schutz (in his letter of August 19, 1939) wrote: "As you
know, for me the question concerning the 'correct,' namely orthodox, Husserl interpre
tation is always secondary to the question concerning the true states of affairs." Of
course, the proper understanding of Husserl and his texts was of major importance to
the friends. Of much greater significance was what Husserl sought: an immensely
thorough-philosophically stubborn-description, analysis, and comprehension of "the
MAURICE NATANSON ix
true states of affairs," the "things themselves." Still, more than a rigorous discussion of
phenomenological problems, the correspondence shows itself to be a sophisticated but,
in a powerful way, raw specimen of philosophizing of the most searching order regard
ing the meaning of perception, action, intersubjectivity, objectivity, the ego, conscious
ness, knowledge of the Other, the proper station of social science, and the limits of
symbol, relevance, and even "limit" itself in "lived experience": the place of transcen
dence (to paraphrase one ofWolfgang Kohler's titles) in a world of finitude.
To say that a considerable part of the correspondence consists in the discussion of
philosophical problems is, once again, the ''wrong'' way of reading this book. The state
ment is true but banal. Rather, the discussion of philosophical problems by Schutz and
Gurwitsch is perhaps the most incisive exchange of views in the course of a twenty-year
correspondence in recent philosophy. If the number of members of the class of outstand
ing philosophers who have sustained a twenty-year intellectual correspondence is small, it
is all the more important testimony to the unusual character of this book and all the more
clarification of what "remarkable" means here: The correspondence is alive with the swift
current of deeply consonant and yet strongly independent and sometimes antagonistic
views; these pages present philosophical thinking in process and in the presence of
another mind at once profoundly congenial and committed only to the truth that philoso
phers have traditionally heralded but seldom lived by.
Yet the philosophical correspondence cannot be taken at surface value. It is extremely
telling that the discussion between Schutz and Gurwitsch deepens our understanding of
phenomenology in quite specific ways. For example, take the different interpretations
and emphases that the two men gave to Husserl's conceptions of the noetic and the
noematic polarities of intentional experience; that is, the way in which consciousness
builds up the unities of meaning and those unities taken as accomplished, as presented to
the perceiver-in phenomenological terms, "as meant." Schutz has been called a "noetic''
phenomenologist and Gurwitsch has been termed a "noematic" phenomenologist. What
the correspondence reveals, however, is that both sides of the perceptual process, the
"subjective" and the "objective" sides, are issues which are very far from being phenome
nologically settled; to the contrary, they remained for the two writers "problem children"
a5 well as "problem adults" in the house of phenomenology. For both parties to the
discussion, it was not enough to think through or to argue out what Husserl meant by
these fundamental concepts; the still deeper demand they made of each other was the
achievement of full clarity about the philosophical grounds of phenomenological issues.
In this correspondence, phenomenology is philosophy in process, not philosophy be
come but philosophy becoming.
A still further way of taking the "right approach" to the distinctively phenomenologi
cal discussions in this book is to recognize as soon as possible what is revealed as the years
of the correspondence pass: that the philosophizing together of Schutz and Gurwitsch is
unthinkable without Husserl but is distorted if their letters are regarded as restricted
either to Husserl, to Bussed's phenomenology, or to matters which are somehow all
derivative from Husserlian thought. The two thinkers were thoroughly acquainted with
the history of philosophy from Sextus Empiricus (Carneades) to work done in recent
times. Both men shared a profound interest in the thought of Leibniz; both men could
justifiably take for granted a detailed grasp of Plato and Aristotle; both men had read
their Kant; and perhaps most important of all, they had unequal backgrounds in certain
. domains: Gurwitsch had devoted himself deeply to the study of Gestalt psychology;
Schutz was saturated with the literature of the social sciences. Gurwitsch taught mathe
matics and physics; Schutz had an impressive knowledge of musicology as well as of the
philosophical problems relating to music. For work on .the foundations of arithmetic, one
turns to Gurwitsch; for an essay such as "Mozart and the Philosophers," one turns to
Schutz.
Their differences are as important as their similarities in coming to terms with what