Global Markets Research T R O P E R R O H C N A Philippines infrastructure: Aggressive ramp in infra spending ahead Initiating on property, conglomerates, 14 February 2017 construction, and others Research analysts Philippines Conglomerate The Philippine economy has managed to deliver 6% average GDP growth Dante Tinga Jr - BDO-NS over the past seven years, despite poor-quality infrastructure that has [email protected] hampered productivity and overall economic competitiveness. The +632 878 4969 government plans to ramp-up infrastructure spending from 3% to 6% of ASEAN Property GDP as well as reduce red tape in order to address this growth bottleneck. We take a look at the implementation process for the infrastructure Abigail Chiw, CFA - BDO-NS [email protected] program as well as sectors and stocks likely to be impacted. +632 878 4590 While investors looking for beneficiaries on this theme usually look to the ASEAN Industrials Philippine conglomerates (AC and MPI), we think the property (ALI, MEG, Thomas Earll Huang - BDO-NS RLC), construction (DMC), and building materials (CHP) sectors [email protected] are more attractive from a risk-reward perspective. +632 878 4968 Key themes and analysis in this Anchor Report include: Asia Economics Euben Paracuelles - NSL Issues to be hurdled to implement the infrastructure rollout [email protected] Sectors and stocks most attractive from a risk-reward perspective +65 6433 6956 given the thrust towards improving public infrastructure Initiation on the Philippine conglomerate, property, construction, and building materials sectors Production Complete: 2017-02-13 20:32 UTC See Appendix A-1 for analyst certification, important disclosures and the status of non-US analysts. Philippines infrastructure EQUITY: ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION Aggressive ramp in infra spending ahead Global MarketsResearch 14 February 2017 Initiating coverage on property, conglomerates, construction, and others Anchor themes Implementation of the Poor infrastructure a drag on Philippine growth government's infra program is a The World Economic Forum (WEF) cites poor-quality infrastructure as the key growth catalyst for the second most problematic factor for doing business in the Philippines. WEF Philippine economy. We believe surveys suggest failure to address the infrastructure deficit may compromise conglomerate, property, the Philippines’ attractiveness as an investment destination. Furthermore, construction, and building poor-quality infrastructure is already a tangible drag on the economy. The materials areas will be most Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) estimates the economic cost impacted. of traffic congestion in Metro Manila alone at US$13bn per year, or roughly 4% of Philippine GDP. Nomura vs consensus Our TPs and valuations are Government focused on finding solutions generally higher vs consensus, Positive steps have already been taken (passage of a right of way bill, creation as we factor in the potential of a Ministry of Transport, emergency powers for the Transport Minister, etc.) impact of the government's to address bureaucratic bottlenecks that are impeding project funding and infrastructure program. implementation. The Duterte administration’s planned ramp-up in infrastructure spending from 3% of GDP in 2015 to at least 6% over the medium term is Research analysts unprecedented. Hence, we conservatively estimate this will translate to USD167bn of infrastructure-related disbursement (90% of target) over the next Philippines Conglomerate five years. Moreover, the government’s pragmatic approach to Public Private Dante Tinga Jr - BDO-NS Partnership (PPP) Projects will likely translate to a more orderly rollout of [email protected] projects. There could be fewer PPP projects bid out, however, as the +632 878 4969 government’s project selection process will likely be more stringent. ASEAN Property Infrastructure beneficiaries: Property, construction, and conglomerates Abigail Chiw, CFA - BDO-NS Investors looking for beneficiaries of increased private-sector participation in [email protected] infrastructure may look to the Philippine conglomerates (AC and MPI) sector. +632 878 4590 Historically, however, direct private sector participation in Philippine ASEAN Industrials infrastructure subjects investors to regulatory risks. In our view, the property (ALI, MEG, RLC), construction (DMC), and building materials (CHP) sectors Thomas Earll Huang - BDO-NS [email protected] are more attractive from a risk-reward perspective, as these sectors / firms +632 878 4968 benefit from an accelerated government infrastructure program without the hazards involved in direct equity investments in infrastructure. Asia Economics Euben Paracuelles - NSL Fig. 1: Stocks for action [email protected] +65 6433 6956 Mkt cap Avg T/O Target Price Upside Company Code Rating (USDmn) (USDmn) price (9 Feb) (%) Robinsons Land Co. RLC PM Buy* 2 ,072 1 .0 35.93 25.85 39% The "BDO-NS" (which stands for "BDO International Container Terminal Services, Inc. ICT PM Buy* 3 ,086 2 .2 92.82 74.85 24% Nomura Securities, Inc.") placed next Ayala Land Inc. ALI PM Buy* 1 0,396 8 .0 43.72 35.75 22% to an analyst’s name on the front page Megaworld Corp. MEG PM Buy* 2 ,514 2 .7 4.61 3 .84 20% of a research report indicates that the Cemex Holdings Philippines CHP PM Buy* 1 ,152 2 .4 13.40 11.18 20% analyst is employed by BDO Unibank Metro Pacific Investments Corp. MPI PM Buy* 4 ,269 2 .1 8.10 6 .84 18% Inc. ("BDO Unibank") who has been Vista Land & Lifescapes Inc. VLL PM Buy* 1 ,299 0 .5 5.98 5 .06 18% seconded to BDO-NS, to provide Ayala Corporation AC PM Buy* 9 ,799 5 .8 920 7 97 15% research assistance services to NSL DMCI Holdings Inc. DMC PM Buy* 3,455 2 .4 15.10 13.10 15% under an agreement between BDO SM Prime Holdings Inc. SMPH PM Neutral* 1 7,339 6 .3 30.57 30.00 2% Unibank, NSL and BDO-NS. BDO-NS Aboitiz Equity Ventures Inc. AEV PM Neutral* 8 ,357 2 .4 70.00 74.00 -5% is a Philippines securities dealer, which is a joint venture between BDO Source: Nomura Research. Note: *Initiating coverage Unibank and the Nomura Group. See Appendix A-1 for analyst certification, important disclosures and the status of non-US analysts. Nomura | Philippines infrastructure 14 February 2017 Contents Philippine infrastructure: problems and opportunities .............................. 3 Poor-quality infrastructure remains a growth bottleneck ................................. 3 Box 1: The rising cost of traffic in Manila* ....................................................... 4 The 2017 budget: Putting its money where its mouth is .................................. 5 How did we get here? ...................................................................................... 5 The road ahead ................................................................................................ 6 Ayala Corporation .................................................................................. 17 Aboitiz Equity Ventures ......................................................................... 24 DMC Holdings ....................................................................................... 31 Metro Pacific Investments ..................................................................... 38 Cemex Holdings Philippines .................................................................. 45 Intl Container Terminal Services ........................................................... 53 Ayala Land ............................................................................................. 59 Megaworld ............................................................................................. 66 Robinsons Land ..................................................................................... 73 SM Prime Holdings ................................................................................ 80 Vista Land & Lifescapes ........................................................................ 87 Appendix A-1 ......................................................................................... 95 2 Nomura | Philippines infrastructure 14 February 2017 Philippine infrastructure: problems and opportunities The economic implications of the Philippines’ infrastructure bottlenecks are frequently cited. The World Economic Forum (WEF) in its annual Global Competitiveness report consistently identifies the Philippines’ poor-quality infrastructure as one of the major drags to investment and economic growth. Furthermore, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), using 2012 data, estimates that traffic congestion in Metro Manila alone results in productivity losses of PHP2.4bn per day. This figure could escalate to PHP6bn by 2030 daily assuming the problems are left unaddressed. Poor- quality infrastructure also results in urban congestion that triggers a host of other problems such as pollution and a shortage of affordable housing. In this report, we undertake a review of the state of Philippine infrastructure, the root of the problems, and government plans to address existing problems. Perhaps most importantly, we seek to identify sectors and stocks which stand to be impacted by government implementation of infrastructure-related programs. Poor-quality infrastructure remains a growth bottleneck Respondents to the World Economic Forum's 2016 Executive Opinion Survey were asked to select the five most problematic factors for doing business in their country and to rank them between 1 (most problematic) and 5. The scores in Fig. 2 correspond to the responses weighted according to their rankings. It is worth pointing out that inadequate supply of infrastructure ranks as the second most problematic factor for doing business, next to an inefficient bureaucracy. Fig. 2: Most problematic factors for doing business in the Fig. 3: Philippines ranks 57th in overall competitiveness but Philippines just 95th in infrastructure quality Inefficient government bureacracy Macroeconomic environment Inadequate supply of infrastructure Market size Corruption Financial market development Tax rates Tax regulations Business sophistication Policy instability Global competitiveness index Restrictive labor regulations Higher education and training Access to financing Innovation Crime and theft Health and primary education Inadequately educated workforce Insufficient capacity to innovate Technological readiness Poor work ethic in national labor force Labor market efficiency Government instabililty Institutions Foreign currency regulations Infrastructure Inflation Poor public health Good market efficiency 0 5 10 15 20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Source: World Economic Foundation, 2016-17 Global Competitiveness Report, Source: World Economic Foundation, 2016-17 Global Competitiveness Report, Nomura Research Nomura Research Fig. 4: Philippines lags most of its ASEAN peers in terms of Fig. 5: Philippines’ persistently poor infrastructure score a infra quality drag on competitiveness 7 120 Overall Competitiveness Infrastructure 6 100 5 80 4 3 60 2 40 1 20 0 ropagniSe aisyalaM dnaliahT aisenodnI manteiV enippilihPs idobmaCa RDP oaL 0 -900201 -010211 -110221 -210231 -310241 -410251 -510261 -610271 Source: World Economic Foundation, 2016-17 Global Competitiveness Report, Source: World Economic Foundation, Nomura Research Nomura Research 3 Nomura | Philippines infrastructure 14 February 2017 The poor quality of Philippine infrastructure impacts the nation’s attractiveness as an investment destination. It is worth emphasizing that in the WEF’s Global Competitive Index 2016-17: • The Philippines ranked #57 of 138 countries in terms of competitiveness (1 = highest ranking) but only 95th in terms of quality of infrastructure. • The Philippines ranks behind most of its ASEAN neighbors in terms of quality of infrastructure. • While the country’s overall competitiveness rank has improved from 87th in the 2009- 2010 survey to 57th in the 2016-17 study, the quality of infrastructure has not improved whatsoever from 95th over the same six-year period. In our view, improvements in overall Philippine competitiveness are capped until the infrastructure bottlenecks are addressed. Box 1: The rising cost of traffic in Manila* In addition to the public annoyance factor, there are real economic costs from traffic congestion that can rapidly rise if left unchecked. According to a joint study by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and several government agencies, the three interrelated urban problems in Manila include traffic congestion, the risk of natural disasters and the lack of low-cost housing. The report’s main recommendation is therefore a multi-pronged approach with an integrated mass transit network, public transport modernisation and expressways to connect other areas, among others. The total investment cost for these projects through 2030 was estimated at PHP2610bn (15.2% of GDP). This could be covered within the national government budget and appears low relative to JICA’s estimated economic cost of traffic at about PHP2bn per day (or PHP630bn per year, 3.7% of GDP). If left unchecked, these costs could rise to PHP6bn per day by 2030 (Fig. 7).1 Encouragingly, some of the projects identified under the report, including road and expressway projects – such as the NLex-SLEx connector, Metro Manila Skyway access and road connections between the two main airports (NAIA and Clark) – and metro/railway projects – such as upgrading and extending LRT1, LRT2 and LRT3 lines – are already underway, as highlighted by projects under the Public Private Partnership program. *This box draws heavily from the JICA study cited above. Fig. 6: Population, vehicles, and public transport growth of Fig. 7: Traffic demand and impact in Metro Manila Metro Manila 2012 2030 Difference 1980 2010 CAGR (%) Traffic demand (million trips/day) 12.8 14.5 1.13 Population (000) 5923 11856 1.4 Public transport share in total demand 69% 69% 1.00 Occupancy of road space by private vehicles 78% 78% 1.00 Roads (km) 6.75 1032 10.8 Transport cost (PHPbn/day) 2.40 6.00 2.50 GRDP per capita (PHP 000) 208 272 0.5 Transport cost (PHPbn/year) 876 2190 1314 No. of vehicles (000 units) 446 1904 3.0 % 2018 GDP 5.1 12.7 7.6 LRT (km) 20 50 1.9 Source: JICA; Nomura Global Economics. PublicTransport Bus (000 units) 3.6 14.2 2.8 Jeepney (000 units) 37 48 0.5 Source: JICA; Nomura Global Economics. GRDP = gross regional domestic product 1 see NEDA: Roadmap for Transport Infrastructure Development for Metro Manila and Its Surrounding Areas (Region III and IV-A), Technical assistance from JICA, March 2014. 4 Nomura | Philippines infrastructure 14 February 2017 The 2017 budget: Putting its money where its mouth is How did we get here? Providing basic infrastructure in a country with the Philippines’ archipelagic geography is inherently expensive. This challenge is further complicated by rapid population growth and urbanization. All these have triggered self-reinforcing trends of: 1) underinvestment in areas that are difficult to access, and 2) population migration to areas which provide relatively better basic services and infrastructure. Note that 12.8% of the Philippine population resides in Metro Manila, which accounts for just 0.2% of the country’s total land mass. Despite this problem, government policy response has been that of persistent underspending on infrastructure. Fig. 8: World Bank Logistics Index (2016) 1 = low to 5 = high Singapore HK Australia Malaysia Thailand Vietnam Indonesia Pakistan Philippines Cambodia 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 Source: World Bank, Nomura Research Fig. 9: Ranking of development indicators, by region (1=best, 17=worst) Poverty Access to safe Access to Regions incidence water electricity Road density NCR 1.0 4.0 1.0 1.0 Luzon 7.0 5.7 7.1 9.0 I 6 2 4 1 CAR 7 10 8 11 II 4 6 5 11 III 2 1 2 6 IVA 3 3 3 7 IVB 13 5 15 16 V 14 13 13 11 Visayas: 8.3 12.3 12.0 7.0 VI 9 14 12 4 VII 5 15 10 3 VIII 11 8 14 14 Mindanao: 13.0 11.7 11.0 9.7 Caraga 17 10 11 14 IX 15 16 16 8 X 12 6 7 4 XI 8 12 9 8 XII 10 9 6 8 ARMM 16 17 17 16 Source: DPWH, PIDS, Nomura Global Economics; NCR = National Capital Region, CAR = Cordillera Autonomous Region, ARMM = Autonomous Region of Muslim. Nomura Research 5 Nomura | Philippines infrastructure 14 February 2017 Fig. 10: Population density (people per km2) Fig. 11: Infrastructure spending as % of GDP (2000 to present) 25,000 Indonesia Philippines 21,000 20% Singapore Malaysia 20,000 Lao PDR Cambodia Thailand Vietnam 15,000 15% 10,000 10% 5,000 850 600 510 390 350 337 - R N s n s s S 5% CN OZ aya ozu oco aya EN RABALAC siV lartneC L lartneC lI siV nretseW IPPILIHP 0% 0002 1002 2002 3002 4002 5002 6002 7002 8002 9002 0102 1102 2102 3102 Source: National Statistics Authority, 2015, Nomura Research Source: International Monetary Foundation, Nomura Research The road ahead Going forward, however, we believe that there are reasons for optimism. In its 20 October 2016 Beyond Words report, the Nomura Global Economics team pointed out that: 1) the state of the Philippine economy as well as the government balance sheet allow for a reversal of previous years’ underspending; 2) reforms allowing for faster planning and execution of infrastructure projects have been put in place or are in the process of being put in place; and 3) a pragmatic approach to Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) should result in a more orderly rollout of projects, reducing policy uncertainties in the infrastructure sector. Government willing and able to spend We are forecasting average Philippine GDP growth of 6.4% over 2016A-18F, underpinned by strong domestic demand complemented by rising investment spending. Regardless of whether or not infrastructure bottlenecks are addressed, we see the rate of Philippine economic growth remaining superior to global and regional trends. Furthermore, we believe the Philippines can better withstand the impact of rising external risks than most other countries in Asia (Global Annual Economic Outlook, December 18, 2016) especially as government and private sector debt levels remain relatively low. While we forecast weakness for the Philippine peso, sizeable policy space nonetheless provides a significant buffer against external risks. We forecast cumulative 50bps of interest rate hikes in 1H17. The BSP is the only central bank in Asia from which we forecast hikes this year. With regard to infrastructure spending, it should be pointed out that Budget Secretary Benjamin Diokno said that the Duterte administration is looking to spend PHP8.2tn on infrastructure during his term of office over 2017-22. The government is specifically looking at reversing the underspending over 2011-2015 while still keeping the budget deficit at a manageable 3% of GDP. What concerns us? It should be pointed out that the Duterte administration’s economic team is looking to ramp-up infrastructure spending, while at the same time implementing tax reforms meant to broaden the tax base by shifting the tax burden from corporates and salary workers to consumers. We are concerned that political and populist pressures may cut into the scope of the reforms, thereby limiting revenue collection. This, in turn may limit the government’s ability to ramp up infrastructure spending. 6 Nomura | Philippines infrastructure 14 February 2017 Fig. 12: Summary of economic forecasts for Philippines % yoy growth unless otherwise stated 1Q16 2Q16 3Q16 4Q16 1Q17 2Q17 3Q17 4Q17 2015 2016 2017 2018 Real GDP (sa, % qoq, annualized) 5.0 8.5 4.8 7.9 4.4 6.2 7.5 8.0 - - - - Real GDP 6.8 7.0 7.1 6.5 6.4 5.8 6.5 6.5 5.9 6.9 6.3 6.5 Private consumption 7.0 7.4 7.3 6.0 6.5 6.5 5.5 6.3 6.3 6.9 6.2 6.5 Government consumption 11.8 13.5 3.1 3.5 2.0 1.5 8.2 5.7 7.8 8.2 4.2 5.8 Gross fixed capital formation 28.2 24.6 23.5 15.6 13.1 11.3 8.5 11.7 15.2 22.5 11.1 17.1 Exports (goods & services) 7.3 10.0 8.8 6.4 6.4 4.1 3.6 3.7 9.0 8.2 4.4 3.0 Imports (goods & services) 19.0 23.2 14.2 11.9 6.6 3.6 6.1 8.3 14.0 16.9 6.1 8.3 Contribution to GDP growth (ppts) Domestic final sales 12.6 11.6 10.8 8.6 8.4 7.2 6.9 8.3 8.4 10.8 7.7 9.8 Inventories 0.9 1.5 -0.3 1.1 -1.2 -1.6 1.4 0.9 0.1 0.8 -0.1 -0.1 Net trade (goods % services) -6.6 -6 -3.5 -3.2 -0.8 0.1 -1.8 -2.7 -2.5 -4.8 -1.3 -3.3 Exports -8.4 -6.6 -3.9 -7.2 -3.7 -0.3 0.5 1.6 -5.3 -6.5 -0.4 0.5 Imports 8.8 27.3 7.7 13.3 12.8 7.1 7.5 8.9 8.7 13.8 9.0 6.0 Merchandise trade balance (USDbn) -5.5 -6.4 -5.9 -8.0 -8.4 -7.9 -7.4 -9.7 -12.2 -25.9 -33.4 -38.4 Current account balance (USDbn) 0.7 0.1 1.2 1.9 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.3 7.7 3.9 1.5 1.5 Current account balance (% of GDP) 1.0 0.1 1.7 2.3 0.2 0.3 1.1 0.3 2.6 1.3 0.5 0.4 Fiscal balance (% of GDP) - - - - - - - - -0.9 -2.2 -2.7 -2.8 Consumer prices (2006=100) 1.1 1.5 2.0 2.3 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 1.4 1.7 3.3 3.7 Unemployment rate (sa, %) 5.8 6.1 5.4 4.9 5.3 5.3 5.1 4.5 6.3 5.6 5.0 4.8 Reverse repo rate (%) 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.5 3.50 3.50 4.00 3.00 3.50 3.50 Exchange rate (USD/PHP) 46 47.2 48.5 49.9 50.2 50.5 51.00 51.5 46.9 49.9 51.5 50.5 Notes: Numbers in bold are actual values; others forecast. Interest rate and current forecasts are end of period; other measures are period average. All forecasts are modal forecasts (i.e., the single most likely outcome). Table reflects data available as of 10 November 2016. *At this early stage, we very tentatively estimate that under President-elect Trump, Real GDP growth could be lowered to 0.2% in 2017 (for more details, see Asia Insight: What Trump means for Asia, 9 November 2016 ). Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics Fig. 13: Philippine 2015-18F GDP CAGR% above trend Fig. 14: Philippine Debt to GDP (%) declining 7% 6.6% (PHPmn) Total debt (LHS) (%) 9,000,000 Total debt % of GDP (RHS) 100 6% 5.3% 8,000,000 80 5% 4.7% 7,000,000 60 6,000,000 40 4% 3.3% 5,000,000 20 3% 4,000,000 0 3,000,000 -20 2% 1.6% 2,000,000 -40 1% 1,000,000 -60 0% 0 -80 Philippines Asia/Pacific Emerging Global Developed 00 1020 30 40 50 6070 80 90 01 11 21 31 41 51 Markets Markets 02 0202 02 02 02 0202 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics Source: Bureau of Treasury, Nomura Research 7 Nomura | Philippines infrastructure 14 February 2017 Fig. 15: 2015A Debt to GDP (%) ASEAN Fig. 16: Philippine Budget Deficit as % of GDP (Actual vs Target) 120% 4.0% Budget Deficit (%GDP) Actual 100% 3.5% Budget Deficit (%GDP) Target 3.0% 80% 2.5% 60% 2.0% 40% 1.5% 20% 1.0% 0% 0.5% e a s a d a n a ropagniS isyalaM enippilihP idnI naliahT eroK awiaT isenodnI 0.0% 9002 0102 1102 2102 3102 4102 5102 F6102 F7102 F8102 F9102 Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics Planning and execution bottlenecks being addressed In addition to increasing budget allocations for infrastructure projects, the Duterte administration is also looking to streamline planning processes and fast-track project implementation. The Philippines’ poor-quality infrastructure is partly attributable to general weakness in technical capacity for project planning and monitoring, as well as intermodal integration. The technical and financial capacity of the local government units responsible for the development and management of the local transport infrastructure appears similarly inadequate, putting a bigger burden on the national government. Limited technical capacity at the bureaucratic level translates to the following issues: • Slow budget disbursements and overall project quality of developed infrastructure tends to be subpar, with limited coordination between impacted agencies. • Planners are vulnerable to the effects of political pressures that lead to the inclusion in national or local transport plans of projects that are not properly validated. • Long-term infrastructure programs tend to be haphazard, opaque, and subject to policy reversals, particularly with changes in national leadership occurring every six years. For its part, the IMF assessed that there are sizeable gains to be made from improving the efficiency of public investment (see Beyond Words). The IMF estimates indicate that the efficiency gap in the Philippines is “substantially larger” than the 27% average for emerging economies. Furthermore, the IMF recommended that the link between planning and budgeting be strengthened, as there appear to be inefficiencies in the allocation of public investment to the right sectors and projects. The government has actually taken steps in this regard. The passage of R.A. 10752 (The “Right of Way Act”) last March 2016 should reduce ROW issues that cause delays and inflate project costs. Furthermore, the spin-off of the Department of Transportation and Communications into a Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) and a Department of Transportation due to the passage of R.A. 10844 last May 2016 should streamline the latter’s functions, allowing for more focused planning and implementation of transport projects. Other measures the Duterte administration is looking at in order to further cut through bureaucratic red tape in the transport and infrastructure sectors include: • Emergency powers for the Department of Transportation enabling the harmonization of all traffic rules and the fast implementation of priority projects for traffic decongestion without a lengthy approval process. • Imposition of 24/7 construction work for major projects as well as further simplifying the implementation of rules and regulations for the Government Procurement Law. • Centralization of project monitoring and project execution powers at the cabinet level. There is also plenty of scope for these reforms to improve spending without adding pressure on the budget. In this context, the Budget Department’s announcement of a focus on capacity building, improvements in budget planning and preparation, and public 8 Nomura | Philippines infrastructure 14 February 2017 financial management (PFM) reforms, appears to be the appropriate approach. While improving in recent years, disbursement rates for capital outlays averaged 85% of full- year budgets over 2011-16. The Nomura Global Economics team estimates that increasing this disbursement rate by another 10pp to 95% would provide an additional fiscal boost to growth worth 0.5% of GDP per year. Of course, execution is always the bigger issue and it is probably unrealistic to assume disbursements of budgeted capital outlays at 100%. We forecast a 90% disbursement rate, which is similar to disbursement levels in Malaysia. This translates to PHP7.4tn in infrastructure spending over 2017- 2022. This figure is less than the government target of PHP8.2tn, but nonetheless represents a substantial ramp-up in government infrastructure spending. Fig. 17: IMF estimate of the public investment efficiency Fig. 18: Government infrastructure spending ramps up frontier (PHPbn) Gov't infrastructure budget (LHS) 1,400 Infra spends % of GDP (RHS) 7% 1,200 6% 1,000 5% 800 4% 600 3% 400 2% 200 1% - … … … … 0% 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Source: IMF; Note: The closer a country is to the efficiency frontier (solid line), the Source: Department of Finance, Nomura Research more efficient its public investment What about PPPs? The Duterte administration will continue the previous government thrust regarding Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). The Aquino administration rolled out 14 PPPs cumulatively worth PHP294bn since launching the program in 3Q10. It appears, however, that the Duterte administration is taking a more pragmatic view with regards to the role of PPPs in infrastructure development, especially given the mixed track record on Philippine PPPs. It should be pointed out that: • A build–operate–transfer law has been in place in the Philippines since 1990. The Philippines has a wide range of generally well-developed regulations governing the transport sector but implementation of these regulations is often weak and subject to political pressure. This limits the intended positive impact of these regulations on performance as well as the willingness of the private sector to invest, especially if economic returns on projects are rendered unattractive by political or regulatory risks. • Interestingly, not all projects have been developed using an open, competitive bidding process. A lot of completed projects have been the result of unsolicited proposals from potential investors to form PPPs with government corporations. We believe this reflects the limited capacity within sector agencies for project planning and preparation as well as the lack of clear rules for the development of such partnerships. However, the reliance on unsolicited proposals could mean that risks to the government side of the partnership are not properly understood and allocated. • While the Duterte Administration remains generally supportive of PPPs, the Economic Team as represented by the Finance and Budget Departments have indicated that they would prefer the government undertake projects itself rather than through PPPs, if it is more cost effective to do so. The Duterte Administration’s Economic Team is also cognizant of the risks in the form of contingent liabilities government is exposed to in case project deals do not work out. We believe the government’s more pragmatic (and possibly more conservative) approach to PPPs should translate to a more orderly rollout of projects. We caution investors against anticipating an accelerated rollout of PPP projects, however. Nonetheless, properly validated PPP projects where sharing of risks and rewards are well defined is ultimately more beneficial to both the government and private investors versus a haphazard and rushed PPP program. 9
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