Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution outside Article V

63 Pages·2016·4.11 MB·English

by  Akhil Reed Amar

The
University
of Chicago
Law Review
VOLUME 55 NUMBER 4 FALL 1988
0 1988 by The University of Chicago
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the
Constitution Outside Article V
Akhil Reed Amart
In the corridors of power of our nation's capital, and in law
school classrooms everywhere, debates are raging over basic ques-
tions of constitutional theory: Does the Constitution guarantee
unenumerated rights? If so, how are these rights to be derived and
enforced? Should judges depart from constitutional text, history,
and structure to maintain a "living" Constitution? With increasing
frequency, these debates have converged to frame the following
now-standard question:
Should we (or did the Framers) rely exclusively on the formal
amending process of Article V to update the Constitution, or
should we (or did the Framers) also rely on the federal judi-
ciary to act as a kind of continuous constitutional convention,
ever evolving new unenumerated individual rights?
f Associate Professor, Yale Law School. B.A. 1980, Yale University; J.D. 1984, Yale
University. This essay grew out of a short speech to the Federalist Society at their seventh
annual symposium at the University of Virginia. In addition to the Federalist Society, I
would like to give special thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Paul Kahn, Gary Lawson, Larry Les-
sig, Lewis Liman, Mike Paulsen, Cass Sunstein, Peter Swire, Ron Wright, and Sam Zurier
for their ever kind and constructive criticisms of earlier drafts. Finally, I would like to thank
my father, to whom this essay is dedicated, for everything. He once asked me to write some-
thing "for the People." Here it is, Dad.
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1044 The University of Chicago Law Review [55:1043
I submit, however, that a different, and perhaps more fruitful,
question lies hidden in the intersection of unenumerated rights
and constitutional amendment. Indeed, this question challenges
two implicit but important assumptions smuggled into the more
standard question-first, that the unenumerated rights retained by
the People are primarily or exclusively individualistic, rather than
majoritarian; second, that those rights are primarily or exclusively
enforceable through judicial, rather than political, processes.
In considering modes of updating our fundamental law, our
choice need not be limited to the Article V amending process ver-
sus freewheeling judicial review, as the standard question suggests,
for there is a third, usually ignored, possibility: constitutional
amendment by direct appeal to, and ratification by, We the People
of the United States. The alternative to the standard question is
then: Do We the People of the 1980s-or more specifically a major-
ity of us-enjoy an unenumerated right to amend our Constitution
in ways not explicitly set out in Article V?
My answer to this new question may at first seem fanciful, for
I believe that the first, most undeniable, inalienable and impor-
tant, if unenumerated, right of the People is the right of a majority
of voters to amend the Constitution-even in ways not expressly
provided for by Article V. In the brief space below, I fear it may be
impossible to convince you of this beyond all doubt, for my posi-
tion is not self-evident. Nevertheless, I will show that this position
is supported by several independent lines of analysis. Even if I fail
to convert you during the course of this essay, I do hope to per-
suade you that the alternative question I have posed is worth ask-
ing, and that the seemingly obvious and straightforward rejoinders
to my answer are not so obvious or straightforward as they seem.
I. PHILADELPHIA II: BACK TO THE FUTURE
Consider the following hypothetical: Pursuant to applications
from two-thirds of the state legislatures, the 101st Congress calls a
convention to propose amendments to the Constitution. The con-
vention meets in-where else-Philadelphia, and proposes a
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, guaranteeing a right of every Ameri-
can citizen to minimal entitlements of food, shelter, and education.
(I can dream-it is, after all, my hypothetical.)1 Moreover, section
Nothing in the analysis that follows turns in any important way on the substantive
content of this hypothetical Twenty-Seventh Amendment. Instead, I shall focus solely on
the process-based rules of recognition by which a judge would determine whether the pro-
posed amendment had in fact become part of the supreme law of the land. Nevertheless,
1988] PhiladelphiaR evisited 1045
2 of the proposed Philadelphia document declares that "this
amendment shall be valid when ratified in a special national refer-
endum to be called by Congress." Congress, after considerable de-
bate, calls the election, at which a majority of voters ratify the
amendment.
Or did they? Opponents of the bill have been arguing all along
that the putative amendment is a nullity, and the supposed ratifi-
every process-based account is informed by some underlying substantive values. See gener-
ally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 73-75 (especially note at 75), 100 (Harvard,
1980); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistenceo f Process-Based Constitutional Theo-
ries, 89 Yale L J 1063 (1980). As will become clear below, the substantive vision underlying
my (and the Framers') process-based theory of constitutional amendment is a vision of pop-
ular sovereignty, which in turn is rooted in the substantive values of equality (no citizen's
vote should count for more than another's) and neutrality (no substantive out-
come-including the status quo-should be specially privileged). See generally text at note
107 (discussing May's theorem).
This substantive vision, in turn, may ultimately limit the permissible content of pro-
posed constitutional amendments. Thus, an amendment that in substance purported to
make itself unamendable would be generally pro tanto unconstitutional, even if adopted in
strict conformity with Article V (or any other amending process). An amendment abolishing
free speech might also be unconstitutional-regardless of the mode of adoption-since abo-
lition of speech would effectively immunize the status quo from further constitutional revi-
sion, in violation of the non-entrenchment component of neutrality. Such a provision might
one day become "supreme law," but its adoption would be arguably a fundamental depar-
ture from the pre-existing rule of recognition, a kind of coup d'etat, notwithstanding the
provision's adoption in apparent conformity with Article V, narrowly construed. Thus, the
First Amendment may itself be a seemingly paradoxical exception to the general rule that
amendments must not be unamendable. Ironically, in order to prevent illegitimate entrench-
ment of the status quo, constitutional rules that disentrench by keeping open the channels
of constitutional change must themselves be entrenched. (Similarly, some free market trans-
actions such as selling oneself into slavery or agreeing to form a cartel must themselves be
invalidated in order to protect free market transactions generally.)
Nor do the examples above necessarily exhaust the substantive content of popular sov-
ereignty. One could argue, for example, that popular sovereignty presupposes certain eco-
nomic and social prerequisites. A person's formally equal vote might be meaning-
less-totally unreflective of her will or judgment-in the absence of minimal entitlements to
food, shelter, and education. Thus, perhaps popular sovereignty, properly (if expansively)
understood, compels acceptance of my proposed Twenty-Seventh Amendment. Indeed, I
believe that the Reconstruction Amendments do reflect this expansive understanding of
popular sovereignty, and that the 13th Amendment, properly (if expansively) read, already
guarantees minimal entitlements akin to "forty acres and a mule," thus rendering my pro-
posed Twenty-Seventh Amendment largely superfluous. Nothing in the argument below,
however, requires acceptance of this more expansive and controversial argument, which I
hope to develop in more detail in a subsequent essay. See generally text at note 207. Com-
pare Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a ConstitutionalD emocracy, 1979 Wash U L Q
659 (deriving substantive minimal entitlements from an expansive understanding of Ely's
process-based premises) with Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights
in the Constitution, 1979 Wash U L Q 695 (arguing that Michelman's thesis ignores "consti-
tutional text, history, and structure" and "convert[s] our government. . . to one by judici-
ary." Id at 696.)
1046 The University of Chicago Law Review [55:1043
cation a farce. Waving the text of Article V2 in their hands, the
opponents make the seemingly irrefutable argument that a pro-
posed constitutional amendment becomes effective only after rati-
fication by three-fourths of state legislatures or state conventions.
A test case arises and you are the judge.3 Are these words about
food, shelter, and education part of the Constitution, or not?4
Before answering this question, consider the possibility that
Article V may not be the only constitutional text on point. A more
complete analysis, I submit, must include not simply Article V, but
also Article VII, the Preamble, and the First, Ninth,5 and Tenth
2
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro-
pose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of
two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Consti-
tution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may
be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior
to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first
and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without
its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
US Const, Art V.
3 For reasons that would take me far beyond my main topic, I reject the language of
Coleman v Miller, 307 US 433 (1939), suggesting that constitutional issues surrounding the
amendment process are generally non-justiciable. Even if Coleman were embraced, however,
these constitutional issues would not disappear. Members of the legislative and executive
branches still would be bound by their oaths of office to determine whether the alleged
Twenty-Seventh Amendment was in fact constitutionally ratified.
4 In asking the purely positive(ist) question of whether or not these words are part of
the "supreme law of the land," I am of course setting off to one side some of the most
important and interesting questions, such as the anarchist's query: "given that X is law, why
should I obey X?" To claim that my hypothetical Twenty-Seventh Amendment was in fact
properly ratified, is only to claim that it conformed to pre-existing rules of recognition,
properly understood, and is therefore law. It is not to claim that ipso facto the law must
necessarily in all cases be obeyed, even by judges. Surely it is possible to imagine a rule that
is clearly the "supreme law," and just as clearly so unjust as to warrant civil disobedience,
even by justices. See generally Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Ju-
dicial Process (Yale, 1975). Nevertheless, although I believe that law and morality do not
necessarily converge, I am by no means arguing that law is devoid of all moral content.
Indeed, I am attempting to offer the most morally attractive process-based account of law
possible: that is, an account that gives a law its greatest presumptive moral legitimacy owing
to the moral worthiness of the process that generated it. At some point, however, the sub-
stantive immorality of a given law might overcome even a strong presumption created by
the law's procedural pedigree.
' Although my argument countenances a role for judicial enforcement of the Ninth
Amendment, that role is quite different from the one suggested by the rhetoric of standard
Ninth Amendment scholarship. I shall argue that, on the facts of my hypothetical, judges
should invoke the Ninth Amendment to uphold, rather than invalidate, majoritarian action.
See text at notes 46-49. Compare Bennett B. Patterson, The Forgetten Ninth Amendment
19 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1955) ("The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution is a basic statement
of the inherent natural rights of the individual.... [and] of individual sovereignty."); id at
19881 PhiladelphiaR evisited 1047
Amendments.
A. Popular Sovereignty in the Eighteenth Century6
Let's start with Article VII, which declares that "[t]he Ratifi-
cation of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying
the Same." Now this (self)proclaimed rule of (self)recognition had
no explicit antecedents in any prior authoritative legal text. In-
deed, Article VII at first seems obviously "unconstitu-
tional"-whatever that means-under pre-existing law. But per-
haps we have read these pre-existing legal texts incorrectly. If so,
maybe Article VII was in fact "constitutional" under pre-existing
law, properly understood. And if that be the case, then perhaps we
need to rethink our reading of Article V, just as we had to rethink
our reading of the legal texts predating the first Philadelphia Con-
vention in 1787. In other words, the Philadelphia I experience of
the 1780s may provide a legitimate precedent supporting the con-
stitutionality of the amendment proposed by Philadelphia II in the
1980s.
To be more specific, it is now almost commonplace for consti-
tutional scholars to observe that Article VII obviously violates Ar-
ticle XIII of the pre-existing Articles of Confederation.7 Article
XIII provided that the Articles of Confederation could be altered
only upon unanimous agreement of all thirteen state legislatures.8
58 (Amendment was "intended solely as a protection of our unenumerated personal rights
as individuals as distinguished from our public or collective rights."); The Supreme Court,
1985 Term, 100 Harv L Rev 100, 219 and note 53 (1986) (invoking the Ninth Amendment as
embodying the "fundamental principle" of "preservation of the rights of minorities against
majority action."); John J. Gibbons, Judicial Review of the Constitution, 48 U Pitt L Rev
963, 984 (1987) (Amendment "is an explicit recognition, in a Constitution intended to have
the force of law, of zones of individual and familial autonomy that are to be protected by
the courts from gross intrusions ordered by legislative majorities.").
I The specific ideas presented in this section build on general foundations laid in an
earlier essay of mine. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
Yale L J 1425 (1987). Wherever possible I shall refer to the appropriate passages of that
essay rather than repeating its arguments and evidence in full here.
See, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitu-
tion, 93 Yale L J 1013, 1017-23, especially n 6, 1058 (1984); John Leubsdorf, Deconstructing
the Constitution, 40 Stan L Rev 181, 187 (1987); Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the
Constitution, 4 Const Comm 57 (1987).
a
AND the Articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every state, and
the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in
any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the united states, and
be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state.
US Articles of Confederation, Art XIII, reprinted in Max Farrand, The Framing of the
1048 The University of Chicago Law Review [55:1043
Article VII, however, abandoned the unanimity requirement, and
looked to ratification by popular conventions instead of legisla-
tures. In his 1983 Storrs Lectures, Bruce Ackerman placed great
weight on Article XIII as proof of his proposition that ratification
of the Philadelphia Constitution was, under pre-existing law,
"plainly illegal."9
I'm not so sure. Of course, Article VII is inconsistent with the
best reading of Article XIII, but to declare Article VII therefore
illegal is to beg the question of the legal status of Article XIII, and
the rest of the Articles of Confederation, in 1787. I believe, as did
many Federalists in 1787, that the Articles of Confederation were a
mere treaty among thirteen otherwise free and independent na-
tions.10 That treaty had been notoriously, repeatedly, and fla-
grantly violated on every side by 1787. Under standard principles
of international law, these material breaches of a treaty freed each
party-that is, each of the thirteen states-to disregard the pact, if
it so chose." Thus, if in 1787 nine (or more) states wanted, in ef-
fect, to secede from the Articles of Confederation and form a new
system, that was their legal right, Article XIII notwithstanding. In-
deed, in defending Article VII against accusations of illegality,
leading Federalists made this very argument. 2
Although I disagree with Professor Ackerman's premise about
the significance of Article XIII, I share his more basic conclusions
that our Constitution may be popularly amended in ways other
than those explicitly set forth in Article V; and that the strongest
precedent for this proposition lies in Article VII and the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution itself.'" But I come to this conclusion by a
Constitution of the United States 211, 223 (Yale, 1913).
9 Ackerman, 93 Yale L J at 1058 (cited in note 7). See also Kay, 4 Const Comm at 57,
64-70 (cited in note 7) (Constitution "was itself the product of blatant and conscious illegal-
ity."); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 130-31 (Princeton, 1988) (similar).
10 See Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1446-48 (cited in note 6).
1 See Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1448 and n 90, and sources cited therein.
12 See id at 1460-62, 1448 and n 90,and sources cited therein. See also, Max Farrand,
ed, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 462-63 (Yale, rev ed 1937) ("Farrand")
(remarks of Nathaniel Gorham); 2 id at 469 (remarks of James Wilson); Federalist 43
(Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 271, 279-80 (Mentor, 1961).
13S ee Ackerman, 93 Yale L J at 1017 n 6, 1057-70 (cited in note 7). Important differ-
ences remain between Professor Ackerman's conclusions and my own. For example, I am
deeply skeptical of Ackerman's claim that the Constitution may be structurally amended
even in the absence of a proposed amendment text. More generally, my account of how
Article V may be supplemented is less nebulous and government-driven-more formalistic
and plebiscitary-than Ackerman's. To my mind, popular sovereignty has a far more precise
and populist meaning than Ackerman seems to acknowledge. See also text at notes 66-85,
168-88.
1988] PhiladelphiaR evisited 1049
different path. I focus not, as does Ackerman, on the Confedera-
tion's Article XIII, but on the pre-existing state constitutions in
1787, which Professor Ackerman ignores. For if, as I have argued,
the so-called "United States" were really separate nations in
1787-much as the so-called "United Nations" are today-then
the most relevant pre-existing legal texts, the true prior rules of
recognition, are to be found not in the Articles of Confederation,
but in the state constitutions.
The real question, then, is: Was Article VII of Philadelphia I
an unconstitutional violation of pre-existing state constitutions? At
first blush, the answer seems to be yes. Adoption of the Philadel-
phia I document would in every state effect a drastic modification
of that state's own form of government-that state's constitu-
tion.4 Yet Article VII sought to effect this amendment of state
constitutions by a procedure not explicitly included in any state
constitution-namely, by a mere majority vote of a popular con-
vention of the People of that state. In several states, including
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, the state constitution
contained seemingly exclusive provisions for constitutional amend-
ment. The Massachusetts document, adopted in 1780, provided for
its own amendment in 1795 by a convention triggered by a two-
thirds vote of the citizenry;"5 the Maryland document required ac-
tion by two successive legislatures;" and so on. Yet in none of
these states was the Philadelphia Constitution ratified pursuant to
these rules.
This point was not lost on the Anti-Federalists. Waving the
texts of state constitutions in their hands, several leading Anti-
Federalists argued that ratification under Article VII would be ille-
gal." Yet this was not one of the Anti-Federalists' main argu-
ments-and for good reason. Federalist supporters of the Constitu-
" See, for example, 2 Farrand at 92-93 (cited in note 12) (remarks of James Madison)
("These changes would make essential inroads on the State Constitutions .. .ratification
must of necessity be obtained from the people.").
" Mass Const of 1780, ch VI, Art X, reprinted in Francis Newton Thorpe, 3 The Fed-
eral and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States,
Territories, and Colonies 1911 (GPO, 1909) ("Thorpe"). Interestingly, the legislature was
constitutionally required to hold this vote in 1795, approximately one generation after the
ratification of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. See text at note 114 (discussing Jef-
ferson's idea for including a sunset provision in the Constitution).
10 Md Const of 1776, Art LIX, reprinted in 3 Thorpe at 1701 (cited in note 15).
17 This argument was advanced in several different states. See, for example, A Republi-
can Federalist, in Cecelia M. Kenyon, ed, The Antifederalists 112, 121-22 (Northeastern,
1985) ("Kenyon") (Massachusetts); The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of
the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents in id at 32-33 (Pennsyl-
vania); 3 Farrand at 172, 229 (cited in note 12) (speech by Luther Martin) (Maryland).
1050 The University of Chicago Law Review [55:1043
tion had a knock-down rejoinder, a rejoinder that we have all but
forgotten today, but that has radical implications for my Philadel-
phia II hypothetical. James Madison perhaps put it best. At the
Philadelphia Convention, Maryland delegate Daniel Carroll ob-
jected to a precursor of Article VII. According to Madison's notes,
"Mr. Carroll mentioned the mode of altering the Constitution of
Maryland pointed out therein, and that no other mode could be
pursued in that State."18 But listen carefully to Madison's reply:
The difficulty in Maryland was no greater than in other
States, where no mode of change was pointed out by the Con-
stitution, and all officers were under oath to support it. The
people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by resorting
to them, all difficulties were got over. They could alter consti-
tutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the Bill of rights,
that first principles might be resorted to.'
What were these "first principles"? Simply that the People
were sovereign, and that a majority of them enjoyed the inalien-
able legal right-that is, a right that they were incapable of waiv-
ing, even if they tried-to alter or abolish their form of govern-
ment whenever they pleased.2" These principles represent the
essence of the American Revolution. In the words of our Declara-
tion of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident... that whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is
the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to insti-
tute new Government, laying its foundations on such princi-
ples and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
18 2 Farrand at 475 (cited in note 12).
18 Id at 476. See also 1 Farrand at 301 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton) ("The people
may come in [and ratify the Constitution] on revolution Principles"). We must take care not
to misunderstand Hamilton's last two words. He is speaking of the principles of the Ameri-
can Revolution, rather than of revolutionary as opposed to lawful principles. Indeed the
modern dichotomy between "revolutionary" and "legal" is anachronistic to the extent it
ignores the ways in which the Framers legitimated-recognized as lawful-certain kinds of
popular revolutions through the device of conventions. See text at notes 24-28; Amar, 96
Yale L J at 1435 and n 41 (cited in note 6); id at 1459 and n 148.
For a brief discussion of the legitimacy of reliance on the legislative history of the Phil-
adelphia I convention, see Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentenial
Comment, 97 Yale L J 281, 287-89 (1987).
2 See generally Amar, 96 Yale L J at 1435-36, 1441, 1458-64 (cited in note 6). The
American understanding of the right of the People to alter their government at any time
and for any reason went beyond Locke's more limited understanding of popular sovereignty.
See id at 1435 n 41; id at 1437 n 50.
19881 PhiladelphiaR evisited 1051
Nor was the Declaration of Independence unique. Consider just a
small sample of similar declarations, collected from various state
Constitutions, and Bills or Declarations of Rights:
[W]henever any Government shall be found inadequate or
contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath
an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform,
alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most
condusive to the publick weal. 1
or
[T]he community hath an indubitable, unalienable and inde-
feasible right to reform, alter, or abolish government in such
manner as shall be by that community judged most conducive
to the public weal.22
or yet again
[T]he people alone have an incontestible, unalienable, and in-
defeasible right to institute government; and to reform, alter,
or totally change the same, when their protection, safety,
prosperity and happiness require it.23
Here, then, is my argument: The Constitution was in fact law-
fully ratified in Massachusetts and its sister states because a bare
majority of the People (in Massachusetts the Constitution pre-
vailed by a slim vote of 187 to 168)24 had a legal right to amend
21 Virginia Declaration of Rights, Art 3, reprinted in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Ler-
ner, eds, 5 The Founders' Constitution 3 (Chicago, 1987) ("Founders' Constitution"). Note
the explicit emphasis on the right of the majority to speak for the whole community. See
also 2 Farrand at 92 (cited in note 12) (remarks of Gouveneur Morris) ("in like manner...
the Constitution of a particular State may be altered by a majority of the people of the
State."); Federalist 39 (Madison), in FederalistP apersa t 246 (cited in note 12) ("a majority
of every national society" is "competent at all times ... to alter or abolish its established
government."); Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §
330 (Da Capo, 1970) ("The declaration of independence ... puts the doctrine on its true
grounds .... Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
right of the people [plainly intending, the majority of the people] to alter, or to abolish
it. . . ." (insert in original)); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic,
1776-1787 281 (W.W. Norton, 1969) (quoting Thomas Tudor Tucker, Conciliatory Hints
(Charleston, 1784) (a constitution should be "unalterable by any authority but the express
consent of a majority of the citizens. . ."); id at 307 (quoting Samuel West) ("it is only the
major part of the community that can claim the right of altering the constitution. . ."). See
also notes 109, 116 and 209.
22 Pa Const of 1776, Declaration of Rights, Art V, reprinted in 5 Founders' Constitution
at 7 (cited in note 21).
2" Mass Const of 1780, Declaration of Rights, Art VII, reprinted in id at 8 (cited in note
21).
24 Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of the Republic 1763-89 153 (Chicago, 1964).
1052 The University of Chicago Law Review [55:1043
their constitution-even in the teeth of a pre-existing constitu-
tional provision that specified a different, and seemingly exclusive,
mode of amendment. Massachusetts in 1787 had its own analogue
of Article V, yet that provision was disregarded, and transcended
by direct appeal to the People. I do not say violated, for I believe
that when the Massachusetts analogue of Article V is read in con-
text, it should not be read to prescribe the exclusive mode of
amendment. It nowhere declared that it was the exclusive mode of
amendment, although at first blush, that seems to be the fairest
reading. After a more careful consideration, however, that reading
should be rejected as inconsistent with the explicit text of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights quoted above, and the general
theory of popular sovereignty underlying the Massachusetts Con-
stitution, and indeed, the American Revolution.
Of course, it is still possible to insist that ratification in Mas-
sachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Maryland (and perhaps other
states)25 was illegal and revolutionary, but this characterization
suffers from two interrelated problems. First, it cannot account for
the immediate and widespread acquiescence of the Anti-Federalist
opponents once votes were taken in the state conventions. There is
a dramatic difference between the Tories' Loyalist opposition of
1776, and the Anti-Federalists' loyal opposition in 1788-a differ-
ence between military resistance to revolution and acquiescence,
however sullen, in lawful change. 6 (Nor can it be assumed that
25 See, for example, Del Const of 1776, Art 30, reprinted in 1 Thorpe at 568 (cited in
note 15); Ga Const of 1777, Art LXIII, reprinted in 2 Thorpe at 785; NH Const of 1784,
Section entitled "Oath and Subscriptions, Provision for a Future Revision of the Constitu-
tion" in 4 Thorpe at 2470.
20 Even Professor Kay, after arguing that the Constitution was in fact "the product of
blatant and conscious illegality" (Kay, Illegality of the Constitution, 4 Const Comm at 57
(cited in note 7)), has acknowledged the immediate and widespread acquiesence of its oppo-
nents in its (alleged) ratification. Id at 77. By contrast, the argument I have made here helps
to solve the admitted puzzle Kay's account presents. This argument also sheds powerful new
light on Hamilton's famous Federalist 78. Long dubbed "countermajoritarian" (Alexander
M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16-23 (Yale, 1962)), Hamilton's argument on be-
half of judicial review is in fact explicitly rooted in majoritarian principles of popular sover-
eignty. See generally Ackerman, 93 Yale L J at 1030 (cited in note 7). Indeed, Hamilton
explicitly invokes the above-quoted language of the Declaration of Independence (see text at
notes 20-21); and specifically singles out for criticism two of the three above-mentioned
Anti-Federalist tracts that claimed that ratification by state convention would violate pre-
existing state constitutions (see note 17):
I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur with its enemies* in
questioning that fundamental principle of republican government which admits the
right of the people to alter or abolish the established Constitution whenever they find
it inconsistent with their happiness ....
*[footnote'in original] Vide Protest of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylva-