Phenomenology and Historical Thought: Its History as a Practice PDF
Preview Phenomenology and Historical Thought: Its History as a Practice
Mark E. Blum Phenomenology and Historical Thought Mark E. Blum Phenomenology and Historical Thought Its History as a Practice ISBN 978-3-11-076897-8 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-077942-4 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-077949-3 Library of Congress Control Number: 2022938903 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com Contents Introduction The Genesis and History of Modern Phenomenological History and Historiography. An Overview 1 What is Phenomenology, and its Derivative Phenomenological History and Historiography? 1 Metahistory: the Phenomenological Method Applied to Generational and Societal Patterns of Thought in the Arts and the Sciences 4 What is the Difference Between a Phenomenological “Metahistory” and Phenomenological History and Historiography that Focuses Primarily Upon the Individual? 9 Post-World War II and Contemporary Phenomenological History and Historiography 14 The Future of Phenomenological History and Historiography 16 Part I: Pre-Modern History of the Phenomenological Method of Discernment—Visual and Grammatical Chapter 1 Aristotle’s Visual and Verbal Phenomenology 19 Chapter 2 Aquinas and Dante: the Early Renaissance and its Furtherance of Verbal Phenomenology 27 Thomas Aquinas 27 Dante Alighieri (1265–1321) 31 Chapter 3 Giotto and the Furtherance of Visual Phenomenology 36 VI Contents Part II: Early Modern History through the Enlightenment and the Development of Visual and Verbal Phenomenological Discernment Chapter 4 Thomas Hobbes, Wilhelm Leibniz, and Johann Martin Chladenius and the Multiple Objectivities of Historical Thought 49 Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) 50 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) 57 Johann Martin Chladenius (1710–1759) 62 Chapter 5 Johann Heinrich Lambert and Visual Phenomenological Understanding 64 Chapter 6 Immanuel Kant Augmenting the Phenomenological Inheritance of Verbal and Visual Understanding 69 Chapter 7 Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx 76 Part III: Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Verbal and Visual Phenomenological Discernment Chapter 8 Franz Brentano and the Adventof Modern Phenomenology 83 Chapter 9 Edmund Husserl and Modern Phenomenology 87 Chapter 10 Wilhelm Dilthey and Generational Metahistory: Towards a Phenomenological Model 95 Chapter 11 Sigmund Freud and Carl Gustav Jung: The Phenomenology of the Spoken Word 100 Contents VII Chapter 12 Heinrich Wölfflin and a Metahistorical Phenomenological Approach to Visual History 105 Chapter 13 Wassily Kandinsky and the Non-Euclidean Geometry of the Visual Image: A Phenomenological Understanding 112 Point 114 Part IV: Mid-Twentieth into the Twenty-First Century: Further Foundations towards a Thorough Phenomenological History and Historiography Chapter 14 Andrew Paul Ushenko and Stephen C. Pepper: the Further Development of Verbal and Visual Phenomenology 121 Chapter 15 Hayden White’s Phenomenological Metahistorical and Metahistoriographical Writings 136 The Theory of Tropes 138 Chapter 16 David Carr’s Essays on Phenomenological History and Historiography 142 Chapter 17 Mark E. Blum’s Augmentations of Phenomenological Thought 154 Chapter 18 Kurt Lewin, Towards a Phenomenology of Interpersonal Activity and Mutual Understanding 172 VIII Contents Part V: Thorough Phenomenological Metahistory and Meta-Historiography in the Future: What is Needed Chapter 19 Grounding Metahistory and Meta-Historiography within a Phenomenologically-Based Interpersonal and Interdependent Comprehension 181 Conclusion 190 Bibliography 193 Index 199 Introduction The Genesis and History of Modern Phenomenological History and Historiography. An Overview 1 What is Phenomenology, and its Derivative Phenomenological History and Historiography? Phenomenologyisamethodofinquirythatseeksamorecertainunderstanding ofwhatoneattendsinjudgment.Thestrengthofphenomenologyasamethodof inquiry is its careful reflection upon what has been perceived or more formally judged verbally or visually. One can say it is additional attention to ordinary judgment.The phenomenological inquirer can spend hours reviewing through guided critical revisioning or re-reading what has been seen or recorded. The phenomenologistseekstodiscernthe“transcendental”logicalformthatguides the judgment of an individual.¹ To begin with the Husserlian phenomenologist isolates what phenomenon to be studied by fixing it as a reflective focus.This iscalledtheinitialepoché.Then,thereisanattendingtoeveryfeatureofthere- flected focus to comprehend its order and the significance of that order.This is calledthe eidetic reduction,discerning the ideation that has fixedthe attended focus as it is known to us in initial perception.Then, there is a raising of the whole in its complexity generated by the eidetic reduction to a concept, called byHusserlthe“transcendentalconcept,”asitsfindingswillguideothersuchor- ganizations of thought in future phenomenological investigations. What is sought is how the mind works and a more refined epistemology to increase our understandingof human judgment and consciousness.² ThismethodcanbetrackedtotheearlyhistoryofWesternthought.Whilea productof philosophicalthinking, itis evidentgradually in the methodological inquiry of all the arts and the sciences over the course of Western history.This See Edmund Husserl’s discussion of the “transcendental,” the prereflective cognitive form which guides an individual judgment. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations,Volume Two, trans.J.N.Findlay(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1970),594 596. SeeRobertSokolowskiforareviewofthisthreestepprocessinhisIntroductiontoPhenom enology(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),49,64fortheepoché,184fortheeidetic reduction,and58 59forthetranscendentalconcept.Hisgeneralintroductiontophenomenol ogyandthephenomenologicalattitudeofinquiryisalsoquitehelpful;seehisChapterFour“An InitialStatementonWhatPhenomenologyIs,”42 65. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110779424001 2 Introduction book will present the historyof this method as it developed incrementallyover the generations into the present,with a particular focus upon how the method has been employed for knowledge about historical events. The essential elements of reflective judgment that constitute what in the latercourseofitsdevelopmentwascalledphenomenology³are1)the“intention- ality” of the individual, a pre-reflective intent that guides action as well as the attention thatgives rise to it; and 2) the temporal duration of attention and ac- tionbytheindividualinwhatmightbecalledan“event.”Timeiscentraltophe- nomenology and its derivative phenomenological history as any judgment re- quires a certain duration of attention. Phenomenology can ascertain through observation of the initial judgment or judgments exactly what has been the se- quentialfocusofwhathasbeenattendedinitsdurationofjudgment.An“event” can be a manifold of manydurational moments of attention.The phenomenol- ogist or phenomenological historian observes both each judgement in its dura- tionalcharacterandthemanifoldofjudgmentsthatimplyan“event”withabe- ginning, middle, and end. Central to the temporality judged, indeed the final cause of the “lived experience” as Husserl puts it, is intentionality.What is in- tended in an act, or, even in the primary awareness in which one will act, is the intention of the person in that moment.The intentionalityof the individual whosepurposesengagehisorherunderstandingoftemporalitycombinetogive that individual a coherent logicof judgment.The “transcendental”understand- ingofthatpersonistodiscernthelogicalformwhichcarriesthetemporalvison and its intentional practice. Asonediscernshisownintentionalitythroughreflection,ortheintentional- ityofanotherthroughaninquiryintowhattranscendentalformofintentionand temporality guides that person’s judgment,we see history—albeit solely a per- sonalhistory.WewillseeinImmanuelKanthowonecanbetheinitialhistorian of even a personal history, and over time be the historiographer of one’s own judgments. Kant will provide a greater insight into the transcendental logic of Theterm“phenomenology”forthereflectiveinquirymethodwewilldatetothefifthcentury ofancientGreecedidnotcomeintotheformalconceptforthisinquirymethoduntiltheeight eenthcentury.TheLatinterm“Phenomenologia”wasintroducedbyChristophFriedrichOeting erin1736.Oetingerwasatheologianwhoinquiredintotheimmediatephenomenaofpercep tion. Indeed, focused,empirical studies of phenomena in the age of modernismcan be seen inDescartesandPascal.Subsequently,theGermanterm“Phänomenologia”wasusedbyJohann HeinrichLambert,afollowerofChristianWolff.Lambertwasamathematicianandphysicist, andinhisstudyofopticsheinvestigatedthedifferencebetweensubjectiveandobjectivepercep tion.Thisworkinhis1764NeuesOrganonwasreadbyImmanuelKant,whointurnusedthe term“phenomenology”inhisownphilosophicalwork.
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