Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency PDF
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Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency · · Jack Martin Jeff H. Sugarman Sarah Hickinbottom Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency 123 JackMartin JeffH.Sugarman SimonFraserUniversity SimonFraserUniversity DepartmentofPsychology Fac.Education 8888UniversityDrive 8888UniversityDrive BumabyBCV5A1S6 BumabyBCV5A1S6 Canada Canada [email protected] [email protected] SarahHickinbottom KwantlenPolytechnicUniversity DepartmentofLearningCommunities 12666-72ndAvenue SurreyBCV3W2MB Canada [email protected] ISBN978-1-4419-1064-6 e-ISBN978-1-4419-1065-3 DOI10.1007/978-1-4419-1065-3 SpringerNewYorkDordrechtHeidelbergLondon LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2009935338 ©SpringerScience+BusinessMedia,LLC2010 Allrightsreserved.Thisworkmaynotbetranslatedorcopiedinwholeorinpartwithoutthewritten permission of the publisher (Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 233 Spring Street, New York, NY10013,USA),exceptforbriefexcerptsinconnectionwithreviewsorscholarlyanalysis.Usein connectionwithanyformofinformationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware, orbysimilarordissimilarmethodologynowknownorhereafterdevelopedisforbidden. Theuseinthispublicationoftradenames,trademarks,servicemarks,andsimilarterms,eveniftheyare notidentifiedassuch,isnottobetakenasanexpressionofopinionastowhetherornottheyaresubject toproprietaryrights. Printedonacid-freepaper SpringerispartofSpringerScience+BusinessMedia(www.springer.com) Preface The discipline of psychology is primarily concerned with understanding human action and experience for the purpose of bettering the lives of persons both indi- viduallyandcollectively.However,forthemostpart,psychologistshavegivenlittle attention to the question of what a person is. Rather, in the attempt to achieve the precision and control of the natural sciences, much mainstream psychology, per- haps somewhat unreflectively, has adopted a materialist perspective that considers all psychological phenomena to be reducible to underlying biological and neuro- physicalsubstratesand/orcomputationalandpsychometricmodels.Thechallenge tothisviewinrecentyearslaunchedbysocialconstructionistthinkers(e.g.,Gergen, 1985;Shotter,1993),whorejectthenotionoffixed,essentialselvesinfavorofan interpretiveselfthatderivesmeaningfromthesocioculturalandhistoricaltraditions andpracticesinwhichitisembedded,overcomesmanyofthedifficultiesassociated withbiophysicalandcomputationalformsofreductionism.Yet,thisalternativemay benolessproblematic. Whenoneconsidersthattheabilitytomakechoicesandactonthesechoicesto impactone’sownlifeandthelivesofothersisthemostdistinctivefeatureofper- sonhood, it becomes clear that neither essentialist nor constructionist approaches provide an adequate account of psychological phenomena. From the essentialist view, our experience of selfhood and agency is illusory, reducible to biological foundations.Fromtheconstructionistview,ourexperienceofselfhoodandagency is merely a fiction, determined by cultural scripts that might have easily been otherwise. Either way, the reality of psychological phenomena is dismissed as reducible to underlying biological or sociocultural determinants. Consequently, it becomes questionable just what, if any, role psychology has to play in furthering understandingaboutthehumancondition. Thisvolumerepresentstheeffortsoftheoreticalandphilosophicalpsychologists JackMartinandJeffSugarman toresuscitateapsychology ofpersonhood. Martin and Sugarman retrieve ontological questions from obscurity with the aim of for- mulatingaviableconceptionofpersonsthatretainstheirmostdistinctivefeatures, andexploretheimplicationsoftheiraccountfordisciplinarypsychologyandother domains that call for adequate conceptions of personhood and selfhood. Persons, MartinandSugarmanargue,arisefrom,butareirreducibleto,theirbiologicaland socioculturalconstituents.Tosupportthisargument,MartinandSugarmanprovide v vi Preface a unique synthesis of philosophy and psychology in the form of a developmental accountofaselfwithbiologicalcapacitiesforprereflectivethoughtandactionthat is thrown into the world and, as it develops, appropriates the linguistic and rela- tional practices of the pre-existing sociocultural context to structure thought and transformitsmodeofbeingfromprereflectiveactortoreflective,intentionalagent. Suchgenuinepsychologicalbeingsrequireabiophysicalbody,butarenotreducible to it. They are shaped by the sociocultural practices in which they are embedded, buttheyarenotfullydeterminedbythem.Perhapsmoreimportantly,suchpsycho- logical agents are real in that they exert influence on their own lives and the lives ofothersandcancontributetoandchangethesocioculturaltraditionsandpractices withinwhichtheyemerge. The work is structured in three parts that reflect the progression of Martin and Sugarman’sthoughts.PartI,ATheoryofPersonsandSelvesforPsychology,intro- ducestheproblemthatinstigatedthiscorpusofworkandprovidesthereaderwitha detailedaccountofMartinandSugarman’sdevelopmentalontologyofpsychologi- calphenomena,aswellasanexplorationoftheimplicationsofthisperspectivefor politicalthought.PartII,HumanAgencyandtheIrreducibilityofPersons,offersa sustainedexaminationoftwoaspectsofMartinandSugarman’stheory.First,draw- ing on philosopher Charles Taylor’s claim that personhood consists in relation to moral goods and commitments, the ways in which Martin and Sugarman’s theory can clarify this relation and its implications for understanding moral agency are explored. The question of irreducibility is then tackled through systematic exami- nation of theories of emergence and the proposal of a “levels of reality” approach thatdemonstratespersonsarebothsubstantivelyandrelationallyemergentwithina biologicalandsocioculturalworld.Following thearticulationofthesetwoaspects ofMartinandSugarman’stheory,thesectionisbroughttoconclusionwithareview of the work of Scottish philosopher John Macmurray. This alternative, yet com- patible,developmentalconceptionofpersonsasirreducibleagentsemphasizesthe importance of action, rather than reflection, as the appropriate starting point for psychological theorizing. Such a position is shown to challenge nativist psycho- logical theories that view human relations as secondary to biology, developmental stages, psychological capacities, or social categories. In Part III, Perspectives, Selves, and Persons, the examination of the ways in which psychological theory andinquirymaybeinformedbyphilosophyisextendedthroughreviewingtheoret- ical accounts of perspective taking (e.g., those contained in the work of George Herbert Mead, William James, and others). It is suggested that the construal of self as perspectival has implications for the training of psychologists, understand- ing moral deliberation and moral problem solving, education, and developmental inquiry. ForthosefamiliarwithHeidegger’sontologyofbeing,Vygotsky’sdevelopmen- taltheory,Macmurray’sphilosophyofthepersonal,Mead’sfallibleperspectivism, or philosopher Charles Taylor’s claims about the moral nature of selfhood, these ideas will cover some familiar territory. What will be unique is the coherent syn- thesis of these disparate views into a viable ontological account for psychology. It is an argument that is at once philosophical and psychological. Moreover, it is Preface vii a perspective that demonstrates the rich possibilities that arise for psychological inquiry when theory is philosophically informed. The way in which this is done canbreathenewlifeintoadisciplinethathasbecomeoverlyfocusedontechnique, method, and formulaic accounts of human action and experience. The psychology endorsed here is an interpretive psychology that is cognizant of the emergent, yet irreducible,natureofpersons,selves,andagency.Followingthehermeneutictradi- tion,suchapsychologyacceptstheperspectivalnatureofunderstandingbutrejects the strongly relativistic conclusions that some have drawn from such acceptance. Thus, this approach will be of interest to those concerned about ethnocentrism in psychology and the need to develop approaches that are more appropriate to our increasinglyglobalizedworld.Suchapsychologyalsoinvolvesaradicalreconcep- tualization of theories of mind, behavior, morality, politics, and education. While readersmaynotagreewitheveryaspectofthisview,theyarecertaintocomeaway fromthisvolumewithafreshperspectiveonpsychologicalresearchandtheory,and theuniquecontributionspsychologycanmakeinattemptstobetterunderstandthe humancondition. Acknowledgements Someoftheideasexpressedinthisbookhavebeenarticulatedpreviously,although somewhatdifferentlybyJackMartinand/orJeffSugarmaninarticlesintheJournal fortheTheoryofSocialBehaviour(2003,2005),Theory&Psychology(2005),New Ideas in Psychology (2003), Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology (2006),andinchaptersinthevolumesBetweenchanceandchoice,editedbyHarald Atmanspacher and Robert Bishop (Imprints Academic, 2002), About psychology, edited by Darryl Hill and Michael Kral (SUNY press, 2003), Studies of how the mindpubliclyenfoldsintobeing,editedbyWilliamSmytheandAngelinaBaydala (SUNYPress,2004),andSociallifeandsocialknowledge,editedbyUlrichMuller, JeremyCarpendale,NancyBudwig,andBryanSokol(LawrenceErlbaum,2008). WethankImprintsAcademic,SUNYPress,LawrenceErlbaum,Wiley-Blackwell, Sage,Elsevier,andAPAJournalsforgenerouslygrantingpermissiontoreprintsome ofthisworkhere. ix Contents PartI ATheoryofPersonsandSelvesforPsychology 1 Introduction:TheProblemofSelvesandPersons inPsychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ABrief,SelectiveHistoryofPersonsandSelves . . . . . . . . . . 10 PlatotoLocke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 AfterLocke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Psychology’sHobbesianLegacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Hobbes’CompatibilistViewofHumanAgency . . . . . . . . . 20 ProblematicAspectsofPsychology’sHobbesianLegacy . . . . . 21 2 ATheoryofSelfandPersonhoodforPsychology. . . . . . . . . 27 ABriefConceptualizationofPersonhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 ADevelopmentalTheoryofSituated,AgentivePersonhood . . . . 28 OurDevelopmentalTheory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 SelfasaKindofUnderstandingthatDisclosesandExtends ParticularBeingWithinTraditionsofLiving . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Possible Challenges to Conceptualizing the Self asanUnderstanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 ImplicationsforUnderstandingHumanAgency . . . . . . . . . . . 40 ConcludingRemarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3 ThePoliticalDispositionofSelfasaKindofUnderstanding . . 45 LiberalandCommunitarianDispositionsofSelf . . . . . . . . . . 46 ThePoliticalDispositionofSelfasaKindofUnderstanding . . . . 50 PartII HumanAgencyandtheIrreducibilityofPersons 4 PersonsandMoralAgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Taylor’sCritiqueofNaturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 MoralOntology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 PersonhoodinQuestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Taylor’sMoralOntologyinQuestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 xi xii Contents PersonsandMoralAgency:APsychologicalPerspective . . . . . . 67 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 5 EmergentPersons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 ExamplesandClaimsofRecentEmergentistTheorizing inPsychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 SharedandDisputedClaims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 AnEmergentOntologyofPersons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 ReductionismVersusEmergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Additional Assumptions Concerning the Emergence ofPsychologicalPersons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 LevelsofReality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Phylogenesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Ontogenesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 ConcludingComment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 6 JohnMacmurray’sPhilosophyofthePersonal andtheIrreducibilityofPersons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 HumanAgencyandtheFormofthePersonal . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 HumanRelationsandtheFormofthePersonal . . . . . . . . . . . 90 ImplicationsforaPsychologyofthePersonal . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 PartIII Perspectives,Selves,andPersons 7 RealPerspectivalSelves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 AgainstStrongNaturalismandtheIllusorySelf . . . . . . . . . . . 104 AgainstStrongConstructionismandtheFictionalSelf . . . . . . . 106 ThePerspectivalSelf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 TheDevelopmentalEmergenceofthePerspectivalSelf . . . . . . . 111 WhatisReal? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 8 Perspectival Selves in Interaction with Others: Re-readingG.H.Mead’sSocialPsychology . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Mead’sTheoryofPerspectives:SocialityandAgentiveSelfhood . . 119 Mead’sDialecticofSelfandOther . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 EngagementwithOthers:ANeo-MeadianPerspective . . . . . . 127 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 9 PerspectivesandPersons:Ontological,Constitutive Possibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 PerspectiveTaking,Perspectives,andPersons . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 PerspectivesandPersons:ASelectionofExtantFormulations . . . 143 Practices,Perspectives,andPersons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 Some Possibilities for the Study and Promotion ofPerspectiveTaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
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