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Persons: Theories and Perceptions PDF

130 Pages·1973·4.695 MB·English
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PERSONS: Theories and Perceptions e u g a H e h T s. ui h s urit a M y Willem van Haecht oyal Picture Gallery. Maurits van Nassau" b R n The Studio of Apelles' f the Collection of the pyright "Stichting Joha ' o o y C s e urt o C y b d e c u d o pr e R DESIREE PARK Persons: Theories and Perceptions SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V. 1973 © 1973 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands in 1973 Al/ rights reserved, inc/uding the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereo/ in any /orm ISBN 978-94-015-0286-3 ISBN 978-94-015-0811-7 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-0811-7 To Freddie Ayer PREFACE This volume grew out of a dissatisfaction with some issues that seem to be rooted in the Empiricist tradition. At least since Locke, that which is perceived has enjoyed a major share in any systematic account of what we claim to know. A main purpose of this study therefore is first to distinguish, and subsequently to relate, what can be perceived and what can be under stood. To this end, the account of persons and personal identity begins with a description of selected types of sense perceptions. While writing a good part of the discussion on vision, I had the advantage of questioning Dr. P. B. Loder about the properties of light. She not only clarified some issues, but prevented several errors from creeping into the text, a result for which I am very grateful. I should like also to express my appreciation to Mrs. G. K. Stamm-Okkinga, who provided hospitality and a friendly interest from the beginning of this study. Finally I wish to thank Miss I. Ris and Mr. W. de Regt for their careful and resourceful preparation of the typescript. Scheveningen December 1972 TABLE OF CONTENTS page PREFACE 5 INTRODUCTION 9 CHAPTER I. VISUAL PERCEPTION AND ITS LIMITS II Descriptions proper to sight 13 Ideas and inferences 13 Surfaces and perceivers 29 CHAPTER II. NOT SIGHTS AND NOT SOUNDS 32 Sight 35 Hearing 41 Theory 46 Visible spectrum and scales 49 Description of visible spectrum and musical score 52 Shape 54 Coloring 55 Two examples of applied theory 58 CHAPTER III. IDEAS AND OBJECTS 62 Perspective and objects 63 Bodies 66 Persistence and range of ideas 71 Perspective and interpretation 73 CHAPTER IV. PERSONS Credited beliefs or convictions Ideas and credited beliefs Persons and continuity Personal history CHAPTER V. PERSONS AND CONTINUITY 93 Brown and Robinson 93 Some practical problems of Brownson 97 Descriptions and assertions in the pursuit of Brownson 98 "Quality space" and perception 106 Identity and similarity 112 CHAPTER VI. IMAGINATION AND EXPLANATION 115 Ideas and hypotheses 115 "Standardised percepts" 117 Imagination 120 Perspectives 123 APPENDIX 128 INDEX 129 INTRODUCTION The first requirement that must be met in any discussion of identity and perception is that of making clear the point at which theory enters the account. In the broadly empiricist tradition since Locke, there has arisen a further demand that sense experience be taken seriously, even at the cost of undermining cherished and otherwise blameless theoretical systems. I have argued elsewherel that, honoring this approach, Berkeley left unanswered a number of awkward questions in his own system of concepts. At the same time however, he made several peculiarly telling distinctions between theories and the evidence about which theories are constructed. In developing some main issues of personal identity we shall take up these distinctions, and use them to separate what is sensed from our ordinary statements about sensa tions, as well as the logical sequences of these assertions. Accordingly we shall discuss, in turn, the concepts of perception itself, objects, bodies, persons and the theories of continuity advanced to identify individual persons. We shall examine too some related issues, including attitudes, beliefs and the different kinds of perspectives inherent in giving a description of the external world. Having used these concepts to outline a theory of persons, we shall then conclude by rehearsing the types of asser tions we, or anyone else, should be inclined to make, and the rOle of values underlying whatever we should finally come to maintain. 1 Vide Complementary Notions (The Hague, 1972). CHAPTER I VISUAL PERCEPTION AND ITS LIMITS The seen is flat. This claim has neither passed unchallenged nor, in my view, been accorded the fullest exposition in the accounts of its most serious critics. In the course of this chapter I hope to make the issues plainer, both by showing that the statement is a true one, and that it offers a useful vantage point for making other type& of observations. In his Essay towards a New Theory of Vision Berkeley argued that visual sensations occur in two spatial dimensions only, and therefore that any suggestion of a visual prospect having depth, as well as length and breadth, is an inference drawn from some other kind of sense experience. He went on, in the Principles, to separate visual space from tangible space and so was able to offer a reasoned solution to the then current "Molyneux Problem". Locke too provided a solution, or rather hit on the correct answer. But as one examines their respective arguments it is clear that their reasons are incompatible with one another. In a journal article on the Molyneux Prob lem, I have indicated these differences at some length, and compared the original version with the printed one. 1 Our interest here is to examine some concepts which underlay Berkeley's account. Replying to Molyneux's question, Berkeley argued from a distinction between what is literally perceived by the senses, or imagined, or remembered 1 "Locke and Berkeley on 'The Molyneux Problem'''. Journal of the History of Ideas. no. 2. 1969. This was the case of the man who was born blind and suddenly regained his sight. The Question then was whether he could visually distinguish a sphere from a cube, both of which he knew by touch. but before having a further opportunity to touch them. The versions of the problem vary; the original letter from Molyneux to Locke. headed "Dublin JulY.7.88" was the following: "A Man. being born blind, and having a Globe and a Cube, nigh of the same bignes sic. Committed into his Hands. and being taught or Told. which is Called the Globe. and which the Cube. so as easily to distinguish them by his Touch or Feeling; Then both being taken from Him. and Laid on a Table. Let us Suppose his Sight Restored to Him; Whether he could. by his sight. and before he touch them, know which is the Globe and which the Cube? Or Whether he could know by his sight. before he stretched out his Hand. whether he could not Reach them. tho they were Removed 20 or 1000 feet from Him?" (Bodleian Library: MS Locke c. 16. fol. 92r).

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