Persons: Theories and Perceptions

130 Pages·1973·4.695 MB·English

by  Désirée Park (auth.)

PERSONS:
Theories and Perceptions
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DESIREE PARK
Persons:
Theories and Perceptions
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
1973
© 1973 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands in 1973
Al/ rights reserved, inc/uding the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereo/ in any /orm
ISBN 978-94-015-0286-3 ISBN 978-94-015-0811-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-0811-7
To Freddie Ayer
PREFACE
This volume grew out of a dissatisfaction with some issues that seem
to be rooted in the Empiricist tradition. At least since Locke, that which is
perceived has enjoyed a major share in any systematic account of what we
claim to know. A main purpose of this study therefore is first to distinguish,
and subsequently to relate, what can be perceived and what can be under
stood. To this end, the account of persons and personal identity begins with
a description of selected types of sense perceptions.
While writing a good part of the discussion on vision, I had the advantage
of questioning Dr. P. B. Loder about the properties of light. She not only
clarified some issues, but prevented several errors from creeping into the text,
a result for which I am very grateful. I should like also to express my
appreciation to Mrs. G. K. Stamm-Okkinga, who provided hospitality and
a friendly interest from the beginning of this study.
Finally I wish to thank Miss I. Ris and Mr. W. de Regt for their careful
and resourceful preparation of the typescript.
Scheveningen
December 1972
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
PREFACE 5
INTRODUCTION 9
CHAPTER I. VISUAL PERCEPTION AND ITS LIMITS II
Descriptions proper to sight 13
Ideas and inferences 13
Surfaces and perceivers 29
CHAPTER II. NOT SIGHTS AND NOT SOUNDS 32
Sight 35
Hearing 41
Theory 46
Visible spectrum and scales 49
Description of visible spectrum and musical score 52
Shape 54
Coloring 55
Two examples of applied theory 58
CHAPTER III. IDEAS AND OBJECTS 62
Perspective and objects 63
Bodies 66
Persistence and range of ideas 71
Perspective and interpretation 73
CHAPTER IV. PERSONS
Credited beliefs or convictions
Ideas and credited beliefs
Persons and continuity
Personal history
CHAPTER V. PERSONS AND CONTINUITY 93
Brown and Robinson 93
Some practical problems of Brownson 97
Descriptions and assertions in the pursuit of Brownson 98
"Quality space" and perception 106
Identity and similarity 112
CHAPTER VI. IMAGINATION AND EXPLANATION 115
Ideas and hypotheses
115
"Standardised percepts" 117
Imagination 120
Perspectives
123
APPENDIX 128
INDEX 129
INTRODUCTION
The first requirement that must be met in any discussion of identity and
perception is that of making clear the point at which theory enters the
account. In the broadly empiricist tradition since Locke, there has arisen a
further demand that sense experience be taken seriously, even at the cost of
undermining cherished and otherwise blameless theoretical systems. I have
argued elsewherel that, honoring this approach, Berkeley left unanswered a
number of awkward questions in his own system of concepts. At the same
time however, he made several peculiarly telling distinctions between theories
and the evidence about which theories are constructed. In developing some
main issues of personal identity we shall take up these distinctions, and use
them to separate what is sensed from our ordinary statements about sensa
tions, as well as the logical sequences of these assertions.
Accordingly we shall discuss, in turn, the concepts of perception itself,
objects, bodies, persons and the theories of continuity advanced to identify
individual persons. We shall examine too some related issues, including
attitudes, beliefs and the different kinds of perspectives inherent in giving a
description of the external world. Having used these concepts to outline a
theory of persons, we shall then conclude by rehearsing the types of asser
tions we, or anyone else, should be inclined to make, and the rOle of values
underlying whatever we should finally come to maintain.
1 Vide Complementary Notions (The Hague, 1972).
CHAPTER I
VISUAL PERCEPTION AND ITS LIMITS
The seen is flat. This claim has neither passed unchallenged nor, in my
view, been accorded the fullest exposition in the accounts of its most serious
critics. In the course of this chapter I hope to make the issues plainer, both
by showing that the statement is a true one, and that it offers a useful
vantage point for making other type& of observations.
In his Essay towards a New Theory of Vision Berkeley argued that visual
sensations occur in two spatial dimensions only, and therefore that any
suggestion of a visual prospect having depth, as well as length and breadth,
is an inference drawn from some other kind of sense experience. He went on,
in the Principles, to separate visual space from tangible space and so was
able to offer a reasoned solution to the then current "Molyneux Problem".
Locke too provided a solution, or rather hit on the correct answer. But as
one examines their respective arguments it is clear that their reasons are
incompatible with one another. In a journal article on the Molyneux Prob
lem, I have indicated these differences at some length, and compared the
original version with the printed one. 1 Our interest here is to examine some
concepts which underlay Berkeley's account.
Replying to Molyneux's question, Berkeley argued from a distinction
between what is literally perceived by the senses, or imagined, or remembered
1 "Locke and Berkeley on 'The Molyneux Problem'''. Journal of the History of Ideas. no. 2.
1969. This was the case of the man who was born blind and suddenly regained his sight. The
Question then was whether he could visually distinguish a sphere from a cube, both of which he
knew by touch. but before having a further opportunity to touch them. The versions of the
problem vary; the original letter from Molyneux to Locke. headed "Dublin JulY.7.88" was the
following:
"A Man. being born blind, and having a Globe and a Cube, nigh of the same bignes sic.
Committed into his Hands. and being taught or Told. which is Called the Globe. and which the
Cube. so as easily to distinguish them by his Touch or Feeling; Then both being taken from
Him. and Laid on a Table. Let us Suppose his Sight Restored to Him; Whether he could. by
his sight. and before he touch them, know which is the Globe and which the Cube? Or Whether
he could know by his sight. before he stretched out his Hand. whether he could not Reach
them. tho they were Removed 20 or 1000 feet from Him?"
(Bodleian Library: MS Locke c. 16. fol. 92r).